Incorporating Temporal Capabilities in Existing Key Management Schemes

Mikhail J. Atallah*
Department of Computer Science
Purdue University
mja@cs.purdue.edu

Marina Blanton†
Department of Computer Science
Purdue University
mbykova@cs.purdue.edu

Keith B. Frikken
Department of Computer Science and Systems Analysis
Miami University
frikkekb@muohio.edu

Abstract

The problem of key management in access hierarchies is how to assign keys to users and classes such that each user, after receiving her secret key(s), is able to *independently* compute access keys for (and thus obtain access to) the resources at her class and all descendant classes in the hierarchy. If user privileges additionally are time-based (which is likely to be the case for all of the applications listed above), the key(s) a user receives should permit access to the resources only at the appropriate times. This paper present a new, provably secure, and efficient solution that can be used to add time-based capabilities to existing hierarchical schemes. It achieves the following performance bounds: (i) to be able to obtain access to an arbitrary contiguous set of time intervals, a user is required to store at most 3 keys; (ii) the keys for a user can be computed by the system in constant time; (iii) key derivation by the user within the authorized time intervals involves a small constant number of inexpensive cryptographic operations; and (iv) if the total number of time intervals in the system is n, then the increase of the public storage space at the server due to our solution is only by a small asymptotic factor, e.g., $O(\log^* n \log\log n)$ with a small constant.

1 Introduction

This work addresses the problem of key management in access control systems, with the emphasis on time-based access control policies. Consider a system where all users are divided into a set of disjoint classes, and a user is granted access to a specific access class for a period of time specified by its beginning and end. In such systems, it is common for the access classes to be organized in a hierarchy, and a user then obtains access to the resources at her own class and the resources associated with all descendant classes in the hierarchy.

When a user joins the system and is granted access to a certain class for a specific duration of time, she is given a key (or a set of keys) which allows her to *independently* derive access keys for all resources she is

*Supported in part by Grants IIS-0325345 and CNS-0627488 from the National Science Foundation, and by sponsors of the Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security.

†Supported by Intel Ph.D. fellowship.

entitled to have access during her time interval. For hierarchically organized user classes this means that the key allows the user to access objects at her access class and all descendant classes in the hierarchy during the time interval specified. Note that the time interval is user-specific and might be different for each user in the system.

There is a wide range of applications that follow this model and which would benefit from automatic enforcement of access policies through efficient key management. Such applications include:

- Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) models, which are useful for many types of organizations with various access constraints including temporal constraints. In such systems users are naturally organized into a hierarchy of classes, and a user higher up in the hierarchy inherits privileges of its descendant classes. Furthermore, users are normally granted their privileges for a specific period of time depending on their work schedule, which is well captured by our model.

- Subscription-based services such as digital libraries, music collections, digital subscriptions to newspapers and magazines, etc. Here a user may be able to join at any time and/or be able to specify the subscription duration, implying that access only during a specific time interval is allowed. Also subscription packages may be organized in a hierarchy depending on the resources included in each package. For instance, a Gold package will include everything available in a Silver package and additional premium services; weekends-only newspaper subscription is contained within the full-access subscription; etc.

- Content distribution where users may join at any time and receive content of varying quality or resolution.

- Cable TV where, similarly, users join at arbitrary times and receive different programs based on what is included in their subscription package.

- Project development, where users' views are organized in a hierarchy and each user obtains access to the resources determined by her role in the project. For example, the managerial view will include the views of developers assigned to the project and possibly other data. Also, users can be assigned to a project only for a specific duration of time.

- Cryptographic directories or file systems, where access is similarly based on a hierarchical relationship between users.

In all of the above examples we use the current time to enforce time-based policies. Additionally, instead of being based on the current time, access control policies can be based on the time in the past and permit access to historical data. For example, a user might buy access to data such as historical transactions, prices, legal records, etc. for a specified time interval in the past, e.g., the year of 1920. These different notions of time can be combined, e.g., a user buys access to 1920 data and is entitled to access it for two weeks starting from today.

If we let the lifetime of a system be partitioned into n short time intervals, the existence of time-based access control policies requires the access keys to be changed during each time interval. In this work, we concentrate on applications where the system is setup to support a large number of such time intervals. For example, access key to a video stream might change at least once a day (thus, permitting users to subscribe on any given day). If the system is setup for a few years, this results in n being in thousands. Likewise, if the application of interest is access to historical data, say, for the last century, the number of time intervals

will tend to be even higher. Thus, a small number of keys per user and efficient access with large n's is the goal of this work.

The notion of security for time-based hierarchical key assignment (KA) schemes was formalized only recently by Ateniese et al. [4]. Thus, in the current paper we use their security definitions and provide a new efficient solution to the problem of key management in systems with time-based access control policies. The approach we propose is provably secure and relies only on the security of pseudo-random functions (PRFs). In addition, our solution does not impose any requirements or constraints on the mechanisms used to enforce policies in systems where access control is not time-based (e.g., for a hierarchy of user classes). This means that our solution can be built on top of an existing scheme to make it capable of handling time. In the rest of this paper, we refer to a scheme without the support for temporal access control as a *time-invariant* scheme, and we refer to a scheme that supports temporal access control policies as *time-based*.

Existing efficient time-invariant key management schemes for user hierarchies are based on the notion of key derivation: a user receives a single key, and all other access keys a user might need to possess according to her privileges can be derived from that key. In the most general formulation of the problem, inheritance of privileges is modeled through the use of a directed graph, where a node corresponds to a class and a parent node can derive the keys of its descendants. In this paper we follow the same model, but, unlike previous work, apply key derivation techniques to time.

In a setup with n time intervals, the server is likely to maintain information which is linear in n. By building a novel data structure, we only slightly increase the storage space at the server beyond the necessary $O(n)$ and at the same time are able to achieve other very attractive characteristics. In more detail, our solution enjoys the following properties:

- To be able to obtain access to an arbitrary contiguous set of time intervals, a user is required to store at most 3 keys.
- The above-mentioned keys to be given to a user can be computed in constant time from that user's authorized set of contiguous time intervals.
- Key derivation within the authorized time intervals involves a small constant number of cryptographic operations and thus is independent of the number of time intervals in the systems or the number of time intervals in the user's access rights.
- If the total number of time intervals in the system is n, then the increase of the public storage space at the server due to our solution is only by a small asymptotic factor, e.g., $O(\log^* n \log\log n)$ with a small constant.
- All operations are extremely efficient, and no expensive public-key cryptography is used.

We provide several solutions with slightly different characteristics, where the difference is due to the building blocks used in our construction. These solutions are summarized in Table 3 (and, in a more general form, in Table 5). An extension of our techniques also allows to support access rights that can be stated as periodic expressions.

While the results given above correspond to a time-based key assignment scheme with a single resource or user class, we can use them to construct a time-based key assignment scheme for a user hierarchy. We show that our construction favorably compares to existing schemes and provides an efficient solution to the problem (the comparison is given at the end of the paper in Section 8). Additionally, our scheme is balanced in the sense that all resource consumption such as the client's private storage, computation to derive keys,

and the server public storage are minimized with tradeoffs being possible. This allows the scheme to work even with very weak clients and not to burden the server with excessive storage. Furthermore, our scheme is provably secure under standard complexity assumptions.

In the rest of the paper, we first review related literature in Section 2. In Section 3 we define the model and give some preliminaries. Section 4 gives a preliminary data structure, which we use in Section 5 to build our improved scheme. Thus, the core of our solution lies in Section 5 along with its analysis. In Section 6 we show how to use the scheme to build a time-based key assignment scheme for a user hierarchy. Finally, Section 7 comments on practical considerations and Section 8 compares our solution with other existing schemes and concludes the paper. Several extensions of our scheme and security proofs can be found in the appendix.

2 Related Work

The literature on time-invariant key assignment (KA) schemes in a user hierarchy is extensive, and its survey is beyond the scope of this paper. For an overview of such publications, see, e.g., [2] and [10].

While the list of publications on time-invariant KA schemes is very large, the number of publications that consider time-based policies and provide schemes for them is rather modest. The time-based setting and the first scheme was introduced by Tzeng [17]. The scheme, however, was later shown to be insecure against collusion of multiple users [22]. Subsequent work of Huang and Chang [12], Chien [9], and Yeh [20] was also shown to be insecure against collusion (in [16], [21, 14], and [4], respectively).

Among very recent publications, Wang and Laih [19] present a time-based hierarchical KA scheme. While their scheme is shown to be collusion-resilient, the notion of security, however, is not formalized and no clear adversarial model is given in that work. Tzeng [18] also describes a time-based hierarchical key assignment scheme, which is used as a part of an anonymous subscription system. The scheme is proven to resist collusion attacks; however, no formal model of adversarial behavior is provided. The work of Ateniese at el. [4] is the first result that provides a formal framework for time-based hierarchical KA schemes and gives provably secure solutions, both secure against key recovery and with pseudo-random keys.

Concurrently with and independently from this work, time-based solutions have been developed by De Santis et al. [15]. We compare performance of all solutions in Section 8.

There is extensive literature on broadcast encryption and multicast security, which might be considered applicable here. There are, however, crucial differences in the models, which prevent us from using solutions from those domains. First, broadcast encryption and multicast security schemes permit access to a single resource instead of a hierarchy and cannot be composed in an obvious way to solve our problem. More importantly, they assume that each client obtains key updates for each time interval, which is impossible in our model: no private channels between the server and a client after the initial issuance of the user keys is assumed, the client is allowed to remain off-line, and can access the resources at her own discretion. The only exception from the above online requirement that we are aware of is the work of Briscoe on multicast key management [8]. That solution builds a binary tree from the time intervals, thus achieving $O(\log n)$ secret keys and $O(\log n)$ key derivation time. Our solution, on the other hand, provides a constant number of secret keys and a constant derivation time, thus resulting in a superior performance when the number of time intervals is significant.

Finally, the access control literature has a large body of work on temporal access control models (see, e.g., [6, 7]). These models, however, concentrate on policy specification and not on key assignment and derivation mechanisms.

3 Problem Description and Preliminaries

3.1 The model

While the motivation for this work comes from the need to support access control policies with temporal constraints in user hierarchies, the problem does not need to be limited to this particular setting. That is, an efficient solution to the key management problem in temporal access control can find use in other domains. Therefore, we provide a very general formulation of the problem, without any assumptions on the environment in which it is used. Of course, access control in user hierarchies remains the most immediate and important application of our techniques. Thus, in Section 6 we will show how our solution can be used to realize temporal access control for user hierarchies.

Now let us assume that we are given a resource, and the owner of this resource would like to control user access to that resource using time-based policies. For that purpose, the lifetime of the system is partitioned into short time intervals (normally, of a length of a day or shorter), and the access key for that resource changes every time interval. Let n denote the number of time intervals in the system, $T = \{t_1, \ldots, t_n\}$ denote the intervals, and $K = \{k_{t_1}, \ldots, k_{t_n}\}$ denote the corresponding access keys.

Now assume that a user $\mathcal{U}$ is authorized to access that resource during a contiguous set of time intervals $T_{\mathcal{U}} \subseteq T$, where $T_{\mathcal{U}} = \{t_{start}, \ldots, t_{end}\}$. Following the notation of [4], we use the *interval-set* over T, denoted by $\mathcal{P}$, which is the set of all non-empty contiguous subsequences of T, i.e., $T_{\mathcal{U}} \in \mathcal{P}$ for any $T_{\mathcal{U}}$. With such access rights, $\mathcal{U}$ should receive or should be able to compute the keys $K_{T_{\mathcal{U}}} \subseteq K$, where for each $t \in T_{\mathcal{U}}$ the key $k_t \in K_{T_{\mathcal{U}}}$. We denote the private information that $\mathcal{U}$ receives by $S_{T_{\mathcal{U}}}$. Obviously, storing $|T_{\mathcal{U}}|$ keys at the user end is not always practical (especially if this number is large), and significantly more efficient solutions are possible. Then a *time-based key assignment scheme* assigns keys to the time intervals and users, so that time-based access control is enforced in a correct and efficient manner. Such key generation is assumed to be performed by a central authority CA, but once a user is issued the keys, there is no interaction with other entities. More formally, we define a time-based KA scheme as follows:

Definition 1 *Let T be a set of distinct time intervals and $\mathcal{P}$ be the interval-set over T. A time-based key assignment scheme consists of algorithms* $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Assign}, \mathsf{Derive})$ *such that:*

Gen *is a probabilistic algorithm, which, on input a security parameter 1^κ and the set of time intervals T, outputs (i) a key k_t for any $t \in T$; (ii) secret information* Sec *associated with the system; and (iii) public information* Pub. *Let* $(K, \mathsf{Sec}, \mathsf{Pub})$ *denote the output of this algorithm, where K is the set of all keys.*

Assign *is a deterministic algorithm, which, on input a time sequence $T_{\mathcal{U}} \in \mathcal{P}$ and secret information* Sec, *outputs private information $S_{T_{\mathcal{U}}}$ for $T_{\mathcal{U}}$.*

Derive *is a deterministic algorithm, which, on input a time sequence $T_{\mathcal{U}}$, time interval $t \in T_{\mathcal{U}}$, private information $S_{T_{\mathcal{U}}}$, and public information* Pub, *outputs the key k_t for time interval t.*

The correctness requirement is such that, for each time sequence $T_{\mathcal{U}} \in \mathcal{P}$, each time interval $t \in T_{\mathcal{U}}$, each private information $S_{T_{\mathcal{U}}}$, each key $k_t \in K$, and each public information Pub *that* $\mathsf{Gen}(1^\kappa, T)$ *and* $\mathsf{Assign}(T_{\mathcal{U}}, \mathsf{Sec})$ *can output,* $\Pr[\mathsf{Derive}(T_{\mathcal{U}}, t, S_{T_{\mathcal{U}}}, \mathsf{Pub}) = k_t] = 1$.

Note that in many cases the Assign algorithm can be a part of the Gen algorithm, i.e., private values $S_{T_{\mathcal{U}}}$ for every $T_{\mathcal{U}} \in \mathcal{P}$ are generated at the system initialization time. We, however, separate these algorithms to account for cases where retrieving $S_{T_{\mathcal{U}}}$ from Sec is not straightforward (which is the case in our scheme). In

such cases, merging these two algorithms together will needlessly complicate Gen resulting in unnecessary complexity.

Also note that since a user accesses the server's public storage for key derivation purposes, there is no need for additional time synchronization mechanisms between the user and the server: the current time interval can be stored as a part of the public information the server maintains.

A time-based KA scheme can be secure against static or adaptive adversaries. In [4], however, it was shown that the security of a time-based hierarchical KA scheme against a static adversary is polynomial-time equivalent to the security of that scheme against an adaptive adversary for both security goals (key recovery and key indistinguishability). While in the current discussion we are not concerned with hierarchical schemes, our setting can be considered to be a special case of a hierarchy with a single class. Thus, in this work we only provide definitions of a time-based KA scheme secure against a static adversary; and a proof of security under such definitions will imply security against an adaptive adversary. Furthermore, we distinguish between two different notions of security for a time-based KA scheme: security against *key recovery* and security with respect to *key indistinguishability* (i.e., schemes with pseudo-random keys). In the current version of this paper we focus on security against key recovery. Our construction, however, can be shown to be secure against the stronger notion of key indistinguishability by introducing only slight modifications (basically by using different building blocks). Thus, we provide intuition on how pseudo-random keys can be achieved, but do not provide formal proofs.

In our definition of a scheme secure against static adversary, let adversary $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ attack the security of the scheme at time $t \in T$. $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ is then allowed to corrupt all users who are not authorized to have access to k_t and, when finished, is asked to guess k_t. We consider a scheme to be secure only if $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ has at most negligible probability in outputting the correct key. A formal definition of security is given in Appendix B.

In addition to the security requirements, an efficient KA scheme is evaluated by the following criteria:

- The size of the private data a user must store;
- The amount of computation necessary to generate an access key for the target time interval;
- The amount of information the service provider must maintain for public access.

3.2 Key derivation

Our approach relies heavily on the notion of key derivation. In our solution, we use the same key derivation techniques that were used in [1]. The crucial difference, however, is that in [1] key derivation was used between user classes (to provide a time-invariant scheme for a user hierarchy), while in this work we use key derivation for the data structures that we build. This is possible because the techniques of [1] work for an arbitrary directed acyclic graph[1] (DAG), and we review them next.

Assume that we are given a DAG denoted by $G = (V, E)$, where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. Let $Anc(v, G)$ denote the set of ancestors of node v in G including v itself, and let $Desc(v, G)$ denote the set of descendants of v in G including v itself. Let $F^\kappa : \{0,1\}^\kappa \times \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\kappa$, for a security parameter κ, be a family of pseudo-random functions (PRFs) that, on input of a κ-bit key and a string, outputs a κ-bit string that is indistinguishable from a random string (note that a PRF can be implemented very efficiently as HMAC [5] or CBC MAC). For brevity, instead of $F^\kappa(k, x)$, we may write $F_k(x)$. Also, when the graph G is clear from the context, we may omit it in the ancestry functions and use $Anc(v)$ and $Desc(v)$.

To be able to derive keys, we need two algorithms:

[1]The technique can be applied to arbitrary graphs, even those that may contain cycles. It, however, was formally proven to be secure for a graph without cycles. Nevertheless, it still can be adopted to graphs with cycles, if necessary.

Scheme	Private storage	Key derivation	Public storage
2HS [2]	1	2 op.	$O(n \log n)$
3HS [1]	1	3 op.	$O(n \log \log n)$
4HS [2]	1	4 op.	$O(n \log^* n)$
$\log^*$HS [2]	1	$O(\log^* n)$ op.	$O(n)$

Table 1: Performance of shortcut schemes for one-dimensional graphs.

- Set is an algorithm for assigning keys to the graph which takes as input a security parameter 1^κ and a DAG $G = (V, E)$ and outputs (i) an access key k_v for each $v \in V$, (ii) a secret information S_v for each node $v \in V$, and (iii) public information Pub.
- Derive is an algorithm for deriving keys which takes as input nodes $v, w \in V$, secret information S_v for v, and public information Pub. It outputs the access key k_w for w, if $w \in Desc(v, G)$.

The derivation method we use is from [1], and is sufficient to achieve security against key recovery:

- $\mathsf{Set}(1^\kappa, G)$: For each node $v \in V$, select a random secret key $k_v \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$ and set $S_v = k_v$. For each node $v \in V$, select a unique public label $\ell_v \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$ and store it in Pub. For each edge $(v, w) \in E$, compute public information $y_{v,w} = k_w \oplus F_{k_v}(\ell_w)$, where $\oplus$ denotes bitwise XOR, and store it in Pub.
- $\mathsf{Derive}(v, w, S_v, \mathsf{Pub})$: Let $(v, w) \in E$. Then given $S_v = k_v$ and Pub, derivation of the key k_w can be performed as $k_w = F_{k_v}(\ell_w) \oplus y_{v,w}$, where ℓ_w and $y_{v,w}$ are publicly available in Pub. More generally, if there is a directed path between nodes v and u in G, then u's key can be derived from v's key by considering each edge on the path.

3.3 Shortcut techniques

Our constructions use the so-called shortcut edges: a *shortcut edge* is an edge that is not in the original graph G but is in the transitive closure of G. Such edges are added to G for performance reasons. Note that addition of shortcut edges does not affect partial order relationship between the nodes, i.e., we may add a shortcut edge (v, w) to the graph only if there is already a directed path from node v to w in the original graph.

In this work we rely on efficient shortcut techniques from prior literature for a graph of dimension 1 (i.e., a total order). For completeness of this work, we review some of these techniques, as well as the notion of the dimension of a graph, in Appendix A. Here we only summarize the performance of existing schemes, any of which can be used as a building block in our constructions.

Consider a directed graph of dimension 1 consisting of n vertices. Then the performance of known solutions for such graphs is given in Table 1. In the table, we denote by sHS a solution where the distance between any two nodes (i.e., the diameter of the graph) is at most s, i.e., a so-called s-Hop Scheme.

Throughout this work we may use $\mathcal{S}1(n)$ to denote any shortcut scheme for graphs of dimension 1 applied to a total order of size n. We also use $space(\mathcal{S}1(n))$ and $time(\mathcal{S}1(n))$ to denote its public storage and key derivation complexity, respectively.



Figure 1: Building a grid for the basic scheme.



Figure 2: Adding shortcuts to the grid.

4 Building Basic Data Structure

As was mentioned above, all of our constructions are based on the notion of key derivation in a graph. Throughout the rest of the paper, when we say that there is a directed edge from v to w in G, it implies that v is capable of deriving w's key using its own key. This means that, for the data structures that we build (all of which are DAGs), there will be a public and secret information associated with each node, and there will be public information corresponding to each edge.

Our preliminary data structure is rather simple and consists of two main steps: building a grid of size $n \times n$ (where n is the number of time intervals in the system) and applying one-dimensional shortcut techniques to parts of the grid. A more detailed description follows.

1. Build half of a grid of dimension $n \times n$ with the time intervals $t_1, \ldots, t_n$ being on its diagonal (see Figure 1). In the grid, we denote by $v_{1,1}$ the root node; node $v_{i,j}$ is located at the row i and column j (i.e., $v_{2,1}$ is "below" $v_{1,1}$ and $v_{1,2}$ is "on the left" of $v_{1,1}$). There is a directed edge from each $v_{i,j}$ to $v_{i+1,j}$, and from each $v_{i,j}$ to $v_{i,j+1}$. The time interval t_i corresponds to the node $v_{i,n-i}$.

   From this data structure, it should be clear that, given a key for $v_{i,j}$, all keys for time intervals in the range $t_i, \ldots, t_{n-j+1}$ can be derived from it (in the worst-case $O(n)$ time).

2. Next, we apply a one-dimensional shortcut scheme $\mathcal{S}1$ to each row and column of the grid (see Figure 2). More precisely, we add shortcuts to the data structure to be able to derive $v_{i,x}$'s key from $v_{i,y}$'s key for any $x > y$ (and similarly $v_{x,j}$'s key from $v_{y,j}$'s key for any $x > y$) in a small number of steps instead of previous $O(n)$ time. This is done at the expense of $O(space(\mathcal{S}1(n)))$ additional shortcuts per row or column and therefore $O(n \cdot space(\mathcal{S}1(n)))$ total shortcuts.

   Having this, now a user entitled to have access during time intervals $T_{\mathcal{U}} = \{t_x, \ldots, t_y\} \in \mathcal{P}$ can receive a single key corresponding to node $v_{x,n-y+1}$. Key derivation of the key corresponding to the current time interval $t_i \in T_{\mathcal{U}}$ now consists of at most $2 \cdot time(\mathcal{S}1(n))$ steps: at most $time(\mathcal{S}1(n))$ steps are needed to derive $v_{i,n-y+1}$'s key from that of $v_{x,n-y+1}$, and then at most $time(\mathcal{S}1(n))$ steps are needed to derive $v_{i,n-i+1}$'s key (which corresponds to t_i) from that of $v_{i,n-y+1}$.

Table 2 summarizes the performance of the basic scheme, when used with various one-dimensional schemes.

Underlying scheme	Private storage	Key derivation	Public storage
2HS	1	≤ 4 op.	$O(n^2 \log n)$
3HS	1	≤ 6 op.	$O(n^2 \log \log n)$
4HS	1	≤ 8 op.	$O(n^2 \log^* n)$
$\log^*$HS	1	$O(\log^* n)$ op.	$O(n^2)$

Table 2: Performance of the basic (and preliminary) scheme.

5 An Improved Scheme

This section describes a solution that achieves significantly better performance than the previous scheme. We first present a new data structure and then fill other parts in to provide a full-fledged time-based KA scheme.

At a high level, to build a new data structure, we partition all time intervals in the system into coarse "chunks" ($\sqrt{n}$ chunks of $\sqrt{n}$ time intervals each) and apply the basic scheme to the chunks. If access is to be granted to a large time interval that spans across boundaries of these chunks, we can use this level of granularity to assign keys. If, on the other hand, the interval to which the user should obtain access is contained within a chunk, we recursively apply this procedure to the time intervals within each chunk to support time-based access control of finer granularity. If a time interval spans across different chunks, but contains partial chunks at the beginning and at the end of the user's sequence of time intervals, then we utilize the coarse chunk's keys along with two new types of keys that are introduced later.

5.1 Reducing storage space

This section describes the tree data structure we build; how it is used is covered in the next sections. For the purposes of presentation of this work, we let $n = 2^{2^q}$ for some integer q. This allows us to avoid using rounding notation $\lfloor x \rfloor$ and $\lceil x \rceil$ throughout the algorithms and results in a cleaner presentation (note that this assumption is purely to make the presentation cleaner, and the solution will work without this assumption). Our procedure for building the data structure takes as inputs a node v and the set $T = \{t_1, \ldots, t_n\}$, and then recursively builds a tree for the set rooted at v. Due to the recursive nature of this function, we use $\hat{T}$ to denote the working set of the current function invocation and $|\hat{T}|$ to denote the size of $\hat{T}$. Then the data structure is constructed as follows:

Algorithm DataStructBuild$(v, \hat{T})$:

1. If $|\hat{T}| = 2$ (i.e., $q = 0$), then return. Otherwise, continue with the steps below.
2. Partition $\hat{T}$ into $\sqrt{|\hat{T}|}$ sets of $\sqrt{|\hat{T}|}$ contiguous time intervals each, call these $\hat{T}_1, \ldots, \hat{T}_{\sqrt{|\hat{T}|}}$. That is, if $\hat{T} = \{t_1, \ldots, t_{|\hat{T}|}\}$, then $\hat{T}_i = \{t_{i\sqrt{|\hat{T}|}+1}, \ldots, t_{i\sqrt{|\hat{T}|}+\sqrt{|\hat{T}|}}\}$. Create a node v_i for each $\hat{T}_i$, and make v_i a child of v.
3. Generate a problem $Coarse(\hat{T})$, derived from $\hat{T}$ by treating each $\hat{T}_i$ as a black box (i.e., "merging" the constituents of $\hat{T}_i$ into a single item). Note that the size of set $Coarse(\hat{T})$ is $\sqrt{|\hat{T}|}$.
4. Store at node v an instance of the basic scheme for $Coarse(\hat{T})$, denoted $D(v)$. $D(v)$ supports performance of: 1 key, $O(time(\mathcal{S}1(|\hat{T}|)))$ key derivation, and



(a) Initial state. (b) State after Step 2. (c) State after Step 3. (d) State after Step 5.

Figure 3: Construction of the data structure for the improved scheme (first level of recursion).

$O(space(\mathcal{S}1(|\hat{T}|)))$ space; but $D(v)$ can only process an interval if it is the union of a contiguous subset of $Coarse(\hat{T})$ (i.e., it cannot handle intervals whose endpoints are inside the $\hat{T}_i$'s, as it cannot "see" inside a $\hat{T}_i$).

5. Also store at node v two solutions of one-dimensional problems on $\hat{T}$: One is for intervals all of which start at the right boundary of $\hat{T}$ and end inside $\hat{T}$ (we call this the *right-anchored* problem and denote the one-dimensional structure for it by $R(v)$); another is for intervals all of which start at the left boundary of $\hat{T}$ and end inside $\hat{T}$ (we call this the *left-anchored* problem and denote the one-dimensional structure for it by $L(v)$). Note that having $R(v)$ and $L(v)$ enables the handling of an interval that lies within $\hat{T}$ and also has its left or right endpoint at a boundary of $\hat{T}$, with performance of: 1 key, $O(time(\mathcal{S}1(|\hat{T}|)))$ steps per key derivation, and $O(space(\mathcal{S}1(|\hat{T}|)))$ space.

6. Recursively apply the scheme to each child of $\hat{T}$; that is, call $\mathsf{DataStructBuild}(v_i, \hat{T}_i)$ in turn for each $i = 1, 2, \ldots, \sqrt{|\hat{T}|}$.

Figure 3 gives an illustration of how the data structure is built. The total space $S(n)$ of the above data structure satisfies the recurrence $S(n) \leq \sqrt{n}S(\sqrt{n}) + c_1 \cdot space(\mathcal{S}1(n))$ if $n > 2$ and $S(2) = c_2$, where c_1 and c_2 are constants. Thus, $S(n) = O(space(\mathcal{S}1(n)) \log\log n)$.

5.2 Key assignment

We now turn our attention to which keys are given to a user with access to an arbitrary sequence of time intervals $T_{\mathcal{U}} \in \mathcal{P}$. In what follows, v is a node of the above tree data structure, $\hat{T}$ is the set of time intervals associated with v, and I is a sequence of time intervals for which the keys must be given. The recursive procedure below, when invoked on any $T_{\mathcal{U}}$ and our data structure, returns a set of (at most 3) keys associated with $T_{\mathcal{U}}$.

Algorithm $\mathsf{AssignKeys}(I, v, \hat{T})$:

1. If v is a leaf, then return a key for each of the (at most two) time intervals in I. Otherwise, continue with the next step.

2. Let $v_1, \ldots, v_{\sqrt{|\hat{T}|}}$ be the children of v, and let $\hat{T}_1, \ldots, \hat{T}_{\sqrt{|\hat{T}|}}$ be the respective sets of times associated with these children. We distinguish two cases:

   (a) I overlaps with only one set $\hat{T}_i$. Then we return the keys from the recursive call $\mathsf{AssignKeys}(I, v_i, \hat{T}_i)$.

(b) I overlaps with all of $\hat{T}_k, \hat{T}_{k+1}, \ldots, \hat{T}_{k+\ell}$, where $\ell \geq 1$. These $\ell + 1$ intervals are handled in 3 different ways: Those completely contained in I are collectively processed using the $D(v)$ structure, resulting in one key. If $\hat{T}_k$ overlaps with I, but is not contained in I, then it is right-anchored and is processed using $R(v_k)$, resulting in one key. If $\hat{T}_{k+\ell}$ overlaps with I, but is not contained in I, then it is left-anchored and is processed using $L(v_{k+\ell})$, resulting in one key. Those (at most) 3 keys are returned.

One can achieve a faster key assignment if we store the recursion tree (call it RT) for the above AssignKeys algorithm, and use it to speed up the key assignment process. The time-consuming part of the above AssignKeys algorithm is the step-by-step descent from the root until the node u of RT at which the keys are actually assigned: The keys we seek would be easy to assign in $O(time(\mathcal{S}1(n)))$ if we could, in constant time, go directly to that node u. This, however, is easy to do once we observe that (i) the parent of u in RT is the lowest node whose interval contains I (i.e., u is the nearest common ancestor in RT of the two leaves that correspond to the endpoints of I), and (ii) in any tree it is possible to answer *nearest common ancestor* (NCA) queries in constant time (see [11] for details).

All keys given to users must be labeled with the level at which they were retrieved in the data structure, i.e., the distance from the root node in the tree for T. This is necessary for achieving constant-time computation of access keys, which will be explained in the next section. To make key derivation simpler, we also label user keys with their type; namely: D, R, or L. In addition, if a user receives more than a single key for her time sequence $T_{\mathcal{U}}$, each key is labeled with a range of time intervals to which it permits access.

To summarize, we assume that a key given to a user will be labeled with four values $(lev, type, t_a, t_b)$, where $0 \leq lev \leq \log\log n$, $type \in \{R, L, D\}$, and $t_a, t_b \in T$ such that $t_a < t_b$. For example, if a user with access rights to $T_{\mathcal{U}} = \{t_{start}, \ldots, t_{end}\}$ is given private information consisting of three keys $S_{T_{\mathcal{U}}} = \{k_1, k_2, k_3\}$, then k_1 could be labeled with (l, R, t_{start}, t_a), k_2 with $(l-1, D, t_{a+1}, t_b)$, and k_3 with (l, L, t_{b+1}, t_{end}).

5.3 Content distribution

At time $t \in T$, the service provider wants to make certain content (possibly very voluminous) available to the users with access rights at time interval t. To do so, the content is encrypted with the access key k_t using a symmetric encryption scheme and is made available to all users in the encrypted form (by placing it in a public location, broadcasting it to the users, or by other means). In our scheme the server also needs to ensure that the keys that users derive for t allow them to derive k_t. There are $O(\log\log n)$ such keys for t in the data structure access to which should allow access to k_t. Since the data structure has $(\log\log n + 1)$ levels, such keys are:

- Keys from data structure $R(v)$, for some v in the data structure, one from each level.
- Keys from data structure $L(v)$, similarly, for a single v per level.
- Keys corresponding to data structure $D(v)$, one from each level l, where $0 \leq l \leq \log\log n - 1$.

We refer to these keys as *enabling keys*. The server places in the public domain information that permits derivation of k_t from any of the enabling keys above. Additionally, the server labels the public derivation information associated with each of the enabling keys with the level and the type (i.e., R, L, or D) of the corresponding enabling key. This is needed to permit fast constant-time derivation of the access key.



Figure 4: An example illustration of the data structure.

5.4 Key derivation

A user $\mathcal{U}$ with access to the sequence of time intervals $T_{\mathcal{U}} = \{t_{start}, \ldots, t_{end}\} \in \mathcal{P}$ receives private information $S_{T_{\mathcal{U}}}$ consisting of 1, 2, or 3 keys that permit her to derive enabling keys for each $t \in T_{\mathcal{U}}$. In the most general (and common) case, such private information consists of 3 keys – denoted by k_1, k_2, and k_3 – labeled as (l, R, t_{start}, t_a), $(l-1, D, t_{a+1}, t_b)$, and (l, L, t_{b+1}, t_{end}), respectively, for some l, a, and b. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that if the number of keys is less than 3, then the missing keys are set to empty strings with k_1 remaining of type R, key k_2 of type D, and key k_3 of type L. Then to obtain the enabling key for a time interval $t_i \in T_{\mathcal{U}}$, $\mathcal{U}$ executes a derivation algorithm which we sketch here:

Algorithm $\mathsf{DeriveKey}(T_{\mathcal{U}}, t_i, S_{T_{\mathcal{U}}}, \mathsf{Pub})$:

1. Parse $S_{T_{\mathcal{U}}}$ as $k_1(l, R, t_{start}, t_a)$, $k_2(l-1, D, t_{a+1}, t_b)$, $k_3(l, L, t_{b+1}, t_{end})$.
2. If $t_i \in \{t_{start}, \ldots, t_a\}$, find the node v at level l such that $R(v)$ permits access to t_i (note that such node v can be computed in constant time using index i of the time interval t_i). Use k_1 and the public information about the edges in Pub to derive the key corresponding to t_i and return that enabling key.
3. Similarly, if $t_i \in \{t_{b+1}, \ldots, t_{end}\}$, locate the node v at level l such that $L(v)$ permits access to t_i. Use k_3 and Pub to derive an enabling key for t_i and return that key.
4. Finally, if $t_i \in \{t_{a+1}, t_b\}$, locate v at level $l-1$ such that $D(v)$ permits access to t_i; use k_2 and Pub to derive an enabling key for t_i and return it.

Key derivation complexity in all of the above cases is $O(time(\mathcal{S}1(n)))$.

5.5 Example

To better illustrate how the above algorithms for building the data structure and assigning and deriving keys work, we give a toy example. Let $n = 16$. Then the
$\mathsf{DataStructBuild}(root, T)$ procedure will result in a tree of depth three. Let us denote the root of the tree by v, ith child of the root by v_i, and jth child of node v_i by v_{ij}. Also, let T_i and T_{ij} denote the set of time intervals that v_i and v_{ij} cover, respectively. For $n = 16$, such a tree is given in Figure 4. In the figure, each node w has data structures $D(w)$, $R(w)$, and $L(w)$ associated with it, which we omit for conciseness.

Now consider users $\mathcal{U}_1$, $\mathcal{U}_2$, and $\mathcal{U}_3$ with the following access rights: $T_{\mathcal{U}_1} = \{t_1, \ldots, t_6\}$, $T_{\mathcal{U}_2} = \{t_2, \ldots, t_4\}$, and $T_{\mathcal{U}_3} = \{t_4, \ldots, t_{14}\}$. According to the key assignment algorithm $\mathsf{AssignKeys}(\cdot)$, they are assigned keys in the following way: Since $\mathcal{U}_1$'s sequence of time intervals starts at the beginning of the system's lifetime, $\mathcal{U}_1$'s credentials are left-anchored at the level of v, and $\mathcal{U}_1$ obtains a single key from $L(v)$ corresponding to t_6. Such a key permits derivation of enabling keys for all of t_1 through t_5. For user $\mathcal{U}_2$, we determine that her access rights are contained within the time interval covered by v_1, so we start at that node. From $D(v_1)$, $\mathcal{U}_2$ obtains a key corresponding to T_{12} (covers t_3 and t_4). The remaining part of $T_{\mathcal{U}_2}$ is

Algorithm $\mathsf{Gen}(1^\kappa, T)$:

1. Create a root node $root$ for the data structure and run $\mathsf{DataStuctBuild}(root, T)$. Let $G = (V, E)$ denote the tree structure returned.
2. For each $v \in V$, randomly choose a secret key $k_w \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$ and a unique public label $\ell_w \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$ associated with each node w in $D(v)$, $R(v)$, and $L(v)$.
3. For each $v \in V$, construct public information about each edge in $D(v)$, $R(v)$, and $L(v)$ using the key derivation method. That is, for each edge (w, u), its public value is $y_{w,u} \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$.
4. For each $t \in T$, randomly choose a secret key $k_t \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$ and a unique public label $\ell_t \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$.
5. For each $t \in T$, let $V_t \subset V$ denote the set of nodes in G access to which implies access to t. Then for each V_t, for each $v \in V_t$:
   (a) find in $D(v)$ the node corresponding to the time interval t; call it w.
   (b) create an edge from w to t by computing public information using enabling key k_w, t's secret key k_t, public label ℓ_t, and the key derivation method. Mark such an edge with the level of v and type D.
   (c) repeat (a) and (b) for $R(v)$ and $L(v)$, using types R and L, respectively.
6. Let K consist of the secret keys k_t for each $t \in T$ and Sec consist of the remaining secret keys k_w. Also let Pub consist of G, all public labels (of the form ℓ_w and ℓ_t), and public information about all edges generated above.

Algorithm $\mathsf{Assign}(T_\mathcal{U}, \mathsf{Sec})$:

1. Execute $\mathsf{AssignKeys}(T_\mathcal{U}, root, T)$, where $root$ is the root node of G.
2. Set $S_{T_\mathcal{U}}$ to the keys computed and return $S_{T_\mathcal{U}}$.

Algorithm $\mathsf{Derive}(T_\mathcal{U}, t, S_{T_\mathcal{U}}, \mathsf{Pub})$:

1. If $t \notin T_\mathcal{U}$, return a special rejection symbol $\perp$.
2. Execute $\mathsf{DeriveKey}(T_\mathcal{U}, t, S_{T_\mathcal{U}}, \mathsf{Pub})$ to compute an enabling key for t; call it k'_t.
3. Use k'_t along with its (level-type) label and Pub to derive key k_t.

Figure 5: Proposed time-based key assignment scheme.

obtained from $R(v_{11})$ (covers t_2). Finally, for user $\mathcal{U}_3$, the access rights cross the boundaries of the nodes at the first level, so we start at node v. $\mathcal{U}_3$ obtains from $D(v)$ a key that permits generation of keys for T_2 and T_3 (their parent) and thus covers t_5 through t_{12}. To cover the remaining parts of $T_{\mathcal{U}_3}$, $\mathcal{U}_3$ is given the key corresponding to t_4 from $R(v_1)$ and a key from $L(v_4)$ corresponding to t_{14} (which permits derivation of the key for t_{13} as well).

To illustrate content distribution and key derivation, let t_4 be the current time interval. Our data structure contains 8 enabling keys for t_4 of level-type $(0, R)$, $(1, R)$, $(2, R)$, $(0, L)$, $(1, L)$, $(2, L)$, $(0, D)$, and $(1, D)$. The service provider places in the public domain derivation information that, given any of the keys above, permits computation of the access key k_{t_4}. $\mathcal{U}_1$ then uses its only key and $L(v)$ to derive the enabling key for t_4 and derives k_{t_4} by using public information marked with $(0, L)$. $\mathcal{U}_2$ uses its key for T_{12} compute its enabling key and obtain k_{t_4} using public information marked with $(1, D)$. Finally, $\mathcal{U}_3$ uses its key for t_4 and public information with label $(1, R)$ to obtain k_{t_4}.

5.6 Putting everything together

In this section we summarize our construction and show its performance. All proofs corresponding to our security theorems can be found in Appendix B. Figure 5 gives a complete description of our time-based KA scheme. In addition to the algorithms given in previous sections, we specify how they are used. Table 3 summarizes performance of our solution. The security of our solution comes from the way key derivation is

Underlying scheme	Private storage	Key derivation	Public storage
2HS	≤ 3	≤ 5 op.	$O(n \log n \log\log n)$
3HS	≤ 3	≤ 7 op.	$O(n(\log\log n)^2)$
4HS	≤ 3	≤ 9 op.	$O(n \log^* n \log\log n)$
$\log^*$HS	≤ 3	$O(\log^* n)$ op.	$O(n \log\log n)$

Table 3: Performance of the improved scheme.

performed in a DAG and is not due to the details of the data structures built.

Theorem 1 *Assuming the security of the family of PRFs F^κ, the time-based key assignment scheme given in Figure 5 is both complete and sound with respect to key recovery in the presence of a static adversary.*

To achieve a stronger notion of key indistinguishability, our solution will require a slightly different key derivation method. Intuitively, we decouple the keys used in the public information from the actual access keys, so that now it is not feasible to test access keys using the public information. The separation is performed using an additional invocation of a PRF, where the keys to be used in Pub are computed as $F(0||k)$ and the access keys are computed as $F(1||k)$. This key derivation method is described in [1] (full version only).

Then in our scheme of Figure 5, we use this enhanced key derivation method in Step 3 of the Gen algorithm (i.e., in data structures $D(v)$, $R(v)$, and $L(v)$). This means that now someone with access to a certain key in, for instance, $R(v)$ and who guesses an unauthorized key correctly, cannot use the public information for that data structure to test the key. This change implies the corresponding change in the Derive algorithm.

So far we devised a solution to support access rights that span across a contiguous sequence of intervals. It is also possible to support periodic access rights that span across a contiguous set of time periods but the time intervals themselves might be discontinuous within a period. If we treat time as a single dimension and the solution presented in this work as a solution to one-dimensional problem, it is possible to extend our approach to higher dimensions. An extension to dimension 2, which is useful in the geo-spatial context, is presented in [3]. This two-dimensional solution can be used to conveniently address the problem of periodic access rights with a small number of keys per user: we use one dimension to specify periods in user access rights and the other dimension to specify individual time slots within a period. Assuming that the total number of time intervals within a period is a fixed constant, the user will obtain a constant number of keys that allow her to access the resources for a predefined sequence of periods with any subset of time intervals within the period. See [3] for more information on the key assignment and derivation mechanisms.

In Appendix C we show how the lifetime of the system can be extended to new intervals beyond the original n. Also, in the same appendix we show one can further decrease public storage space at a slight increase in the number of user keys (i.e., a generalization in terms of keys/space tradeoff).

6 Temporal Access Control for a User Hierarchy

In systems with hierarchically organized access classes, such a hierarchy is normally modeled as a directed acyclic access graph which we denote by G_U. In such a graph, each node corresponds to an access class and the edges form a partial order relationship between the classes. An edge from node v to node w means that the parent node v inherits privileges of the node w (while the converse is not true). This implies that

a user with access to a specific class obtains access to the resources at that class and the resources at all of the descendant classes in the hierarchy. With this setup in place, it is possible to assign each class a single secret key and let users obtain keys of their descendant classes through a key derivation process. Similar to a general graph, in an access graph G_U a directed path from node v to w means that w's keys are derivable from v's key.

Now if we equip the model with time-based policies, in addition to computing keys of descendant classes, a user should be able to compute keys based on time. That is, a user $\mathcal{U}$ entitled to access class $v \in V_U$ during a sequence of time intervals $T_{\mathcal{U}} \in \mathcal{P}$ obtains private information that permits her to compute keys $k_{v,t}$ for her access class v and each $t \in T_{\mathcal{U}}$ (time-based key derivation). In addition, the private information allows $\mathcal{U}$ to compute, for each $t \in T_{\mathcal{U}}$, keys $k_{w,t}$ for each descendant access class w in the user hierarchy (class-based key derivation). Thus, key derivation now consists of two dimensions, which can potentially be performed using drastically different techniques.

A definition of a hierarchical time-based KA scheme can be constructed by extending Definition 1 with user hierarchies. Due to space limitations, we do not provide it in this version of the paper. We only note that the private information for access class v and time sequence $T_{\mathcal{U}}$ is now denoted by $S_{v,T_{\mathcal{U}}}$. The definition of a secure time-based KA scheme must also be slightly modified for this setting to take into account different access classes. Recall from Section 3.1 that we do need to consider active adversaries, and now have a static adversary $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ who attacks a class $v \in V_U$ at time $t \in T$. $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ is allowed to obtain access to the secret information of all classes $w \in V_U$ at all times $t' \in T$, except classes $Anc(v)$ at time t. We say that a hierarchical key assignment scheme is secure if such $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ has at most negligible probability of guessing $k_{v,t}$ correctly. The formal definition is given in Appendix B.

We can create a hierarchical time-based KA scheme by applying our solution independently to each access class in the user hierarchy. Then for each $t \in T$, the nodes with keys $k_{v,t}$ for each $v \in V_U$ are connected with edges to form the original hierarchy of classes. In more detail, for each $v \in V_U$ we use the improved scheme to build the data structure for T and generate access keys $k_{v,t}$ for every $t \in T$. This will result in $|V_U|$ instances of the time-based graph G, each of which permits key derivation for a specific access class. Since the structure of such graphs is the same for all of them, but the keys assigned to nodes and keys encoded in the public information will differ, we denote the public information generated for access class v according to G as Pub_v^G. Then for any $t \in T$, the public information for G_U is constructed according to the current keys for each access class using the key derivation method (which was the original use of it in [1]). We denote the public information at time interval t generated according to G_U by $\mathsf{Pub}_t^{G_U}$. For a user with access privileges for time interval $T_{\mathcal{U}} \in \mathcal{P}$ at access level $v \in V_U$ consists of time-based key derivation (using Pub_v^G) of the key $k_{v,t}$ followed by class-based key derivation of the key $k_{w,t}$ (using $\mathsf{Pub}_t^{G_U}$); this is assuming that $t \in T_{\mathcal{U}}$ and $w \in Desc(v, G_U)$. A more precise description of our scheme is given in Figure 6.

In the figure, we first build the data structure G and generate public labels for the time intervals (Steps 1–3). Then for each class u in the user hierarchy, we pick secret keys for its copy of G and generate public information according to those keys (Step 5). Next, we connect the data structures corresponding to different user classes according to the partial order relationship between those classes (Step 6). That is, for each time interval t, if user class u_1 is a parent of user class u_2, we compute public information that permits derivation of $k_{u_2,t}$ from $k_{u_1,t}$. Finally, Step 7 is similar to Step 5 in Figure 5 and allows computation of t's access keys from an enabling key corresponding to t at any level of granularity in the data structure G.

The fact that keys for an access class are assigned independently of the keys for other access classes allows us to state the following result:

Theorem 2 *Assuming the security of the family of PRFs F^κ, the time-based key assignment scheme for hierarchically organized access classes given in Figure 6 is both complete and sound with respect to key*

Algorithm $\mathsf{Gen}(1^\kappa, T, G_U)$:

1. Create a root node $root$ for the data structure and run $\mathsf{DataStuctBuild}(root, T)$. Let $G = (V, E)$ denote the tree structure returned.
2. For each $v \in V$, choose a unique public label $\ell_w \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$ for every node w in $D(v)$, $R(v)$, and $L(v)$.
3. For each $t \in T$, choose a unique public label $\ell_t \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$.
4. For each $u \in V_U$, choose a unique public label $\ell_u \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$.
5. For each node $u \in V_U$, perform the following:
   (a) For each $v \in V$, randomly choose a secret key $k_{u,w} \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$ associated with each node w in $D(v)$, $R(v)$, and $L(v)$.
   (b) For each $v \in V$, construct public information about each edge in $D(v)$, $R(v)$, and $L(v)$ using the key derivation method.
   (c) For each $t \in T$, randomly choose a secret key $k_{u,t} \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$.
6. For each $t \in T$, compute public information to permit key derivation between classes: for each edge $(u_1, u_2) \in E_U$ compute public information by setting $S_{u_1} = k_{u_1,t}$ and $S_{u_2} = k_{u_2,t}$ and using the key derivation method and public labels ℓ_{u_1} and ℓ_{u_2}.
7. For each $t \in T$, let $V_t \subset V$ denote the set of nodes in G access to which implies access to t. Then for each V_t, for each $v \in V_t$:
   (a) Find in $D(v)$ the node corresponding to the time interval t; call it w.
   (b) For each $u \in V_U$, compute public information to permit derivation of t's access key from w's enabling key $k_{u,w}$ using the key derivation method and public label ℓ_t. Mark such an edge with the level of v and type D.
   (c) repeat (a) and (b) for $R(v)$ and $L(v)$, using types R and L, respectively.
8. Let K consist of the secret keys $k_{u,t}$ for each $t \in T$ and $u \in V_U$, and let Sec consist of the remaining secret keys $k_{u,w}$. Let Pub consist of G, all public labels, and public information about all edges generated above.

Algorithm $\mathsf{Assign}(u, T_\mathcal{U}, \mathsf{Sec})$:

1. Execute $\mathsf{AssignKeys}(T_\mathcal{U}, root, T)$ using the data structure stored in Pub_u^G, where $root$ is the root node of G.
2. Set $S_{u,T_\mathcal{U}}$ to the keys computed and return $S_{u,T_\mathcal{U}}$.

Algorithm $\mathsf{Derive}(u_1, u_2, T_\mathcal{U}, t, S_{v,T_\mathcal{U}}, \mathsf{Pub})$:

1. If $t \notin T_\mathcal{U}$ or $u_2 \notin Desc(u_1, G)$, return $\perp$.
2. Execute $\mathsf{DeriveKey}(T_\mathcal{U}, t, S_{u_1,T_\mathcal{U}}, \mathsf{Pub}_{u_1}^G)$ to compute an enabling key for t; call it $k'_{u_1,t}$.
3. Use $k'_{u_1,t}$ along with its (level-type) label and $\mathsf{Pub}_{u_1}^G$ to derive key $k_{u_1,t}$.
4. Use $k_{u_1,t}$ and $\mathsf{Pub}_t^{G_U}$ to derive $k_{u_2,t}$ using the key derivation method.

Figure 6: Proposed time-based hierarchical key assignment scheme.

recovery in the presence of a static adversary.

To achieve key indistinguishability in this scheme, as before we need to utilize the enhanced key derivation method that prevents key testing. In this case we need to use this method within the data structure G itself (in Step 5b of Gen) to prevent a member of class u from testing keys of unauthorized time intervals. We also need to use this key derivation method between user classes (in Step 6 of Gen) to prevent a member of class u from testing keys of its ancestor classes.

It is not difficult to show how dynamic changes to the hierarchy can be addressed, but we leave this discussion to the full version of this paper.

Scheme	Public information	Private information	Key derivation	Operation type	Complexity assumption
Encryption-based [4]	$O(\|V_U\|^2\|T\|^3)$	1	1	decryption	one-way functions
Pairing-based [4]	$O(\|V_U\|^2)$	$O(\|T\|)$	1	pairing evaluation	Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Binary tree	$O(\|E_U\|\|T\|)$	$O(\log \|T\|)$	$O(\log \|T\|+ diam(G_U))$	PRF	one-way function
ISPIT+(3,1)-CSBT +EBC [15]	$O(\|E_U\|\|T\| + \|V_U\|\|T\|\times \log \|T\|(\log\log \|T\|)^2)$	≤ 3	$O(diam(G_U))$	decryption	`IND-P1-CO` encryption [13]
Our 4HS-based	$O(\|E_U\|\|T\| + \|V_U\|\|T\|\times \log^* n \log\log \|T\|)$	≤ 3	$O(diam(G_U))$	PRF	one-way functions
ISPIT+(3,1)-CSBT +EBC [15]	$O(\|E_U\|\|T\| + \|V_U\|\|T\|\times \log \|T\| \log\log \|T\|)$	≤ 3	$O(\log^* \|T\|+ diam(G_U))$	decryption	`IND-P1-CO` encryption [13]
Our $\log^*$HS-based	$O(\|E_U\|\|T\| + \|V_U\|\|T\|\times \log\log \|T\|)$	≤ 3	$O(\log^* \|T\|+ diam(G_U))$	PRF	one-way functions

Table 4: Comparison of time-based hierarchical KA schemes.

7 Practical Considerations

As was mentioned earlier, the goal of this work is efficiency under the assumption that the number of unit intervals n in the system is large. In systems when this is not the case, other, simpler solutions will suffice (e.g., a simple binary tree built on top of n intervals), and it is common sense to assume that the most suitable solution for the context will be chosen. We, however, believe that our solution will find its uses in a number of domains such as, for instance, access to historical data. And even in applications where access is based on the current time, the service provider will be free to choose the level of granularity for time-based access rights. For instance, for broadcast-based services, there is no overhead in changing keys often.

Another consideration is that, in subscription-based services where access is based on current time, dues might be paid in installments. That is, a user subscribes only to a rather short sequence of intervals and renews her subscription on a periodic basis. But even such systems might be setup for a long time in the future, and the service provider will choose a solution that minimizes system and user resources.

8 Comparison with Existing Solutions

Table 4 compares performance of our scheme with other existing solutions; only security against recovery was considered. In the table, $diam(G_U)$ denotes the diameter of the graph (i.e., maximum distance between nodes) that bounds the number of operations which, given a class key, are necessary to derive the key of the target descendant class within the user hierarchy. Also, $|E_U|$ denotes the number of edges in a user hierarchy G_U. The table does not list private storage at the server since it is equivalent for all solutions. Before proceeding with comparing existing results, we briefly explain what these parameters mean.

In the great majority of cases, the depth of user hierarchies is a small constant, resulting in small constant $diam(G_U)$. In cases where the depth of the original graph G_U is fairly large and it is unacceptable to have the user perform $diam(G_U)$ operations, the graph can be modified to significantly reduce $diam(G_U)$. This is done by inserting shortcut edges at random (if $diam(G_U) = O(V_U)$) or using the techniques of [1] and [2] that reduce $diam(G_U)$ to a small constant at the expense of small increase in the public storage associated

with the hierarchy[2]. Thus, in this case $diam(G_U)$ is also a small constant, and parameter $|E_U|$ will need to be replaced with a slightly larger value.

We also would like to mention that the schemes [19, 18] are not listed in the table due to the difference in the expressive power. These solutions allow a user to obtain access to an arbitrary subsequence of time intervals, but require significantly slower key derivation of $O(|V_U| \cdot |T|)$ modular exponentiations.

Considering that small private user storage and fast key derivation, followed by reasonable server storage are the main evaluation criteria, we can analyze the solutions as follows. The Pairing-based scheme of [4] will have the slowest key derivation time among all of the schemes listed here, as it uses pairing evaluation rather than fast encryption or PRF operations. Additionally, the number of secret keys a user has to maintain is large.

Compared to the Encryption-based scheme of [4], our key derivation time is higher by a constant factor, private storage is similar (i.e., three keys instead of one), but the amount of public information the server must maintain is much lower than in that scheme. That is, for modest values of $|T| = 1000$ and $|V_U| = 10$, the encryption-based schemes requires storing on the order of 10^11 labels, while in our case it will be bounds by the order of 10^6 labels.

While the simple binary-tree approach has asymptotically higher performance, for small values of $|T|$ it will be preferred due to its simplicity. However, for the applications we envision, other solutions exhibit better performance. Thus, our recommendation is to use the simplest approach suitable for a particular setup.

The work of De Santis et al. [15] lists solutions with different performance parameters, and we include only selected two here. That is, we chose two schemes that require a user to store 3 private keys (just like in our solutions) and where time-based key derivation involves $O(1)$ and $O(\log^* n)$ decryptions, respectively. This allows us to directly compare the schemes of [15] with our schemes. As can be seen from the table, the solutions exhibit very similar performance with CSBT-based constructions having an additional factor of $\log |T|$ in the public storage space. Moreover, they do not discuss key assignment but it does not look like their key assignment can be done in constant time, whereas we can do it in constant time; recall that this is the issue of coming up with the keys to be given to a user, given that user's authorized set of contiguous time intervals.

To summarize, our solution offers very attractive characteristics and superior performance compared to other existing solutions: each user in the system receives a small (≤ 3) number of keys, constant-time key assignment to a user, (off-line) computation of any access key involves a small number of very efficient operations, and the public storage required by our solution is only slightly higher than the number of access keys that the system must maintain. It is the most balanced solution among all available in the literature and appears to be close to the optimal bounds.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Michael Rabinovich for his excellent suggestion of using the geo-spatial key assignment scheme to address temporal key assignment for periodic expressions.

[2]The techniques of [1] and [2] may fail on hierarchies of high dimensions, but we believe that such cases are very rare for the applications we consider in this work.

References

[1] M. Atallah, M. Blanton, N. Fazio, and K. Frikken. Dynamic and efficient key management for access hierarchies. Preliminary version appeared in *ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'05)*. Full version is available as *Technical Report TR 2006-09, CERIAS, Purdue University*, 2006.

[2] M. Atallah, M. Blanton, and K. Frikken. Key management for non-tree access hierarchies. In *ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies (SACMAT'06)*, pages 11–18, 2006. Full version is available as *Technical Report TR 2007-30, CERIAS, Purdue University*.

[3] M. Atallah, M. Blanton, and K. Frikken. Efficient techniques for realizing geo-spatial access control. In *ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS'07)*, pages 82–92, 2007.

[4] G. Ateniese, A. De Santis, A. Ferrara, and B. Masucci. Provably-secure time-bound hierarchical key assignment schemes. In *ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'06)*, 2006.

[5] M. Bellare, R. Canetti, and H. Krawczyk. Keying hash functions for message authentication. In *Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO'96*, volume 1109, 1996.

[6] E. Bertino, C. Bettini, E. Ferrari, and P. Samarati. An access control model supporting periodicity constraints and temporal reasoning. *ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)*, 23(3):231–285, 1998.

[7] E. Bertino, P. Bonatti, and E. Ferrari. Trbac: A temporal role-based access control model. In *ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies (SACMAT'00)*, pages 21–30, 2000.

[8] B. Briscoe. MARKS: Zero side effect multicast key management using arbitrarily revealed key sequences. In *First International Workshop on Networked Group Communication (NGC'99)*, LNCS, pages 301–320, 1999.

[9] H. Chien. Efficient time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme. *IEEE Transactions of Knowledge and Data Engineering (TKDE)*, 16(10):1301–1304, 2004.

[10] J. Crampton, K. Martin, and P. Wild. On key assignment for hierarchical access control. In *IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'06)*, 2006.

[11] D. Harel and R. Tarjan. Fast algorithms for finding nearest common ancestors. *SIAM Journal of Computing*, 13(2):338–355, 1984.

[12] H. Huang and C. Chang. A new cryptographic key assignment scheme with time-constraint access control in a hierarchy. *Computer Standards & Interfaces*, 26:159–166, 2004.

[13] J. Katz and M. Yung. Characterization of security notions for probabilistic private-key encryption. *Journal of Cryptology*, 19:67–95, 2006.

[14] A. De Santis, A. Ferrara, and B. Masucci. Enforcing the security of a time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme. *Information Sciences*, 176(12):1684–1694, 2006.

[15] A. De Santis, A. Ferrara, and B. Masucci. New constructions for provably-secure time-bound hierarchical key assignment schemes. In *ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies (SACMAT'07)*, 2007.

[16] Q. Tang and C. Mitchell. Comments on a cryptographic key assignment scheme for access control in a hierarchy. *Computer Standards & Interfaces*, 27:323–326, 2005.

[17] W. Tzeng. A time-bound cryptographic key assignment scheme for access control in a hierarchy. *IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering (TKDE)*, 14(1):182–188, 2002.

[18] W. Tzeng. A secure system for data access based on anonymous authentication and time-dependent hierarchical keys. In *ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS'06)*, pages 223–230, 2006.

[19] Shyh-Yih Wang and Chi-Sung Laih. Merging: an efficient solution for a time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme. *IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing*, 3(1):91–100, 2006.

[20] J. Yeh. An RSA-based time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme for electronic article subscription. In *ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM'05)*, pages 285–286, 2005.

[21] X. Yi. Security of Chien's efficient time-bound hierarchical key assignment scheme. *IEEE Transactions of Knowledge and Data Engineering (TKDE)*, 17(9):1298–1299, 2005.

[22] X. Yi and Y. Ye. Security of Tzeng's time-bound key assignment scheme for access control in a hierarchy. *IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering (TKDE)*, 15(4):1054–1055, 2003.

A Shortcut Techniques for One-Dimensional Graphs

This section reviews selected techniques from existing literature which are used as a building block in our construction. The techniques we present here work for one-dimensional directed graphs and significantly decrease the distance between any two nodes (measured as the number of edges on the path from one node to another) by inserting additional shortcut edges.

Before we proceed with the description, we would like to remind the reader that any DAG G is a partial order and thus can be represented as the intersection of t total orders. The smallest t for which this is possible is the *dimension* of the partial order. Thus in this section we deal with a graph which has a total order relationship defined over its nodes. Throughout this section we assume that the nodes are sorted according to the total order, where node v_{i+1} is the parent of node v_i. Since there is a directed edge from each v_{i+1} to v_i, the graph can be viewed as a linked list. The set of ancestors of node v_i is then all nodes v_j such that $j \geq i$. Similarly, the set of descendants of v_i is all nodes v_j such that $j \leq i$.

Here we concentrate only on a single scheme, to give the reader an understanding of how such schemes are built. The scheme, an overview of which we provide, is an adoption of the shortcut technique from [1] to one-dimensional graphs. Others solutions for one-dimensional schemes can be found in [2].

For an n-vertex graph, this scheme results in $O(n \log \log n)$ additional edges and the distance between any two nodes being at most 3 edges (which implies that the key of node v can be derived from the key of node u in at most 3 steps, if u is an ancestor of v). The idea behind the technique is that the graph G is decomposed into $\sqrt{n}$ chunks of $\sqrt{n}$ nodes each. The nodes used in the decomposition are called the special nodes, and the chunks are denoted as $C_1, \ldots, C_k$. The special nodes are connected to each other, so that



Figure 7: Addition of shortcut edges for the three-hop one-dimensional solution: (a) the original hierarchy, (b) the hierarchy after selection of special nodes and constructing their transitive closure, and (c) the hierarchy after adding shortcut edges to and from the special nodes.

the distance between any two of them is one edge. All nodes within a specific chunk are connected to the corresponding special node, so that the distance between any non-special node and a special is also one edge. Then the special nodes are served as a "beltway" between the chunks, and reaching a node from any other node involves at most three steps: one is to reach a special node, another is to just to a new chunk, and the third one is to reach the target node.

The algorithm for adding shortcut edges to G uses a notion of a reduced graph. A reduced graph, denoted $\hat{G}$, that consists of the special nodes and edges that satisfy the following condition: there is an edge from node v to node w in $\hat{G}$ if and only if (i) v is an ancestor of w in G, and (ii) there is no other node of $\hat{G}$ on the v-to-w path in G. Then the following procedure adds shortcut edges to G. In what follows, $|G|$ denotes the number of nodes in G.

AddShortcuts(G):

1. If $|G| \leq 4$ then return an empty set of shortcuts. Otherwise continue with the next step.
2. Compute the special nodes of G. Initialize the set of shortcuts S to be empty.
3. Create, from G, the reduced graph $\hat{G}$ and add to S a shortcut edge between every ancestor-descendant pair in $\hat{G}$ (unless the ancestor is a parent of the descendant, in which case there is already such an edge in G).
4. For every chunk C_i in turn ($i = 1, \ldots, k$), add to S a shortcut edge from the node with the highest index in C_i, denoted by v_{C_i}, to every node in C_i that is not a child of that node.
5. For every chunk C_i in turn ($i = 1, \ldots, k$), add to S a shortcut edge from each node N in C_i (other than v_{C_i}) to all nodes in $\hat{G}$ that are both: (i) descendants of N and (ii) children of the root of C_i in $\hat{G}$.
6. For every chunk C_i in turn ($i = 1, \ldots, k$), recursively call AddShortcuts(C_i) and, if we let S_i be the set of shortcuts returned by that call, then we update S by doing $S = S \cup S_i$.

Experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^{\text{key-rec}}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}(1^\kappa)$
$(K, \mathsf{Sec}, \mathsf{Pub}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\kappa, T)$
$corr \leftarrow \mathsf{Corrupt}_t(\mathsf{Sec})$
$k \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{st}(1^\kappa, \mathsf{Pub}, corr)$
if $k = k_t$ then return 1
else return 0

Figure 8: An experiment in which a static adversary participates.

7. Return S.

Figure 7 illustrates the first level of recursion. There is a corresponding FindPath procedure that, given two nodes v and w, finds a path from node v to node w of length at most 3 edges in the graph. We omit its description here. The number of shortcut edges added by the above algorithm is $O(n \log\log n)$.

B Security Definitions and Proofs

B.1 Security of a time-based key assignment scheme

In our definition of a scheme secure against a static adversary, let adversary $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ attack the security of the scheme at time $t \in T$. $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ is then allowed to corrupt all users who are not authorized to have access to k_t. We capture this notion using algorithm $\mathsf{Corrupt}_t(\cdot)$ that takes the secret information Sec as input and outputs a sequence of private information denoted by $corr$. The adversary then uses $corr$ to try to compute the key k_t.

Definition 2 *Let T be a set of distinct time intervals, $\mathcal{P}$ be the interval-set over T, and $\mathsf{KA} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Assign}, \mathsf{Derive})$ be a time-based KA scheme for $\mathcal{P}$ and a security parameter κ. Then KA is secure against key recovery in the presence of a static adversary if it satisfies the following properties:*

- Completeness: *A user, who is given private information $S_{T_\mathcal{U}}$ for a sequence of time intervals $T_\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{P}$, is able to compute the access key k_t for each $t \in T_\mathcal{U}$ using only her knowledge of $S_{T_\mathcal{U}}$ and public information Pub with probability 1.*
- Soundness: *Let $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ be a static adversary who attacks the scheme KA at time interval $t \in T$. If we let the experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^{\text{key-rec}}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$ be specified as in Figure 8, the advantage of $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ is defined as:*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{key-rec}}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}(1^\kappa) = \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}^{\text{key-rec}}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}(1^\kappa) = 1]$$

We say that KA is sound with respect to key recovery if for each $t \in T$, for all sufficiently large κ, and every positive polynomial $p(\cdot)$, $\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{key-rec}}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}(1^\kappa) < 1/p(\kappa)$ for each polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}_{st}$.

Proof sketch of Theorem 1 Our proof uses a standard hybrid argument. Per Definition 2, we are dealing with adversary $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ who participates in the experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^{\text{key-rec}}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$ for time interval $t \in T$. We construct a sequence of experiments $\mathbf{Exp}^0_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}, \ldots, \mathbf{Exp}^q_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$, in which we modify the way the scheme is constructed while ensuring that the distributions of $\mathcal{A}_{st}$' views remain indistinguishable in any two consecutive experiments. Our modification consists of replacing, in the public data structure corresponding to KA, one

(pseudo-random) output produced by the function F^κ with a random sequence. Formally, $\mathbf{Exp}^i_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$ for any $i = 0, \ldots, q$ is:

Experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^i_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}(1^\kappa)$
$(K, \mathsf{Sec}, \mathsf{Pub}') \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}^i(1^\kappa, T)$
$corr \leftarrow \mathsf{Corrupt}_t(\mathsf{Sec})$
$k \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{st}(1^\kappa, \mathsf{Pub}', corr)$
if $k = k_t$ then return 1
else return 0

Here the algorithm Gen^0 corresponds to the original algorithm Gen, while Gen^{i+1} is constructed from Gen^i by replacing one edge in the data structure with a random string. The edges that we replace are those that were constructed using k_t or any other key material that can lead to derivation of k_t. More precisely, for each level l in the data structure G, there is a unique $v \in G$ that covers t. For each such v, we replace the edges:

1. In $D(v)$, let w denote the leaf node that covers t. Then replace each edge on the path between any two nodes in $Anc(w, G)$ and replace each outgoing edge from every node in $Anc(w, G)$.

2. In $R(v)$ and $L(v)$, replace each edge on the path from the root to the node corresponding to t (call it w) and the edge from w.

The edges are replaced in the top-down fashion to completely exclude from the data structure information about each key on the way from the root to the node corresponding to time interval t.

Additionally, we replace edges from each of the $O(\log \log n)$ enabling keys, which correspond to t in G, to k_t. Thus, $\mathbf{Exp}^0_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$ corresponds to the case where $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ operates on the data structure of experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^{\text{key}-\text{rec}}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$, while $\mathbf{Exp}^q_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$ corresponds to the case where $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ operates on the data structure with no information related to k_t. Since all of the keys (including k_t) are chosen at random, $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ has at most negligible probability in succeeding in $\mathbf{Exp}^q_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$. The total number of edges replaced is $O(space(\mathcal{S}1(n) \log \log n)$ (and thus is polynomial in the security parameter κ).

Using a standard reduction argument, we can show that any non-negligible difference in behavior between experiments $\mathbf{Exp}^i_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$ and $\mathbf{Exp}^{i+1}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$ can be used to construct an algorithm that $\mathcal{B}_F$ is able to break the pseudo-random function F with non-negligible advantage. Thus, we conclude that $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ has at most negligible advantage in breaking the security of the scheme. □

B.2 Security of a hierarchical time-based key assignment scheme

Now a static adversary $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ who attacks a class $v \in V_U$ at time $t \in T$ obtains access to the secret information of all classes $w \in V_U$ at all times $t' \in T$, except classes $Anc(v)$ at time t. This is modeled by an algorithm $\mathsf{Corrupt}_{v,t}(\cdot)$, which now is class-based. The rest of the security definitions for key recovery and key indistinguishability mimic our previous definitions without a hierarchy of classes.

Definition 3 *Let $G_U = (V_U, E_U)$ be a DAG corresponding to a hierarchy, T be a set of distinct time intervals, $\mathcal{P}$ be the interval-set over T, and $\mathsf{KA} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Assign}, \mathsf{Derive})$ be a time-based hierarchical KA scheme for G_U, $\mathcal{P}$, and a security parameter κ. Then KA is secure against key recovery in the presence of a static adversary if it satisfies the following properties:*

Experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^{\text{key}-\text{rec}-\text{h}}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}(1^\kappa)$
$(K, \mathsf{Sec}, \mathsf{Pub}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\kappa, G_U, T)$
$corr \leftarrow \mathsf{Corrupt}_{v,t}(\mathsf{Sec})$
$k \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{st}(1^\kappa, \mathsf{Pub}, corr)$
if $k = k_{v,t}$ then return 1
else return 0

Figure 9: An experiment in which a static adversary attacking a hierarchical scheme participates.

- Completeness: *A user, who is given private information $S_{v,T_\mathcal{U}}$ for a sequence of time intervals $T_\mathcal{U} \in \mathcal{P}$ and a class $v \in V_U$, is able to compute with probability 1 the access key $k_{w,t}$ for each $t \in T_\mathcal{U}$ and $w \in Desc(v, G_U)$ using only her knowledge of $S_{v,T_\mathcal{U}}$ and public information* Pub.
- Soundness: *Let $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ be a static adversary who attacks the class v at time interval $t \in T$. If we let the experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^{\text{key}-\text{rec}-\text{h}}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$ be specified as in Figure 9, the advantage of $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ is defined as:*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{key}-\text{rec}-\text{h}}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}(1^\kappa) = \Pr[\mathbf{Exp}^{\text{key}-\text{rec}-\text{h}}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}(1^\kappa) = 1]$$

We say that KA *is sound with respect to key recovery if for each $t \in T$, for each $v \in V$, for all sufficiently large κ, and every positive polynomial $p(\cdot)$, $\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{key}-\text{rec}-\text{h}}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}(1^\kappa) < 1/p(\kappa)$ for each adversary $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ that runs in polynomial time.*

Proof sketch of Theorem 2 Similar to the proof above, in this case we also use a hybrid argument and construct a sequence of experiments $\mathbf{Exp}^0_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}, \ldots, \mathbf{Exp}^q_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$ for adversary $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ who attacks the scheme at class v during time interval t, defined as follows:

Experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^i_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}(1^\kappa)$
$(K, \mathsf{Sec}, \mathsf{Pub}') \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}^i(1^\kappa, G_U, T)$
$corr \leftarrow \mathsf{Corrupt}_{v,t}(\mathsf{Sec})$
$k \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{st}(1^\kappa, \mathsf{Pub}', corr)$
if $k = k_{v,t}$ then return 1
else return 0

In the experiments, Gen^0 corresponds to the original algorithm Gen, and Gen^{i+1} is constructed from Gen^i by replacing public information about a single edge in the data structure by a random string. The edges replaced are:

1. For each access class $u \in Anc(v, G_U)$, replace in Pub^G_u all of the edges that were replaced in Pub for a single resource in the proof of Theorem 1 (in $D(w)$, $R(w)$, and $L(w)$ for all w of interest and in the top-down fashion).
2. Replace in $\mathsf{Pub}^{G_U}_t$, starting at the root[3], information about edges $(u, w) \in E_U$ for each $u \in Anc(v)$.

Thus, $\mathbf{Exp}^0_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$ is the same as $\mathbf{Exp}^{\text{key}-\text{rec}-\text{h}}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$, while $\mathbf{Exp}^q_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$ has no information related to $k_{v,t}$ at the level of v or any of its ancestors. This means that $\mathcal{A}_{st}$ has at most negligible probability in succeeding in $\mathbf{Exp}^q_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$.

[3]If several roots exist in G_U sort the nodes using any topological ordering.

Since the number of edges replaced is clearly polynomial in the security parameter, we can use a standard reduction argument to show that any non-negligible advantage between any $\mathbf{Exp}^{i}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$ and $\mathbf{Exp}^{i+1}_{\mathsf{KA},\mathcal{A}_{st}}$ can be used to break the security of pseudo-random functions. Since by our assumptions the PRF is secure, thus the scheme is secure as well. □

C Extensions

C.1 Extending the lifetime of the system

So far in all of our discussion we considered the lifetime of the system to consist of a fixed set of time intervals $\{t_1, \ldots, t_n\}$. In many applications, however, there might eventually be a need to support time intervals beyond the original n intervals. In this section, we briefly describe techniques for extending the number of time intervals. The full details of these approaches are not given, but will appear in the full version of the paper.

One simple approach is to apply the techniques of Section 5 to a second set of intervals. The interesting case is when a user's access rights straddle the boundary (i.e., t_n and t_{n+1}), and this case results in two sets of keys being issued to that user. This is particular appealing in applications where users purchase a subscription for a period of time (e.g., they can view a collection of media objects on a specific day or month), after expiration of which there is no need to maintain keys for that period. However, this approach is less desirable in applications where objects are assigned a date (e.g., a user requests access to all movies released in 1977), because previous intervals need to be maintained even after they have elapsed.

Suppose that the keys for previous time intervals need to be maintained. One approach is to extend the time intervals, rebuild the data structure, and recompute the public information. The downside of this approach is that all of the public information has to be recomputed (previous shortcuts may no longer be necessary and other shortcuts may need to be added), but if extensions to the time intervals are rare (which we assume is the case almost all of the time), then this may be acceptable. If recomputing all of the public information is unacceptable, then in some cases we can reuse the previous information. The simplest technique to achieve this is to set the new number of time intervals to n^2 (recall that building the tree data structure involves partitioning the time intervals into chunks of size of square-root of their number). Unfortunately, squaring the number of intervals is prohibitively expensive, but if we assume that n is a power of 2 and is a perfect square, then we can achieve full reuse of the previous information by doubling the length of a time interval. The basic idea of this approach is that, in the data structure for n^2 intervals, the subset of the data structure that effects the first $2^c n$ ($c < \log n$) intervals has size $O(space(\mathcal{S}1(2^c n)) \log\log(2^c n))$. Thus, we can use this subset for the intervals, and when we need to add more intervals we can simply add the new information from the data structure for n^2 intervals. We omit a detailed justification of the claim, but it will be in the full version of this paper.

C.2 Further decreasing the space or a key-space tradeoff

The purpose of this section is to substantiate Table 5. We do so using the fact that the claims of Table 3 have already been established. For the sake of definiteness, we explain in detail how the last entry of Table 5 is obtained from the last entry of Table 3. A similar partitioning scheme works for every pair of corresponding rows in those two tables.

Let A_1 be the scheme (described earlier in the paper) that achieves 3 keys, $O(\log^* n)$ derivation time, and $O(n \log^{(2)} n)$ public space, where the notation $\log^{(t)}$ is a shorthand for applying the $\log$ function t times.

Underlying scheme	Private storage	Key derivation	Public storage
2HS	$\leq 2k+1$	≤ 5 op.	$O(n \log n \log^{(2^k)} n)$
3HS	$\leq 2k+1$	≤ 7 op.	$O(n \log \log n \log^{(2^k)} n)$
4HS	$\leq 2k+1$	≤ 9 op.	$O(n \log^* n \log^{(2^k)} n)$
$\log^*$HS	$\leq 2k+1$	$O(\log^* n)$ op.	$O(n \log^{(2^k)} n)$

Table 5: Key/space tradeoff of generalized scheme, where k is a positive integer.

We now give the construction of a family of schemes $A_2, A_3, \ldots$ such that A_k achieves $2k+1$ keys, $O(\log^* n)$ derivation time, and $O(n \log^{(2^k)} n)$ public space. We describe the construction inductively, with $k = 1$ being the base case. A_{i+1} is constructed from A_i as follows:

1. Partition the range of size n into $n' = n/\log^{(2^i)}$ chunks of size $\log^{(2^i)} n$ each.

2. Considering each chunk as one unit of time, use A_i on the resulting ("reduced") problem of size n'. This uses $O(n' \log^{(2^i)} n')$ public space, which is $O(n)$. The number of keys and key derivation times are those of A_i ($2i+1$ and $O(\log^* n')$, respectively). The resulting structure (call it M) can handle time intervals that consist of a whole number of chunks, but it cannot handle intervals that start and/or end inside of a chunk. These are handled as explained in the next steps.

3. The structure built in this step is for handling intervals that start and end inside different chunks (those that start and end inside the same chunk are handled differently). For each chunk j, we build two separate 1-dimensional structures: One structure L_j for intervals that start at the chunk's left boundary (called *left-anchored* intervals), and another structure R_j for intervals that start at the chunk's right boundary (called *right-anchored* intervals). Note that L_j and R_j are 1-dimensional structures that are implemented using the $\log^*$HS scheme of Table 1 (which includes shortcut edges). Their total public space is $O(n'(\log^{(2^i)} n) = O(n)$. These structures, together with the M structure described in the above, enable the handling of any interval I that starts and ends inside different chunks as follows: We break I into 3 pieces, the leftmost of which overlaps with only 1 chunk (call it v), the right most of which overlaps with only one chunk (call it w), and the middle one consists of the union of a number of whose chunks. The middle piece of I is handled using the M structure. The left (right) piece of I is handled using R_v (resp., L_w). The derivation time and public space are $O(\log^* n)$ and (respectively) $O(n)$. However, the number of keys now includes 2 more than for scheme A_i, because each of R_v and L_w introduces an extra key, hence the total number of keys is $2i+1+2 = 2(i+1)+1$, as required.

4. We are left with the case where both endpoints of the interval I are in the same chunk. To handle such cases, we associate a structure for scheme A_i with every chunk, thereby enabling a performance of $2i+1$ keys and $O(\log^* n)$ derivation time. The space for each chunk is:

$$(\log^{(2^i)} n) \log^{(2^i)}(\log^{(2^i)} n) = \log^{(2^i)} n \log^{(2^{i+1})} n$$

   Since there are $n' = n/\log^{(2^i)}$ chunks, the total space is $O(n \log^{(2^{i+1})} n)$, as required.