Reflection Attacks on Product Ciphers

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Abstract. In this paper we describe a novel attack method on product ciphers, the *reflection attack*. The attack method exploits certain similarities among round functions which have not been utilized in previous self similarity attacks. We give practical examples illustrating the power of the reflection attack on several ciphers such as GOST, DEAL and some variants of DES and Magenta. Many interesting and exceptional properties of the attack are also presented in these examples. In addition, we discuss new design criteria that make product ciphers resistant to self similarity attacks and introduce a definition of similarity degree.

Key words: Block Cipher, Round Function, Round Key, Key Schedule, Cryptanalysis, Self Similarity.

1 Introduction

Only two attack methods independent of round numbers have been discovered since the first attempt by Grossman and Tuckerman in 1978 [12]: Slide attacks [6,7] and related key attacks [3]. Both of them exploit some degree of self similarity of round functions. In this paper, we introduce a novel attack method, which we call the *reflection attack*¹. This attack method is related to slide attacks and related key attacks as it is also a kind of self similarity analysis. However, the principle is novel and its assumptions are different from those in [6,7] or in [3]. Therefore, it is applicable to some ciphers resistant to previous self similarity attacks.

The reflection attack exploits similarities of some round functions of encryption process with those of decryption. The main principle behind the attack consists of exploiting a biased distribution of the fixed points, and extending these properties to the full cipher. The reflection attack works especially well for ciphers containing involutions, since the fixed points of intermediate rounds are likely extended to full cipher through the involutions.

The assumptions are weaker than those of previous self similarity attacks in some cases. In consequence, reflection attacks are not limited to ciphers with simple key schedules. We give an example for the cipher DEAL, which has a complicated key schedule. Certain weak keys of DEAL are extracted.

We also apply the attack on GOST, 2K-DES (a variant of DES defined in [6]) and MagentaP2 (a new variant of Magenta which is expected to be stronger than Magenta itself). We introduce a chosen plaintext attack on full-round GOST. The attack works on approximately 2^{224} keys and its complexity is 2^{192} steps with 2^{32} chosen plaintexts. In addition, we introduce a known plaintext attack on 30-round GOST. This attack works for any key. The key is recovered with 2^{224} steps by using only 2^{32} known plaintexts. In another example, we recover 2K-DES key faster than one encryption step by using 2^{33} known plaintexts. Moreover, we detect that certain classes of DEAL keys are vulnerable to reflection attacks. Their numbers are 2^{16} , 2^{80} and 2^{88} , and they can be recovered in 2^{72} , 2^{136} and 2^{200} steps for 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit key lengths respectively. The

¹ This should not be confused with the reflection attack on challenge response authentication protocols or distributed reflection denial of service, which are subjects of different domains.

data complexity is around 2^{66} known plaintext in all cases. Finally, we attack MagentaP2, a new variant of Magenta which is a double encryption of Magenta including two more rounds. The workloads are $2^{64.8}$, $2^{131.1}$ and 2^{196} encryptions using 2^{65} , $2^{65.6}$ and 2^{66} known plaintexts for 128 bit, 192 bit and 256 bit key lengths respectively. Note that MagentaP2 is expected to resist any analyses including the attack in [5] since its number of rounds is 2r + 2 when Magenta has r rounds.

Reflection attacks have several interesting and unusual properties. We list some of them:

- 1. Weaknesses of round functions are not exploited in most cases. Hence, the attack works for any round function in these cases. In this paper, we analyze four ciphers and we do not exploit any weaknesses in their round functions.
- 2. The workload is independent of the number of rounds in some cases. For example, for all the ciphers analyzed here, except DEAL, the workload is independent of the number of rounds.
- 3. It is quite unusual that in some cases, increasing the number of rounds may cause weakness in terms of reflection analysis. Magenta is strong against reflection analysis. However, reflection attack works quite well on MagentaP2.
- 4. It is realistic and open to generalizations. The reflection attack is realistic since it breaks actual ciphers and generalization of its assumptions is possible. In this paper, the most trivial similarity exploited is equality. We introduce a novel definition of *similarity degree* which generalizes equality and also diffusion properties of functions. The attack can be applicable to more general class of ciphers in this case.
- 5. In some cases, it is more powerful than previous self similarity analyses in terms of both complexity and assumptions. We reduce the complexity of the attack in [6] mounted on 2K-DES. Furthermore, the assumptions are much weaker. If 32 different round keys were used in 2K-DES by repeating in reversing order, then the reflection attack would still work whereas slide attacks [6, 7] would possibly fail. In addition, MagentaP2 is expected to resist to all known attacks including previous self similarity attacks. Moreover, the reflection attacks on GOST are the best known attacks so far. These examples exhibit the power of the reflection attack.
- 6. It is extraordinary for modern ciphers that a component of a cipher designed in order to resist against an attack causes weakness that could be exploited in some other attacks. We give an interesting example: The twist in the order of round keys in last eight rounds of GOST thwarts slide attacks [7]. Existence of the twist is discussed in [7] and it is concluded that GOST is less secure without it. In contrast, it is amazing that the known plaintext reflection attack exploits twist property of GOST. If the twist were canceled, the reflection attack would probably not work.
- 7. Unlike previous self similarity attacks, it is possible to mount reflection attack on ciphers having strong and complicated key schedules. As an illustration, we show existence of weak keys in DEAL.

This paper is organized as follows. We introduce notations and summarize previous self similarity analyses given in [6, 7] and in [3] in Section 2. The fundamental idea of reflection attacks and general statements are given in Section 3, including the assumptions and description of typical attack on Feistel networks. In the following four sections, we give attack examples on four different ciphers. In Section 8, we generalize the attack idea and introduce a definition of self similarity degree of two functions. This new definition can be considered as a generalization of several diffusion criteria such as those given in [13, 33, 28, 31, 24]. Then, several questions related to exploiting more general forms of self similarity follow. Finally, we impose two new security criteria. One of them is about key schedule and the other is on block length.

2 Notations and Previous Self Similarity Analyses

Let $E_K : GF(2)^n \to GF(2)^n$ be an encryption function defined by a key material K and $D_K : GF(2)^n \to GF(2)^n$ be its inverse mapping. Assume that E_K is a composition of some functions:

$$E_K(x) = F_{k_r} F_{k_{r-1}} \cdots F_{k_1}(x), x \in GF(2)^n,$$

where r is the number of rounds, $k_1, ..., k_r$ are subkeys (round keys) and F_{k_i} is the *i*-th round function. Define the composite of j - i + 1 functions $F_K[i, j]$ starting from *i* as

$$F_K[i,j] = F_{k_i} \cdots F_{k_i} \text{ for } 1 \le i < j \le r \tag{1}$$

and as identity map for i > j. Such functions can be called *intermediate functions*. Let $U_K(i, j)$ be the set of fixed points of the function $F_K[i, j]$. More explicitly,

$$U_K(i,j) = \{ x \in GF(2)^n : F_K[i,j](x) = x \}.$$

We use these notations throughout the paper.

One of the generic attack methods that exploits some degree of self similarity is the slide attack [6,7]. The typical slide attack can be applied if the sequence of round keys has a short period, such as 1, 2 or 4. For instance, if all the round keys are equal, $k_i = K$, then the encryption function will be $E_K(x) = F_K^r(x) = y$. Let $F_K(x) = x'$. Encrypting x' we have $E_K(x') = y'$. Then, from these two encryptions we obtain two equations which are probably much easier to solve: $F_K(x) = x'$ and $F_K(y) = y'$. Such (x, x') pairs are called *slid pairs*. The laborious part of the attack is to identify slid pairs. This basic attack can be generalized if the period of sequence of round keys is 2 (i.e., $k_i = k_{i+2}$) or 4 (i.e., $k_i = k_{i+4}$) [7].

Related key attacks proposed by Biham [3] are based on a powerful assumption that the attacker knows a relation between several keys and can access encryption function with these related keys. The goal is to find the keys. The most basic type of relation defined over a pair of keys is that the *i*-th subkey of one is equal to the (i + 1)-th subkey of the other.

3 Description of The Basic Attack

The reflection attack makes use of high level self similarity. We compose a new function whose output matches that of encryption function on a large subset of input space by exploiting a biased distribution of fixed points of a properly chosen intermediate function and by extending its properties through certain involutions. The following statement plays a crucial role in the basic attack. Moreover, we illustrate the principle in the statement in Figure 1.

Lemma 1. Let i, j be given such that $0 < j - i < i + j \le r$. Assume that $F_{k_{i-t}} = F_{k_{j+t}}^{-1}$ for all t : 1 < t < i. If $F_K[i-t,i-1](x) \in U_K(i,j)$, then $x \in U_K(i-t,j+t)$ for all t : 1 < t < i. In addition, if $x \in U_K(i-t,j+t)$ for some t : 1 < t < i, then $F_K[i-t,i-1](x) \in U_K(i,j)$.

Proof. Assume that $F_K[i-t, i-1](x) \in U_K(i, j)$. Then we have

$$\begin{aligned} F_K[i-t, j+t](x) &= F_K[j+1, j+t] \cdot F_K[i, j] \cdot F_K[i-t, i-1](x) \\ &= F_K[j+1, j+t] \cdot F_K[i-t, i-1](x), \text{ since } F_K[i-t, i-1](x) \in U_K(i, j) \\ &= x, \text{ since } F_{k_{i-t}} = F_{k_{i+t}}^{-1} \text{ for all } t: 1 < t < i. \end{aligned}$$



Fig. 1. The reflection property given in Lemma 1. The fixed point, P_0 , of the intermediate function $F_K[i, j]$ is extended to the fixed point, P_t , of $F_K[i-t, j+t]$ through the involutions.

Hence $x \in U_K(i-t, j+t)$. On the contrary, assume that $x \in U_K(i-t, j+t)$ for some t: 1 < t < i. Then the input of $F_K[i, j]$ is $F_K[i-t, i-1](x)$ and the output of $F_K[i, j]$ is $F_K^{-1}[j+1, j+t](x)$. However, $F_K^{-1}[j+1, j+t] = F_K[i-t, i-1]$ since we assume that $F_{k_{i-t}} = F_{k_{j+t}}^{-1}$. Hence, $F_K[i-t, i-1](x) \in U_K(i, j)$.

One immediate result can be deduced from Lemma 1 by taking the parameter t as i - 1:

Corollary 1. Assumptions in Lemma 1 imply that $x \in U_K(1, j+i-1)$ if and only if $F_K[1, i-1](x) \in U_K(i, j)$.

Another corollary can lay the groundwork for an attack on product ciphers whose some round functions in encryption equal some round functions in decryption:

Corollary 2. Let i, j be given such that $0 < j - i < i + j \le r$. Assume that we have $F_{k_{i-t}} = F_{k_{j+t}}^{-1}$ for all t : 1 < t < i. Then the encryption function E_K is equal to the function $F_K[i+j,r]$ on the set $F_K^{-1}[1,i-1](U_K(i,j))$.

Proof. The set $F_K^{-1}[1, i-1](U_K(i, j))$ is equal to $U_K(1, j+i-1)$ by Lemma 1. On the other hand, we have $F_K[1, j+i-1](x) = x$ for $x \in U_K(1, j+i-1)$ by definition. Thus,

$$E_K(x) = F_{k_r} \cdots F_{k_1}(x) = F_K[i+j,r] \cdot F_K[1,i+j-1](x) = F_K[i+j,r](x).$$

Corollary 2 states that there exists another function which equals to encryption function on some special subset of the encryption space. This function is probably much weaker then the encryption function since its number of rounds may be much less than r. Then, the attack below can recover the round keys $k_{i+j}, ..., k_r$ by solving the system of equations

$$F_K[i+j,r](x) = E_K(x) = y.$$
 (2)

This is a typical reflection attack. There are three main parameters which specify the complexity of the attack:

- 1. m: The number of required pairs (x, y) to solve Equation 2. By solving, we mean a unique solution if all the m equations are correct and a contradiction (no solution) otherwise.
- 2. $|U_K(i,j)|$: The cardinality of $U_K(i,j)$.

3. $\Pr(F_K[1, i-1](x) \in U_K(i, j) | E_K(x))$: The probability that $F_K[1, i-1](x)$ is in $U_K(i, j)$ given $E_K(x)$.

The probability that $F_K[1, i - 1](x)$ is in $U_K(i, j)$ is $\frac{|U_K(i, j)|}{2^n}$ for randomly chosen x. However, for given particular values of $E_K(x)$, the probability may be much greater or less than $\frac{|U_K(i, j)|}{2^n}$ depending on the structure of a cipher. This structure is crucial in determining time complexity. We have observed that some conditional probabilities are extremely large for some recent ciphers and have successfully mounted reflection attack by exploiting this deviation. For example, the probability $\Pr(F_K[1, i-1](x) \in U_K(i, j) | E_K(x))$ is one half for 2K-DES. We give the details in the next section.

Theorem 1. Assume that we need m pairs to solve Equation 2 and let C be the time, the number of encryptions, required for solving it. Then the attack recovering the round keys $k_{i+j}, ..., k_r$ has a data complexity of $\frac{m \cdot 2^n}{|U_K(i,j)|}$ known plaintexts. Assume the probabilities $\Pr(F_K[1,i](x) \in U_K(i,j) | E_K(x))$ are pre-calculated and the greatest ℓ probabilities are chosen among $\frac{m \cdot 2^n}{|U_K(i,j)|}$ plaintexts so that

$$\sum_{s=1}^{\ell} \Pr(F_K[1,i](x_s) \in U_K(i,j) \,|\, E_K(x_s)) \approx m.$$
(3)

Then the attack has time complexity bounded above by $\binom{\ell}{m} \cdot C$ encryptions.

Proof. We need m elements of $F_K^{-1}[1, i-1](U_K(i, j))$ for solving Equation 2. The expected number of elements of $F_K^{-1}[1, i-1](U_K(i, j))$ among randomly chosen t plaintexts is $t \cdot \frac{|U_K(i, j)|}{2^n}$. So, tshould be approximately $\frac{m \cdot 2^n}{|U_K(i, j)|}$ to get about m elements of $F_K^{-1}[1, i-1](U_K(i, j))$. Each plaintext ciphertext pair gives an equation like Equation 2. However, only approximately m of them are correct equations. One might try all the plaintexts for solving Equation 2 exhaustively. However, if $\Pr(F_K[1, i](x) \in U_K(i, j) | E_K(x))$ are large enough for some x, then it is more likely that the corresponding equations are correct. Choose ℓ plaintexts, x_1, \dots, x_ℓ such that Equation 3 holds. Then, the expected number of correct equations is m among these ℓ equations. The correct equation set can be obtained by trying all subsets of m elements of $\{x_1, \dots, x_\ell\}$. Since the search should be sorted according to the probabilities of subsets, we get an upper bound, $\binom{\ell}{m} \cdot C$, for time complexity. \Box

Let us note that false alarm probability is disregarded in the theorem since we assume that the solution set is empty if at least one of the equations is incorrect.

Remark 1. In this section, we give only the general idea of the attack. This is a general description and open to straightforward improvements in some special examples. For instance, the attack is explained only for encryption function. One may repeat the attack for decryption function and improve the complexity. In addition, the success of the attack depends on the number of fixed points of chosen intermediate function. This function does not have to be composite of some consecutive rounds. For instance, it seems that it is appropriate to take the intermediate function as 1.5 rounds in Feistel ciphers (including two swaps) since 1.5 rounds have many fixed points.

3.1 Reflection Attack on Feistel Network

Let a plaintext $x \in GF(2)^n$ be given as $x = (x_0, x_1); x_0, x_1 \in GF(2)^{n/2}$. The Feistel structure can be stated as a recursive function defined as $x_i = R_{k_{i-1}}(x_{i-1}) \oplus x_{i-2}$ with the initial conditions given

by $x = (x_0, x_1)$. The function $R : GF(2)^{n/2} \to GF(2)^{n/2}$ is the encryption function and \oplus is the "XOR" operation. The *i*-th round operation is defined as

$$(x_i, x_{i+1}) = F_{k_i}(x_{i-1}, x_i) = (x_i, R_{k_i}(x_i) \oplus x_{i-1})$$

$$(4)$$

for i < r. In general, the swap operation is excluded in the last round and (x_{r+1}, x_r) is the corresponding ciphertext. With some abuse of terminology, R is also called the round function. We call the stream $x_0, x_1, ..., x_r, x_{r+1}$ the encryption stream of $x = (x_0, x_1)$ with respect to K.

Proposition 1 ([9]). For a given natural number m < r, assume that $k_{m-i} = k_{m+i}$, $\forall i : 1 \le i \le \min\{r-m, m-1\}$. Let $x = (x_0, x_1)$ be encrypted and $x_0, x_1, ..., x_r, x_{r+1}$ be its encryption stream. If $R_{k_m}(x_m) = 0$ then $x_{m-i} = x_{m+i}$, $\forall i : 1 \le i \le \min\{r-m, m-1\}$. Conversely, if $x_{m-i} = x_{m+i}$ and $x_{m-i+1} = x_{m+i-1}$ for some i then $R_{k_m}(x_m) = 0$.

Proposition 1 had already been known during the studies on cycle structures of DES (see [9, 26]). Hence, the notion of the fixed points of the weak keys of DES is well known. However, the studies were focused on algebraic properties of DES permutations and their short cycles rather than developing a key recovery attack [9, 26, 17, 25]. The following corollary points out the opposite direction of this old phenomenon.

Corollary 3. Assume that each round key k_i determines a round function R_{k_i} randomly. Let $x = (x_0, x_1)$ be encrypted and $x_0, x_1, ..., x_r, x_{r+1}$ be its encryption stream. Assume the round number r is even, r = 2r', and $k_{r'-i} = k_{r'+i} \quad \forall i : 1 \le i < r'$. Then, $\Pr(x_0 = x_r) = 2^{-\frac{n}{2}+1} - 2^{-n}$ and $\Pr(R_{k_{r'}}(x_{r'}) = 0 \mid x_0 = x_r) = \frac{1}{2-2^{-\frac{n}{2}}}$.

Proof. Assume that the round function is random. Then, the probability that $x_0 = x_r$ is given as

$$\Pr(x_0 = x_r) = 1 \cdot 2^{-n/2} + 2^{-n/2}(1 - 2^{-n/2}) = 2^{-\frac{n}{2}+1} - 2^{-n} \text{ since it is equal to}$$
$$\Pr(x_0 = x_r \mid R_{k_{r'}}(x_{r'}) = 0) \Pr(R_{k_{r'}}(x_{r'}) = 0) + \Pr(x_0 = x_r \mid R_{k_{r'}}(x_{r'}) \neq 0) \Pr(R_{k_{r'}}(x_{r'}) \neq 0)$$

On the other hand, $\Pr(x_0 = x_r | R_{k_{r'}}(x_{r'}) = 0) = 1$ by Proposition 1. Hence, we conclude that

$$\Pr(R_{k_{r'}}(x_{r'}) = 0 \mid x_0 = x_r) = \frac{\Pr(x_0 = x_r \mid R_{k_{r'}}(x_{r'}) = 0) \cdot \Pr(R_{k_{r'}}(x_{r'}) = 0)}{\Pr(x_0 = x_r)} = \frac{2^{-\frac{n}{2}}}{2^{-\frac{n}{2}+1} - 2^{-n}}.$$

Theorem 2. Assumptions are as in Corollary 3. Then the equality $x_0 = x_r$ implies that the following equation is true with probability $\frac{1}{2-2^{-\frac{m}{2}}}$.

$$x_1 = R_{k_r}(x_r) \oplus x_{r+1}.\tag{5}$$

Proof. Assume that $x_0 = x_r$. Then by Corollary 3, we have $R_{k_{r'}}(x_{r'}) = 0$ with probability $\frac{1}{2-2^{-\frac{n}{2}}}$. Thus the equality $x_1 = x_{r-1}$ is true with probability $\frac{1}{2-2^{-\frac{n}{2}}}$ by Proposition 1. On the other hand $x_{r+1} = R_{k_r}(x_r) \oplus x_{r-1}$. Thus, the probability that $x_1 = R_{k_r}(x_r) \oplus x_{r+1}$ is $\frac{1}{2-2^{-\frac{n}{2}}}$. \Box

Reflection Attack on Feistels. Note that the parameters in Theorem 2 are all public except the last round key. (x_0, x_1) forms the plaintext and (x_{r+1}, x_r) forms the corresponding ciphertext. So, Theorem 2 leads to a straightforward attack: Encrypt plaintexts and collect those such that $x_0 = x_r$. If the round keys satisfy that $k_{\frac{r}{2}-i} = k_{\frac{r}{2}+i}$, then the corresponding equations, $x_1 = R_{k_r}(x_r) \oplus x_{r+1}$, are correct with probability nearly one half for the collected plaintexts by Theorem 2. Most probably, these equations are easy to solve. Solving them recovers the last round key. One may apply the attack several times with properly chosen parameters or use key schedule for recovering the main key.

4 Cryptanalysis of 2K-DES

2K-DES is one of the modified DES examples given in [6]. 2K-DES uses two independent 48 bit keys K_1 and K_2 and has no key schedule. K_1 is used in the odd rounds and K_2 is used in the even rounds. The total number of rounds is 64. It is most likely that 2K-DES resists to the conventional differential [4] and linear attacks [23] due to its increased number of rounds. Biryukov and Wagner have proposed a slide attack with complexity independent of the number of rounds [6]. The attack uses 2^{32} known plaintexts and its time complexity is 2^{50} 2K-DES encryptions.

Observe that $k_{32-i} = k_{32+i}$ and $k_{33-i} = k_{33+i}$ for i = 1, ..., 31 (note that this condition is weaker than that of slide attack in [6]). Hence, one can apply reflection attack to both encryption function and decryption function.

We need to find one plaintext $x = (x_0, x_1)$ satisfying $x_{64} = x_0$ and another plaintext $x' = (x'_0, x'_1)$ satisfying $x'_{65} = x'_1$. The former gives the equation $x_1 = R_{K_2}(x_{64}) \oplus x_{65}$ and the latter gives $x'_{64} = R_{K_1}(x'_1) \oplus x'_0$. Each equation is true with probability nearly one half and one needs approximately 2^{32} known plaintexts to get approximately four equations by Theorem 2. Two equations deduced from $x_{64} = x_0$ will give at most 2^{17} candidates for K_2 whereas other two equations deduced from $x'_{65} = x'_1$ will give at most 2^{17} candidates for K_1 . One may get the correct K_1 and the correct K_2 by searching over these solution sets exhaustively. It costs 2^{34} 2K-DES encryptions. As a result the reflection attack on 2K-DES uses 2^{32} known plaintexts and recovers the keys in 2^{34} steps.

It is obvious that the attack can be improved further by increasing the amount of plaintexts. If we use 2^{33} plaintexts, then we expect four equations for each key and two of them to be correct. It is most likely that two correct equations out of four give a unique solution and we get no solution for any other two equations. Hence, the time complexity is $2 \cdot {4 \choose 2} \cdot C$ by Theorem 1 where $C = 2/64 = 2^{-5}$ encryption. Therefore, time complexity will be less than one.

5 Cryptanalysis of GOST

GOST, the Russian encryption standard [32], is a 32 round 64 bit Feistel network with 256 bit key. It has a simple key schedule: 256 bit key is divided into eight 32 bit words $k_0, ..., k_7$ and the sequence of round keys is given as $k_0, ..., k_7, k_0, ..., k_7, k_0, ..., k_7, k_6, ..., k_1, k_0$. The round key is included by modular addition in the round function. We do not consider details of the round function. We only assume that it is bijective.

There is no known attack better than exhaustive search. A related key differential cryptanalysis is shown in [19]. The attack is impractical for properly chosen S-boxes with not too bad difference distributions. A slide attack has been mounted on 20 round $\text{GOST}\oplus$, a variant of GOST defined in [7]. This attack uses 2^{33} known texts and 2^{65} memory space with 2^{70} encryptions. Another related key differential attack given in [29] has been mounted on 21 round GOST and it has data complexity as 2^{56} chosen plaintexts. A recent related key differential attack is mounted on GOST in [20], by developing the idea of Seki and Kaneko in [29]. The attack is on full-round GOST and recovers 12 bits of the key with 2^{35} chosen plaintexts and 2^{36} steps. However, the attack is based on a powerful assumption that the attacker knows that the two related keys differ in only eight specific bits.

Denote the first eight rounds of GOST as $F_K[1,8]$. Note that, $F_K[1,8]$ ends with a swap operation. Then, the GOST encryption function is given as

$$E_K(x) = F_K^{-1}[1,8] \cdot S \cdot F_K^3[1,8](x)$$

where S is the swap operation of the Feistel network. We mount two reflection attacks on GOST. The former is a chosen plaintext attack on full-round GOST and it is successful if the key has certain properties. The number of such keys is roughly 2^{224} . The latter attack is a known plaintext attack on 30-round GOST.

5.1 Chosen Plaintext Attack on Full-Round GOST

Assume that there exists a fixed point of the function $F_K[1,8]$ whose left half is equal to its right half. That is, assume $\exists x$ such that x is a fixed point of both $F_K[1,8]$ and S: $F_K[1,8](x) = x$ and S(x) = x. Then, x is also a fixed point of the encryption function E_K . This plain observation leads to the following attack: Encrypt all the 2^{32} plaintexts whose left halves equal their right halves and collect the fixed points in a set, say U. If U is empty, then the attack is not applicable. Otherwise, for any x in U, solve the equation $F_K[1,8](x) = x$ for K. Note that there are 2^{192} solutions and each of the solutions may be obtained by guessing $k_0, k_1, ..., k_5$ and then determining k_6 and k_7 . Guessing k_0, k_1, \dots, k_5 , we construct a two-round Feistel network with unknown keys k_6 and k_7 and an input/output pair given as $(F_K[1,6](x), x)$. Then, solving the system for k_6 and k_7 is straightforward since the round functions, F_{k_6} and F_{k_7} , are bijective and we know their outputs. Reversing F_{k_6} and F_{k_7} , we obtain the inputs and then k_6 and k_7 . Consequently, we obtain 2^{192} candidates for the key by solving $F_K[1,8](x) = x$. We recover the correct key by searching over all the candidates by roughly 2^{192} encryptions. We solve $F_K[1,8](x) = x$ for each $x \in U$. However, it is most likely that U is empty if there exists no fixed point of $F_K[1,8]$ with equal halves. On the other hand, the number of keys satisfying that $\exists x$ such that $F_K[1,8](x) = x$ and S(x) = x is roughly 2^{224} . Because, the expected number of fixed points is one (see appendix) and the probability that any arbitrary value is a fixed point of S is 2^{-32} .

5.2 Known Plaintext Attack on 30-Round GOST

Consider 30-round GOST by eliminating first two rounds. Then, the encryption function, $E_K^{(30)}$, is given as

$$E_K^{(30)}(x) = F_K^{-1}[1,8] \cdot S \cdot F_K^2[1,8] \cdot F_K[3,8](x).$$

Recall that S has 2^{32} fixed points and they are all the vectors whose left halves equal their right halves. Take S as the intermediate function. Then, $F_K^{-1}[1,8] \cdot S \cdot F_K[1,8]$ has also 2^{32} fixed points by Lemma 1. Therefore, if we encrypt 2^{32} arbitrary plaintexts, then we expect that one of the ciphertexts is a fixed point of $F_K^{-1}[1,8] \cdot S \cdot F_K[1,8]$. Assume that y is a fixed point of $F_K^{-1}[1,8] \cdot S \cdot$ $F_K[1,8]$ and x is the corresponding plaintext. Then, we have $E_K^{(30)}(x) = y = F_K[1,8] \cdot F_K[3,8](x)$. Solve the equation, $y = F_K[1,8] \cdot F_K[3,8](x)$ for K. Note that the equation has 2^{192} solutions. Guessing the subkeys, $k_2, k_3, ..., k_7$, we obtain a two-round Feistel network with keys k_0 and k_1 , and an input/output pair given as $(F_K[3,8](x), F_K^{-1}[3,8](y))$. Then, as in the case of chosen ciphertext attack, recover k_0 and k_1 by reversing the round functions. Then, one immediate check is whether y is a fixed point of $F_K^{-1}[1,8] \cdot S \cdot F_K[1,8]$ by checking $F_K[1,8](y)$ has equal halves. All the 2^{32} plaintext/ciphertext pairs are checked and we expect that one of the ciphertexts is a fixed point and hence the corresponding equation, $y = F_K[1,8] \cdot F_K[3,8](x)$, is correct. Then, the correct key will be among the 2^{192} candidates. In conclusion, we recover the key with at most 2^{224} encryptions by using only 2^{32} known plaintexts.

Remark 2. It is believed that GOST is less secure without the twist in the order of round keys. In [7], it is concluded that the twist of GOST hinders the slide attacks. However, it is surprising that reflection attack exploits this twist property.

6 Weak Keys of DEAL

DEAL is a 128 bit block cipher designed by Knudsen [21] and submitted for the AES contest. It is a Feistel network and accepts three different key sizes, namely 128-bit (for 6 rounds), 192-bit (for 6 rounds) and 256-bit (for 8 rounds). DEAL makes use of DES as its round function.

There are some impractical attacks against DEAL. The attack by Knudsen [21] is a meet-inthe-middle attack and requires unrealistically many chosen plaintexts and unrealistic amount of memory. In [22], Lucks uses similar techniques and mounts chosen ciphertext attack on DEAL. A trade-off is given between the number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs and the time complexity. In [18], Kelsey and Schneier discuss the existence of equivalent keys and mount a related key attack. All the attacks require memory and we will not discuss about their workloads.

We mount the reflection attack on DEAL when the key satisfies some conditions. We briefly describe DEAL and explain the attack for 128 bit key-length. The attacks are quite similar for the other cases of key lengths. DEAL-128 uses 128 bit key K, divided into two 64-bit parts as K_1 and K_2 . The six round keys, RK_1, \ldots, RK_6 , are computed by using DES as $RK_i = E_C(K_{(i \mod 2)+1} \oplus RK_{i-1} \oplus s_i)$ where E is the DES encryption, C is a 56-bit public constant used as a DES key in the key schedule and $RK_0 = 0$. Here s_i 's are 64-bit constants. Only 56 bits of each RK_i is used in the *i*-th round of DEAL which we denote $RED(RK_i)$ (reduction of RK_i to 56 bits). Note that the final round ends with a swap.

Assume that $RED(RK_2) = RED(RK_6)$ and $RED(RK_3) = RED(RK_5)$. The probability that these equalities hold is roughly 2⁻¹¹². In this case, the last five rounds of DEAL has 2⁶⁴ fixed points (without the last swap). Applying the reflection attack similar to 2K-DES, we obtain around eight equations for the first round encryption by collecting the plaintexts whose left parts are equal to the left parts of their corresponding cipher texts among 2⁶⁶ known plaintexts. This will be enough to decide that the equalities $RED(RK_2) = RED(RK_6)$ and $RED(RK_3) = RED(RK_5)$ hold since otherwise, we would expect around four plaintexts whose left parts are equal to the left parts of their corresponding cipher texts.

Four of the eight equalities are expected to come from fixed points. Hence, we can recover 56 bits of RK_1 by making search over all possible values of $RED(RK_1)$ and checking whether around four of the equations, $E_{RK_1}(x) = y$, hold. Recovering 56 bits of RK_1 yields 56- bit information about the first 64 bit part of the main key, K_1 . The remaining unknown key bits may be obtained by applying several attacks on 5-round DEAL (see [21, 22]). However, the simplest way is just making search on remaining bits. So, the time complexity is around 2^{72} steps.

We have the same data complexity for DEAL-192 and DEAL-256. On the other hand, the time complexities are around 2^{136} and 2^{200} steps respectively (this is the complexity of searching remaining bits after recovering 56 bits of a key). Note that we have three equalities instead of two when the key length is 256 bits. Hence, the probability that the equalities hold is roughly 2^{-168} in this case.

7 Cryptanalysis of MagentaP2

Magenta is a block cipher submitted for the AES contest by Deutsche Telekom AG [16]. It is a Feistel cipher with 128 bit block size and 128, 192 or 256 bit key sizes. In this section we give a high level description of Magenta and construct a distinguisher for the whole cipher. This distinguisher does not assist key recovering. We modify Magenta and call it MagentaP2 (meaning Magenta Plus 2). MagentaP2 is double encryption of Magenta plus two more rounds. The modified Magenta is expected to be more secure then Magenta against most of the attack methods including the attack in [5] on Magenta. However, it is surprising that MagentaP2 is weaker than Magenta itself in terms of reflection attacks.

We give a short description of Magenta. We do not enter into details of round function since we do not exploit it in cryptanalysis. When the key length of Magenta is of 128, 192 or 256 bits then it is divided into two, three or four equal parts as (K_1, K_2) , (K_1, K_2, K_3) or (K_1, K_2, K_3, K_4) respectively. The encryption functions are

$$E_{K} = \begin{cases} F_{K_{1}}F_{K_{1}}F_{K_{2}}F_{K_{2}}F_{K_{1}}F_{K_{1}} & \text{if key size is 128,} \\ F_{K_{1}}F_{K_{2}}F_{K_{3}}F_{K_{3}}F_{K_{2}}F_{K_{1}} & \text{if key size is 192,} \\ F_{K_{1}}F_{K_{2}}F_{K_{3}}F_{K_{4}}F_{K_{4}}F_{K_{3}}F_{K_{2}}F_{K_{1}} & \text{if key size is 256.} \end{cases}$$

Each round function F_{K_i} is defined as

$$F_{K_i} : GF(2)^{128} \longrightarrow GF(2)^{128}$$

$$F_{K_i}(x, y) = (y, R_{K_i}(y) \oplus x).$$
(6)

Magenta was cryptanalyzed during the AES conferences by Biham *et. al.* [5] and hence eliminated. The attack is a divide and conquer type attack. One can extract the outer keys, independently from the inner key. The complexity is 2^{l_k-31} encryptions for a known plaintext attack where l_k is the key length.

7.1 Description of MagentaP2 and Reflection Attack

Define an intermediate function

$$I_{K_i} : GF(2)^{128} \longrightarrow GF(2)^{128}$$
$$I_{K_i}(x, y) = (R_{K_i}(R_{K_i}(y) \oplus x) \oplus y, R_{K_i}(y) \oplus x).$$
(7)

The function I_{K_i} is indeed two rounds of encryption with key K_i such that the second swap is ignored: I_{K_i} is $F_{K_i}F_{K_i}$ without the last swap. We use this function as the intermediate function. It has many fixed points:

Lemma 2. The function I_{K_i} has 2^{64} fixed points.

Proof. The fixed points of the function I_{K_i} are those $(x, y) \in GF(2)^{128}$ such that

$$x = R_{K_i}(R_{K_i}(y) \oplus x) \oplus y \text{ and } y = R_{K_i}(y) \oplus x.$$
(8)

These are the same equations and the points $(R_{K_i}(y) \oplus y, y)$ are fixed points of $I_{K_i} \forall y \in GF(2)^{64}$.

The modified Magenta, called MagentaP2 is a double encryption of Magenta including two more rounds. Let $E_K^{(M)}$ and $E_K^{(MP2)}$ denote the encryption functions of Magenta and MagentaP2, respectively. Then MagentaP2 encryption is defined as

$$E_K^{(MP2)}(x) = F_{(K_t \ll_m)} E_K^{(M)} E_K^{(M)} F_{K_t}(x)$$
(9)

where F is the round function of Magenta and

$$K_t = \begin{cases} K_2 & \text{if key size is 128,} \\ K_2 \oplus K_3 & \text{if key size is 192,} \\ K_2 \oplus K_3 \oplus K_4 & \text{if key size is 256.} \end{cases}$$

 \ll_m is cyclic rotation to left by *m* bits where *m* can be chosen any positive integer less then 64. The new cipher depends on *m* but we call all the ciphers simply as "MagentaP2" by abuse of terminology.

The intermediate function of MagentaP2 chosen as

$$I_{K_1}(x,y) = (R_{K_1}(R_{K_1}(y) \oplus x) \oplus y, R_{K_1}(y) \oplus x)$$
(10)

also has 2^{64} fixed points by Lemma 2. If the first half of a plaintext is equal to first half of its corresponding ciphertext through encryption of Magenta, then the other halves are also equal with probability nearly one half by Theorem 2. This distinguisher does not depend on the number of Magenta encryptions.

The reflection attack on MagentaP2 is to get an equation similar to Equation 5 and solve it to extract the subkey K_t . The following proposition leads to a reflection attack on MagentaP2.

Proposition 2. Assume that Magenta is a random function. Let a plaintext $x = (x_0, x_1)$ be encrypted by MagentaP2 and the ciphertext $y = (y_0, y_1)$ be obtained. Assume that $x_1 = y_1$. Then x and y satisfy the equation

$$R_{K_t}(x_1) \oplus R_{K_{t \ll m}}(y_1) = x_0 \oplus y_0. \tag{11}$$

with probability $\frac{1}{2-2^{-64}}$.

Proof. Observe that the equations $R_{K_t}(x_1) \oplus R_{K_{t \ll m}}(y_1) = x_0 \oplus y_0$ and $x_1 = y_1$ together come from a fixed point $(R_{K_t}(x_1) \oplus x_0, x_1)$ of double encryption Magenta function $E_K^{(M)} E_K^{(M)}$. We have the equality of probabilities:

$$\Pr(F_{K_t}(x) \text{ is fixed point} | x_1 = y_1) = \frac{\Pr(F_{K_t}(x) \text{ is fixed point})}{\Pr(x_1 = y_1)}$$

since $\Pr(x_1 = y_1 | F_{K_t}(x) \text{ is fixed point}) = 1$. On the other hand, $\Pr(x_1 = y_1) = 2^{-63} - 2^{-128}$ by Theorem 2 and the result follows.

Equation 11 leads to a divide and conquer type attack that can be mounted on MagentaP2. Encrypt a plaintext $x = (x_0, x_1)$ and obtain the corresponding ciphertext $y = (y_0, y_1)$. If $x_1 = y_1$ then Equation 11 is satisfied for x and y with probability nearly one half. Solve the equation and extract the subkey K_t and then recover the remaining key bits by searching exhaustively. Let the key length be $64 \cdot i$ for i = 2, 3, 4. Then by using $i \cdot 2^{64}$ plaintexts we obtain approximately 2i equations of the form Equation 11 and expect half of them to be correct by Proposition 2. By collecting the subsets of i equations and solving them we obtain a unique solution for K_t . Note that false alarm probability is almost zero since the probability that a false key is a solution of all the i equations is 2^{-64i} . The time complexity of recovering K_t is $\binom{2i}{i} \frac{j \cdot 2^{64i-63}}{r}$ by Theorem 1 where r is the number of rounds, namely 14 or 18 depending on the key size. The remaining key material (i.e., K_1) can be deduced by exhaustive search. As a result, one can recover the key by $2^{64.78}, 2^{131.1}$ and $2^{196.96}$ encryptions using $2^{65}, 2^{65.58}$ and 2^{66} known plaintexts for 128 bit, 192 bit and 256 bit key lengths respectively.

Remark 3. The algorithm Magenta is doubled in the modified version. Indeed, the number of Magenta encryption does not affect the attack complexity. Therefore, one may use triple or more Magenta encryptions. Still, the attack will work. It is also interesting that other self similarity attack methods whose complexities are independent of round number, such as related key attacks or slide attacks probably do not work for MagentaP2.

8 Generalization and Questions

We give a novel definition which can be considered as a benchmark for similarity degree.

Definition 1. Let $F_1, F_2 : GF(2)^n \to GF(2)^m$ be two functions. Then F_1 and F_2 are called similar of degree (d_1, d_2) with probability p if the number of ordered pairs $(x, x') \in GF(2)^n \times GF(2)^n$ satisfying

$$HW(x \oplus x') \le n - d_1 \Rightarrow HW(F_1(x) \oplus F_2(x')) \le m - d_2$$

is $p \cdot 2^n \cdot \sum_{i=0}^{n-d_1} {n \choose i}$ where HW() is the Hamming Weight of binary vectors ².

This definition generalizes the equality of functions. Two functions are equal if and only if they are similar of full degree with probability one. Note that this is also a generalization of several criteria on diffusion of a single function such as those in [13, 33, 28, 31, 24]. A function F is self similar (similar to itself) of degree (d_1, d_2) with probability p means changing $n - d_1$ or less number of bits of an input would cause a change of at most $n - d_2$ bits of its corresponding output with probability p.

Likewise, we can generalize the notion of fixed points of a function in the following definition:

Definition 2. Let $F : GF(2)^n \to GF(2)^n$ be a function. The points $x \in GF(2)^n$ satisfying $HW(x \oplus F(x)) \leq d$ are called semi-fixed points of degree d.

Remark that semi-fixed points of degree d are also semi-fixed points of degree d' for $d \leq d'$.

The assumptions of Lemma 1 can be extended by using the definitions of similarity and semifixed notions. Thus, we can obtain a statement with generalized assumptions. However, the corresponding reflection attack may be much weaker since similarity probability is expected to diminish

 $^{^{2}}$ This notion may be considered as a generalization of Lipschitz condition.

at each iteration. On the other hand, similarity may be high with high probability in some subsets of a key space which leads to a weak key space with respect to reflection attacks.

The most interesting generalization of the reflection attack may be combining the attack with several statistical attack methods such as differential attacks and linear attacks. Another interesting question is whether reflection attacks can be mounted on SPN structures or stream ciphers.

9 New Security Criteria

Some security criteria have been imposed on lengths of parameters of a stream cipher such as IV length [15] and internal state size [1, 11]. The corresponding criterion on block ciphers is that block length should be at least as large as key length if it is operated in a stream mode in order to supply resistance to tradeoff attacks. This is necessary also against distinguishing attacks. Besides, observe that relatively much smaller block length of GOST is also exploited in the reflection attack.

We illustrate some examples supporting that assumptions about the independence of round functions in the security proofs given in [30, 2] are not only sufficient but also necessary. The functions producing round keys can be tested whether they are similar of degree (d_1, d_2) with large d_1 and d_2 as a "pseudo-independence" test. Some classifications of key schedules have been proposed in [8, 14] according to independence degree of round keys. It was argued that AES key schedule was surprisingly poor and a new key schedule was proposed for AES in [14]. A poor key schedule has round key producing functions which are highly similar (similar of high degree) with high probability. For instance, the key scheduling process of Blowfish is complex (see [?]) but, some self similarity attacks work in some special cases [6]. This is due to high degree of similarity of the functions producing round keys even though these functions themselves are highly complicated and nonlinear.

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A Fixed Points of Random Permutations

Let $\pi \in S_n$ be a random permutation (a permutation chosen randomly from the set of permutations) of the symmetric group S_n . Then the probability that it is a derangement (a permutation having no fixed point) is given by the formula

$$\sum_{i=0}^{n} \frac{(-1)^{i}}{i!} \approx \frac{1}{e}.$$
(12)

This formula comes from an example of the inclusion exclusion principle which gives the number of derangements:

$$D(n) = \sum_{i=2}^{n} \binom{n}{i} (-1)^{i} (n-i)!.$$
(13)

One immediate consequence is that the probability that a random function has a fixed point is approximately $\frac{e-1}{e} \approx 0.6321$. One can count the number of permutations having at least two fixed points by a similar argument and can get

$$\sum_{i=2}^{n} \binom{n}{i} (-1)^{i} (i-1)(n-i)!$$
(14)

and the probability that it has at least two fixed points is

$$\sum_{i=2}^{n} \frac{(-1)^{i}(i-1)}{i!} \approx 26.42\%.$$
(15)

Similarly, the probability that a random permutation has more than two fixed points is 8.03%. So, if a permutation has fixed points, then the most probable number of fixed points is 1 or 2 (with probability 87.3%). Indeed, a random permutation of length not smaller than m, on the average, contains $\frac{1}{m}$ cycles of length m. So, the average number of fixed points is one and if we exclude derangements, then the average will be $1/0.6321 \approx 1.58$. See [27] for details on fixed points.