CRYPTANALYSIS OF RSA WITH CONSTRAINED KEYS

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Abstract. Let $n = pq$ be an RSA modulus with unknown prime factors and F any function for which there exists an integer $u \neq 0$ satisfying $F(u) \approx n$ and pu or qu is computable from $F(u)$ and n. We show that choosing a public key exponent e for which there exist positive integers X, Y such that $|eY - XF(u)|$ and Y are suitably small, then the system is insecure.

1 Introduction

Let $n = pq$ be an RSA modulus, i.e the product of two large primes p, q of the same size. Let e and d be the public and secret keys satisfying $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$ where $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$ is the Euler totient function related to n. Since its publication in 1977 [8], the RSA cryptosystem has been analyzed for vulnerability by many researchers (see [2]). Since RSA is computationally expensive, one might be tempted to use short secret keys d in ordre to speed up the decryption process. Unfortunately, in 1990, Wiener [11] showed that RSA is insecure if $d \leq \frac{1}{3}n^{\frac{1}{4}}$. In 1999, Boneh and Durfee [3] (heuristically) improved the bound to $d \leq n^{0.292}$. While Wiener's attack uses continued fractions, the Boneh and Durfee attack is based on Coppersmith's method for finding small roots of modular polynomial equations [4]. In 2002, de Weger [10] improved these bounds for the RSA modulus $n = pq$ with small prime difference $|p - q|$. Recently, Blömer and May [1] extended both Wiener and de Weger attacks for the RSA cryptosystems with secret keys having the modular factorization $d \equiv -xy^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$ where x and y are suitably

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small. Morever, they showed that the number of such weak keys is at least $O\left(n^{3/4-\varepsilon}\right)$ where ε is a positive constant.

All the known non-factoring attacks on RSA exploit the weakness of the public key e relatively to $\phi(n)$ focusing on the information encoded in e and $\phi(n)$. The starting point is the equation

$$ed - k\phi(n) = 1,$$

or, as considered in [1], the more general equation

$$ex + y = k\phi(n),$$

where x, y, k are suitably small relatively prime integers.

In this paper, we present an attack on RSA by exploiting additional information that may be encoded in the public key e relatively to special functions of the primes p and q. Let F be a function satisfying the conditions

$$\text{There exists an integer } u \neq 0 \text{ such that } F(u) \approx n. \tag{1}$$

$$\text{There exists a transformation relating } F(u) \text{ to a multiple of } p \text{ or } q. \tag{2}$$

We now introduce the concept of F-constrained public keys. Let us formalize this notion.

Definition 1.1. *Let n be an RSA modulus and F a function satisfying the conditions (1), (2). A public key e is F-constrained if there exists an integer u and two coprime positive integers X and Y such that both Y and $|eY - F(u)X|$ are suitably small.*

The integers X, Y will be formally defined in Theorem 3.1. We list below typical examples of functions satisfying the conditions (1), (2). Let $u_0 \neq 0$ be a fixed rational and F a function defined by one of the following expressions

$$\begin{aligned}
F_1(u) &= p(q-u), && 1 \leq |u| < q.\\
F_1'(u) &= (p-u)q, && 1 \leq |u| < p.\\
F_2(u) &= n + u_0 - pu, && 1 \leq |u| < q + \frac{u_0}{p}.\\
F_2'(u) &= n + u_0 - qu, && 1 \leq |u| < p + \frac{u_0}{q}.\\
F_3(u) &= (q-u)\left(p - \frac{u_0}{u}\right), && 1 \leq |u| < q.\\
F_3'(u) &= (p-u)\left(q - \frac{u_0}{u}\right), && 1 \leq |u| < p.
\end{aligned}$$

Observe that when $u_0 = 1$, we have $F_3(1) = (p-1)(q-1) = \phi(n)$. This indicates that our method is a natural extension of the attack of Blömer and May [1]. In this paper, we mainly study the cryptanalysis of RSA with F_1-constrained keys. More precisely, we show that if e satisfies the equation

$$eY - F_1(u)X = Z \tag{3}$$

with unknown integers u, X, Y, Z such that

$$1 \leq Y \leq \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{qF_1(u)}{e|u|}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \qquad \text{and} \qquad 1 \leq |Z| \leq \frac{2n^{-\frac{3}{4}}\left(n - p|u|\right)eY}{F_1(u)},$$

then n can be factored in polynomial time. In a radically new way, we will show that the number of F_1-constrained keys is at least $O\left(n^{3/4-\varepsilon}\right)$.

Our new method works as follows. Assume that e is $F(u)$-constrained for some integer u where F is a function satisfying (1), (2). We use the continued fraction algorithm to find X and Y in (3) by replacing $\frac{e}{F(u)}$ by $\frac{e}{n}$. For every convergent $\frac{X}{Y}$ of the expansion, we compute the approximation $F(u) \approx \frac{eY}{X}$ and by (2), an approximation $\tilde{P}$ of a multiple of p or q. We then apply May's extension (Theorem 10 of [7]) of Coppersmith's method [4] to find the factorization of n.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review former continued fraction attacks on RSA with short secret exponents. In Section 3, we discuss the possiblity of determining the first convergents of the continued fraction expansion of $\frac{e}{F(u)}$ using $\frac{e}{n}$ if e is $F(u)$-constrained. Recall that the attacker does not know F but he does know e and n. In Section 4 we show how to factor the RSA modulus n when e is F_1-constrained and give an estimation of the number of such keys. We will use techniques from the continued fraction expansion combined with Coppersmith's Theorem [4] and May's extension [7]. In Section 5, we give a numerical example to illustrate our attack. Exploiting the symmetry on the primes p and q in F_1 and F_1', the vulnerablity of an RSA cryptosystem with a modulus n and an F_1'-constrained public key e follows.

A key role in our attack is played by the following extension of the well-known theorem of Coppersmith [4].

Theorem 1.2. (May, Theorem 10 of [7]). *Let $n = pq$ be an RSA modulus with $q < p$. Let u be an (unknown) integer that is not multiple of q. Suppose we know an approximation $\tilde{P}$ of pu with*

$$|pu - \tilde{P}| \leq 2n^{\frac{1}{4}}.$$

Then n can be factorized in time polynomial in $\log n$.

2 Former continued fraction attacks on RSA with weak keys

In this section, we present three former attacks on RSA based on the continued fractions. All the attacks exploits the weakness of the public key e relatively to $\phi(n)$.

2.1 The Wiener attack.

The public and private keys are related by the equation $ed - k\phi(n) = 1$ rewriting as

$$\frac{e}{\phi(n)} - \frac{k}{d} = \frac{1}{\phi(n)d}.$$

Wiener exploits the fact that $\frac{e}{\phi(n)} \approx \frac{e}{n}$ and $n = pq$ for primes p, q of the same bit-size. Combining the arithmetical properties of $\phi(n)$ with the assumption $d < \frac{1}{3}n^{\frac{1}{4}}$, this leads to

$$\left|\frac{e}{n} - \frac{k}{d}\right| < \frac{1}{2d^2}.$$

By Legendre's theorem (see Corollary 2, [1, § 2] in [6]), $\frac{k}{d}$ is a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of $\frac{e}{n}$.

2.2 The de Weger attack.

The continued fraction part of the de Weger attack [10] applies to an RSA modulus with small difference between its primes. It exploits the approximation $\phi(n) \approx n+1-2\sqrt{n}$ and the weakness of e relatively to $\phi(n)$ and works as follows. Using $ed - k\phi(n) = 1$ and assuming that $\phi(n) > \frac{3}{4}n$, $n > 8d$ with

$$d < \frac{n^{\frac{3}{4}}}{p-q},$$

de Weger showed that

$$\left|\frac{e}{n+1-2\sqrt{n}} - \frac{k}{d}\right| < \frac{1}{2d^2}.$$

Hence $\frac{k}{d}$ is a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of $\frac{e}{n+1-2\sqrt{n}}$.

2.3 The Blömer-May attack.

The attack of Blömer and May [1] combines the continued fraction expansion of $\frac{e}{n}$ and Coppersmith's lattice-based technique for finding small roots of univariate modular polynomial equations [4]. The attack applies when the public key e is weak relatively to $\phi(n)$ and is based on the existence of coprime integers x, y, k satisfying $ex + y = k\phi(n)$ with

$$0 < x \leq \frac{1}{3}n^{\frac{1}{4}} \qquad \text{and} \qquad |y| \leq cn^{-\frac{3}{4}}ex,$$

where $c \leq 1$. Combining with the properties of $\phi(n)$, they showed that

$$\left|\frac{e}{n} - \frac{k}{x}\right| < \frac{1}{2x^2}.$$

Hence $\frac{k}{x}$ is a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of $\frac{e}{n}$. Next, they applied Coppermith's method [4] to find the factorization of the modulus n as follows. Using $ex + y = k(n+1-p-q)$, we have

$$p + q = n + 1 - \frac{ex}{k} - \frac{y}{k}.$$

Since k and x are known, then $s = n + 1 - \frac{ex}{k}$ is an approximation of $p+q$ up to an error term $\frac{|y|}{k} \leq \frac{4}{3}cn^{\frac{1}{4}}$ (see [1] for more details). Let $t = \sqrt{s^2 - 4n}$. Then t is an approximation

of $p-q$ up to an error term bounded by $9n^{\frac{1}{4}}$. This shows that $\frac{s+t}{2}$ is an approximation of p that can be bounded by $6n^{\frac{1}{4}}$. Applying Coppersmith's algorithm with $\frac{s+t}{2}$ gives the factorization of n.

The extension of the continued fraction attacks by Verheul and van Tilborg [9] and its modification by Dujella [5] applies to $d \leq n^{\frac{1}{4}+\frac{\gamma}{2}}$ provided exhaustive search on $O(\gamma \log_2(n))$ bits. These extensions are also based on the weakness of e relatively to $\phi(n)$.

3 The continued fraction expansion of $\dfrac{e}{F(u)}$

Let F be a function satisfying (1), (2). Our goal in this section is to guess a part of the continued fraction expansion of $\frac{e}{F(u)}$. Recall that the attacker does not know the exact expression of F but he does know that $F(u)$ could be close to n for some unknown u. Morever, we suppose that $0 < F(u) < 2n$ so that there exists α with $-\frac{1}{2} < \alpha < \frac{1}{2}$ such that

$$|F(u) - n| = n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha}. \tag{4}$$

Theorem 3.1. *Let F be a function satisfying (1), (2) and $n = pq$ an RSA modulus with $p < q$. Let u be an integer such that $|F(u) - n| = n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha}$, with $-\frac{1}{2} < \alpha < \frac{1}{2}$. Let X, Y, Z be coprime integers satisfying $eY - F(u)X = Z$. If*

$$Y < \frac{1}{2} n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}} \left(\frac{F(u)}{e}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}, \tag{5}$$

and

$$|Z| \leq n^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}} eY, \tag{6}$$

then $\frac{X}{Y}$ is a convergent among the continued fraction expansion of $\frac{e}{n}$.

Proof. Using $eY - F(u)X = Z$, we get

$$\begin{aligned}\left|\frac{e}{n} - \frac{X}{Y}\right| &\leq \left|\frac{e}{n} - \frac{e}{F(u)}\right| + \left|\frac{e}{F(u)} - \frac{X}{Y}\right| \\ &= \frac{e|F(u)-n|}{nF(u)} + \frac{|eY - F(u)X|}{F(u)Y} \\ &= \frac{en^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}}}{F(u)} + \frac{|Z|}{F(u)Y}.\end{aligned}$$

Since $|Z| \leq n^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}} eY$, then

$$\left|\frac{e}{n} - \frac{X}{Y}\right| \leq \frac{en^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}}}{F(u)} + \frac{en^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}}}{F(u)} = \frac{2en^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}}}{F(u)}.$$

By assumption, we have

$$Y < \frac{1}{2} n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}} \left(\frac{F(u)}{e}\right)^{1/2},$$

Hence

$$\frac{2en^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}}}{F(u)} < \frac{1}{2Y^2}.$$

which gives

$$\left|\frac{e}{n} - \frac{X}{Y}\right| < \frac{1}{2Y^2}.$$

By Legendre's theorem (Corollary 2, [1, § 2] in [6]), $\frac{X}{Y}$ is a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of $\frac{e}{n}$.

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Theorem 3.1 relates the unknowns Y, Z in the equation (3). Let us find a lower bound for the quantity X.

Corollary 3.2. *With the hypothesis of Theorem 3.1, we have*

$$X \geq \left(1 - n^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}}\right) \frac{eY}{F(u)}. \tag{7}$$

Proof. Since by assumption $-\frac{1}{2} < \alpha < \frac{1}{2}$, then $-1 < \alpha - \frac{1}{2} < 0$. Hence $1 - n^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}} > 0$. Combining $Z = eY - F(u)X$ and $|Z| \leq n^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}} eY$, we get

$$X = \frac{eY - Z}{F(u)} \geq \frac{eY - |Z|}{F(u)} = \frac{eY}{F(u)}\left(1 - \frac{|Z|}{eY}\right) \geq \frac{eY}{F(u)}\left(1 - n^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}}\right),$$

which terminates the proof.

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4. Vulnerability of RSA using $F = F_1$

In this section, we will show that using an RSA modulus $n = pq$ with $q < p$ and an F_1-constrained public key e is insecure. Recall that $F_1(u) = p(q - u)$. We will also give an estimation of the number of $F_1(u)$-constrained keys for a fixed u and derive an estimation of the number of F_1-constrained keys.

4.1 Cryptanalysis of RSA with F_1-constrained keys.

Theorem 3.1 relates the unknowns Y, Z of the equation (3) and shows that the first convergents of $\frac{e}{F_1(u)}$ are among the convergents of $\frac{e}{n}$. In the following theorem, we give a condition relating X and Y and leading to the factorization of n.

Theorem 4.1. *Let X, Y be coprime positive integers. If there exists an integer u with $1 \leq |u| \leq q-1$ such that $|eY - F_1(u)X| \leq 2n^{\frac{1}{4}}X$, then n can be factored in polynomial time.*

Proof. Put $Z = eY - F_1(u)X$. Using $F_1(u) = p(q-u)$, we get

$$pu = n - \frac{eY}{X} + \frac{Z}{X}.$$

Let $\tilde{P} = n - \frac{eY}{X}$. We have

$$\left|\tilde{P} - pu\right| = \frac{|Z|}{X} \leq \frac{2n^{\frac{1}{4}}X}{X} = 2n^{\frac{1}{4}}.$$

Hence $\tilde{P}$ is an approximation of pu with an error term less than $2n^{\frac{1}{4}}$. We conclude the proof by applying Theorem 1.2.

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Let us consider the α term as defined in (4). Since $q < \sqrt{n} < p$ and $F_1(u) = p(q-u) = n - pu$ with $1 \leq |u| \leq q-1$ we get $|F_1(u) - n| = p|u| = n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha}$ with $0 < \alpha < \frac{1}{2}$.

We now state our result concerning the vulnerability of RSA using $F = F_1$.

Theorem 4.2. *Let $n = pq$ be an RSA modulus with $q < p$ and u an integer satisfying $1 \leq |u| \leq q-1$ and $p|u| = n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha}$. Let X, Y be coprime positive integers. If X and Y satisfy $eY - F_1(u)X = Z$, with*

$$Y < \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}}\left(\frac{F_1(u)}{e}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}, \tag{8}$$

and

$$|Z| \leq \frac{2n^{\frac{1}{4}}\left(1 - n^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}}\right)eY}{F_1(u)}, \tag{9}$$

then $\frac{X}{Y}$ is a convergent of $\frac{e}{n}$ and n can be factored in polynomial time.

Proof. Let us first show that $\frac{X}{Y}$ is a convergent of $\frac{e}{n}$. Observe that Y satisfies the inequality (5) of Theorem 3.1 with $F = F_1$. Let $Z = eY - F_1(u)X$. Assume that Z satisfies (9). Since $F_1(u) \geq n - n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha}$, we get

$$|Z| \leq \frac{2n^{\frac{1}{4}}\left(1 - n^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}}\right)eY}{F_1(u)} \leq \frac{2n^{\frac{1}{4}}\left(1 - n^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}}\right)eY}{n - n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha}} = 2n^{-\frac{3}{4}}eY \leq n^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}}eY.$$

This shows that (6) is also satisfied. Hence, by Theorem 3.1, $\frac{X}{Y}$ is a convergent of $\frac{e}{n}$. On the other hand, combining (7) with $F = F_1$ and (9), we get

$$\frac{|Z|}{X} \leq \frac{|Z|F_1(u)}{\left(1 - n^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}}\right)eY} \leq 2n^{\frac{1}{4}}.$$

Hence, by Theorem 4.1, n can be factored in polynomial time.

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4.2 The number of $F_1(u)$-constrained keys.

Let u be a fixed integer satisfying $1 \leq |u| \leq q-1$. We indicate below how the crypto designer could build public keys which are $F_1(u)$-constrained using only very short values of X, Y. We begin by the following useful lemma. We use the usual notation $\lfloor x \rfloor$ for the integral part of x.

Lemma 4.3. *Let $n = pq$ be an RSA modulus with $q < p$ and u an integer satisfying $1 \leq |u| \leq q-1$ and $p|u| = n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha}$. Let X, Y be coprime integers with*

$$1 \leq X \leq Y < \frac{1}{2} n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}}.$$

If $e = \lfloor F_1(u)\frac{X}{Y} \rfloor$, then $e > n^{\frac{1}{2}-\alpha}$.

Proof. Let $Z = eY - F_1(u)X$. By the definition of e, we have

$$0 \leq F_1(u)\frac{X}{Y} - e < 1.$$

Combininig with the inequalities $1 \leq X < Y < \frac{1}{2} n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}}$, this gives us

$$e + 1 > F_1(u)\frac{X}{Y} \geq (n - p|u|)\frac{1}{Y} > 2\,(n - p|u|)\, n^{\frac{\alpha}{2}-\frac{1}{4}}.$$

To show that $e > n^{\frac{1}{2}-\alpha}$, it suffices to show that

$$2\,(n - p|u|)\, n^{\frac{\alpha}{2}-\frac{1}{4}} > n^{\frac{1}{2}-\alpha} + 1. \tag{10}$$

Note that $p|u| = n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha}$. Then $n^{\alpha} = p|u|n^{-\frac{1}{2}}$ and consequently

$$n^{\frac{\alpha}{2}-\frac{1}{4}} = p^{\frac{1}{2}}|u|^{\frac{1}{2}} n^{-\frac{1}{4}} n^{-\frac{1}{4}} = \left(\frac{|u|}{q}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}.$$

Similarly,

$$n^{\frac{1}{2}-\alpha} = n^{\frac{1}{2}} p^{-1} |u|^{-1} n^{\frac{1}{2}} = \frac{q}{|u|}.$$

Hence (10) is equivalent with

$$2\,(n - p|u|)\left(\frac{|u|}{q}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} > \frac{q}{|u|} + 1.$$

Let

$$f(u) = 2\,(n - p|u|)\left(\frac{|u|}{q}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} - \frac{q}{|u|} - 1,$$

with $1 \leq |u| \leq q-1$. An arithmetical study of the derivatives of f shows that for any such u we have

$$f(u) \geq \min(f(1), f(q-1)) = f(q-1) = 2p\left(\frac{q-1}{q}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} - \frac{q}{q-1} - 1 > 0.$$

This confirms (10) and completes the proof.

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Corollary 4.4. *Let $n = pq$ be an RSA modulus with $q < p$ and u an integer satisfying $1 \le |u| \le q-1$ and $p|u| = n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha}$. Let X, Y be coprime integers with*

$$1 \le X \le Y < \frac{1}{2} n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}}.$$

If $e = \lfloor F_1(u)\frac{X}{Y} \rfloor$, then $\frac{X}{Y}$ is a convergent of both $\frac{e}{F_1(u)}$ and $\frac{e}{n}$ and e is $F_1(u)$-constrained.

Proof. Let $Z = eY - F_1(u)X$. Since $1 \le |u| \le q-1$, $p > \sqrt{n}$ and $1 \le X \le Y < \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}}$, then

$$F_1(u) = n - pu \ge n - p|u| \ge n - p(q-1) = p > n^{\frac{1}{2}} > 2Y^2.$$

On the other hand, by the definition of e, we have

$$0 \le F_1(u)\frac{X}{Y} - e < 1. \tag{11}$$

Hence

$$\left| \frac{e}{F_1(u)} - \frac{X}{Y} \right| < \frac{1}{F_1(u)} < \frac{1}{2Y^2}.$$

This shows that $\frac{X}{Y}$ is a convergent of $\frac{e}{F_1(u)}$. Let us show that $\frac{X}{Y}$ is a convergent of $\frac{e}{n}$. By (11) and Lemma 4.3 we have

$$|Z| = |eY - F_1(u)X| < Y < n^{\alpha-\frac{1}{2}}eY,$$

and the inequality (6) of Theorem 3.1 is satisfied where $F = F_1$. Morever, by (11), we have

$$\frac{F_1(u)}{e} \ge \frac{Y}{X} \ge 1.$$

Combining with $Y < \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}}$, this gives

$$Y < \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}} \left(\frac{F_1(u)}{e}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}},$$

and (5) is also satisfied with $F = F_1$. Hence, by Theorem 3.1, $\frac{X}{Y}$ is a convergent of $\frac{e}{n}$. Finally, using (11), we have

$$\frac{|Z|}{X} = \frac{|eY - F_1(u)X|}{X} < \frac{Y}{X} \le Y < \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}} < 2n^{\frac{1}{4}}.$$

Thus, by Theorem 4.1, e is $F_1(u)$-constrained which terminates the proof. ∎

Corollary 4.4 indicates that every couple (X, Y) of coprime positive integers with $1 \le X < Y < \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}}$ and every integer u with $1 \le |u| \le q-1$ yield a candidate public key e for which the RSA cryptosystem is insecure. We show below that different couples produce different candidate public keys.

Lemma 4.5. *Let $n = pq$ be an RSA modulus with $q < p$ and u an integer satisfying $1 \leq |u| \leq q-1$ and $p|u| = n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha}$. Let X, X', Y and Y' be positive integers with $\gcd(X,Y) = \gcd(X',Y') = 1$ and*

$$1 \leq X \leq Y < \frac{1}{2} n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}} \qquad \text{and} \qquad 1 \leq X' < Y' < \frac{1}{2} n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha'}{2}}.$$

Let $e = \left\lfloor F_1(u)\frac{X}{Y} \right\rfloor$ and $e' = \left\lfloor F_1(u)\frac{X'}{Y'} \right\rfloor$. If $e = e'$, then $(X,Y) = (X',Y')$.

Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that $\frac{X}{Y} \geq \frac{X'}{Y'}$. By definition, e satisfies (11). Similarly, we have

$$0 \leq F_1(u)\frac{X'}{Y'} - e' < 1. \tag{12}$$

Combining (11) and (12), we get

$$\left(\frac{X}{Y} - \frac{X'}{Y'}\right) F_1(u) - 1 < e - e' < \left(\frac{X}{Y} - \frac{X'}{Y'}\right) F_1(u) + 1.$$

From this, we derive

$$0 \leq \left(\frac{X}{Y} - \frac{X'}{Y'}\right) F_1(u) < e - e' + 1.$$

By assumption $e = e'$. Then $0 \leq \left(\frac{X}{Y} - \frac{X'}{Y'}\right) F_1(u) < 1$ or equivalently,

$$0 \leq (XY' - YX')F_1(u) < YY'.$$

Combining the inequalities $1 \leq Y < \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}}$, $1 \leq Y' < \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha'}{2}}$ and $F_1(u) \geq n - p|u| \geq n - p(q-1) = p > n^{\frac{1}{2}}$, we get

$$0 \leq (XY' - X'Y) < \frac{YY'}{F_1(u)} < \frac{\frac{1}{4}n^{\frac{1}{2}-\frac{\alpha+\alpha'}{2}}}{n^{\frac{1}{2}}} < 1.$$

Hence $XY' - X'Y = 0$ and since $\gcd(X,Y) = \gcd(X',Y') = 1$, we get $X = X'$ and $Y = Y'$.

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For a fixed integer u satisfying $1 \leq |u| \leq q-1$, we state below a lower bound for the number of $F_1(u)$-constrained public keys.

Theorem 4.6. *Let $n = pq$ be an RSA modulus with $q < p$ and u an integer satisfying $1 \leq |u| \leq q-1$ and $p|u| = n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha}$. The number of $F_1(u)$-constrained public keys is at least $O\left(n^{\frac{3}{4}-\alpha-\varepsilon}\right)$.*

Proof. Let ε be a positive constant and u a fixed integer with $1 \leq |u| \leq q-1$. Let X and Y be coprime positive integers satisfying $1 \leq X \leq Y < \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}-\varepsilon}$. Define $e = \lfloor F_1(u)\frac{X}{Y} \rfloor$ and $Z = eY - F_1(u)X$. Using similar arguments as in the proof of Corllarly 4.4, we get $\frac{|Z|}{X} < 2n^{\frac{1}{4}-\varepsilon}$. If $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) \neq 1$, then e is not a valid public key. Let $e' = e + h$ for some integer h with $\gcd(e+h, \phi(n)) = 1$ and

$$1 \leq h \leq n^{\frac{1}{4}}\frac{X}{Y}.$$

Let $Z' = e'Y - F_1(u)X$. Since $Z < 0$, then

$$\frac{|Z'|}{X} = \frac{|(e+h)Y - F_1(u)X|}{X} = \frac{|Z + hY|}{X} \leq \frac{\max(|Z|, hY)}{X} < n^{\frac{1}{4}}.$$

Hence, by Theorem 4.1, e' is $F_1(u)$-constrained. This shows that every couple (X, Y) satisfying $\gcd(X, Y) = 1$ builds approximately $\frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}}\frac{X}{Y}$ public keys which are $F_1(u)$-constrained. Hence, the number of such keys depends on the number of couples (X, Y) satisfying $\gcd(X, Y) = 1$ and $1 \leq X \leq Y < n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}-\varepsilon}$. For a fixed Y, there are $\phi(Y)$ positive integers X such that $\gcd(X, Y) = 1$ and $1 \leq X \leq Y$. Let $m = \left\lfloor \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}-\varepsilon} \right\rfloor$. Using the well known estimation

$$\phi(Y) \geq \frac{KY}{\log\log(Y)} \geq \frac{KY}{\log\log(n)} = Yn^{-\varepsilon'},$$

where K is a constant related to the Euler constant, the number of the $F_1(u)$-constrained keys is at least

$$\sum_{1 \leq X \leq Y \leq m} \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}}\frac{X}{Y}\phi(Y) \geq \sum_{X=1}^{m} \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\varepsilon'}X = n^{\frac{1}{4}-\varepsilon'}\frac{m(m+1)}{4} = O\left(n^{\frac{3}{4}-\alpha-2\varepsilon-\varepsilon'}\right).$$

Replacing $2\varepsilon + \varepsilon'$ by ε, this terminates the proof.

■

4.3 The number of F_1-constrained keys.

Theorem 4.6 gives an estimation of the number of $F_1(u)$-constrained keys for a fixed u. It remains to give an estimation of the number of F_1-constrained keys. Let u and u' be a fixed integers with $1 \leq |u|, |u'| \leq q-1$. We show below that if e is simultaneously constrained to $F_1(u)$ and $F_1(u')$, then $u = u'$.

Lemma 4.7. *Let $n = pq$ be an RSA modulus with $q < p$ and let u, u' be integers satisfying $1 \le |u|, |u'| \le q-1$ and $p|u| = n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha}$, $p|u'| = n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha'}$. Let X, Y, X', Y' be positive integers satisfying $\gcd(X,Y) = \gcd(X',Y') = 1$, and*

$$1 \le X \le Y < \frac{1}{2} n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}} \qquad \text{and} \qquad 1 \le X' < Y' < \frac{1}{2} n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha'}{2}}.$$

Let $e = \left\lfloor F_1(u)\frac{X}{Y} \right\rfloor$ and $e' = \left\lfloor F_1(u)\frac{X'}{Y'} \right\rfloor$. If $e = e'$ then $u = u'$ and $(X,Y) = (X',Y')$.

Proof. Assume that

$$e = \left\lfloor F_1(u)\frac{X}{Y} \right\rfloor = e' = \left\lfloor F_1(u')\frac{X'}{Y'} \right\rfloor.$$

From this, we get

$$\left| F_1(u)\frac{X}{Y} - F_1(u')\frac{X'}{Y'} \right| < 1.$$

Using $F_1(u) = n - pu$, $F_1(u') = n - pu'$, this gives

$$|(q-u)XY' - (q-u')X'Y| < \frac{YY'}{p}.$$

Since by assumption $1 \le X \le Y < \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}}$, $1 \le X' < Y' < \frac{1}{2}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha'}{2}}$ and $p > \sqrt{n}$. Then

$$|(q-u)XY' - (q-u')X'Y| < \frac{YY'}{p} < \frac{1}{4}n^{\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha}{2}+\frac{1}{4}-\frac{\alpha'}{2}-\frac{1}{2}} = \frac{1}{4}n^{-\frac{\alpha+\alpha'}{2}} < 1.$$

Since $(q-u)XY' - (q-u')X'Y$ is an integer, then $(q-u)XY' - (q-u')X'Y = 0$. Further, $\gcd(X,Y) = \gcd(X',Y') = 1$. From this, it follows that

$$X = (q-u')X', \quad Y = (q-u)Y', \quad X' = (q-u)X, \quad Y' = (q-u')Y.$$

Combining X and X', we get $X = (q-u')X' = (q-u')(q-u)X$ and $(q-u)(q-u') = 1$. Hence $q-u = q-u' = \pm 1$ and $u = u'$. Finally, by Lemma 4.5, $(X,Y) = (X',Y')$ which terminates the proof.

■

We now give an estimation for the number of F_1-constrained public keys.

Theorem 4.8. *Let $n = pq$ be an RSA modulus with $q < p < 2q$. The number of F_1-constrained public keys is at least $O\left(n^{\frac{3}{4}-\varepsilon}\right)$.*

Proof. By Theorem 4.6, for every u with $1 \le |u| \le q-1$ and $p|u| = n^{\frac{1}{2}+\alpha}$, the number of the $F_1(u)$-constrained keys is at least $O\left(n^{\frac{3}{4}-\alpha-\varepsilon}\right)$. Hence, the number of the F_1-constrained keys is at least

$$N(F_1) = \sum_{0<\alpha<1} n^{\frac{3}{4}-\alpha-\varepsilon}.$$

Since $q < p < 2q$, then $n < p^2 < 2n$ and $p < 2^{\frac{1}{2}} n^{\frac{1}{2}}$. Combining this with $n^{\alpha} = n^{-\frac{1}{2}} p|u|$, we get

$$n^{-\alpha} = n^{\frac{1}{2}} p^{-1} |u|^{-1} > 2^{-\frac{1}{2}} |u|^{-1}.$$

It follows that

$$N(F_1) = n^{\frac{3}{4}-\varepsilon} \sum_{\alpha} n^{-\alpha} > 2^{-\frac{1}{2}} n^{\frac{3}{4}-\varepsilon} \sum_{|u|=1}^{q-1} |u|^{-1}.$$

The sum $\sum_{|u|=1}^{q-1} u^{-1}$ is related to the harmonic series $\sum_{u=1}^{\infty} u^{-1}$ which diverges. Trivially, we have

$$\sum_{|u|=1}^{q-1} u^{-1} > 2$$

and finally

$$N(F_1) \geq 2^{\frac{1}{2}} n^{\frac{3}{4}-\varepsilon},$$

which terminates the proof.

■

5. A numerical example using $F = F_1$

Let $n = pq$ be an RSA modulus with $q < p$. Let e be a public exponent. In this section, we give an algorithm to factor the modulus n if e is $F_1(u)$-constrained for some unknown u where $F_1(u) = p(q-u)$.

The algorithm.

INPUT: a) The RSA modulus $n = pq$ with unknown prime factors.
b) The public key e such that $eY - F(u)X = Z$ for some unknown integers u, X, Y and Z satisfying (8) and (9).

1. Compute the continued fraction expansion of $\frac{e}{n}$.
2. For every convergent $\frac{X}{Y}$ such that $Y < \frac{1}{2} n^{\frac{1}{4}}$:
   i) Compute $\tilde{P} = n - \frac{eX}{Y}$.
   ii) Apply Coppersmith's algorithm with $\tilde{P}$ and output a value N.
   iii) Compute $g = \gcd(N, n)$. If $g \neq n$ then stop.

OUTPUT: $p = g$, $q = \frac{n}{p}$, $u = \frac{N}{p}$.

Let us now consider the 48 digit example.

$$n = 941096252089784462564816358283310787682673275523,$$
$$e = 315625340556173340571223891244486052970403822 67.$$

The first 24 partial quotients of the continued fraction expansion of $\frac{e}{n}$ are

$$[0,\ 29,\ 1,\ 4,\ 2,\ 5,\ 1,\ 7\ 1,\ 12,\ 14,\ 2,\ 1,\ 1,\ 1,\ 1,\ 1,\ 1,\ 1,\ 5,\ 2,\ 3020,\ 1, 1,\ ...].$$

The 21th convergent is $\frac{X}{Y} = \frac{78754791}{2348222057}$. With $\tilde{P} = n - \frac{eY}{X}$, Coppersmith's algorithm outputs $N = -16844161339196881321690656 75$. This gives $p = \gcd(N, n) = 13211106932703436330 73777$, $u = \frac{N}{p} = -1271$, $q = \frac{n}{p} = 712352308465649934350899$, and the factorization of n is achieved.

We are now able to analyze our attack and the the Blömer-May attack. The attack of Blömer and May gives the factorization of n if the prime factors p and q satisfy $|n + 1 - \frac{ex}{k} - p - q| < n^{\frac{1}{4}}$ for some convergent $\frac{k}{x}$ of $\frac{e}{n}$ or $\frac{e}{n+1-2\sqrt{n}}$. No such convergent exists which explains why Blömer-May's attack fails. Our attack succeeds since there exist an integer $u = -1271$ and a convergent $\frac{X}{Y} = \frac{78754791}{2348222057}$ of $\frac{e}{n}$ such that (8) and (9) are satisfied.

Note that the secret key is $d = 565214697101365558758015289139548803045295395763$ and satisfy $d \approx n^{0.995\cdots} > \frac{1}{3}n^{\frac{1}{4}}$ which explains why the original attack of Wiener [11] fails. Similarly, we have $d > \frac{n^{3/4}}{p-q}$, which explains why the continued fraction attack of de Weger [10] also fails.

6. Conclusion

Using methods based on continued fractions and May's extension of Coppersmith's Theorem, we showed that an RSA cryptosystem with modulus $n = pq$ and a public key e is insecure if there exist an integer u such that $n - pu \approx n$ and a convergent $\frac{X}{Y}$ of $\frac{e}{n}$ for which both $|eY - (n - pu)X|$ and Y are relatively small. Morever we showed that there are at least $O\left(n^{\frac{3}{4}-\varepsilon}\right)$ public keys making the cryptosystem insecure.

We analysed the security of RSA using the function F_1 where $F_1(u) = p(q - u)$. The situation is similar with the symmetric function F_1' where $F_1'(u) = q(p-u)$. As mentioned in the introduction, RSA could be insecure if the public key e is constrained with other sort of functions satisfying similar conditions. Our results show that one should be very cautious when using an RSA modulus with a constrained key.

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