

Cryptanalysis of Li et al.'s Identity-Based Threshold Signcryption Scheme

S. Sharmila Deva Selvi¹, S. Sree Vivek^{*,1}, Neha Jain^{**,2}, and Pandu Rangan Chandrasekaran^{*,1}

¹ {sharmila,svivek}@cse.iitm.ernet.in, prangan@iitm.ac.in

Indian Institute of Technology Madras
Theoretical Computer Science Laboratory
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Chennai, India

² neo_gudiya@yahoo.co.in

VIT University
School of Computing Sciences
Vellore, India

Abstract. Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive that aims at providing confidentiality and authentication simultaneously. Recently in May 2008, a scheme for identity based threshold signcryption was proposed by Fagen Li and Yong Yu. They have proved the confidentiality of their scheme and have also claimed the unforgeability without providing satisfactory proof. In this paper, we show that in their signcryption scheme the secret key of the sender is exposed (total break) to the clerk during signcryption and hence insecure in the presence of malicious clerks. Further, we propose a corrected version of the scheme and formally prove its security under the existing security model for signcryption.

1 Introduction

Encryption and signature are the basic cryptographic tools offered by public key cryptography for achieving confidentiality and authentication. Encryption is the process of transforming information (plain text) using an algorithm (cipher) to make it unreadable for those who do not have the secret key needed to decipher (decrypt) the information. Encryption can be done using the same secret key at the sender's and the receiver's side (private key encryption) or using different keys at both sides (public key encryption). Encryption guarantees confidentiality and privacy because the encrypted text can be read only by the intended recipient. Signature

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is the cryptographic technique where, before sending a message the sender A signs it with his private key. This ensures authentication because the recipient B knows that the message has been sent by A , and on the other hand, A cannot deny having sent the message to B .

The concept of signcryption originates from the various applications where both confidentiality and authentication are mandatory requirements. Signcryption, introduced by Zheng in 1997[2], is a cryptographic primitive that offers confidentiality and authentication simultaneously similar to the sign-then-encrypt technique, but with lesser computational complexity and lower communication cost. After Zheng's work a number of signcryption schemes were proposed [4][13][20][14][11][10][22]. The security notion for signcryption was first formally defined in 2002 by Baek et al. in [23]. This was similar to the notion of semantic security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attack. The concept of identity-based cryptosystem was introduced by Shamir [17] in 1984. The distinguishing characteristic of identity-based cryptography is the ability to use any string as a public key. In particular, this string may be the email address, telephone number, or any publicly available parameter of an individual that is unique to that individual. An identity-based cryptosystem removes the need for senders to look up the receiver's public key before sending out an encrypted message. It provides a more convenient alternative to conventional public key infrastructure.

Group oriented cryptography was introduced by Desmedt in 1987 [9]. Elaborating on this concept, Desmedt and Frankel [7] proposed a (t, n) threshold signature scheme based on the RSA system [16]. In such a (t, n) threshold signature scheme, any t out of n signers in the group can collaboratively sign messages on behalf of the group by sharing the signing capability. This can be visualised in the situation where a company has n directors and if at least t of them agree on a decision, then only that decision is finalised. An identity-based threshold signcryption incorporates the concept of threshold cryptosystem and an identity-based system along with the basic signcryption concept.

In 2004, Duan et al. [12] proposed an identity-based threshold signcryption scheme by combining the concepts of identity-based threshold signature and signcryption together. However, in Duan et al.'s scheme [12], the master-key of the PKG is distributed to a number of other

PKGs, which creates a bottleneck on the PKGs. In 2005, Peng and Li [15] proposed an identity-based threshold signcryption scheme based on Libert and Quisquater's identity-based signcryption scheme [19]. However, Peng and Li's scheme [15] does not provide the forward security i.e., anyone who obtains the sender's private key can recover the original message of a signcrypted text. In addition, both Duan et al.'s scheme [12] and Peng and Li's scheme [15] do not consider the formal security models and security proofs. Ma et al. [21] also proposed a threshold signcryption scheme using the bilinear pairings. However, Ma et al.'s scheme [21] is not identity-based. In May 2008, another scheme was proposed by Fagen Li and Yong Yu[1]. Although the scheme is more efficient (as it requires one pairing less than the previous schemes) but it is not secure against the insider attack.

Our contribution: In this paper, we show that the threshold signcryption scheme of Fagen Li and Yong Yu[1] is vulnerable to the attack by the clerk(the semi trusted authority who combines the signatures of all the t players) by demonstrating an attack which shows that if the adversary corrupts the clerk then it is able to get the secret key of the system and hence a total break of the system is possible. Further, we propose a corrected version of their scheme and prove correctness and security (confidentiality and unforgeability) under the existing security model for signcryption.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the preliminaries like bilinear pairings and related computational problems, the general framework of identity-based threshold signcryption schemes, and the security models for such schemes. Next, in Section 3, we review Fagen Li's threshold signcryption scheme [1]. We present the attack on this scheme in Section 4. In Section 5, we lay out the details of our fix to the original scheme. In Section 6, we present the analysis of the corrected scheme which includes proofs of correctness, unforgeability and confidentiality of the scheme. Section 7 concludes the discussion.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Bilinear Pairing

Let \mathbb{G}_1 be an additive cyclic group generated by P , with prime order q , and \mathbb{G}_2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order q . A bilinear pairing is a map $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \longrightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ with the following properties.

- **Bilinearity.** For all $P, Q, R \in \mathbb{G}_1$,

$$\hat{e}(P + Q, R) = \hat{e}(P, R)\hat{e}(Q, R)$$

$$\hat{e}(P, Q + R) = \hat{e}(P, Q)\hat{e}(P, R)$$

$$\hat{e}(aP, bQ) = \hat{e}(P, Q)^{ab}$$
- **Non-Degeneracy.** There exist $P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_1$ such that $\hat{e}(P, Q) \neq I_{\mathbb{G}_2}$, where $I_{\mathbb{G}_2}$ is the identity element of \mathbb{G}_2 .
- **Computability.** There exists an efficient algorithm to compute $\hat{e}(P, Q)$ for all $P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_1$.

2.2 Computational Assumptions

In this section, we review the computational assumptions related to bilinear maps that are relevant to the protocol we discuss.

Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem (BDHP)

Given $(P, aP, bP, cP) \in \mathbb{G}_1^4$ for unknown $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, the BDH problem in \mathbb{G}_1 is to compute $\hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$.

The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathcal{A} in solving the BDH problem in \mathbb{G}_1 is defined as

$$Adv_A^{BDH} = \Pr [\mathcal{A}(P, aP, bP, cP) = \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc} \mid a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*]$$

The BDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathcal{A} , the advantage Adv_A^{BDH} is negligibly small.

Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDHP)

Given $(P, aP, bP, cP, \alpha) \in \mathbb{G}_1^4 \times \mathbb{G}_2$ for unknown $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, the DBDH problem in \mathbb{G}_1 is to decide if $\alpha = \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$.

The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathcal{A} in solving the DBDH problem in \mathbb{G}_1 is defined as

$$Adv_A^{DBDH} = |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(P, aP, bP, cP, \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(P, aP, bP, cP, \alpha) = 1]|$$

The DBDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathcal{A} , the advantage Adv_A^{DBDH} is negligibly small.

Computation Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP)

Given $(P, aP, bP) \in \mathbb{G}_1^3$ for unknown $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, the CDH problem in \mathbb{G}_1 is to compute abP .

The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathcal{A} in solving the CDH problem in \mathbb{G}_1 is defined as

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{CDH} = \Pr [\mathcal{A}(P, aP, bP) = abP \mid a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*]$$

The CDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathcal{A} , the advantage $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{CDH}$ is negligibly small.

2.3 Identity Based Threshold Signcryption

A generic identity-based threshold signcryption scheme with total n players and t threshold limit consists of the following five algorithms.

- **Setup:** Given a security parameter k , the private key generator (PKG) generates the system's public parameters $params$. Among the parameters produced by Setup is a key P_{pub} that is made public. There is also corresponding master key s that is kept secret.
- **Extract:** Given an identity ID , the PKG computes the corresponding private key S_{ID} and transmits it to its owner in a secure way.
- **Keydis:** Given a private key S_{ID} associated with an identity ID , the number of signcryption members n and a threshold parameter t , this algorithm generates n shares of S_{ID} and provides each one to the signcryption members M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n . It also generates a set of verification keys that can be used to check the validity of each shared private key. We denote the shared private keys and the matching verification keys by $\{S_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n}$ and $\{y_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n}$, respectively. Note that each (S_i, y_i) is sent to M_i , then M_i publishes y_i but keeps S_i secret.
- **Signcrypt:** Give a message m , the private keys of t members $\{S_i\}_{i=1, \dots, t}$ in a sender group U_A with identity ID_A , a receiver's identity ID_B , it outputs an identity-based (t, n) threshold signcryption σ on the message m .
- **Unsigncrypt:** Give a ciphertext σ , the private key of the receiver S_{ID_B} , the identity of the sender group ID_A , it outputs the plain text m or the symbol \perp if σ is an invalid ciphertext between the group U_A and the receiver. We make the consistency constraint that if $\sigma = \text{Signcrypt}(m, \{S_i\}_{i=1, \dots, n}, ID_B)$, then $m = \text{Unsigncrypt}(\sigma, ID_A, S_{ID_B})$.

2.4 Security Model for Identity-Based Threshold Signcryption (IDTSC)

The notion of semantic security of public key encryption was extended to identity-based signcryption scheme by Malone-Lee in [8]. This was later modified by Sherman et al. in [10] which incorporates indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext and identity attacks (IND-IDTSC-CCA2) and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message

and identity attacks (EUF-IDTSC). We describe below the security models for confidentiality and unforgeability given in [11], this is the strongest security notion for this problem.

Confidentiality : A signcryption scheme is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attack (IND-IDTSC-CCA2) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.

1. The challenger \mathcal{C} runs the Setup algorithm and sends the system public parameters to the adversary \mathcal{A} .
2. In the first phase, \mathcal{A} makes polynomially bounded number of queries to the following oracles.

Extract Oracle : \mathcal{A} produces an identity ID_i and queries for the secret key of user i . The Extract Oracle returns S_i to \mathcal{A} .

Signcrypt Oracle : \mathcal{A} produces a message m , sender identity ID_A and receiver identity ID_B . \mathcal{C} computes the secret key S_A from $\text{Extract}(ID_A)$ and returns to \mathcal{A} , the signcrypted ciphertext from $\text{Signcrypt}(m, \{S_i\}_{i=1,\dots,t}, ID_j)$.

Designcrypt Oracle : \mathcal{A} produces a sender identity ID_A , receiver identity ID_B and a signcryption σ . The challenger \mathcal{C} computes the secret key S_B from $\text{Extract}(ID_B)$, returning the result of $\text{Designcrypt}(\sigma, ID_A, S_B)$ to \mathcal{A} . The result returned is \perp if σ is an invalid signcryption from ID_A to ID_B .

3. \mathcal{A} produces two messages m_0 and m_1 of equal length from the message space M and an arbitrary sender identity ID_A . The challenger \mathcal{C} flips a coin, sampling a bit $b \leftarrow_R \{0, 1\}$ and computes $\sigma^* = \text{Signcrypt}(m_b, \{S_i\}_{i=1,\dots,t}, ID_B)$. σ^* is returned to \mathcal{A} as challenge signcrypted ciphertext.

4. \mathcal{A} is allowed to make polynomially bounded number of new queries as in Step 2 with the restrictions that it should not query the Designcrypt Oracle for the designcryption of σ^* , the Signcrypt Oracle for the signcryption of m_0 or m_1 under the sender identity ID_A and the Extract Oracle for the secret keys of ID_B .

5. At the end of this game, \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' . \mathcal{A} wins the game if $b' = b$.

Unforgeability: A signcryption scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack (EUF-IDTSC) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.

1. The challenger \mathcal{C} runs the Setup algorithm to generate the master public and private keys params and msk respectively. \mathcal{C} gives system public parameters params to \mathcal{A} and keeps the master private key msk secret from \mathcal{A} .
2. The adversary \mathcal{A} makes polynomially bounded number of queries to the oracles as described in Step 2 of the confidentiality game.

3. A produces a signcrypted ciphertext σ and wins the game if the private key of sender identity ID_A was not queried in the previous step and \perp is not returned by $\text{Designcrypt}(\sigma, ID_A, S_B)$ and σ is not the output of a previous query to the Signcrypt Oracle with ID_A as sender.

3 Review of Fagen Li's Identity-Based Threshold Signcryption Scheme

In this section, we present the identity-based threshold signcryption scheme as proposed by Fagen Li and Yu . The scheme involves four roles: the PKG, a trusted dealer, a sender group $U_A = \{M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n\}$ with identity ID_A , and a receiver Bob with identity ID_B .

Setup: Given a security parameter k , the PKG chooses groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 of prime order q (with \mathbb{G}_1 additive and \mathbb{G}_2 multiplicative), a generator P of \mathbb{G}_1 , a bilinear map $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$, a secure symmetric cipher (E, D) and hash functions $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$, $H_2 : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n_1}$, $H_3 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow Z_q^*$. The PKG chooses a master-key $s \in_R Z_q^*$ and computes $P_{pub} = sP$. The PKG publishes system parameters $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, n_1, e, P, P_{pub}, E, D, H_1, H_2, H_3)$ and keeps the master-key s secret.

Extract: Given an identity ID , the PKG computes $Q_{ID} = H_1(ID)$ and the private key $S_{ID} = sQ_{ID}$. Then PKG sends the private key to its owner in a secure way.

Keydis: Suppose that a threshold t and n satisfy $1 \leq t \leq n < q$. To share the private key S_{ID_A} among the group U_A , the trusted dealer performs the steps below.

- 1) Choose F_1, F_2, \dots, F_{t-1} uniformly at random from \mathbb{G}_1^* and construct a polynomial $F(x) = S_{ID_A} + xF_1 + \dots + x^{t-1}F_{t-1}$.
- 2) Compute $S_i = F(i)$ for $i = 0, \dots, n$. ($S_0 = S_{ID_A}$). Send S_i to member M_i for $i = 1, \dots, n$ secretly.
- 3) Broadcast $y_0 = \hat{e}(S_{ID_A}, P)$ and $y_j = \hat{e}(F_j, P)$ for $j = 1, \dots, t-1$.
- 4) Each M_i then checks whether his share S_i is valid by computing $\hat{e}(S_i, P) = \prod_{j=0}^{t-1} y_j^{i^j}$. If S_i is not valid, M_i broadcasts an error and requests a valid one.

Signcrypt: Let M_1, \dots, M_t are the t members who want to cooperate to signcrypt a message m on behalf of the group U_A .

- 1) Each M_i chooses $x_i \in_R Z_q^*$.
 -computes $R_{1i} = x_i P, R_{2i} = x_i P_{pub}$
 -sends (R_{1i}, R_{2i}) to the clerk C .
- 2) The clerk C (one among the t cooperating players) computes,
 - $R_1 = \sum_{i=1}^t R_{1i}, R_2 = \sum_{i=1}^t R_{2i}$

- $\tau = \hat{e}(R_2, Q_{ID_B})$
- $k = H_2(\tau)$, $c = E_k(m)$, and $h = H_3(m, R_1, k)$.
- 3) Then the clerk C sends h to M_i for $i = 1, \dots, t$.
- 4) Each M_i computes the partial signature $W_i = x_i P_{pub} + h \eta_i S_i$ and sends it to the clerk C , where $\eta_i = \prod_{j=1; j \neq i}^t -j(i-j)^{-1} \text{mod } q$
- 5) Clerk C verifies the correctness of partial signatures by checking if the following equation holds
$$\hat{e}(P, W_i) = \hat{e}(R_{1i}, P_{pub}) (\prod_{j=0}^{t-1} y_j^{i^j})^{h \eta_i}$$
If all partial signatures are verified to be legal, the clerk C computes $W = \sum_{i=1}^t W_i$ otherwise rejects it and requests a valid one.
- 6) The final threshold signcryption is $\sigma = (c, R_1, W)$.

Unsigncrypt: When receiving σ , Bob follows the steps below.

- 1) Compute $\tau = \hat{e}(R_1, S_{ID_B})$ and $k = H_2(\tau)$.
- 2) Recover $m = D_k(c)$.
- 3) Compute $h = H_3(m, R_1, k)$ and accept σ if and only if the following equation holds:

$$\hat{e}(P, W) = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, R_1 + h Q_{ID_A})$$

4 Attack on the scheme

The scheme described above [1] is insecure from the point of view of attack by the clerk. The clerk is the semi trusted body in the scheme. He combines all the partial signatures to generate the final signature for the message. If the clerk becomes corrupt, the secret key of the system is revealed and hence a total break of the system occurs. We describe how the attack proceeds in this section.

we know that,

$$\begin{aligned} W &= \sum_{i=1}^t W_i \\ W &= \sum_{i=1}^t (x_i P_{pub} + h \eta_i S_i) \\ W &= \sum_{i=1}^t (x_i P_{pub}) + \sum_{i=1}^t (h \eta_i S_i) \\ W &= R_2 + h S_A \end{aligned}$$

The clerk has the value of (R_2, W, h) , hence the secret key of A , S_A is exposed as shown below:

$$\frac{W - R_2}{h} = S_A$$

5 The Improved Scheme

In this section, we propose an improved version of the Fagen Li's scheme, which we formally prove to be secure. The setup and key generation algo-

gorithms of our scheme are similar to that of Li's scheme. The modification has been made in the signcryption algorithm such that the system is secure against the clerk or any other insider. The details of the scheme are as follows:

The scheme involves four roles: the PKG, a trusted dealer, a sender group $U_A = \{M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n\}$ with identity ID_A , and a receiver Bob with identity ID_B .

Setup: Given a security parameter k , the PKG chooses groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 of prime order q (with \mathbb{G}_1 additive and \mathbb{G}_2 multiplicative), a generator P of \mathbb{G}_1 , a bilinear map $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$, a secure symmetric cipher (E, D) and hash functions $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$, $H_2 : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n_1}$, $H_3 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow Z_q^*$. The PKG chooses a master-key $s \in_R Z_q^*$ and computes $P_{pub} = sP$. The PKG publishes system parameters $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, n_1, e, P, P_{pub}, E, D, H_1, H_2, H_3)$ and keeps the master-key s secret.

Extract: Given an identity ID , the PKG computes $Q_{ID} = H_1(ID)$ and the private key $S_{ID} = sQ_{ID}$. Then PKG sends the private key to its owner in a secure way.

Keydis: Suppose that a threshold t and n satisfy $1 \leq t \leq n < q$. To share the private key S_{ID_A} among the group U_A , the trusted dealer performs the steps below.

- 1) Choose F_1, F_2, \dots, F_{t-1} uniformly at random from \mathbb{G}_1^* and construct a polynomial $F(x) = S_{ID_A} + xF_1 + \dots + x^{t-1}F_{t-1}$.
- 2) Compute $S_i = F(i)$ for $i = 0, \dots, n$. ($S_0 = S_{ID_A}$). Send S_i to member M_i for $i = 1, \dots, n$ secretly.
- 3) Broadcast $y_0 = \hat{e}(S_{ID_A}, P)$ and $y_j = \hat{e}(F_j, P)$ for $j = 1, \dots, t-1$.
- 4) Each M_i then checks whether his share S_i is valid by computing $\hat{e}(S_i, P) = \prod_{j=0}^{t-1} y_j^{i^j}$. If S_i is not valid, M_i broadcasts an error and requests a valid one.

Signcrypt: Let M_1, \dots, M_t are the t members who want to cooperate to signcrypt a message m on behalf of the group U_A .

- 1) Each M_i chooses $x_i \in_R Z_q^*$.
 -computes $R_{1i} = x_i P, R_{2i} = x_i P_{pub}, \tau_i = \hat{e}(R_{2i}, Q_{ID_B})$
 -sends (R_{1i}, τ_i) to the clerk C .
- 2) The clerk C (one among the t cooperating players) computes,
 - $R_1 = \sum_{i=1}^t R_{1i}$
 - $\tau = \prod_{i=1}^t \tau_i$
 - $k = H_2(\tau), c = E_k(m)$, and $h = H_3(m, R_1, k)$.
- 3) Then the clerk C sends h to M_i for $i = 1, \dots, t$.

4) Each M_i computes the partial signature $W_i = x_i P_{pub} + h\eta_i S_i$ and sends it to the clerk C , where

$$\eta_i = \prod_{j=1; j \neq i}^t -j(i-j)^{-1} \text{mod } q$$

5) Clerk C verifies the correctness of partial signatures by checking if the following equation holds

$$\hat{e}(P, W_i) = \hat{e}(R_{1i}, P_{pub}) (\prod_{j=0}^{t-1} y_j^{i^j})^{h\eta_i}$$

If all partial signatures are verified to be legal, the clerk C computes $W = \sum_{i=1}^t W_i$ otherwise rejects it and requests a valid one.

6) The final threshold signcryption is $\sigma = (c, R_1, W)$.

Unsigncrypt: When receiving σ , Bob follows the steps below.

1) Compute $\tau = \hat{e}(R_1, S_{ID_B})$ and $k = H_2(\tau)$.

2) Recover $m = D_k(c)$.

3) Compute $h = H_3(m, R_1, k)$ and accept σ if and only if the following equation holds:

$$\hat{e}(P, W) = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, R_1 + hQ_{ID_A})$$

6 Analysis of the scheme

A. Correctness Proof:

The correctness can be easily verified by the following equations.

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{e}(R_1, S_{ID_B}) &= \hat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^t R_{1i}, S_{ID_B}) \\ &= \hat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^t (x_i P_{pub}), Q_{ID_B}) \\ &= \hat{e}(\sum_{i=1}^t R_{2i}, Q_{ID_B}) \\ &= \hat{e}(R_{21}, Q_{ID_B}) \cdot \hat{e}(R_{22}, Q_{ID_B}) \dots \hat{e}(R_{2t}, Q_{ID_B}) \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^t \tau_i \end{aligned}$$

and,

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{e}(P, W) &= \hat{e}(P, \sum_{i=1}^t W_i) \\ &= \hat{e}(P, \sum_{i=1}^t (x_i P_{pub} + h\eta_i S_i)) \\ &= \hat{e}(P, \sum (x_i P_{pub}) + \sum_{i=1}^t (h\eta_i S_i)) \\ &= \hat{e}(P, \sum_{i=1}^t (x_i P_{pub}) + hS_{ID_A}) \\ &= \hat{e}(P, \sum_{i=1}^t (x_i P) + hQ_{ID_A}) = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, R_1 + hQ_{ID_A}) \end{aligned}$$

B. Security Analysis

1. Unforgeability Proof:

Theorem : Our identity based threshold signcryption scheme is secure against any EUF-IDTSC adversary \mathcal{A} under the random oracle model if CDHP is hard in G_1 .

The challenger \mathcal{C} receives an instance (P, aP, bP) of the *CDH problem*. His goal is to determine abP . Suppose there exists an EUF-IDTSC adversary \mathcal{A} for our proposed scheme. We show that \mathcal{C} can use \mathcal{A} to solve the CDH problem. \mathcal{C} will set the random oracles \mathcal{O}_{H1} , \mathcal{O}_{H2} , \mathcal{O}_{H3} , $\mathcal{O}_{extract}$, $\mathcal{O}_{signcrypt}$, $\mathcal{O}_{unsigncrypt}$. The answers to the oracles \mathcal{O}_{H1} , \mathcal{O}_{H2} and \mathcal{O}_{H3} are randomly selected, therefore, to maintain consistency, \mathcal{C} will maintain three lists L_1 , L_2 , L_3 . We assume that \mathcal{A} will ask for $H_1(ID)$ before ID is used in any key *extraction*, *signcryption*, and *unsigncryption* queries. First, the adversary \mathcal{A} outputs the identity ID_A of the sender whose signcryption he claims to be able to forge. Then, the challenger \mathcal{C} gives \mathcal{A} the system parameters *params*, consisting of $P, P_{pub} = aP$. The descriptions of the oracles is as follows:

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{H1}(ID_i)$: \mathcal{C} checks if there exists a tuple (ID_i, b_e) in L_1 . If such a tuple exists, \mathcal{C} answers with b_e . Otherwise, \mathcal{C} does the following.

1. If $ID_i = ID_A$, answer by giving bP .
2. If $ID_i \neq ID_A$, choose a new $b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$. Add the tuple (ID_i, b) to L_1 and return b .

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{H2}(\tau_e)$: \mathcal{C} checks if there exists a tuple (τ_e, k_e) in L_2 . If such a tuple exists, \mathcal{C} answers with k_e . Otherwise, \mathcal{C} does the following.

1. Choose a new $k \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ such that no tuple (\cdot, k) exists in L_2 .
2. Add the tuple (τ_e, k) to L_2 and return k .

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{H3}(m_e, R_{1e}, k_e)$: \mathcal{C} checks if there exists a tuple (m_e, R_{1e}, k_e, h_e) in L_3 . If such a tuple exists, \mathcal{C} answers with h_e . Else \mathcal{C} performs:

1. Choose a new $h \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.
2. Add the tuple (m_e, R_{1e}, k_e, h) to L_3 and return h .

Extract (ID_e):

1. if $ID_e = ID_A$ return \perp .
2. If $ID_e \neq ID_A$, recover the tuple (ID_e, b_e) from L_1 and return $(b_e P_{pub})$ as the secret key.

Signcrypt (m, ID_s, ID_B):

1. if $ID_s \neq ID_A$, \mathcal{C} computes the private key S_{ID_s} corresponding to ID_s by running the key extraction query algorithm. Then \mathcal{C} runs *Keydis*

to output n shared private keys $\{S_i\}_{i=1,\dots,t}$. Finally, \mathcal{C} answers the query by a call to $\text{Signcrypt}(m, \{S_i\}_{i=1,\dots,t}, Q_{ID_B})$.

2. else, \mathcal{C} chooses $x, h \in_R Z_q^*$ and computes $R_1 = xP - hQ_{ID_A}$, $W = xP_{pub}$, and $\tau = \hat{e}(R_1, S_{ID_B})$ (\mathcal{C} could obtain S_{ID_B} from the key extraction algorithm because $ID_B \neq ID_A$). \mathcal{C} runs the H_2 simulation algorithm to find $k = H_2(\tau)$ and computes $c = E_k(m)$. \mathcal{C} then checks if L_3 already contains a tuple (m, R_1, k, h') with $h' \neq h$. In this case, \mathcal{C} repeats the process with another random pair (x, h) until finding a tuple (m, R_1, k, h) whose first three elements do not appear in a tuple of the list L_3 . Such a tuple, (m, R_1, k, h) is then entered in L_3 . (C, R_1, W) is hence a valid signcryption according to the oracle.

Unsigncryption queries:

For a unsigncryption query on a ciphertext $\sigma' = (C', R'_1, W')$ between a sender group with identity ID_A and a receiver with identity ID_B . We have the following two cases to consider.

1. If $ID_A = ID_B$ \mathcal{C} always answers \mathcal{A} that σ' is invalid.
2. If $ID_B \neq ID_A$ \mathcal{C} computes $\tau' = \hat{e}(R'_1, S_{ID_B})$. \mathcal{C} then runs the H_2 simulation algorithm to obtain $k' = H_2(\tau')$ and computes $m' = D_{k'}(c)$. Finally, \mathcal{C} runs the H_3 simulation algorithm to obtain $h' = H_3(m', R'_1, k')$ and checks if $\hat{e}(P, W') = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, R'_1 + h'Q_{ID_A})$ holds. If the above equation does not hold, \mathcal{C} rejects the ciphertext. Otherwise \mathcal{C} returns m' .

Eventually \mathcal{A} outputs a forged signcryption $\sigma' = (C, R_1, W)$ on some message m' from the sender ID_A to receiver ID_B . Challenger \mathcal{C} designcrypts the ciphertext σ' with identity ID_B to get the 'signature' W of ID_A , if σ' is a valid signcrypted ciphertext from ID_A to ID_B on message m' . Now, \mathcal{C} applies the oracle replay technique to produce two valid signcrypted ciphertexts $\sigma_1 = (C, R_1, W_1)$, and $\sigma_2 = (C, R_1, W_2)$ for the same message m . \mathcal{C} designcrypts 1 and 2 to obtain signatures $W_1 = (R_2 + h_1 S_A)$ and $W_2 = (R_2 + h_2 S_A)$. Now we can apply standard arguments for the outputs of the forking lemma since both W_1 and W_2 are valid signatures for the same message m and same random tape of the adversary. Finally, \mathcal{C} obtains the solution to the CDH instance as

$$W_1 = (R_2 + h_1 S_A)$$

$$W_2 = (R_2 + h_2 S_A)$$

$$W_1 - W_2 = (h_1 - h_2) S_A$$

hence, $(W_1 - W_2)(h_1 - h_2)^{-1} = aQ_A = abP$

So, we can see that the challenger \mathcal{C} has the same advantage in solving the CDH problem as the adversary \mathcal{A} has in forging a valid signcrypted ciphertext. So, if there exists an adversary who can forge a valid signcrypted ciphertext with non-negligible advantage, that means there exists an algorithm to solve the CDH problem with non-negligible advantage. Since this is not possible, no adversary can forge a valid signcrypted ciphertext with non-negligible advantage. Hence, the scheme is secure against any EUF-IDTSC attack.

2. Confidentiality Proof:

Theorem :Our identity based threshold signcryption scheme is secure against any IND-IDTSC-CCA2 adversary \mathcal{A} under the random oracle model if $DBDHP$ is hard in \mathbb{G}_1 .

The challenger \mathcal{C} receives an instance (P, aP, bP, cP, h) of the $DBDH$ problem. His goal is to decide whether $h = \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$ or not. Suppose there exists an IND-IDTSC-CCA2 adversary \mathcal{A} for the proposed scheme. We show that \mathcal{C} can use \mathcal{A} to solve the $DBDH$ problem. \mathcal{C} will set the random oracles \mathcal{O}_{H1} , \mathcal{O}_{H2} , \mathcal{O}_{H3} , $\mathcal{O}_{extract}$, $\mathcal{O}_{signcrypt}$, $\mathcal{O}_{unsigncrypt}$. The answers to the oracles \mathcal{O}_{H1} , \mathcal{O}_{H2} and \mathcal{O}_{H3} are randomly selected, therefore, to maintain consistency, \mathcal{C} will maintain three lists L_1, L_2, L_3 . We assume that \mathcal{A} will ask for $H_1(ID)$ before ID is used in any *extraction*, *signcryption*, and *unsigncryption* queries. First, the adversary \mathcal{A} outputs the identity ID_A of the sender whose signcryption he claims to be able to forge. Then, the challenger \mathcal{C} gives \mathcal{A} the system parameters $params$, consisting of $P, P_{pub} = aP$. The descriptions of the oracles is as follows:

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{H1}(ID_i)$: \mathcal{C} checks if there exists a tuple (ID_i, b_e) in L_1 . If such a tuple exists, \mathcal{C} answers with b_e . Otherwise, \mathcal{C} does the following.

1. If $ID_i = ID_A$, answer by giving bP .
2. If $ID_i \neq ID_A$, choose a new $b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$. Add the tuple (ID_i, b) to L_1 and return b .

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{H2}(\tau_e)$: \mathcal{C} checks if there exists a tuple (τ_e, k_e) in L_2 . If such a tuple exists, \mathcal{C} answers with k_e . Otherwise, \mathcal{C} does the following.

1. Choose a new $k \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$. such that no tuple (τ_e, k) exists in L_2 .
2. Add the tuple (τ_e, k) to L_2 and return k .

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{H3}(m_e, R_{1e}, k_e)$: \mathcal{C} checks if there exists a tuple (m_e, R_{1e}, k_e, h_e) in L_3 . If such a tuple exists, \mathcal{C} answers with h_e . Else \mathcal{C} performs:

1. Choose a new $h \in_R Z_q^*$.
2. Add the tuple (m_e, R_{1e}, k_e, h) to L_3 and return h .

Extract (ID_e):

1. if $ID_e = ID_A$ return \perp .
2. If $ID_e \neq ID_A$, recover the tuple (ID_e, b_e) from L_1 and return $(b_e P_{pub})$ as the secret key.

Signcrypt (m, ID_s, ID_B):

1. if $ID_s \neq ID_A$, \mathcal{C} computes the private key S_{ID_s} corresponding to ID_s by running the key extraction query algorithm. Then \mathcal{C} runs Keydis to output n shared private keys $\{S_i\}_{i=1, \dots, t}$. Finally, \mathcal{C} answers the query by a call to $Signcrypt(m, \{S_i\}_{i=1, \dots, t}, Q_{ID_B})$.
2. else, \mathcal{C} chooses $x, h \in_R Z_q^*$ and computes $R_1 = xP - hQ_{ID_A}$, $W = xP_{pub}$, and $\tau = \hat{e}(R_1, S_{ID_B})$ (\mathcal{C} could obtain S_{ID_B} from the key extraction algorithm because $ID_B \neq ID_A$). \mathcal{C} runs the H_2 simulation algorithm to find $k = H_2(\tau)$ and computes $c = E_k(m)$. \mathcal{C} then checks if L_3 already contains a tuple (m, R_1, k, h') with $h' \neq h$. In this case, \mathcal{C} repeats the process with another random pair (x, h) until finding a tuple (m, R_1, k, h) whose first three elements do not appear in a tuple of the list L_3 . Such a tuple, (m, R_1, k, h) is then entered in L_3 . (C, R_1, W) is hence a valid signcryption according to the oracle.

Unsigncryption queries:

For a unsigncryption query on a ciphertext $\sigma' = (C', R'_1, W')$ between a sender group with identity ID_A and a receiver with identity ID_B . We have the following two cases to consider.

1. If $ID_A = ID_B$. \mathcal{C} always answers \mathcal{A} that σ' is invalid.
2. If $ID_B \neq ID_A$. \mathcal{C} computes $\tau' = \hat{e}(R'_1, S_{ID_B})$. \mathcal{C} then runs the H_2 simulation algorithm to obtain $k' = H_2(\tau')$ and computes $m' = D_{k'}(c)$. Finally, \mathcal{C} runs the H_3 simulation algorithm to obtain $h' = H_3(m', R'_1, k')$ and checks if $\hat{e}(P, W') = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, R'_1 + h'Q_{ID_A})$ holds. If the above equation does not hold, \mathcal{C} rejects the ciphertext. Otherwise \mathcal{C} returns m' .

After the first stage, \mathcal{A} picks a pair of identities on which he wishes to be challenged on (ID_i, ID_j) . Note that If \mathcal{A} queried the identity of ID_A , it would have failed in the first step itself. Then \mathcal{A} outputs two plaintexts m_0 and m_1 . \mathcal{C} chooses $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$ and signcrypts m_b . To do so, he sets

$R_1^* = cP$, obtains $k^* = H_2(h)$ (where h is \mathcal{C} candidate for the DBDH problem) from the H_2 simulation algorithm, and computes $c_b = E_{k'}(m_b)$. Then \mathcal{C} chooses $W^* \in \mathbb{G}_1^*$ and sends the ciphertext $\sigma^* = (c_b, R_1^*, W^*)$ to \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A} then performs a second series of queries which is treated in the same way as the first one. At the end of the simulation, he produces a bit b_0 for which he believes the relation $\sigma^* = \text{Signcrypt}(m_{b'}, S_{i=1,\dots,t}, ID_j)$ holds. At this moment, if $b = b'$, \mathcal{C} outputs $h = \hat{e}(R_1^*, S_{ID_j}) = \hat{e}(cP, abP) = \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$ as a solution of the DBDH problem, otherwise \mathcal{C} stops and outputs "failure".

So, we can see that the challenger \mathcal{C} has the same advantage in solving the DBDH problem as the adversary \mathcal{A} has in distinguishing a valid signcrypted ciphertext from a random string. So, if there exists an adversary who can succeed in such a CCA2 attack with nonnegligible advantage, that means there exists an algorithm to solve the DBDH problem with non-negligible advantage. Since this is not possible, no adversary can distinguish a valid signcrypted ciphertext from a random string with non-negligible advantage. Hence the scheme is secure against any IND-IDTSC-CCA2 attack.

7 Conclusions

In this paper, we have studied an existing identity-based threshold signcryption scheme by Fagen Li [1]. They have proved the confidentiality of their scheme, but the unforgeability proof given by them is based on the underlying scheme's security which loses its validity in the new scheme. We have shown a possible attack on their scheme where the clerk can obtain the secret key of the sender. Hence a total break of the system is possible. We have also proposed an improved scheme and we have proved its security formally in the existing security model for identity-based threshold signcryption schemes. We leave it as an open problem to investigate for more efficient schemes for identity-based threshold signcryption.

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