# ELLIPTIC CURVES SUITABLE FOR PAIRING BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY

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ABSTRACT. We give a method for constructing ordinary elliptic curves over finite prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$  with small security parameter k with respect to a prime  $\ell$  dividing the group order  $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  such that  $p \ll \ell^2$ .

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Over the last few years there has been an increasing interest in pairing based cryptography. The primitives of pairing based crypto systems are two groups (G, \*) and  $(H, \circ)$  in which the discrete logarithm problem is believed to be hard. Moreover, we require the existence of an efficiently computable, non-degenerate pairing  $G \times G \to H$ . This additional structure allows many interesting protocols for all kind of different applications [5, 7, 11, 14].

Well known examples of such a pairing are the Weil and the Tate pairing on an elliptic curve. Here, G is the group of points on an elliptic curve defined over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  and H is equal to the multiplicative group of a field extension  $\mathbb{F}_{q^k}^*$ .

**Definition 1.1.** Let E be an elliptic curve defined over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  whose group order  $\#E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  is divisible by a prime  $\ell$ . Then E has security parameter k if k is the smallest integer such that  $\ell$  divides  $q^k - 1$ .

If E has security parameter k > 1 with respect to  $\ell$ , the Weil pairing  $e_{\ell}$  defines a non-degenerate pairing from the group of  $\ell$ - torsion points in  $E(\mathbb{F}_{q^k}^*)$  into  $\mathbb{F}_{q^k}^*$ . It can be evaluated in  $\mathcal{O}(k^2 \log^3 q)$  bit operations. Supersingular elliptic curves have security parameter less than or equal to 6 [9, 13].

It is an interesting question whether there exist suitable elliptic curves with  $k \ge 7$ . Obviously, they can not be supersingular. But ordinary elliptic curves with such a small security parameter are very rare [2]. We are left with the problem to construct ordinary curves with relatively small security parameter (see e.g. [5, 8]).

Let E be an ordinary elliptic curve defined over a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  and let  $\ell$  be a prime dividing the group order  $\#E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  such that E has security parameter k with respect to  $\ell$ . We have

(1)  $\#E(\mathbb{F}_q) = q + 1 - t \equiv 0 \mod \ell$  and

(2) 
$$q^k - 1 \equiv 0 \mod \ell.$$

Inserting equation (2) in (1) shows that (t-1) must be a kth root of unity modulo  $\ell$ . On the other hand, if E is an elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  satisfying equation (1) and  $t = \zeta_k + 1 \mod \ell$  for some primitive kth roots of unity modulo  $\ell$ , E has security parameter k with respect to  $\ell$ . This fact has first been discovered by Cocks and Pinch [6].

Since E is ordinary, it has complex multiplication by some order  $\mathcal{O}$  of discriminant

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dividing  $t^2 - 4q$  in an imaginary quadratic field  $K = \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{D})$ . Set

$$d = \begin{cases} \frac{D}{4} & \text{if } D \equiv 0 \mod 4\\ D & \text{else.} \end{cases}$$

The Frobenius element  $\pi_q : (x, y) \to (x^q, y^q)$  corresponds to an element  $w = \frac{a+b\sqrt{D}}{2} \in \mathcal{O}$  such that  $\operatorname{Norm}_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(w) = w\overline{w} = q$ . We have t = a.

This observation leads to a simple algorithm. Given an imaginary quadratic field  $K = \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{D})$ . Take a prime  $\ell$  with the properties that  $\ell$  splits in  $\mathcal{O}_K$  and  $\ell \equiv 1 \mod k$  and determine a kth root of unity  $\zeta_k \mod \ell$ . Set  $a = \zeta_k + 1 \mod \ell$  and  $b = \pm \frac{a-2}{\delta} \mod \ell$  where  $\delta$  is a square root of  $d \mod \ell$ . Finally test whether  $\operatorname{Norm}_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(w)$  is a prime p (or a prime power q). We find the corresponding elliptic curve defined over  $\mathbb{F}_p$  (or  $\mathbb{F}_q$ ) using the complex multiplication method (for the CM method see e.g. [1]).

The correctness of this method can easily be seen by the following lemma which summarizes the discussion above.

**Lemma 1.2.** Let  $E/\mathbb{F}_q$  be an elliptic curve with complex multiplication by an order  $\mathcal{O}$  in  $\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{D})$  such that the Frobenius endomorphism corresponds to the imaginary quadratic integer  $w = \frac{a+b\sqrt{D}}{2}$  with a, b constructed as above. Then  $\#E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  is divisibly by  $\ell$  and has security parameter k with respect to  $\ell$ .

*Proof.* By the choice of b, we find

$$#E(\mathbb{F}_q) = \operatorname{Norm}_{\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{D})/\mathbb{Q}}(w-1) = \frac{1}{4}((a-2)^2 - Db^2) \equiv 0 \mod \ell.$$

Since the trace t of  $\pi_q$  is equal to  $a = \zeta_k + 1 \mod \ell$ , the security parameter of E with respect to  $\ell$  is equal to k.

Note that the case that  $\operatorname{Norm}_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(w)$  is not a prime but a prime power is very unlikely. Hence in the following we only consider the case where  $\operatorname{Norm}_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(w)$  is prime.

The values a and b are solutions of equations modulo  $\ell$ . Hence, they will in general be of size  $O(\ell)$  leading to a prime of size  $O(\ell^2)$ . Desirable would be to have p of size  $O(\ell)$ .

It is still an open question to find an algorithm for the construction of ordinary elliptic curves with arbitrary security parameter k where p is significantly smaller than  $\ell$ . Barreto, Lynn and Scott describe a method to derive a better relation between p and  $\ell$  for the case where k is divisible by 3 [5]. In this paper we extend their idea using the fact described above to get more examples of curves with  $p \ll \ell^2$ . Moreover we find examples where  $\ell$  is a prime of low Hamming weight with respect to the basis 2. For such primes, the Weil resp. Tate pairing can efficiently be evaluated [4, 10].

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The necessary computations were done using Magma (http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/magma/).

### 2. The main idea

We explain the main idea in the case where D is odd. Note that it can easily be modified for  $D \equiv 0 \mod 4$ .

Given k and a discriminant D < 0 which is not too large. We can consider the number field  $M(\zeta_n, D)$ . Suppose  $M \simeq \mathbb{Q}[x]/(f(x))$  where f is a irreducible polynomial of degree d where d = 2n or n depending on whether  $\sqrt{D} \subseteq \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_n)$  or not.

Moreover we require that f represents primes.

Every element in M can be represented by a polynomial of degree  $\leq d-1$ . We can compute the polynomials  $g_1, \ldots, g_{\varphi(k)}$  which represent the primitive kth roots of unity. Let  $h_1, -h_1$  be the polynomials which represent  $\sqrt{D}$ . Suppose that  $g_i$  and  $h_i$  lie in  $\mathbb{Z}[x]$ .

We now set

$$a(x) = (g_i(x) + 1)$$

and

$$b'(x) = (a(x) - 2)h_j(x) \text{in } \mathbb{Q}[x]/(f(x))$$

for some i, j.

We test if there exists some congruence class  $x_0 \mod (-D)$  such that  $b'(x_0) \equiv 0 \mod (-D)$ . For all  $x_1, x_0 \equiv x_1 \mod (-D), b'(x_1)/D$  will be in  $\mathbb{Z}$ . We can now define

$$p(x) = \frac{1}{4}(a(x)^2 - \frac{b'(x)^2}{D}).$$

Now suppose the following conditions are satisfied:

- p(x) is irreducible,
- p(x) has integer values for  $x_0 \mod (-D)$  and
- $f(Dy + x_0) \in \mathbb{Z}[y]$  is irreducible.

We can then try to find primes  $\ell = f(x_1)$  for some  $x_1 \equiv x_0 \mod D$  and test whether  $p(x_1)$  is prime as well.

We easily check that if  $a(x_1)$ ,  $b'(x_1)$  are constructed as above, there exists an elliptic curve over the prime field  $\mathbb{F}_{p(x_1)}$  with complex multiplication by the maximal order  $\mathcal{O}_K$  in  $\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{D})$  such that the Frobenius endomorphism of E corresponds to the element

$$\frac{a(x_1) \pm \frac{b'(x_1)}{D}\sqrt{D}}{2} \in \mathcal{O}_K.$$

The order  $#E(\mathbb{F}_{p(x_1)})$  is equal to

$$\frac{(a(x_1)-2)^2 - \frac{b'(x_1)^2}{D}}{2}$$

and will by construction be divisible by  $\ell$ .

The degrees of a(x) and b'(x) are less than equal to  $\deg(f) - 1 = d - 1$ . Hence,  $\ell$  will be of size  $O(x_1^d)$  and p of size  $O(x_1^{2d-2})$  which is significantly smaller than  $O(\ell^2)$ . In special cases, the relation between  $\ell$  and p will be even better.

Note that the assumption that a(x) and  $b'(x) \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$  is very strong since only few number fields M have a power integer basis.

### 3. A better relation between $\ell$ and p

We demonstrate our idea presenting several examples. The first example has already been considered in [3]. It can easily be deduced from our general approach. In all our examples, the number field  $M = \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{D}, \zeta_n)$  is a cyclotomic field and therefore has a power integer basis.

1. Let  $M = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_9)$  and  $K = \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-3})$ . The 9th cyclotomic polynomial is given by  $x^6 + x^3 + 1$ . Suppose  $\ell = x_0^6 + x_0^3 + 1$  for some integer  $x_0$  and let D = -3. We would like to construct a suitable Frobenius element  $\frac{a+b\sqrt{-3}}{2}$ . The element a has to be equal to  $\zeta_9 + 1$  where  $\zeta_9$  is a ninth root of unity. We set  $a = x_0 + 1$ . Moreover b should be equal to

$$\frac{\pm(a-2)}{\sqrt{-3}} = \frac{\pm\sqrt{-3}(a-2)}{3} = \frac{(x_0-1)(2x_0^3+1)}{3}.$$

We now choose  $x_0 \equiv 1 \mod 3$ . Then  $a \equiv b \mod 2$  and  $p = \operatorname{Norm}_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\frac{a+b\sqrt{-3}}{2})$  is of size  $O(\ell^{\frac{4}{3}})$ .

2. Let  $M = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_{10}, \sqrt{-1})$  and  $K = \mathbb{Q}(i)$ . The number field M is generated by the polynomial  $x^8 - x^6 + x^4 - x^2 + 1$ . The primitive 10th roots of unity are represented by the polynomials

$$x^2, -x^4, -x^6 + x^4 - x^2 + 1, x^6$$

and the roots of -1 are given by the polynomials  $\pm x^5$ . Suppose that  $\ell$  is equal to  $x_0^8 - x_0^6 + x_0^4 - x_0^2 + 1$  for some integer  $x_0$ . Set  $a = (-x_0^6 + x_0^4 - x_0^2 + 2)$ . Then b should be equal to

$$\frac{\pm (a-2)}{\sqrt{-1}} = \frac{\pm (-x_0^6 + x_0^4 - x_0^2)}{x_0^5} \equiv \pm (-x_0^5 + x_0^3) \mod \ell.$$

We have to ensure that  $\operatorname{Norm}_{K/\mathbb{Q}}(\frac{a+b\sqrt{-1}}{2})$  is prime. We see that p is of order  $O(\ell^{\frac{3}{2}})$ .

3.  $M = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_{60})$ . This field is generated by  $f(x) = x^{16} + x^{14} - x^{10} - x^8 - x^6 + x^2 + 1$ . We consider the cases k = 10, k = 12, k = 15, k = 20, k = 30 and k = 60 and D = -3.

We see that discriminant D = -1 is not possible because for all choice of a(x) and b'(x) there exist no  $x_1$  such that  $a_1(x_1) = b'(x_1) \equiv 0 \mod 2$ . For D = -3 we collect from each case an example where the relation between p and  $\ell$  is particularly good.

- (a) **k=10:** Thre exists no  $x_1$  such that  $b'_1(x_0) \equiv 0 \mod 3$ .
- (b) **k=12:** Set  $a = -x^5 + 1$  and  $b = 2x^{15} + 2x^{10} x^5 1$ . Take  $x \equiv 2 \mod 3$ .
- (c)  $\mathbf{k} = 15$ : Set  $a = x^8 + 1$ ,  $b = -2x^{14} + 2x^{12} + 2x^{10} + x^8 + 2x^6 + 2x^4 3$ . More examples are given by  $a = x^{14} x^{10} x^8 + x^2 + 1$ ,  $b = x^{14} + x^{10} x^8 2x^6 + x^2$  and  $a = x^{14} + x^{12} x^8 x^6 x^4 + 2$ ,  $b = x^{14} + x^{12} + 2x^{10} + x^8 x^6 x^4$ . Take  $x \equiv 1 \mod 3$ .
- (d) **k=20:** One possible solution is given by  $a = -x^{11} + x + 1$  and  $b = x^{11} 2x^{10} + x + 1$ . Another possibity is  $a = x^{11} x + 1$  and  $b = x^{11} + 2x^{10} + x 1$ . The element x has to be chosen  $\equiv 1 \mod 3$ .
- (e) **k=30:** One possible solution is given by  $a = x^{12} x^2 + 1$  and  $x^{12} + 2x^{10} + x^2 1$ . The element x has to be chosen  $\equiv 1 \mod 3$ .
- (f) **k=60:** Set e.g. a = -x + 1 and  $b = 2x^{11} + 2x^{10} x 1$  where  $x \equiv 2 \mod 3$ .
- 4. Let q be a prime. Consider  $M = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_q, i)$  and k = q. In this case the minimal polynomial is given by

$$f(x) = x^{2q-2} - x^{2q-4} + x^{2q-6} - x^{2q-8} + \dots + 1.$$

Note that  $f(x)(x^2+1) = x^{2q}+1$ . Hence  $x^{2q} = -1 \mod f(x)$ , i.e. the element  $\sqrt{-1}$  corresponds to  $\pm x^q \mod f(x)$ .

Moreover we have  $x^2$  is a primitive 2*q*th root of unity, i.e.  $-x^2$  is a *q*th root of unity. We can set  $a = -x^2 + 1$  and  $b = (-x^2 - 1)x^q = -x^{q+2} - x^q$ . The relation  $\frac{\log(p)}{\log(\ell)}$  is approximately  $\frac{q+2}{q-1}$ .

5. Let q be a prime. Consider  $M = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_q, \zeta_3)$  and k = q. In this case the minimal polynomial is given by

$$f(x) = \frac{x^{2q} - x^q + 1}{x^2 - x + 1}.$$

We have  $f(x)(x^3+1)\Phi(2q) = x^{3q}+1$  and  $f(x)(x^2-x+1) = x^{2q}-x^q+1$ . As above we see that  $-x^3$  is a *q*th root of unity. We can choose  $a = -x^3+1$ . Now  $(2x^q-1)^2+3=4(x^{2q}-x^q+1)\equiv 0 \mod f(x)$ . So  $(2x^q-1)$  corresponds

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to the element  $\sqrt{-3}$  and we set  $b = (-x^3 - 1)(2x^q + 1)$ . The relation  $\frac{\log(p)}{\log(\ell)}$  is approximately  $\frac{q+3}{q-1}$ .

## 4. Cryptographically interesting examples

4.1. Curves with low Hamming weight. Pairing based cryptography is very efficient if the prime  $\ell$  is a prime of low signed Hamming weight (see [4, 10]). For the signed Hamming weight we allow the coefficients of the binary expansion to be -1, 0, 1.

Using the method in section 2 we find some particularly nice examples. To find these examples we run through all cylcotomic fields with discriminant divisible by 3 or 4. For each field, we determine the minimal polynomial f(x) and test whether  $f(x_0)$  is prime for some  $x_0$  of low Hamming weight, say  $x_0 = 2^i$ ,  $x_0 = 2^i \pm 2^k$  or  $x_0 = 3^i$ . Next we choose a discriminant D = -3, -4, compute the corresponding polynomials a(x) and b'(x) and test whether  $\frac{a(x_0)^2 - D(b(x_0)'/D)^2}{4}$  is prime, too.

1. Take  $M = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_{15}), k = 15$  and the imaginary quadratic field of discriminant D = -3.

Let  $x_0 = 2^{32} + 1$  and  $\ell = \Phi_{15}(x_0)$ . The prime  $\ell$  has 257 binary digits and signed Hamming weight 17. Set  $a = x_0^4 + 1$  and  $b = 2x_0^7 - 2x_0^6 - 2x_0^5 + x_0^4 - 2x_0^3 + 2x_0^2 - 3$ . The prime p is given by  $\frac{1}{4}(a^2 + 3(\frac{b}{3})^2)$ . It is of order  $O(\ell^{\frac{7}{4}})$ . 2. Take  $M = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_{20}), k = 10$  and the imaginary quadratic field of discriminant

D = -1.

Let  $x_0 = 2^{23} + 1$  and  $\ell = \Phi_{20}(x_0)$ . We have  $\lfloor \log_2(\ell) \rfloor \sim 184$  and  $\ell$  has signed Hamming weight 17. Set  $a = x_0^2 + 1$  and  $b = x_0^7 - x_0^5$ . The prime  $p = \frac{1}{4}(a^2 + b^2)$ is of order  $O(\ell^{\frac{7}{4}})$ 

3. Take  $M = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_{48}), k = 24$  and the imaginary quadratic field of discriminant D = -3.

Let  $x_0 = 2^{12} + 2$  and  $\ell = \Phi_{48}(x_0)$ . The prime  $\ell$  has 185 binary digits and signed Hamming weight 24. Set  $a = x_0^2 + 1$  and  $b = -2x_0^{10} + 2x_0^8 + x_0^2 - 1$ . The prime p is of order  $O(\ell^{\frac{3}{4}})$ .

The prime *p* is of order  $O(e^{1})$ . The prime *p* is given by  $\frac{1}{4}(a^2 + 3(\frac{b}{3})^2)$ . 4. Take  $M = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_{12}), k = 12$  and the imaginary quadratic field D = -3. Let  $x_0 = 2^{39} + 2^{11} + 2^{10}$  and  $\ell = \Phi_{12}(x_0)$ . Then  $\ell$  has 157 binary digits and signed Hamming weight 21. Set  $a = -x_0^3 + x_0 + 1$  and  $x_0^3 - 2 * x_0^2 + x_0 + 1$ . The prime p is of order  $O(\ell^{\frac{3}{2}})$ .

4.2. Curves with fast addition chain. There exist natural numbers whose Hamming weight is not particularly small but which still allow a fast scalar multiplication.

Lemma 4.1. Let P be a point on an elliptic curve and let

$$m = 2^{j_1} \pm 2^{j_2} \pm 2^{j_3}$$

where  $0 \leq j_3 < j_2 < j_1$ . Then mP can be computed with  $j_1$  doublings and two additions/subtractions.

Note that a subtraction has the same complexity as an addition, since taking the additive inverse on an elliptic curve is a free operation.

*Proof.* Set  $Q_1 = 2^{j_3}P$ ,  $Q_2 = 2^{j_2-j_3}Q_1$  and  $Q_3 = 2^{j_1-j_2}Q_2$ . We need  $j_1$  doublings to compute  $Q_1$ ,  $Q_2$  and  $Q_3$  and 2 additions/subtractions to compute  $Q_3 \pm Q_2 \pm Q_1$ .

We can now consider the values of certain cyclotomic polynomials at m given as above.

**Corollary 4.2.** Let f be a polynomial of degree s with coefficients in  $\{0, \pm 1\}$  and t non-zero coefficients. Then f(m) with m given as in Lemma 4.1 can be evaluted with  $sj_1$  doublings and 2s + t - 1 additions/subtractions.

For the proof we just count the number of operations.

**Example 4.3.** 1. Take  $m = 2^{22} + 2^{13} + 1$  and consider  $M = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_{24})$  with k = 8. We have  $\Phi_{24} = x^8 - x^4 + 1$  and we realize  $\ell = \Phi_{24}(m)$  and we can calculate  $\ell P$  with only  $8 \cdot 22 = 176$  doublings and 18 additions. Note that the signed Hamming weight of  $\Phi_{24}(m)$  is larger than 30.

We have  $\lfloor \log_2(\ell) \rfloor \sim 176$ . Set  $a = x_0^5 - x_0 + 1$  and  $b = x_0^5 + 2x_0^4 + x_0 - 1$ . The prime p is of order  $O(\ell^{\frac{5}{4}})$ .

Alternatively, we can take  $m = 2^{23} + 2^{17} + 2^6$ . In this case, the evaluation takes  $8 \cdot 23 = 184$  doublings and 18 additions. We set  $a = -x_0^5 + x_0 + 1$  and  $b = -x_0^5 + 2x_0^4 - x_0 - 1$ . The prime is of order  $O(\ell^{\frac{5}{4}})$ .

 $b = -x_0^5 + 2x_0^4 - x_0 - 1$ . The prime is of order  $O(\ell^{\frac{5}{4}})$ . Or we take  $m = 2^{22} - 2^{10} - 2^4$  and  $-x_0^5 + x_0 + 1$  and  $b = -x_0^5 + 2x_0^4 - x_0 - 1$ . In all three cases, we find an elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{F}_p$  with  $p = \frac{1}{4} \left(a^2 + 3(\frac{b}{3})^2\right)$  with complex multiplication by  $\mathbb{Z}[\zeta_3]$ .

2. Take  $\Phi_{20}(x) = x^8 - x^6 + x^4 - x^2 + 1$  and  $m = 2^{20} + 2^{14} + 4$ . Then  $\ell = \Phi_{20}(m)$  can be computed using 160 doublings and 20 additions. Let k = 10 and set  $a = -x_0^6 + x_0^4 - x_0^2 + 2$  and  $b = 2x_0^5 - 2x_0^3$ . We find an elliptic curve with complex multiplication by  $\mathbb{Z}[i]$  over  $\mathbb{F}_p$  with  $p = \frac{1}{4}(a^2 + b^2)$ 

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