One-Way Signature Chaining - A New Paradigm For Group Cryptosystems

Amitabh Saxena and Ben Soh Dept. of Computer Science and Computer Engineering La Trobe University, Bundoora, VIC, Australia 3086

Abstract

In this paper, we describe a new cryptographic primitive called (One-Way) Signature Chaining. Signature chaining is essentially a method of generating a chain of signatures on the same message by different users. Each signature acts as a "link" of the chain. The one-way-ness implies that the chaining process is one-way in the sense that more links can be easily added to the chain. However, it is computationally infeasible to remove any intermediate links without removing all the links. The signatures so created are called chain signatures (CS). We give precise definitions of chain signatures and discuss some applications in trust transfer. We then present a practical construction of a CS scheme that is secure (in the random oracle model) under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption in bilinear maps.

Keywords: Signature chaining, mobile agent authentication, bilinear maps, stateless routing

1 Introduction

Over recent years, a lot of research in e-commerce systems has been on the problem of *trust transfer*. In this paper, we attempt to give a formal treatment of this trust transfer using the notion of **Chain signatures** (CS). Chain signatures are similar to proxy signatures, where the original signer delegates signing power to a proxy signer [1]. In addition, chain signatures ensure that the hierarchy of the delegation is preserved and cannot be tampered with. The crucial difference is that chain signatures are completely non-interactive and stateless - the signer can be completely oblivious of the receiver's identity. The intriguing part of chain signatures is that despite this anonymity, they provide sufficient guarantee of the path from which this delegation was actually propagated. As an application of CS, consider wireless and ad-hoc sensor networks, where routing information often needs to be transmitted without prior knowledge of the topology.

In many ways, CS are similar to transitive signatures [2] in that they allow trust to be transferred between multiple entities. The difference is that transitive signatures attempt to hide the intermediate nodes of trust transfer, while CS try to ensure that intermediate nodes cannot be removed. Intuitively, chain signatures can be considered as a combination of Verifiably Encrypted Signatures (VES) [3, 4] and sequential aggregate signatures [5, 6].

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We give the background and motivation for chain signatures in Sections 2 and 3. We then formalize the intuition of chain signatures in Section 4.2. Finally, in Section 5 we present the scheme and prove its security in Section 5.3. We then discuss some applications of chain signatures in Section 6.

2 Background

STRUCTURED SIGNATURES. When multiple entities sign a document, the signing order often reflects the role of each signer and signatures with different signing orders are regarded as multisignatures with different meanings. Although the signing order is of little relevance to authentication, there are other aspects one should take into account, such as the liability of the signers which may be determined by the signing order. Moreover, each signer may only wish to sign after the previous signers have done so or only if certain users have **not** signed. Additionally, the verifier may require that the correct order has been adhered to. A multisignature scheme is said to be *structured* if the group of signers is structured [7]. The structure takes into account the signing order of the entities. Strictly speaking, there are two types of structured signatures: (a) *Serial*, where the order of every member is specified. (b) *Parallel*, where the order of some members is hidden [7]. In this work, by structured signatures, we always imply serial structured signatures. However, our construction of structured signatures (called *chain signatures*) can be converted into a parallel one simply by hiding the order of some signers (i.e., by not including their public keys in the sequences before computing the chain signatures).

REQUIREMENTS OF STRUCTURED SIGNATURES. The simplest model of structured signatures is when many users to commit to a single contract (we will later extend our model to multiple contracts). By the *view*, of a signer, we imply the information known to the signer at the time of making this contribution. In our case, the view of a signer includes the message to be signed and the names (with the order) of the entities who have already signed the message. In structured signatures, not only should it be infeasible to forge a signature under any user's public key, but also, it should infeasible to modify the view of any user indicated by the multisignature. We define the following requirement for structured signatures. The definition extends the requirements of (serial) structured signatures of [7] by including truncation resilience, extensibility and non-interactivity.

- 1. Unforgeability. It should be infeasible to contribute to a multisignature under some public key without knowing the corresponding private key.
- 2. Extensibility. It should be possible to extend the signature. That is, new members may contribute at any time.
- 3. Non-Interactivity. It should be possible to extend the multisignature without interaction with any of the previous signers.
- 4. Constant Size. The size of the multisignature at any stage must be constant.
- 5. **Reorder protection.** It should be infeasible to change the order of the public keys needed for verification of the multisignature from the order indicated by the view of each individual signer.
- 6. **Truncation Resilience.** It should be infeasible to truncate the view of any signer who has previously contributed to the multisignature. A truncated view is a subset of the real view. Note that truncation is different from reordering.

Any signature scheme is expected to satisfy unforgeability and we will not elaborate on it. Structured signatures satisfying reorder protection have been extensively studied in the literature [7, 8, 9]. Many multisignature schemes (such as [10, 11, 6, 5]) can be modified to achieve extensibility, non-interactivity, constant size and reorder protection. However, there is very little work on signature schemes satisfying truncation resilience [12]. The authors of [12] provide a mobile agent authentication protocol that provides truncation resilience by requiring nodes to sign the names of the next (intended) signer. However, their model of truncation resilience is inherently different from ours because it makes signers liable for an individual who has not yet committed to the contract. Specifically, the view of the signer is different in their model.

We define a *chain signature* to be a structured signature scheme that satisfies all the above properties. To give a clear intuition of chain signatures, we elaborate on the chaining scheme proposed by Karjoth, Asokan and Gülcü for mobile agent authentication [12], which we call the KAG scheme, and explain how our model supersedes theirs.

2.1 KAG Authentication Scheme For Mobile Agents

MOBILE AGENTS. Mobile agents are software programs that live in computer networks, performing their computations and moving from host to host as necessary to fulfill their goals [12]. Electronic commerce (such as comparison shopping) appears to be a particularly interesting application for agents. The principal scheme for comparison shopping, described in [12] is the following:

1. The agent owner sets up the agent with a description of the good.

- 2. The agent travels from the owner's site to the directory in the electronic marketplace, where it obtains the locations of all retailers that offer the good.
- 3. The agent visits the electronic store-front of each retailer in turn. The agent gives the description of the good to the store-front and is quoted a price.
- 4. The agent eventually returns to its owner and delivers a report of its findings.

AUTHENTICATION, INTEGRITY AND NON-REPUDIATION. As the agent hops from shop to shop, collecting offers, it builds a chain of offers corresponding to the nodes visited in sequence. In the description, $O_1, O_2, \ldots O_m$ are the encapsulated offers of the *m* shops visited sequentially by the agent. Some shops, but not shop S_m , may conspire with the attacker, possibly being shop S_{m+1} . Let $1 \leq i \leq m$. The originator of the agent is S_0 and may have offer O_0 . The requirements for signatures given in [12] are:

- 1. Non-repudiability: Shop S_i cannot repudiate its offer O_i once it has committed.
- 2. Integrity: None of the encapsulated offers O_k , where k < m, can be modified.
- 3. Publicly Verifiable Forward Integrity: Anyone can verify if the chain is valid at O_i .
- 4. Insertion resilience: An offer can be only be inserted at i if S_i is the attacker.
- 5. Truncation Resilience: The chain can only be truncated at i if S_i is the attacker.

As noted in [12], the first four properties can be achieved using any standard two-party signature that is existentially unforgeable. The most difficult problem, however, is providing truncation resilience. Let us first discuss why trivial approaches do not work. Denote by Sig_i the signing function of S_i . Assume that the agent is carrying signatures $\{Sig_0(O_0), Sig_1(O_1), \ldots Sig_{m-1}(O_{m-1})\}$ of shops $\{1, 2, \ldots m - 1\}$ on their offers at step m. To ensure publicly verifiable forward integrity, these signatures must be in cleartext. Consequently, m can truncate any signature.

THE KAG SCHEME. The following protocol presented in [12] provides a weak form of truncation resilience. In their protocol, each user *i* includes $Sig_i(O_{i-1}, O_i, S_{i+1})$ instead of just $Sig_i(O_i)$ as in the previous example. Therefore, at step *m*, the agent will carry the following signatures

$$\{Sig_0(O_0, S_1), Sig_1(O_0, O_1, S_2), Sig_2(O_1, O_2, S_3), \dots Sig_{m-1}(O_{m-2}, O_{m-1}, S_m)\}\$$

WEAKNESSES IN THE KAG SCHEME. The above protocol has several weaknesses, some noted by the authors themselves [12]. We briefly elaborate on the major ones: (a) The above scheme is reactive because it does not prevent an attacker from truncating the chain - rather, it allows truncation but enables detection. (b) If the attacker is able to corrupt any shop S_j for j < m, it can truncate and insert offers after j even without detection.¹ (c) The identity of S_{i+1} must be known to S_i at the time S_i computes its signature. Consequently, S_{i+1} cannot remain anonymous from S_i . (d) If the agent branches at i, then shop S_i would have to create a signature as many times as there are branches. (e) The size of the signature payload is linear to the number of nodes.

As noted earlier, the last drawback (regarding the size) can be overcome using aggregate signatures [3] or sequential aggregate signatures [6, 5]. However, none of these signature schemes take into account truncation resilience.

DESIRED PROPERTIES. Assume that a multisignature scheme is used for authenticating mobile agents (unlike the above protocol). In this model, we desire the following properties.

- 1. Non-repudiability, Integrity, Publicly Verifiable Forward Integrity as defined earlier.
- 2. Truncation and Insertion Resilience: Let the agent be as it step m. To truncate or insert at i (for some i < m), the attacker must corrupt all shops from S_{i+1} to S_m .
- 3. Constant Size: The size of signature payload is constant at any stage i.
- 4. Non-Interactivity: Any shop S_i need not know the identity of shop S_{i+1} .

¹By corruption, we imply that the attacker succeeds only in obtaining the private key of j. However, all messages sent/received by j when it was uncorrupted are lost.

Property 2 above gives the intuition behind our security model for truncation resilience. Informally, it should be infeasible to truncate the chain at i (for some i < m) even if the private key of i is known. Additionally, our model of truncation resilience is proactive - the attacker cannot obtain *anything* linking to a truncated view from a given multisignature.

3 Intuition Behind Chain Signatures

We give an informal intuition behind the security of chain signatures using the following scenario. Alice signs some message m and sends the signature σ_A to Bob, after which she is not available for interaction. Now Bob wants to convince Carol that Alice indeed signed the message m. However if Carol later wants to convince a third party (using Bob's proof) the statement "Alice signed the message m" then she cannot deny (or hide) Bob's knowledge of the fact.

More formally, assume that users A, B compute signatures σ_A , σ_B (on the same message) using private keys SK_A , SK_B respectively. Define the following properties:

- 1. Aggregation: Given signatures σ_A , σ_B it is easy to compute a combined signature $\sigma_{\{A,B\}}$ that can be verified using public keys PK_A , PK_B .
- 2. Truncation Resilience: Given $\{\sigma_{\{A,B\}}, PK_A, PK_B\}$, it must be infeasible to compute σ_A or σ_B
- 3. Strong Truncation Resilience: This is a stronger variant of the previous property.
 - Given $\{\sigma_{\{A,B\}}, PK_A, PK_B, SK_A\}$, it must be infeasible to compute σ_B .
 - Given $\{\sigma_{\{A,B\}}, PK_A, PK_B, SK_B\}$, it must be infeasible to compute σ_A .

The above idea can be extended to an arbitrary number of users. Assume that users 1, 2, ..., n compute signatures $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, ..., \sigma_n$ (on the same message) using private keys $SK_1, SK_2, ..., SK_n$ respectively. We can then similarly define:

- 1. Aggregation: Given signatures $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \ldots, \sigma_n$, it is easy to compute a combined signature $\sigma_{\{1,2,\ldots,n\}}$ that can be verified using public keys PK_1, PK_2, \ldots, PK_n .
- 2. Truncation Resilience: Given $\{\sigma_{\{1,2,\ldots,n\}}, PK_1, PK_2, \ldots, PK_n\}$, it must be infeasible to compute σ_{α} for any $\alpha \subsetneq \{1, 2 \ldots n\}$
- 3. Strong Truncation Resilience: Given $\{\sigma_{\{1,2,\ldots,n\}}, PK_1, PK_2, \ldots, PK_n, SK_{\beta_1}, SK_{\beta_2}, \ldots, SK_{\beta_i}\}$ for i < n and $\{\beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \beta_i\} \subsetneq \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$, computing any signature σ_{α} for $\alpha \subseteq \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} \setminus \{\beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \beta_i\}$ must be infeasible.

A signature scheme that satisfies the aggregation and truncation resilience conditions is called a *Chain Signature* (CS) scheme. A CS scheme that additionally satisfies the strong truncation resilience condition is called a *Strong Chain Signature* (SCS) scheme. Although in the above (informal) description we assumed that the combined signature is unordered, in our formal definition we will also take into account the order in which the users contribute. Our model of CS will not provide strong truncation resilience.

4 Formal Definition - Chain Signatures

In this section, we will formalize the above intuition of chain signatures. Since chain signatures inherently deal with ordered elements (i.e., the public keys), we first develop some notation to deal with ordered elements, which we call sequences.

1. A sequence is similar to a set except that the order of its elements matters. We require that the elements of a sequence must be distinct. The elements of a sequence are written in order and enclosed with \langle , \rangle symbols. For instance, $\langle y_1, y_2, y_3 \rangle$. The symbol θ denotes the empty sequence with zero elements. The symbol \diamond denotes the empty string of zero length.

- 2. Let $L_a = \langle y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_k \rangle$ be some non-empty sequence. For any other sequence L_b , we say that $L_b \prec L_a$ if and only if $L_b = \langle y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_i \rangle$ and $0 \le i \le k$. We say that two sequences $\{L_a, L_b\}$ **overlap** if there exists a non-empty sequence L' such that $L' \prec L_a$ and $L' \prec L_b$. For instance, $\{\langle y_1, y_2 \rangle, \langle y_1 \rangle\}$ overlap, while $\{\langle y_1, y_2 \rangle, \langle y_2 \rangle\}$ do not.
- 3. For any two sequences L_a, L_b , the symbol $L_a \cup L_b$ denotes the **set** of elements that belong to at least one of $\{L_a, L_b\}$. Similarly $L_a \cap L_b$ denotes the **set** of elements that belong to both L_a and L_b . We denote by $L_a \odot L_b$ to be the **set** of elements from the largest sequence L' such that $L' \prec L_a$ and $L' \prec L_b$. Clearly, for two overlapping sequences $\{L_a, L_b\}$, we have that $L_a \odot L_b \neq \emptyset$.

4.1 Algorithms

A chain signature scheme is defined using three PPT algorithms KeyGen, ChainSign, ChainVerify as follows. (It is more convenient to describe ChainVerify before ChainSign.)

- **KeyGen** (Key Generation) This *randomized* algorithm takes as input a security parameter τ and outputs a randomly selected key-pair (x, y) such that x is the private key and y is the public key. We say that $(x_i, y_i) \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \text{KeyGen}$ on the i^{th} run of this algorithm.
- **ChainVerify** (Verification) This algorithm takes as input a tuple (m, σ_i, L_i) . Here $L_i = \langle y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_i \rangle$ is some sequence of *i* public keys and the pair (σ_i, L_i) is a purported chain signature on message *m*. The algorithm works as follows:
 - 1. If $L_i = \theta$ and $\sigma_i = \diamond$ the algorithm outputs VALID and terminates.
 - 2. If $L_i = \theta$ and $\sigma_i \neq \diamond$ the algorithm outputs INVALID and terminates.
 - 3. If this step is executed then $L_i \neq \theta$. The algorithm invokes a deterministic poly-time procedure after which it outputs either VALID or INVALID and terminates.
- **ChainSign** (Signing) The ChainSign algorithm takes as input a tuple $(x_i, y_i, m, \sigma_j, L_j)$. Here (x_i, y_i) is a valid private-public key-pair (generated using the KeyGen algorithm), the pair (σ_j, L_j) is a purported chain signature on message m, and $L_j = \langle y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_j \rangle$ is some sequence of j public keys such that $y_i \notin \{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_j\}$. The algorithm works as follows:
 - 1. If any of the input conditions (as described above) are violated, the algorithm outputs ERROR and terminates.
 - 2. The algorithm invokes ChainVerify with (m, σ_j, L_j) as input (i.e. it checks whether (σ_j, L_j) is a valid chain signature on m or not). If (σ_j, L_j) is not a valid chain signature on message m, the algorithm outputs ERROR and terminates.
 - 3. If this step is executed then no input conditions are violated and (σ_j, L_j) is a valid chain signature on m. In this case this algorithm uses the private key x_i to compute a new valid chain signature (σ_i, L_i) on message m such that $L_i = \langle y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_j, y_i \rangle$. It outputs (σ_i, L_i) and terminates.

The ChainVerify and ChainSign algorithms must satisfy the standard consistency constraint of signatures. That is, if the input (m, σ_i, L_i) to the ChainVerify is the output of the ChainSign algorithm then the ChainVerify algorithm must output VALID. Note that ChainSign can be initialized by setting $\sigma_j = \diamond$ and $L_j = \theta$.

4.2 Security Model

We define adaptive security of chain signatures using Game 1 below. For simplicity, we assume that the adversary is not allowed to use a chosen private key. The adversary is, however, allowed to extract private keys of choice. In this respect, our model is similar to an identity based system. We call this *adaptive* security under known key and chosen message attack.

The reader should note that this is a weaker model than *adaptive security under chosen key and chosen message attack* used in the aggregate signatures of [3]. We feel, however, that our notation is more suitable in modeling the requirements of chain signatures (which are slightly different from aggregate signatures).

Game 1

Setup. The challenger C sets a parameter τ and gives it to the adversary A, who then selects a game parameter n.

On receiving n, \mathcal{C} generates n key-pairs $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2), \ldots, (x_n, y_n) \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow}$ **KeyGen** and gives the set $Y = \{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n\}$ of n public keys to \mathcal{A} . Denote by L the set of all non-empty sequences with elements from Y.

- Queries. Working adaptively, the adversary \mathcal{A} issues at most q_s chain sign queries and q_e (private-key) extract queries as follows:
 - 1. ChainSign: A chain sign query i $(1 \le i \le q_s)$ consists of a pair $(m_{s(i)}, L_{s(i)}) \in \Sigma^* \times L$. The challenger responds with a valid **chain signature** $(\sigma_{s(i)}, L_{s(i)})$ on $m_{s(i)}$ computed using the **ChainSign** algorithm.
 - 2. Extract: An extract query j $(1 \le j \le q_e)$ consists of a public key $y_{e(j)}$. The challenger responds with the private key $x_{e(j)}$.

Output. Finally \mathcal{A} outputs a **chain-signature**-message pair $(\sigma_A, (m_A, L_A))$.

Result: \mathcal{A} wins the game if all the following conditions hold:

- (a) (a) $L_A \in L$ and the **ChainVerify** algorithm accepts $(\sigma_A, (m_A, L_A))$ as valid.
 - (b) No chain sign query has been previously made on the pair (m_A, L_A) .
 - (c) At least one private key corresponding to L_A has not been extracted.
- (b) For each chain sign query *i*, if $(m_{s(i)} = m_A) \wedge (\{L_A, L_{s(i)}\})$ overlap), then there is at least one key in $(L_{s(i)} \cup L_A) \setminus (L_{s(i)} \odot L_A)$ which has not been extracted.

We use the random oracle model [13], where a hash function is implemented using a random oracle. If the adversary needs to compute a hash value it queries the random oracle, which is also simulated by the challenger. The requirement of a fair game is that the responses of the challenger (to hash queries) are indistinguishable from the responses of a random oracle.

Definition 4.1. We say that the chain signature scheme is $(n, \tau, t, q_s, q_e, q_h, \epsilon)$ -secure under an **adaptive known-key and chosen-message attack** if, for some parameters τ and n, there is no adversary \mathcal{A} that runs for at most time t; makes at most q_s sign queries; makes at most q_e extract queries; makes at most q_h hash queries; and wins Game 1 with probability at least ϵ . Otherwise, we say that \mathcal{A} $(n, \tau, t, q_s, q_e, q_h, \epsilon)$ breaks the chain signature scheme under an adaptive known-key and chosen-message attack.

Remark: The reader might ask the following question: "Why do we not allow the adversary to submit a chain signature σ_i on some message-sequence pair (m_i, L_i) and a public key $y_{i+1} \notin L_i$, and require the ChainSign oracle to return a chain signature σ_{i+1} on $(m_i, \langle L_i, y_{i+1} \rangle)$? It appears that the adversary of Game 1 is given less powers than a real-world adversary." However, this is not the case when we observe that the adversary is also allowed to **extract** all the private keys of L_i and compute the above chain signature σ_i without the help of the ChainSign oracle, or make a query to the ChainSign oracle on (m_i, L_i) to obtain σ_i . In other words, the two models are equivalent. The reason for not allowing the above query is to restrict the information (i.e., chain signatures) the adversary has when all the private keys in L_i are not extracted.

4.3 Weak Adaptive Security

Although full adaptive security of chain signatures under known key attacks and chosen message attacks is given by Definition 4.1, we will prove the security of our construction in a restricted model, which we called **weak** adaptive known key and chosen message attacks. In this model, the attacker \mathcal{A} submits the extract queries before the challenge public keys are generated (for instance by specifying their index numbers). This is a reasonable assumption considering that even though the adversary is not allowed to actively corrupt participants, it is given unlimited access prior to the execution of the session. We define this using a modified version of Game 1, which we call Game 1-a.

Game 1-a: This is a variation of Game 1 with the following differences: (1) In the setup phase, the adversary submits not only the parameter n but also an n bit string *extr*, where the 1's of *extr* denote the indexes of the keys that the adversary wants to extract. (2) In the challenge phase, the challenger responds, not only with the public keys Y, but also the extracted private keys X corresponding to the non-zero bits of *extr*. (3) There are no private key extract queries in Game 1-a.

Definition 4.2. We say that the chain signature scheme is $(n, \tau, t, q_s, q_e, q_h, \epsilon)$ -secure under a weak adaptive known-key and chosen-message attack if, for some parameters τ and n, there is no adversary \mathcal{A} that runs for at most time t; makes at most q_s sign queries; makes at most q_e extract queries; makes at most q_h hash queries; and wins Game 1-a with probability at least ϵ . Otherwise, we say that \mathcal{A} $(n, \tau, t, q_s, q_e, q_h, \epsilon)$ -breaks the chain signature scheme under an adaptive known-key and chosenmessage attack. Game 1-a is similar to Game 1, except that the adversary must submit the (indexes of the) private key extract queries before the setup phase is completed.

Reason For Weakining Game 1: At first, it may seem strange that we have further weaked Game 1 (which is already weak compared to a game for *chosen key attacks*) to Game 1a. However, we have been unable to prove the security of our presented scheme under Game 1, which is an open problem at this stage. The reader is encouraged to try and prove it, since that would be a non-trivial result.

4.4 Analysis Of Game 1

Let us analyze the Result Section of Game 1 (and Game 1a). Clearly, Part (a) rules out the cases of a trivial win. The intuition of CS is captured in Part (b). To see this, consider the illustration in Figure 1 of the **ChainSign** algorithm at some stage j. Since we know that **ChainSign** can be "reversed" from σ_j (using the private key x_j) to obtain σ_{j-1} , we can also consider Figure 2 as a valid usage of this algorithm.




Figure 1: Typical Usage Of ChainSign.




Figure 2: Valid Usage Of ChainSign.

Therefore, if L_A and $L_{s(i)}$ overlap for some *i* and $m_A = m_{s(i)}$ (we call such queries non-trivial queries), then we know that **ChainSign** can be "reversed" from $\sigma_{s(i)}$ and then "forwarded" to obtain σ_A using only a subset of private keys for L_A . The security requirement of CS is that this is the **only** other way to generate σ_A without knowing all the private keys of L_A . The condition of Part (b) of the Result Section implies that if the adversary does not know at least one private key needed for this "reverse-forward" operation, then this is a valid win for the adversary.

4.5 Differences With Other Signature Schemes

In this section, we briefly demonstrate how chain signatures are different from other multi-user signature schemes such as sequential aggregate signatures [5, 6], multisignatures [11], aggregate signatures [3], and structured multisignatures [7]. We distinguish between two types of forgers for chain signatures.

- **Type 1 Forger** This adversary either does not make any non-trivial queries, or for each non-trivial query j made, we have that $L_A \not\prec L_{s(j)}$. We call such a forgery an Ordinary Forgery.
- **Type 2 Forger** This adversary makes one or more non-trivial queries j such that $L_A \prec L_{s(j)}$. We call such a forgery an *Extraction Forgery*.

All the above mentioned signature schemes only consider type 1 forgers, while chain signatures also consider type 2. To see this, consider the following instance of Game 1 with n = 7 and $Y = \{y_i | 1 \le i \le n\}$. The adversary outputs a valid chain-signature-message tuple $(\sigma_A, (m_A, L_A))$ after making five extract queries on the keys $\{y_1, y_2, y_3, y_5, y_6\}$ and three non-trivial sign queries *i* (i.e., $m_A = m_{s(i)}$) such that $L_{s(i)} \odot L_A \neq \emptyset$. The sequences are (keys of extract queries have a gray box):

$$\begin{split} L_{s(1)} &= \langle \ y_1 \ , y_2 \ , y_3 \ , y_4, y_5 \ , y_6 \ , y_7 \rangle \\ L_{s(2)} &= \langle \ y_1 \ , y_2 \ , y_3 \ , y_4, y_6 \ , y_7 \rangle \\ L_{s(3)} &= \langle \ y_1 \ , y_2 \ , y_3 \ \rangle \\ L_A &= \langle \ y_1 \ , y_2 \ , y_3 \ , y_4, y_5 \ \rangle \end{split}$$

Since for all the sequences $L_{s(i)}$ $(1 \le i \le 3)$, at least one private key needed for the reverse-forward operation (described earlier) has not been extracted, the above configuration represents a win for the adversary of Game 1. The same configuration, however, represents a loss for the adversary of a suitably adapted game (adaptive chosen-key and chosen-message attack) in all the above mentioned schemes ([5, 11, 3, 7]) when we keep y_4 as the challenge public key.

4.6 Relationship With Verifiably Encrypted Signatures

Although CS are quite different from other signature schemes, they are very similar to verifiably encrypted signatures (VES) of [3]. VES can be abstractly described as follows. Suppose Alice wants to send a signature (on a payment order) to Bob in return for some goods bought online. However, she wants to ensure that Bob obtains her signature only after he has fulfilled his commitments. On the other hand, Bob suspects that Alice may deny him the signature after receiving the goods. The problem can be solved using VES and a trusted third party (the Adjudicator). An essential property of the adjudicator's public key is that existential forgery is easy but standard forgery is hard. Using this scheme, Alice creates her signature $\sigma_A(m)$ on the message m (the payment order) under her public key A and creates an existential forgery under the adjudicator's VES-public key J to obtain a forged signature-message pair ($\sigma_J(m_*), m_*$). She combines the two signatures $\sigma_A(m)$ and $\sigma_J(m_*)$ to obtain an aggregate signature $\sigma_{(A,J)}(m, m_*)$ and sends ($\sigma_{(A,J)}(m, m_*), m, m_*$) to Bob. VES have the following properties: (1) Bob can verify that $\sigma_{A,J}(m, m_*)$ is an aggregation of the signatures $\sigma_A(m)$ on m and $\sigma_J(m_*)$ on m_* . (2) Bob cannot extract either signature without the Adjudicator's (or Alice's) help. Both these properties when combined are termed opacity [3]. From this we can observe the following similarities and differences between VES and CS.

Similarities. (1) Both CS and VES are based on the idea of aggregating many signatures into one object. (2) Similar to CS, VES provide truncation resilience in the form of opacity.

Differences. (1) VES are defined only for one signer (and possibly many adjudicators [3]) and do not provide any sort of security guarantee when multiple signers are involved. (2) Existential forgery is not possible under any user's key in CS.

Therefore, chain signatures can be considered as an extension of VES to multiple users. Also, using the idea of an existentially forgeable adjudicator public key, we can think of *verifiably encrypted chain* signatures (VECS).

Remark: To see why the above definition of CS is non-trivial, observe that the opacity of VES (or unforgeability of aggregate signatures) **does not** imply truncation resiliance (the reader is encouraged to try and prove the security of Game 1a under the standard aggregate signature scheme of [3]).

5 Chain Signatures Using Bilinear Maps

Let G_1 be a cyclic additive group and G_2 be a cyclic multiplicative group, both of prime order p, such that computing discrete logarithms in G_1 and G_2 is intractable. A bilinear pairing is a map $\hat{e}: G_1 \times G_1 \mapsto G_2$ that satisfies the following properties [14, 15, 3].

- 1. Bilinearity: $\hat{e}(xP, yQ) = \hat{e}(P, Q)^{xy} \forall P, Q \in G_1 \text{ and } x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_p.$
- 2. Non-degeneracy: If P is a generator of G_1 then $\hat{e}(P, P)$ is a generator of G_2 .
- 3. Computability: The map \hat{e} is efficiently computable.

In a practical implementation, G_1 is a subgroup of points $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ on an elliptic curve E/\mathbb{F}_q and G_2 is a subgroup of $\mathbb{F}_{q^r}^*$ (for suitably chosen q, r). The map \hat{e} is derived either from the modified Weil pairing [14, 15] or the Tate pairing [16].

5.1 BDH Parameter Generator

Using the idea of [14], define a Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) parameter generator **BDH** as a randomized algorithm that takes as input $\tau \in \mathbb{N}$ and outputs (\hat{e}, p, G_1, G_2) , where G_1, G_2 are the descriptions of two cyclic groups, each of prime order p such that $p \approx 2^{\tau}$, and $\hat{e}: G_1 \times G_1 \mapsto G_2$ is a bilinear map as defined above. The security of chain signatures depends on the hardness of the following problem.

Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem CDH_(P,G₁): Let $P \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} G_1$ be a generator of G_1 . Given $xP, yP \in G_1$ for unknown $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}$, output $xyP \in G_1$.

The Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDHA) states that the $\text{CDH}_{(P,G_1)}$ problem is intractable for any PPT adversary. This is formally stated below.

CDHA. Let \mathcal{A} be an algorithm, and $\nu : \mathbb{N} \mapsto [0, 1]$ a function. We associate with any $\tau \in \mathbb{N}$ the following experiment.

Experiment $\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{cdh}(\tau)$ $(\hat{e}, p, G_1, G_2) \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbf{BDH}(\tau); P, Q \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} G_1 \setminus \{1\}; x \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p; B \leftarrow xP$ $C \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\hat{e}, p, G_1, G_1, P, Q, B)$ If C = xQ return 1 else return 0

We let

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{cdh}(\tau) = \Pr\left[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{cdh}(\tau) = 1\right]$$

denote the advantage of \mathcal{A} on input τ , the probability computed over the random choices of the inputs to \mathcal{A} and the coins of \mathcal{A} if any. We say that \mathcal{A} has success bound ν for τ if $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{cdh}(\tau) \leq \nu(\tau)$

Assumption CDHA: For all poly-time algorithms \mathcal{A} there exists a negligible function ν and an integer $\tau' \in \mathbb{N}$, such that for all $\tau > \tau'$, \mathcal{A} has success bound ν .

Definition 5.1. We say that algorithm $\mathcal{A}(\tau, t, \epsilon)$ -breaks the BDH parameter generator **BDH** if \mathcal{A} runs for time at most t, and $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{cdh}(\tau)$ is at least ϵ .

5.2 Chain Signature Protocol

In this scenario, there are n ordered distinct users $(1, 2, \dots, n)$ and $m \in \Sigma^*$ is the message.

- **System Parameters** A Trusted Authority (TA) sets the parameter τ and generates $(\hat{e}, G_1, G_2, p) \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbf{BDH}(\tau)$. Here, G_1, G_2 are descriptions of two groups each of prime order $p \approx \tau$ bits and $\hat{e}: G_1 \times G_1 \mapsto G_2$ is a bilinear mapping as defined above. The TA selects a one-way hash function $\mathcal{H}: \Sigma^* \mapsto G_1$ and picks a random generator P of G_1 . The system parameters are $(e, p, G_1, G_2, \mathcal{H}, P)$.
- **KeyGen** Each participant *i* generates $x_i \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ as the private key. The corresponding public key is $Y_i = x_i P \in G_1$.

ChainSign Let $L_i = \langle Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_i \rangle$ and $H_i = \mathcal{H}(m, L_i)$ for $i \ge 1$. Define $\sigma_0 = 0 \in G_1$ and define recursively

$$\sigma_i = \sigma_{i-1} + x_i H_i \in G_1 \text{ for } i \ge 1$$

The chain signature of user i on m is (σ_i, L_i) .

ChainVerify We accept the signature (σ_i, L_i) on m as valid if the following equality holds:

$$\hat{e}(\sigma_i, P) \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{j=1}^{i} \hat{e}(H_j, Y_j)$$

The correctness of the verification process follows from the property of bilinear maps:

$$LHS = \hat{e}(\sigma_i, P) = \hat{e}(\sum_{j=1}^{i} x_j H_j, P) = \prod_{j=1}^{i} \hat{e}(H_j, x_j P) = RHS$$

5.3 Security Of The Construction

We will reuse the proof of security of the short signature scheme of Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [14] (hereafter called BLS). The scheme is defined as follows.

Preliminary Setup For BLS Signatures A Trusted Authority (TA) sets a security parameter τ and generates $(\hat{e}, G_1, G_2, p) \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbf{BDH}(\tau)$. Here, G_1, G_2 are descriptions of two groups each of prime order $p \approx \tau$ bits and $\hat{e}: G_1 \times G_1 \mapsto G_2$ is a bilinear mapping as defined above. The TA then selects a cryptographic hash function $\mathcal{H}: \Sigma^* \mapsto G_1$ and picks a random generator $P \in G_1$. The system parameters are $(\hat{e}, p, G_1, G_2, \mathcal{H}, P)$.

KeyGen Generate $x \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ as the private key. The public key is $Y = xP \in G_1$.

- **Sign** To sign message *m* under public key *Y*, compute $\sigma \leftarrow x\mathcal{H}(m) \in G_1$. Then σ is a valid BLS signature on message *m* under public key *y*.
- **Verify** Accept the BLS signature σ under the public key Y as valid if the following holds:

$$\hat{e}(\sigma, P) \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(\mathcal{H}(m), Y)$$

Security of BLS signatures is defined using Game 2.

Game 2

- **Setup.** The challenger sets the parameter τ' and generates a key pair $(x, Y) \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathsf{KeyGen}$. It gives Y, the challenge public key, along with τ' to the adversary.
- Queries. Working adaptively, \mathcal{A} issues at most q'_s sign queries and q'_h hash queries:
 - 1. Sign queries: For each sign query *i* on distinct messages m_i for $1 \le i \le q'_s$, the challenger responds with a valid BLS signature $\sigma_i = x \mathcal{H}(m_i) \in G_1$.
 - 2. Hash queries: For each hash query j on distinct messages m_h for $1 \leq j \leq q'_h$, the challenger responds with $\mathcal{H}(m_j)$.

Output. Finally \mathcal{A} outputs a BLS signature σ_A .

Result: \mathcal{A} wins if σ_A is a valid signature and no sign query was issued on m_A .

Definition 5.2. We say that the BLS scheme is $(\tau', t', q'_s, q'_h \epsilon')$ -secure against existential forgery under an adaptive **chosen message attack** if for some parameter τ' , there is no adversary \mathcal{A} that runs for at most time t'; makes at most q'_s sign queries and q_h hash queries; and wins Game 2 with probability at least ϵ' . Otherwise, if such an adversary \mathcal{A} exists, then we say that $\mathcal{A}(\tau', t', q'_s, q'_h, \epsilon')$ -breaks the BLS scheme. To prove the security of chain signatures, we will use the following result from [14].

Theorem 5.3. ([14, Theorem 3.2]) If there exists an algorithm \mathcal{A} that $(\tau', t', q'_s, q'_h, \epsilon')$ -breaks the BLS scheme under Definition 5.2, then then there exists another algorithm \mathcal{B} that $(\tau'', t'', \epsilon'')$ -breaks the BDH parameter generator **BDH** under Definition 5.1, where;

$$\tau'' = \tau'; \quad t'' \le t' + c'_{G_1}(q'_h + 2q'_s); \quad \epsilon'' \ge \frac{\epsilon'}{e(q'_s + 1)}$$

Here, c'_{G_1} is a constant that depends on G_1 and e is the base of natural logarithms.

Our security follows from Theorem 5.4 below.

Theorem 5.4. Let there exist an algorithm \mathcal{A} that $(n, \tau, t, q_s, q_e, q_h, e)$ -breaks the chain signature scheme under Definition 4.2. Then there exists another algorithm \mathcal{B} that $(\tau', t', q'_s, q'_h, e')$ -breaks the BLS scheme under Definition 5.2, where;

$$\tau = \tau'; \quad t' \le t + c_{G_1} \Big[n(q_h + 1) + q_s(n+1) \Big]; \quad q'_s \le q_s; \quad q'_h \le n(q_h + q_s); \quad \epsilon' \ge \frac{\epsilon}{e \cdot q_s}$$

Here, c_{G_1} is a constant that depends on G_1 and e is the base of natural logarithms.

Proof. Let there exist an adversary \mathcal{A} that $(n, \tau, t, q_s, q_e, q_h, e)$ -breaks the chain signature scheme under a weak adaptive known key and chosen message attack. Using \mathcal{A} , we construct another algorithm \mathcal{B} that $(\tau', t', q'_s, q'_h, e')$ -breaks the BLS signature scheme under an adaptive chosen message attack.

Algorithm \mathcal{B} simulates the adversary of Game 2 and is given the system parameter P, a challenge public key $Y = xP \in G_1$ (for unknown x) and the security parameter τ' by challenger \mathcal{C} . Its goal is to forge a valid BLS signature under Y using adversary \mathcal{A} that can win Game 1-a of Section 4.2.

Denote the BLS hash and sign oracles by \mathcal{H}_{BLS} and $Sign_{BLS}$ respectively and denote the chain signature hash oracle by \mathcal{H} . The oracles \mathcal{H}_{BLS} and $Sign_{BLS}$ will be simulated by \mathcal{C} , while \mathcal{H} will be simulated by \mathcal{B} .

Setup. Algorithm \mathcal{B} simulates the challenger of Game 1-a to adversary \mathcal{A} . It gives the parameter $\tau = \tau'$ to \mathcal{A} , who returns an n bit value *extr*, indicating by 1 the private keys it wants to extract.

Denote the i^{th} bit of extr by bit_i . Algorithm \mathcal{B} maintains a table of n entries called the K-List. Each entry i in the table is a tuple of the form $(a_i, r_i, Y_i) \in \{0, 1\} \times \mathbb{Z}_p^* \times G_1$ and is created as follows. \mathcal{B} generates $r_i \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and a bit $a_i \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$ using a biased coin such that $\Pr[a_i = 0] = 1/q_s$. It then sets $a_i \leftarrow a_i \cdot (1 - bit_i)$, computes $Y_i = a_i Y + r_i P \in G_1$ and adds the entry (a_i, r_i, Y_i) to the K-List. \mathcal{B} gives the set $\mathbf{Y} = \{Y_i | 1 \leq i \leq n\}$ of challenge public keys, along with $\mathbf{X} = \{r_i \cdot bit_i | 1 \leq i \leq n\}$, the set of extracted private keys to \mathcal{A} .

Denote by L the set of all sequences with elements from \mathbf{Y} .

Queries. To handle the queries of \mathcal{A} , algorithm \mathcal{B} works as follows.

Hash: At any time \mathcal{A} may query the random oracle \mathcal{H} . To respond to hash queries, \mathcal{B} maintains another table called the H-List (which is initially empty and can have up to $n(q_h + q_s)$ entries). Each entry *i* in the list is of the form,

 $(m_i, L_i, b_i, u_i, H_i, \gamma_i) \in \Sigma^* \times L \times \{0, 1\} \times \mathbb{Z}_p^* \times G_1 \times G_1,$ and can be interpreted using Table 1.

For a hash query j on m_j^* , algorithm \mathcal{B} first parses m_j^* as (m_j, L_j) and scans the H-List for the the unique entry $(m_j, L_j, b_j, u_j, H_j, \gamma_j)$. If such an entry exists, \mathcal{B} returns H_j as its response to the hash query. Otherwise, \mathcal{B} adds the entry $(m_j, L_j, b_j, u_j, H_j, \gamma_j)$ to the H-List as follows.

- First it parses L_j as $\langle Y_{j(1)}, Y_{j(2)}, \dots, Y_{j(|L_j|)} \rangle$ and and scans the K-List to find the entry (a_l, Y_l, r_l) such that $Y_l = Y_{j(|L_j|)}$.
- If $|L_j| > 1$ then \mathcal{B} constructs the sequence $L'_j = \langle Y_{j(1)}, Y_{j(2)}, \dots, Y_{j(|L_j|-1)} \rangle$ and simulates a *Hash* query to itself on the value (m_j, L'_j) .
- Let $(m_j, L'_j, b'_j, u'_j, H'_j, \gamma'_j)$ be the entry in the H-List corresponding to (m_j, L'_j) if $|L_j| > 1$.

Entry i	$b_i = 0$	$b_i = 1$
		$H_i = \mathcal{H}_{\text{BLS}}(m_i, L_i)$
	$H_i = \mathcal{H}_{\text{BLS}}(m_i, L_i)$	γ_i = chain signature on $(m_i, L_i) - xH_j$
$u_i = 0$		for some $(m_j, L_j, b_j, u_j, H_j, \gamma_j) \in \text{H-List}$
	γ_i = chain signature on (m_i, L_i)	such that
		$m_i = m_j \wedge L_j \prec L_i \wedge b_j = 1 \wedge u_j > 0$
	$H_i = u_i P - H_j$	
	for some $(m_j, L_j, b_j, u_j, H_j, \gamma_j) \in \text{H-List}$	$H_i = \mathcal{H}_{\text{BLS}}(m_i, L_i)$
$u_i > 0$	such that	
	$m_i = m_j \wedge L_j \prec L_i \wedge b_j = 1 \wedge u_j > 0$	γ_i = chain signature on $(m_i, L_i) - xH_i$
	γ_i = chain signature on (m_i, L_i)	
$u_i > 1$		$Sign_{BLS}$ query issued to C on (m_i, L_i)

Table 1: H-List interpretation table.

IF		$ L_j > 1$	$ L_j = 1$
		$H_j \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{BLS}}(m_j, L_j)$	$H_j \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{BLS}}(m_j, L_j)$
$a_l = 0$	$b_j \leftarrow b'_j; u_j \leftarrow 0$		$b_j \leftarrow 0; u_j \leftarrow 0$
		$\gamma_j \leftarrow \gamma_j' + r_l H_j$	$\gamma_j \leftarrow r_l H_j$
		$H_j \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{BLS}}(m_j, L_j)$	
	$b'_j = 0$	$b_j \leftarrow 1; u_j \leftarrow 1$	
		$\gamma_j = \gamma'_j + r_l H_j$	
		$b_j \leftarrow 0; u_j \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$	$H_j \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{BLS}}(m_j, L_j)$
$a_l = 1$		$H_j \leftarrow u_j P - H_k$, where	$b_j \leftarrow 1; u_j \leftarrow 1$
	$b'_{j} = 1$	$(m_k, L_k, b_k, u_k, H_k, \gamma_k) \in \text{H-List such that}$	$\gamma_j \leftarrow r_l H_j$
	Ŭ	$m_k = m_j \wedge L_k \prec L_j \wedge b_k = 1 \wedge u_k > 0 \wedge L_k$ is	
		the largest such sequence	
		$\gamma_j \leftarrow \gamma'_j + u_j Y + r_l H_j$	

Table 2: H-List computation table.

Algorithm \mathcal{B} uses Table 2 to compute its response. It adds $(m_j, h_j, b_j, u_j, H_j, \gamma_j)$ to the H-List and returns H_j as its response to the hash query.²

- **ChainSign:** For each chain sign query i $(1 \le i \le q_s)$ on $(m_{s(i)}, L_{s(i)})$, algorithm \mathcal{B} scans the H-List to find the unique entry $(m_j, L_j, b_j, u_j, H_j, \gamma_j)$ such that $(m_j, L_j) = (m_{s(i)}, L_{s(i)})$. If such an entry does not exist, \mathcal{B} adds it by simulating a hash query on the message-sequence $(m_{s(i)}, L_{s(i)}).$
 - **1.** If $b_j = 1$, algorithm \mathcal{B} finds the entry $(m_k, L_k, b_k, u_k, H_k, \gamma_k) \in \text{H-List}$ such that $(m_k = m_{s(i)}) \wedge (L_k \prec L_{s(i)}) \wedge (b_k = 1) \wedge (u_k > 0) \wedge (L_k \text{ is the largest sequence}).^3$
 - If $u_k = 1$, \mathcal{B} sets $u_k \leftarrow 2$ and updates the H-List tuple $(m_k, L_k, b_k, u_k, H_k, \gamma_k)$.
 - \mathcal{B} then sets $\sigma_{s(i)} \leftarrow \gamma_j + Sign_{\text{BLS}}(m_k, L_k)$ by making a sign query to \mathcal{C} and returns $\sigma_{s(i)}$ as its response to the chain sign query. Note that $Sign_{BLS}(m_k, L_k) = xH_k$
 - **2.** If $b_j = 0$, algorithm \mathcal{B} sets $\sigma_{s(i)} \leftarrow \gamma_j$ and returns $\sigma_{s(i)}$ as its response to the chain sign query.

In either case it can be verified that $\sigma_{s(i)}$ is a valid chain signature on $(m_{s(i)}, L_{s(i)})$. \mathcal{B} also keeps track of all such queried messages.

Output. Finally \mathcal{A} outputs a chain-signature-message pair $(\sigma_A, (m_A L_A))$.

 $^{^{2}}$ If $|L_{j}| = 0$, \mathcal{B} simply replies with $H_{j} = \mathcal{H}_{BLS}(m_{j})$ without storing the value in the H-List. \mathcal{B} 's replies to \mathcal{A} 's hash queries are indistinguishable from those of a random oracle. Therefore, the hash simulation provided by \mathcal{B} is perfect. ³It is possible that j = k. By analyzing Table 2, we can conclude that such an entry must necessarily exist.

Algorithm \mathcal{B} ensures that an entry for the pair (m_A, L_A) exists in the H-List. (If necessary, by simulating a hash query on (m_A, L_A) .)

Result: If $(m_A, (\sigma_A, L_A))$ is not a winning configuration (by adversary \mathcal{A}) of Game 1-a, Algorithm \mathcal{B} reports Failure and terminates.

We know that $(m_A, (\sigma_A, L_A))$ is a winning configuration of Game 1-a. Algorithm \mathcal{B} finds the entry $(m_A, L_A, b_A, u_A, H_A, \gamma_A)$ in the H-List.

- 1. If $b_A = 0$, algorithm \mathcal{B} reports Failure and terminates.
- 2. We know that $b_A = 1$. \mathcal{B} finds the entry $(m_k, L_k, b_k, u_k, H_k, \gamma_k) \in \text{H-List}$ such that $(m_k = m_A) \wedge (L_k \prec L_A) \wedge (b_k = 1) \wedge (u_k > 0) \wedge (L_k \text{ is the largest sequence}).^4$ If $u_k > 1$, \mathcal{B} reports Failure and terminates.

We know that

$$b_A = 1 \land u_k = 1 \tag{1}$$

Therefore, by definition $\gamma_A = \sigma_A - xH_k$, where $H_k = \mathcal{H}_{BLS}(m_k, L_k)$. In other words, $\sigma_A - \gamma_A$ is a valid BLS signature under public key Y on the message (m_k, L_k) . Additionally, $u_k = 1$ implies that \mathcal{B} did **not** make a BLS sign query to \mathcal{C} on the message (m_k, L_k) .⁵

Algorithm \mathcal{B} returns $(\sigma_A - \gamma_A, (m_k, L_k))$ to \mathcal{C} , thereby winning Game 2.

Probability: We need the probability ϵ' that \mathcal{B} wins Game 2. Consider the events:

 \mathcal{E}_1 : \mathcal{A} wins Game 1-a.

 \mathcal{E}_2 : Event \mathcal{E}_1 and $b_A = 1 \wedge u_k = 1$ in Equation 1.

 \mathcal{B} succeeds if both these events happen. Therefore, $\epsilon' = \Pr[\mathcal{E}_1] \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{E}_2|\mathcal{E}_1]$. The following three claims give the bound on ϵ' .

Claim 1. $\Pr[\mathcal{E}_1] \geq \epsilon$

Proof. Since the simulation provided by \mathcal{B} is indistinguishable from a real game, the probability of \mathcal{A} winning the simulated Game 1-a is the same as the probability of \mathcal{A} winning Game 1-a. Thus, $\Pr[\mathcal{E}_2|\mathcal{E}_1] \geq \epsilon.$

Claim 2. $\Pr[\mathcal{E}_2|\mathcal{E}_1] = 1/(e \cdot q_s)$

Proof. Let $q_s > 1$. Using Equation 1, define events:

 $\mathcal{E}_3: b_A = 1$ $\mathcal{E}_4:$ Event \mathcal{E}_3 and $u_k = 1$

 $\therefore \quad \Pr[\mathcal{E}_2|\mathcal{E}_1] = \Pr[\mathcal{E}_4|\mathcal{E}_3 \wedge \mathcal{E}_1] \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{E}_3|\mathcal{E}_1].$

For any key $Y_l \in \mathbf{Y}$, define a_l to be the first element of the entry (a_l, r_l, Y_l) in the K-List corresponding to Y_l . For any sequence $L_* \in L$ or set $L_* \in 2^{\mathbf{Y}}$, define

$$Sum(L_*) = \sum_{Y_l \in L_*} a_l$$

Now consider the Result Section of Game 1-a (reproduced below):

Result: \mathcal{A} wins Game 1-a if all the following conditions hold:

(a) (a) $L_A \in L$ and the **ChainVerify** algorithm accepts $(\sigma_A, (m_A, L_A))$ as valid.

⁴It is possible that $L_k = L_A$. By analyzing Table 2, we can conclude that such an entry must necessarily exist. ⁵To visualize this, consider the example of Section 4.5 with n = 7. Assume that $b_5 = b_7 = 1$, while $b_i = 0 \forall Y_i \ (i \neq 5, 7)$. In other words, keys Y_5 and Y_7 are "fake", while the others are "real". In this instance of the game $L_k = \langle Y_1, Y_2, Y_3, Y_4 \rangle$. Observe that \mathcal{B} would never have made a $Sign_{BLS}$ query to \mathcal{C} on the message $(m_A, \langle Y_1, Y_2, Y_3, Y_4 \rangle)$.

- (b) No chain sign query has been previously made on the pair (m_A, L_A) .
- (c) At least one private key corresponding to L_A has not been extracted.
- (b) For **each** chain sign query *i*, if $(m_{s(i)} = m_A) \land (\{L_A, L_{s(i)}\})$ overlap), then there is at least one key in $(L_{s(i)} \cup L_A) \setminus (L_{s(i)} \odot L_A)$ which has not been extracted.

By checking Table 2, we can verify that

$$\mathcal{E}_3 \Rightarrow Sum(L_A) \equiv 1 \pmod{2}$$

$$\mathcal{E}_4 \Rightarrow (Sum(L_{s(i)} \setminus L_k) < 1) \land (m_A = m_{s(i)}) \land (L_k \prec L_{s(i)}) = \text{False} \ \forall \ i \ (1 \le i \le q_s)$$

For event \mathcal{E}_3 , we require that of the unextracted keys in L_A , an odd number of keys Y_l have $a_l = 1$. Thus, $1 - 1/q_s \ge \Pr[\mathcal{E}_3|\mathcal{E}_1] \ge 1/q_s$.

Consider the following three cases:

- Case 1: \mathcal{A} did not make any non-trivial chain sign queries. In this case $u_k = 1$ (necessarily), and $\Pr[\mathcal{E}_4 | \mathcal{E}_3 \wedge \mathcal{E}_1] = 1$.
- Case 2: \mathcal{A} made sign queries *i* such that $(m_A = m_{s(i)}) \land (L_A \odot L_{s(i)} \neq \emptyset)$ but for each such query *i*, at least one key (say Y_l) in $L_A \setminus L_A \odot L_{s(i)}$ is unextracted. In the worst case, this unextracted key in L_A would be the same for all such queries, implying that all other keys in L_A are extracted. Then with probability $1 1/q_s$, we would have $a_l = 1$, in which case $u_k = 1$, and so we have

$$\Pr[\mathcal{E}_4|\mathcal{E}_3 \wedge \mathcal{E}_1] \ge 1 - \frac{1}{q_s}$$

• Case 3: The only case left to consider is when one or more chain sign queries *i* have been made such that

 $(m_A = m_{s(i)}) \land (L_A \odot L_{s(i)} \neq \emptyset) \land (\text{All keys in } L_A \setminus (L_A \odot L_{s(i)}) \text{ are extracted})$

Let us denote this set of queries by \mathbf{Q} . In the worst case, all keys except the ones restricted by the winning condition are extracted. This implies that for each such query $i \in \mathbf{Q}$, there is at least one key in $L_{s(i)} \setminus (L_A \odot L_{s(i)})$ that has **not** been extracted. Now consider the set of queries $\mathbf{Q}_* \subseteq \mathbf{Q}$ defined as

$$\mathbf{Q}_* = \{i | (i \in \mathbf{Q}) \land (L_k \prec L_{s(i)})\}$$

Then for each $i \in \mathbf{Q}^*$, there is (necessarily) at least one key (say Y_l) in $L_{s(i)} \setminus L_k$ that has **not** been extracted. Event \mathcal{E}_4 implies that for each of these $|\mathbf{Q}^*|$ unextracted keys Y_l^* , the corresponding bits a_l^* in the K-List are 1.

From the simulation, it is clear that the values of the above bits a_l^* are independent of \mathcal{A} 's view and so $\Pr[a_l^* = 1] = 1 - 1/q_s$ independent of the other bits. Since $|\mathbf{Q}^*| \leq q_s$, we have,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{E}_4|\mathcal{E}_3 \wedge \mathcal{E}_1] = \Pr[\text{At most } q_s \text{ independent bits } a_l^* \text{ are } 1] \ge \left(1 - \frac{1}{q_s}\right)^{q_s} \ge \frac{1}{e}$$

Consequently,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{E}_2|\mathcal{E}_1] = \Pr[\mathcal{E}_4|\mathcal{E}_3 \wedge \mathcal{E}_1] \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{E}_3|\mathcal{E}_1] \ge \frac{1}{e \cdot q_s}.$$

Combining Claims 1 and 2, we get the bound on ϵ' .

Hash queries to C: For each entry in the H-List, \mathcal{B} makes at most one hash query to C. Also, \mathcal{A} can make up to q_h hash queries on arbitrary message-sequence pairs (m_*, L_*) , and each sequence L_* may contain up to n keys (and therefore, up to n sub-sequences). Consequently, each hash query by \mathcal{A} can cause at most n entries to be added to the H-List. Additionally, adversary \mathcal{A} may make sign queries on q_s distinct message-sequence pairs (m_*, L_*) without making any hash queries on them. These sign queries

may cause up to nq_s more entries to be added to the H-List. Thus, for a total of q_h hash queries and q_s sign queries, the number of entries in the H-List (and the number of hash queries made by algorithm \mathcal{B} to challenger \mathcal{C}) is upper-bounded by $n(q_h + q_s)$.

Sign queries to C: For each chain chain sign query by adversary A, algorithm \mathcal{B} makes at most one sign query to challenger C. Therefore, $q'_s \leq q_s$.

Running time of \mathcal{B} : It only remains to bound the running time t' of \mathcal{B} . This is the running time of \mathcal{A} , plus the time required to generate up to n public keys; the time required to add up to $n(q_h + q_s)$ entries in the H-List. Each signature query involves up to one multiplication in G_1 . Assuming that the lists are efficiently indexed, the time for searching the H-List and K-List can be ignored. Adding each entry in the H-List and generating a public key requires 1 exponentiation and up to 1 multiplication in G_1 . Therefore, for a maximum of $n(q_h + q_s)$ entries in the H-List, a maximum of n public keys, and a maximum of q_s signature queries, we have $t' \leq t + c_{G_1}(n(q_h + 1) + q_s(n + 1))$, where c_{G_1} is the time for 1 exponentiation and 1 addition in G_1 .

This completes the proof of Theorem 5.4.

The above proof is similar to the proof of security of Verifiably Encrypted Signatures (VES) of [3]. In fact, the security of CS in the weak known key attack model is very similar to the security of VES against signature extraction and forgery. It is possible that our construction is also secure in the stronger sense of adaptive known key and chosen message attacks given by Definition 4.1. In fact, we posit that an efficient reduction exists from an adversary of Game 1 to an adversary of Game 1-a.

5.4 Identity Based Chain Signatures (IBCS)

The protocol presented in Section 5.2 uses a standard certificate-based PKI. However, it is possible to construct Identity Based Chained Signatures (IBCS) because of the observation that the Identity Based Signature (IBS) schemes of [17, 18] support signature aggregation with the property that once aggregated, individual signatures cannot be extracted. The security model for IBCS under adaptive chosen key and chosen message attacks would be identical to that of CS under adaptive known key and chosen message attacks described in Game 1. Unlike standard signatures, however, no known constructions of IBS are known where the size of the aggregate signature is constant. This is an interesting open problem.

5.5 Chain Signatures On Distinct Messages

In our model, chain signatures are defined only in a situation when many users sign the same message. However, in many situations users may need to sign different messages and still enjoy the benefits of chain signatures. This is not a major problem and we describe two approaches to solve it. The first and obvious approach is to simply include the individual messages in the hash before the chain signature is computed. However, the security reduction becomes quite complicated in this case.⁶ We suggest an alternate and simpler approach that does not require any modification of the chain signature protocol. The idea is to use chain signatures (on a random message) to authenticate the path independently of the actual message(s) in question and then link the message from the chain signature to the actual message(s) using any existentially unforgeable signature scheme. This is the approach we follow in Section 6.1.1.

5.6 Efficiency Of Chain Signatures

Let E/\mathbb{F}_q be an elliptic curve defined by $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ with coefficients in \mathbb{F}_q and let $E(\mathbb{F}_q^r)$ denote the set of points of E in \mathbb{F}_{q^r} . Then in practice, $G_1 \subseteq E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ is the set of points of order p (plus the point at infinity) and G_2 is a subgroup of $\mathbb{F}_{q^r}^*$ (for suitably chosen q, r). It is necessary to ensure that $p = |G_1| \ge 2^{171}$ to disable generic algorithms for computing discrete logs in G_1 (such as Pollard's rho method [19, p.128]). Note that an indirect method to compute discrete logs in G_1 is to use the MOV-attack and compute discrete logs in $G_2 \subset \mathbb{F}_{q^r}^*$ [20]. Hence, q, r must be chosen so that the fastest algorithm for computing discrete logs in $\mathbb{F}_{q^r}^*$ (number field sieve [21]) is also impractical.

 $^{^{6}}$ To see why the security reduction is complicated, the reader is encouraged to try and prove the security for distinct messages using the above-mentioned approach. The problem arises because with different messages, the proof technique of Theorem 5.4 does not work - the probability of success after the adversary outputs a valid forgery becomes negligibly small if the individual signatures are not "linked" using the same message.

Although chain signatures can be constructed using an asymmetric bilinear map $\hat{e}: G_1 \times G_2 \mapsto G_3$ using non-supersingular curves (as in [14]), the public keys are elements of $E(\mathbb{F}_{q^6})$ as apposed to $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ for symmetric maps (and therefore 6 times larger). Consequently, in this work we only consider symmetric maps. Such maps can be constructed using supersingular curves over \mathbb{F}_q with $q = 3^{\ell}$ as discussed in [14]. Taking into account Coppersmith's algorithm for computing discrete logs in finite fields of small characterstic [14, 21], we obtain $\ell \geq 149$ for security equivalent to that offered by a 1024 bit RSA modulus [21]. Using these parameters, elements of G_1 will be points on $E(\mathbb{F}_{3^{149}})$. Hence, elements of G_1 can be represented using at most $\lceil \log_2(3^{149}) \rceil + 1 = 238$ bits.⁷

Key and signature size: These are elements of G_1 and can be represented in ≤ 30 bytes.

Computation time: The benchmarks of [22] indicate that each pairing operation using these parameters takes ≈ 8.6 ms and each elliptic curve point exponentiation takes ≈ 1.5 ms. These results were obtained on a desktop PC with an AMD Athlon 2100+ 1.8 GHz, 1 GB RAM and an IBM 7200 RPM, 40 GB, Ultra ATA/100 hard drive [22]. Using these values and neglecting the faster operations, we obtain the following performance estimates of the above protocol (assuming *n* users in the chain):

- 1. Signing: one exponentiation and addition in G_1 , and one computation of \mathcal{H} (total < 2ms).
- 2. Verification: *n* pairing computations and multiplications in G_2 , and *n* computations of \mathcal{H} (giving < 1 second for n = 100).

6 Applications of Chain Signatures

Considering that chain signature enable us to correctly validate the path of any received message using very short signatures and provides non-repudiation, we can consider several applications: mobile agent authentication [23, 24], group e-commerce, work-flow enforcement, secure routing, authenticated mail relaying, Grid computing and Mobile IP. The applications to mobile agent systems have already been discussed in Section 2. Here, we discuss another application: stateless routing.

6.1 Stateless Routing

The most common and robust interior and exterior routing protocol is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [25, 26]. It is a **Path Vector Routing** protocol, in which routers repeatedly advertise 'better' routes (along with the path details) to their immediate neighbors. On receiving an update, a router checks its routing table to decide if this advertised route is better than its existing routes. If so, the router updates its table and advertises the new route to all its other immediate neighbors. Although BGP is very robust, it has many security vulnerabilities [27, 28]. For instance, a router could send forged updates or extract intermediate routes from legitimate updates and claim to a shorter route (we call the latter a *Path Extraction Attack*). This is best explained using an example.




Figure 3: Scenario for a Path Extraction Attack

Consider the network of routers given in Figure 3. In the following, the symbol $X \triangleleft Y$ denotes the string "*There is a one-hop path from* Y to X" and the symbol $X \triangleleft$ denotes the string "*There is a zero-hop path from* X to X" (we define the latter for technical reasons). The numbers on the links indicate the metric. Assume that E is a rogue router who would like to intercept traffic sent from D to A, which would ordinarily be routed directly via router C. In BGP, assume that (ordinary) signatures are used to authenticate updates. Then the following update messages will be sent (considering only routes to A).

 $[\]sqrt[7]{\log_2(3^{149})}$ bits to represent the x-coordinate of the point and 1 bit to represent the sign of the y-coordinate.

Example 1. BGP updates

 $\begin{array}{ll} 1. \ A \to B : & \{Sign_A(A \triangleleft)\} \\ \\ 2. \ B \to C : & \{Sign_A(A \triangleleft), \ Sign_B(A \triangleleft B)\} \\ \\ 3. \ C \to D, E : \{Sign_A(A \triangleleft), \ Sign_B(A \triangleleft B), \ Sign_C(B \triangleleft C)\} \\ \\ 4. \ D \to E : & \{Sign_A(A \triangleleft), \ Sign_B(A \triangleleft B), \ Sign_C(B \triangleleft C), \ Sign_D(C \triangleleft D)\} \\ \\ 5. \ E \to D : & \{Sign_A(A \triangleleft), \ Sign_B(A \triangleleft B), \ Sign_C(B \triangleleft C), \ Sign_E(C \triangleleft E)\} \end{array}$

In this setup, traffic originating from D and destined for A will never pass through E. However, if E wants, it can simply extract the last two signatures in the update received from C and claim (to D) that it has a direct route to A by sending it the update $\{Sign_A(A), Sign_E(A \triangleleft E)\}$. In this case, D will assume that E has a more efficient path to A and use it to forward that traffic. Secure BGP (S-BGP) [29] mitigates this attack by requiring that "links" in the updates be two-way (i.e. contain signatures from each endpoint authenticating the other). In S-BGP, the routing updates would be as follows:

Example 2. S-BGP updates

Although the protocol of Example 2 is secure from the path extraction attack, it has two drawbacks: (1) Each router must be "aware" of its neighbors, and (2) In the example, router C can no longer broadcast the same message to its neighbors. This can cause scalability problems as follows. Firstly, each router must establish authenticity of each of its peer(s). Secondly, each update is peer-specific and therefore, even a single path change could result in a large number of messages sent by a host with many neighbors. It would be much simpler if the underlying routing protocol resisted path extraction attacks and required each router to broadcast only one short message on each update without being aware of its neighbors (as in Example 1). We call such a protocol a **Stateless Routing Protocol**. Such stateless-ness is useful if path vector routing is used over broadcast networks (such as ad-hoc wireless/sensor networks).

Current research on S-BGP authentication assumes the above stateful scenario of Example 2 and is focused on methods to reduce the number of signatures transmitted and/or processing time for signing and verification [10, 3, 30]. For instance, aggregate signatures have been proposed to keep the signature payload to a constant size [3]. The authors of [29] propose the use of *Signature Amortization* [30] coupled with aggregate or sequential aggregate signatures [6] to reduce the size of update messages and the signing time. However, all the above works assume some sort of stateful environment, where information about peers is pre-distributed or known. In this work, we focus on how to achieve security under path extraction attacks in a stateless implementation of BGP. Our proposed protocol, called Stateless Secure-BGP (SS-BGP) is based on chain signatures and provides the following benefits.

- 1. It is fully stateless. Routers need not be aware of their neighbors.
- 2. The update size is constant irrespective of the number of peers. Additionally, only one message needs to be transmitted if using broadcast.
- 3. The signing time is constant. The verification time is linear to the size of the path and is comparable to efficient stateful S-BGP based on aggregate signatures [29].

6.1.1 Stateless S-BGP (SS-BGP)

In this implementation, we will assume the same routing logic of BGP. However, we will use Example 1 in our scenarios and assume that routers may not be aware of their immediate neighbors. We will assume that routers can be directly identified using their public keys.

Denote by Y_i the public key of user *i* under a chain signature scheme. Let $Sign_i$, $Verify_i$ denote sign and verify functions of user *i* under another existentially unforgeable signature scheme, such as BLS. Denote by $L_i = \langle Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_n \rangle$ some ordered sequence of (public keys of) routers that would be affected by a given routing update. Note that there will be many such distinct sequences for the same update and Y_1 would be the first name (i.e., key) all these sequences. Each individual router may want to add additional information to the update. Denote this additional information of router *i* (intended for routers at level i + 1) by M_i . Denote by U_i the update message of *i* that is sent to i + 1 describing this update. The SS-BGP protocol is as follows.

Initialize First, the initiator, 1 generates a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ describing this update (i.e., the name of the Originating AS and a time-stamp). Let m_1 be the additional information (if any). To start the update user 1 computes $Sig_1 = \text{Sign}_1(m, m_1)$ and $(\sigma_1, (m, L_1))$, a chain signature on (m, L_1) . It broadcasts the update $U_1 = (\sigma_1, m, L_1, m_1, Sig_1)$ to all its neighbors.

Update On receiving update $U_i = (\sigma_i, m, L_i, m_i, Sig_i)$, router i + 1 does the following.

Accept Router *i* accepts this update if the following checks pass (and aborts otherwise):

- 1. $(\sigma_i, (m, L_i))$ is a valid chain signature.
- 2. Verify_i $(Sig_i, (m, m_i)) =$ True.
- 3. The destination and time-stamp defined in m are correct.
- 4. Routes to each of the links specified in L_i exist and all the nodes in L_i are trusted.

It then checks m_i for additional information regarding this update (if any).

Propagate If the update is valid, router i + 1 propagates it as follows:

- 1. It constructs the sequence L_{i+1} by appending its own public key Y_i to L_i and computes a chain signature $(\sigma_{i+1}, (m, L_{i+1}))$ using σ_i and its private key x_{i+1} .
- 2. It constructs a message m_{i+1} with additional routing information (if any) and computes the signature $Sig_{i+1} = \text{Sign}_{i+1}(m, m_{i+1})$.
- 3. It broadcasts the update $U_{i+1} = (\sigma_{i+1}, m, L_{i+1}, m_{i+1}, Sig_{i+1}).$

Let us analyze this method:

- 1. Security: The use of chain signatures ensures that router i + 1 cannot prove a direct route to any router j < i without access to the chain signature sent by j. Consequently, path extraction attacks are infeasible. Note that it is still possible for an attacking node to simply forward the received update without including its chain signature (i.e., the attacker simply acts as the transmission medium). In this case, the best he can do is make the path one hop shorter. However, if the communication channel allows sender authentication then this attack is also infeasible. The use of the time-stamp avoids any replay attacks. The use of Sig_i ensures that some correlation is maintained between an advertised route and the actual destination.
- 2. Storage: To be able to validate the signatures, each host must be able to store/obtain public keys of all routers in question, which may lead to scalability problems. This problem is easily solved using Identity Based Chain Signatures (IBCS) (briefly discussed in Section 5.4) and Identity Based Signatures (IBS) where the IP address of a host acts as the public key. The security model of IBCS would be identical to the model described here.
- 3. Overhead: The overhead incurred by (m, m_i, Sig_i) in update U_i cannot be avoided. The chain signature additionally incurs the overhead of (σ_i, L_i) . Assuming that public keys can be uniquely identified by IP addresses, the sequences L_i can be constructed from the IP addresses of the nodes in the path. Consequently, L_i is part of the update message itself and does not incur any overhead. The only overhead is then the size of a chain signature, which will be less than 30 bytes using the parameters discussed in Section 5.6.

4. Multiple Updates Aggregation: In the above description, we assumed that each advertisement U_i contains only one route and is transmitted instantaneously. In the real world, each advertisement contains multiple routes and is sent periodically. Fortunately, both the chain signature and individual signature schemes used above allow for signature aggregation and aggregate verification where a large number of (chained or individual) signatures can be verified at once [3].⁸

7 Summary

In this paper, we introduced the notion of Chain Signatures as an extension of Boneh et al.'s short signatures [14]. Although chain signature arise naturally from the aggregate signatures of [3] due to the inherent properties of bilinear maps, the security requirements of chain signatures is significantly different as demonstrated in Sections 4.2 and 4.5. We note that chain signatures without using bilinear maps were independently proposed in [24, 31] in which the authors used hypothetical primitives called *Strong Associative One-Way Functions* (SAOWFs).

Considering that chained signatures enable us to correctly validate the path of any received message and provide non-repudiation, we can consider several applications: mobile agent authentication [31, 24], electronic auctions, relaying, token based authentication. As a practical demonstration of applications, we presented a novel method for stateless routing.

The main feature of chain signatures that distinguishes them from other multi-user signature schemes is that chain signatures provide *truncation resilience* (See Section 3). The chain signature scheme presented here, however, does not provide *strong truncation resilience*. Signatures that also provide strong truncation resilience are called *Strong Chain Signatures* (SCS). However, whether practical SCS schemes exist or not, is still an open question at this stage.

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 $^{^{8}}$ The use of aggregate signatures in BGP advertisement verification has already been discussed in [3]. We additionally suggest using chain signatures for increased scalability.

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