Secure Parameters for SWIFFT - Extended Abstract -

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Abstract. The SWIFFT compression functions, proposed by Lyubashevsky *et al.* at FSE 2008, are very efficient instantiations of generalized compact knapsacks for a specific set of parameters. They have the property that, *asymptotically*, finding collisions for a randomly chosen compression function implies being able to solve computationally hard ideal lattice problems in the *worst-case*.

We present three results. First, we present new average-case problems, which may be used for all lattice schemes whose security is proven with the worst-case to average-case reduction in either general or ideal lattices. The new average-case problems require less description bits, resulting in improved keysize and speed for these schemes. Second, we propose a parameter generation algorithm for SWIFFT where the main parameter n can be any integer in the image of Euler's totient function, and not necessarily a power of 2 as before. Third, we give experimental evidence that finding *pseudo-collisions* for SWIFFT is as hard as breaking a 68-bit symmetric cipher according to the well-known heuristic by Lenstra and Verheul. We also recommend conservative parameters corresponding to a 127-bit symmetric cipher.

Keywords: post-quantum cryptography, hash functions, lattices.

1 Introduction

In 2007, the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a comptetion to develop a new cryptographic hash algorithm. The winner of this competition will be standardized as Secure Hash Algorithm 3 (SHA-3) and will replace the current standards SHA-1 and SHA-2. One candidate that has been submitted to this competition is SWIFFTX [2] which is constructed using the SWIFFT compression function family [16]. This hash function is most interesting because its collision resistance, the most important security property, has been proven to rely on the worst-case hardness of finding short vectors in a large class of lattices. This kind of security reduction is unique among all the SHA-3 candidates. In order for the submission to be successful, the inventors have presented parameters for SWIFFT that guarantee 100-bit security and they have argued that SWIFFTX ist sufficiently efficient. In this paper we show that the proposed parameters for SWIFFT are inadequate for 100-bit security. We do this by presenting evidence based on the method of Lenstra and Verheul [13] and our extensive experiments that lattice attacks require significantly less than 2^{100} operations. To be more precise, we argue that the effort to find so-called pseudo-collisions¹ is comparable to breaking a 68-bit symmetric cipher. In lattice attacks against the SWIFFT collision resistance, we consider finding such pseudo-collisions the most time-consuming step.

We also present a new parameter set that we claim yields 100-bit security. However, with these new parameters, SWIFFTX does not satisfy the SHA-3 efficiency requirements any more. We partially solve this problem. We propose an efficient parameter generation algorithm that can be used for a much wider class of SWIFFT compression functions, compared to in the method the original SWIFFT proposal. There, only the case where the security parameter n is a power of 2 was considered. We generalize this to all $n = \varphi(k)$ where φ is the Euler totient function. We are convinced that using those compression functions a new version of SWIFFTX can be designed that satisfies the SHA-3 efficiency requirements.

We present a new average-case problem SIS'. We show that the average-case *small integer solution* problem (SIS) reduces to SIS'. So, SIS' can be used, for example, to solve worst-case problems that reduce to SIS without any loss in the parameters. The advantage is that SIS' requires $n^2 \log(q)$ less random bits. We show how this can be applied to SWIFFT in order to increase performance and save memory.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with basics about lattices. Section 3 introduces the new average-case problem and reductions from SIS. Section 4 explains the SWIFFT compression function. Section 5 presents the parameter generation algorithm and Section 6 discusses the SWIFFT security.

2 Preliminaries

A lattice Λ is a discrete, additive subgroup of \mathbb{R}^n . It can always be described as $\Lambda = \{\sum_{i=1}^d x_i \mathbf{b}_i \mid x_i \in \mathbb{Z}\}$, where $\mathbf{b}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{b}_d \in \mathbb{R}^n$ are linearly independent. The matrix $\mathbf{B} = [\mathbf{b}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{b}_d]$ is a *basis* of Λ and we write $\Lambda = \Lambda(\mathbf{B})$. The number of vectors in the basis is the dimension of the lattice.

For each basis **B** there is a decomposition $\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{B}^* \mu$, where \mathbf{B}^* is orthogonal and μ is upper triangular. The decomposition is uniquely defined by these rules

$$\mu_{j,i} = \langle \mathbf{b}_i, \mathbf{b}_j^* \rangle / \|\mathbf{b}_j^*\|^2, \quad \mathbf{b}_i = \mu_{1,i}\mathbf{b}_1^* + \dots + \mu_{i-1,i}\mathbf{b}_{i-1}^* + \mathbf{b}_i^*, \quad 1 \le j \le i \le n.$$

It can be computed efficiently with the Gram-Schmidt process and \mathbf{B}^* is the *Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalization* (GSO) of \mathbf{B} .

Conforming with notations in previous works, we will write vectors and matrices in boldface. Special tuples of vectors will be denoted with a hat (see for example Section 4). The residue class ring $\mathbb{Z}/\langle q \rangle$ is denoted \mathbb{Z}_q .

¹ For the definition see Section 4.2.

3 Two average-case problems

In this section we present a new average-case problem SIS'. We show that the average-case *small integer solution* problem (SIS) reduces to SIS'. So, SIS' can be used, for example, to solve worst-case problems that reduce to SIS without any loss in the parameters. The advantage is that SIS' requires $n^2 \log(q)$ less random bits.

All cryptographic schemes, whose security relies on SIS, can switch to SIS' resulting in a scheme with smaller keys, which is also slightly faster (due to the structure of SIS'). This includes *all* systems based on worst-case lattice problems via Ajtai's reduction [1] or the adaptions thereof (e.g. $[9,8,19]^2$).

We will also show that the same idea can be adapted to the ISIS problem, which is SIS restricted to the class of ideal lattices. The number of description bits we save in this case is $n \log(q)$. So, *all* schemes based on worst-case problems in ideal lattices via the reduction of Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [15] can benefit from using ISIS' (e.g. [16,15,24,23]). How these improvements apply to SWIFFT may be seen in Section 4.1.

The technical difference is that SIS chooses a somewhat random basis for a random lattice, whereas SIS' chooses only a random lattice and takes the basis in Hermite normal form. This is analogous to using the standard form for linear codes in coding theory.

Definition 1 (SIS). Given integers n, m, q, a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, and a real β , the small integer solution problem (in the ℓ_r norm) is to find a nonzero vector $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^m \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$ such that

 $\mathbf{z} \in \Lambda_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{A}) = \{ \mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^m \mid \mathbf{A}\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q} \} \qquad and \qquad \|\mathbf{z}\|_r \le \beta.$

We will now define two probability ensembles over SIS instances and show that these are essentially equivalent.

Definition 2. For any functions $q(n), m(n), \beta(n)$ let

$$SIS_{q(n),m(n),\beta(n)} = \{(q(n), U(\mathbb{Z}_{q(n)}^{n \times m(n)}), \beta(n))\}_n$$

be the probability ensemble over SIS instances $(q(n), \mathbf{A}, \beta(n))$, where \mathbf{A} is chosen uniformly at random from all $n \times m(n)$ integer matrices modulo q(n). Alternatively let

$$SIS'_{q(n),m(n),\beta(n)} = \{ (q(n), [\mathbf{I}_n, U(\mathbb{Z}_{q(n)}^{n \times (m(n)-n)})], \beta(n)) \}_n$$

be the probability ensemble over SIS instances $(q(n), \mathbf{A}, \beta(n))$, where \mathbf{A} is an *n*-dimensional identity matrix concatenated with a matrix chosen uniformly at random from all $n \times (m(n) - n)$ integer matrices modulo q(n).

 $^{^{2}}$ We found that for the public-key encryption scheme presented by Peikert *et al.* in [19], Regev and Micciancio already suggested using SIS' (without naming it or proving reductions) in [17].

Theorem 1. Let $n, q(n) \ge 2, m(n) \ge (1+\epsilon)n$ be positive integers, and $\beta(n) > 0$ be a positive real, then $SIS_{q(n),m(n),\beta(n)}$ reduces to $SIS'_{q(n),m(n),\beta(n)}$. Here, $\epsilon > 0$ is some real number independent of n.

The proof is given in Appendix A.

In the remainder of the section we will adept Theorem 1 to the case of ideal lattices. Throughout this part, let ζ_n be a sequence of algebraic integers, such that the ring $R_n = \mathbb{Z}[\zeta_n]$ is a \mathbb{Z} -module of rank n, i.e. $R^n \cong \mathbb{Z}^n$ as an additive group. Since $R_n = [1, \zeta_n, \ldots, \zeta_n^{n-1}] \mathbb{Z}^n$, we can use any ℓ_r norm on ring elements, by transforming them to integral coefficient vectors of this power basis. In order to apply ℓ_r norms on tuples of ring elements, we take the norm of the vector consisting of the norms of each element, so for $\hat{\mathbf{z}} \in R_n^m$ we have $\|\hat{\mathbf{z}}\|_r = \|(\|\mathbf{z}_1\|_r, \ldots, \|\mathbf{z}_m\|_r)\|_r$. We use the shorthand $R_{n,q} = R_n/\langle q \rangle = \mathbb{Z}_q[\zeta_n]$.

Definition 3 (ISIS). Given integers n, m, q, a tuple $\widehat{\mathbf{a}} = [\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_m] \in R_{n,q}^m$, and a real β , the ideal shortest vector problem (in the ℓ_r norm) is to find a nonzero vector $\widehat{\mathbf{z}} = [\mathbf{z}_1, \dots, \mathbf{z}_m] \in R_n^m \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$, such that

$$\widehat{\mathbf{z}} \in \Lambda_q^{\perp}(\widehat{\mathbf{a}}) = \{\widehat{\mathbf{z}} \in R_n^m \mid \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{a}_i \mathbf{z}_i = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}\} \quad and \quad \|\widehat{\mathbf{z}}\|_r \le \beta.$$

Analogous to the case of general lattices, we have two probability ensembles.

Definition 4. For any functions $q(n), m(n), \beta(n)$ let

$$ISIS_{q(n),m(n),\beta(n)} = \{(q(n), U(R_{n,q(n)}^{m(n)}), \beta(n))\}_n$$

be the probability ensemble over ISIS instances $(q(n), \hat{\mathbf{a}}, \beta(n))$, where $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ is chosen uniformly at random from all m(n) tuples of ring elements modulo q(n). Alternatively let

$$USIS'_{q(n),m(n),\beta(n)} = \{(q(n), [\mathbf{1}, U(R_{n,q(n)}^{m(n)-1})], \beta(n))\}_{n}$$

be the probability ensemble over ISIS instances $(q(n), \hat{\mathbf{a}}, \beta(n))$, where $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ is a **1** concatenated with a tuple chosen uniformly at random from all (m(n)-1) tuples of ring elements modulo q(n).

Theorem 2. Let $n, m(n) \in \Omega(\log(n))$ be positive integers, $q(n) \in \omega(n)$ be prime, and $\beta(n) > 0$ be real, then $ISIS_{q(n),m(n),\beta(n)}$ reduces to $ISIS'_{q(n),m(n),\beta(n)}$.

The proof is similar to the one before and can be found in Appendix B.

4 SWIFFT compression functions

The SWIFFT compression function family was proposed by Lyubashevsky et al. at FSE 2008 [16]. They showed that for one set of parameters, its efficiency is comparable to SHA-2, while its collision resistance is asymptotically based on worst-case computational problems in ideal lattices.

Specifically, for a set of integer parameters (n, m, p), in their case (64, 16, 257), they use the polynomial $f(x) = x^n + 1$, the ring $R_{p,n} = \mathbb{Z}_p[x]/\langle f \rangle$, and the subset $D_n = \{0, 1\}[x]/\langle f \rangle$ to define the family

$$\mathcal{H}_{n,m,p} = \left\{ h_{\widehat{\mathbf{a}}} \colon D_n^m \ni \widehat{\mathbf{x}} \longmapsto \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbf{a}_i \mathbf{x}_i \pmod{p} \mid (\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_m) = \widehat{\mathbf{a}} \in R_{p,n}^m \right\}.$$

These functions can be computed efficiently. Let $\omega_0, \ldots, \omega_{n-1}$ be the roots of f in \mathbb{Z}_p in any order, and **V** be the Vandermonde matrix generated by them

$$\mathbf{V} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \omega_0 & \dots & \omega_0^{n-1} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 1 & \omega_{n-1} & \dots & \omega_{n-1}^{n-1} \end{pmatrix}.$$

Applying the Fast Fourier Transform over \mathbb{Z}_p to SWIFFT we get

$$\mathbf{z} \equiv \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} \mathbf{a}_i \mathbf{x}_i \mod f \equiv \mathbf{V}^{-1} \left(\sum_{i=0}^{m-1} \mathbf{V} \mathbf{a}_i \odot \mathbf{V} \mathbf{x}_i \right) \pmod{p}, \tag{1}$$

where \odot is the pointwise multiplication in \mathbb{Z}_p^n . Since **V** is invertible, we may use $\mathbf{z}' = \mathbf{V}\mathbf{z}$ as hash, instead of **z**. Since the compression function key $\hat{\mathbf{a}}$ is fix, we may precompute $\mathbf{a}'_i = \mathbf{V}\mathbf{a}_i$ for all *i*. So evaluating the compression function amounts to computing all *n* components of \mathbf{z}' with

$$z'_{j} = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} a'_{i,j} x'_{i,j} \mod p, \qquad \qquad x'_{i,j} = \sum_{l=0}^{n-1} \omega_{j}^{l} x_{i,l} \mod p.$$

Due to the form of f we can set $\omega_j \leftarrow \omega^{2j+1}$ for any element ω of order 2n in \mathbb{Z}_p . We insert the parameters and split up the indices $j = j_0 + 8j_1$ and $l = l_0 + 8l_1$.

$$x'_{i,j_0+8j_1} = \sum_{l_0=0}^{7} \sum_{l_1=0}^{7} \omega^{(l_0+8l_1)(2(j_0+8j_1)+1)} x_{i,l_0+8l_1} \mod p$$
$$= \sum_{l_0=0}^{7} \omega^{16l_0j_1} \cdot \underbrace{\omega^{l_0(2j_0+1)}}_{m_{l_0,j_0}} \cdot \underbrace{\sum_{l_1=0}^{7} \omega^{8l_1(2j_0+1)} x_{i,l_0+8l_1}}_{t_{l_0,j_0}} \mod p \tag{2}$$

The quantities t_{l_0,j_0} for all 2^8 possible x_{i,l_0+8l_1} and m_{l_0,j_0} can be precomputed. The SWIFFT authors recommend using $\omega = 42$, because then $\omega^{16} \equiv 4 \mod p$, so some multiplications in the last expression can be realized with bit-shifts. A single \mathbf{x}'_i , i.e. the last expression for all j, can then be evaluated with a total of 64 multiplications, $8 \cdot 24$ additions/substractions using an FFT network. The total number of operations (ignoring index-calculations and modular reduction) for the standard SWIFFT parameters is

$$\underbrace{\underbrace{16 \cdot 64}_{\text{computing } x'_{i,j}} + \underbrace{16 \cdot 64}_{\text{all } a'_{i,j} \cdot x'_{i,j}} = 2048 \text{ multiplications}$$

$$\underbrace{16 \cdot 8 \cdot 24}_{\text{computing } x'_{i,j}} + \underbrace{16 \cdot 64 - 1}_{\text{summing } a'_{i,j} \cdot x'_{i,j}} = 4095 \text{ additions/substractions}$$

Lyubashevsky and Micciancio showed in [14] that asymptotically these compression functions are collision resistant, as long as standard lattice problems in lattices corresponding to ideals of $\mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle f \rangle$ are hard in the *worst-case*. The arguments given later by Peikert and Rosen in [18] can also be adapted to prove collision resistance of SWIFFT with a *tighter* connection to the same worst-case problem.

4.1 More parameters

Let k > 0 be some integer, p be prime and $n = \varphi(k)$, where φ is Euler's totient function. Furthermore, let f be the kth cyclotomic polynomial, which is monic, irreducible over the integers, and has degree equal to n. Using the same structures as above, i.e. the ring $R_{p,n} = \mathbb{Z}_p[x]/\langle f \rangle$, and subset $D_n = \{0,1\}[x]/\langle f \rangle$ with this new f, we can construct the same compression function family as above and the asymptotic security argument given in [18,14] still holds. In order to apply FFT as before, we need to ensure that elements of order k exist in \mathbb{Z}_p . This is guaranteed whenever $k \mid (p-1)$.

Optimizations similar to the ones available for SWIFFT in this more general setting are still an area of investigation. We give some preliminary general results here and some specific results for the parameters we recommend in Section 5.1.

We found that using additions in a logarithmic table instead of multiplications in \mathbb{Z}_p is comparable in speed to the normal multiplication and special bit shifting reduction modulo 257 used in SWIFFT.

Another very general optimization follows from the observations given in Section 3. Using functions from the set

$$\mathcal{H}'_{n,m,p} = \left\{ h_{\widehat{\mathbf{a}}} \colon D_n^m \ni \widehat{\mathbf{x}} \longmapsto \mathbf{x}_1 + \sum_{i=1}^{m-1} \mathbf{a}_i \mathbf{x}_{i+1} \pmod{p} \mid (\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_{m-1}) = \widehat{\mathbf{a}} \in R_{p,n}^{m-1} \right\}.$$

results in a slightly more efficient scheme, which uses less memory. Recall that all entries in $\hat{\mathbf{a}}'$ can be precomputed in practice and having one of them equal **1** saves some multiplications during evaluation depending on the implementation. In Equation (1), if we would computed \mathbf{z} instead of \mathbf{z}' the speed-up is 1/m. For m = 16 this is $\approx 6\%$ and it may be further increased with the sliding window method used for NTRU [3]. However, at the moment it is more efficient to compute \mathbf{z}' . In this case we save n multiplications, which is about 1% of all operations for standard SWIFFT parameters.

We believe that optimizations are easiest to find in the cases where k is prime or a power of two. Focusing on these two special cases, we can already see

much more variety in the choice of parameters. See Table 1 for comparison of parameters where n is between 64 and 128.

4.2 SWIFFT lattice

Let $\hat{\mathbf{a}} \in R_{p,n}$. Consider the function $h_{\hat{\mathbf{a}}} \in \mathcal{H}_{n,m,p}$ and extended the domain to $R_n = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle f \rangle$. The coefficient vectors of the *periods* of this function form the set

$$\Lambda_p^{\perp}(\widehat{\mathbf{a}}) = \left\{ (x_1, \dots, x_{nm}) \in \mathbb{Z}^{nm} \mid h_{\widehat{\mathbf{a}}} \left(\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} x_{i+1} x^i, \dots, \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} x_{m(i+1)} x^i \right) = \mathbf{0} \right\}.$$

This is a lattice of dimension nm, since the extended $h_{\widehat{\mathbf{a}}}$ is R_n -linear. A basis for this lattice can be found efficiently using a method described by Buchmann *et al.* [4]. Collisions in the original (unextended) function $h_{\widehat{\mathbf{a}}}$ correspond exactly to vectors in this lattice with ℓ_{∞} -norm bounded by 1. Therefore we refer to these lattices as SWIFFT lattices.

A pseudo-collision is a vector in this lattice with Euclidean norm less than \sqrt{nm} , i.e. all vectors in the smallest ball containing all collisions. So every collision is a pseudo-collision, but not vice versa.

5 Parameter generation

We now describe an algorithm for generating parameter sets (n, m, p) for the SWIFFT compression function families in Section 4. For the polynomial f we will use the kth cyclotomic polynomial, such that $n = \varphi(k)$. If multiple polynomials are possible, we choose the one, where the resulting bitlength of the output is shorter, i.e. the one with smaller p. For example, if the first parameter n is a predecessor of a prime, we will use the polynomial $f(x) = x^n + x^{n-1} + \cdots + 1$, and if n is a power of two, we will use the polynomial $f(x) = x^n + 1$.

```
Input: Integer n, s.t. n = \varphi(k), k > 0
Output: Parameters (n, m, p)
```

```
l \leftarrow 1

p \leftarrow k + 1

while not isPrime(p) do

l \leftarrow l + 1

p \leftarrow l \cdot k + 1

end

m \leftarrow \lceil 1.99 \cdot \log_2(p) \rceil
```

Algorithm 1: Parameter generation for $n = \varphi(k), k > 0$.

For each set of parameters, we may additionally compute the output bitlength $out = n(\lfloor \log_2(p) \rfloor + 1)$, the compression rate $cr = m/\log_2(p)$, the Hermite factor

k	n	m	p	out	cr	δ	d
128	64	16	257	513	1.999	1.0084	206
67	66	17	269	529	2.106	1.0084	211
71	70	19	569	631	2.076	1.0073	248
73	72	17	293	577	2.074	1.0077	231
79	78	17	317	625	2.046	1.0072	251
83	82	15	167	575	2.032	1.0075	237
89	88	15	179	617	2.004	1.0071	255
97	96	18	389	769	2.092	1.0061	308
101	100	19	607	901	2.055	1.0056	340
103	102	19	619	919	2.049	1.0055	348
107	106	19	643	955	2.037	1.0053	361
109	108	21	1091	1081	2.081	1.0049	392
113	112	16	227	785	2.044	1.0058	325
127	126	18	509	1009	2.002	1.0047	408
256	128	16	257	1025	1.999	1.0051	373

Table 1. Parameters for $64 \le n \le 128$, k prime or a power of two.

 δ required for finding pseudo-collisions, and the minimal dimension d where we can expect to find pseudo-collisions. These values are listed in Table 1.

The two latter values δ and d are computed in the following fashion. Consider the function $len(d) = p^{n/d} \delta^d$. According to an analysis by Gama and Nguyen [7]³ this is the Euclidean size of the smallest vector we are likely to find when reducing a sublattice with dimension d of any SWIFFT lattice $\Lambda_p^{\perp}(\hat{\mathbf{a}})$. Micciancio and Regev observed in [17] that this function takes its minimal value

$$len(d_{min}) = \delta^2 \sqrt{n \log(p) / \log(\delta)}$$
 for $d_{min} = \sqrt{n \log(p) / \log(\delta)}$.

A pseudo-collision is a vector in $\Lambda_p^{\perp}(\hat{\mathbf{a}})$ with Euclidean norm \sqrt{nm} . In order to find such a vector, we need a δ , s.t. $len(d_{min}) = \sqrt{nm}$. We say this is the Hermite factor required for finding pseudo-collisions, and the corresponding d_{min} is the minimal dimension, where we can expect to find a pseudo-collision. Note that these minimal dimensions, which we will work in are about 5 *times* smaller than the corresponding dimensions of the SWIFFT lattices. To give an intuition, Gama and Nguyen state that the best lattice reduction algorithms known today can achieve a Hermite factor of roughly $\delta = 1.01$ in high dimension within acceptable time.

5.1 Recommended parameters

We will give arguments in Section 6.2 that parameters with $d \ge 260$ correspond to SWIFFT instances, where finding pseudo-collisions is at least as hard as

³ Their experiments were performed on random lattices following a different distribution, but experimentally their results apply here as well.

breaking a 100-bit symmetric cipher. The smallest such parameters in Table 1 are (n, m, p) = (96, 18, 389). Finding pseudo-collisions for these parameters is as hard as breaking a 127-bit symmetric cipher. Concerning all other known attacks, these parameters are more secure than (64, 16, 257).

Note that some of the efficiency improvements we outlined in Section 5 for the original SWIFFT function work here as well. Recall Equation 2, since k = 97 is prime we can set $\omega_j \leftarrow \omega^{j+1}$ for any element ω of order k in \mathbb{Z}_p . We recommend to split up the indices $l = l_0 + 8l_1$, where $0 \leq l_0 \leq 7, 0 \leq l_1 \leq 11, j$ similar and use $\omega = 275$, and since multiplying with $\omega^8 = 16$ can then be realized with bit-shifts. Corresponding to Equation 2 we get

$$x'_{i,j_0+8j_1} = \sum_{l_0=0}^{7} \omega^{8l_0j_1} \cdot \underbrace{\omega^{l_0(j_0+1)}}_{m_{l_0,j_0}} \cdot \underbrace{\sum_{l_1=0}^{11} \omega^{l_1(8j_0+64j_1+8)} x_{i,l_0+8l_1}}_{t_{l_0,j_0,j_1}} \operatorname{mod} p.$$

Note that the precomputed t part depends on j_1 now, and needs to be available for 2^{12} possible $x_{i,l}$. So this part will need $12 \cdot 2^4 = 192$ times the space it did before. Although we have no implementation yet, we are confident that efficiency of evaluation here is comparative to the original SWIFFT function.

6 Security Analysis

The collision resistance of SWIFFT has the desirable property of being reducible to a worst-case computational problem. In particular, this means an algorithm which breaks random instances of SWIFFT compression functions with main parameter n can also be used to find short nonzero vectors in *all* ideals of the ring $\mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle x^n + 1 \rangle$. Finding such vectors is assumed to be infeasible for large n. However, for the current parameter, n = 64, exhaustive search algorithms find these short vectors in less than one hour. In the lattice challenge [4] open for all enthusiasts similar problems have been solved⁴ up to n = 108. Gama and Nguyen even state that finding the *shortest* vector in *n*-dimensional lattices for $n \leq 70$ should be considered easy [7]. So the resulting lower bound on the attacker's runtime is insignificant.

We will analyze the *practical* security of SWIFFT. With all known attacks, breaking SWIFFT directly is harder than breaking the underlying worst-case problem. As we have seen in Section 4.2, collisions in the SWIFFT compression functions naturally correspond to vectors with ℓ_{∞} -norm bounded by 1 in certain lattices. These may be recovered with lattice basis reduction algorithms. Since these algorithms are highly optimized to find small vectors in the Euclidean norm, it is reasonable to analyze the computational problem of finding pseudo-collisions instead of collisions. These are vectors in the *smallest ball* which contains all vectors corresponding to collisions, so an algorithm which minimizes the Euclidean norm cannot distinguish between the two. In this section, we give

⁴ See http://www.latticechallenge.org

experimental evidence that according to a well-known heuristic by Lenstra and Verheul [13], finding pseudo-collisions is comparable to breaking a 68-bit symmetric cipher. In comparison, all other attacks analyzed by the SWIFFT authors take 2^{106} operations and almost as much space.

In their original proposal of SWIFFT, Lyubashevsky *et al.* provide a first analysis of all standard attacks. When it comes to attacks using lattice reduction they state however, they state that the dimension 1024 of SWIFFT lattices is too big for current algorithms. We will start by showing in Section 6.1 that reducing sublattices of dimension 251, which corresponds roughly to m = 4, is sufficient to find pseudo-collisions and dimension 513 (m = 8) is sufficient for collisions and beyond this point as Micciancio and Regev observe in [17] "the problem [SVP] cannot become harder by increasing m". This means if we find a pseudocollision in dimension 251, we can pad it with zeroes to obtain a pseudo-collision for SWIFFT. In practice, even dimension d = 205 is sufficient to find pseudocollisions (cf. Table 1). In particular this means SWIFFTX, where internally SWIFFT is used with m = 32 is not more secure.

6.1 Existence of (pseudo-)collisions in d-dimensional sublattices

The method we have given in Section 5 for choosing the dimension of the sublattice we attack with lattice-basis reduction algorithms is a heuristic, because it is based on extensive experiments by Gama and Nguyen. We will now give a related result independent of experiments but dependent on the construction of SWIFFT lattices and other lattices of the form $\{\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^d : \mathbf{Av} \equiv \mathbf{0} \pmod{p}\}$, where **A** is some integral matrix. These lattices are widely used in practice for constructing provably secure cryptosystems (see e.g. [8,15,20]) and they originate from Ajtai's work [1].

Let $h_{\widehat{\mathbf{a}}}$ be a random SWIFFT compression function with parameters (n, m, p). The range of this function has size $|R| = p^n$. We change the domain of h to all vectors in a d-dimensional subspace of \mathbb{Z}^{nm} that have Euclidean norm less than $r = \sqrt{nm/2}$. The size of this space can be very well approximated by the volume of a d-dimensional ball with radius r, i.e. $|D| = r^d \pi^{d/2} / \Gamma(d/2 + 1)$.

Now any collision in the modified $h_{\widehat{\mathbf{a}}}$ corresponds to a pseudo-collision of the corresponding SWIFFT function by the triangle inequality. These collisions exist for certain by the pigeonhole principle for all $d \geq 251$. So the dimension d = 205 suggested by the heuristic looks too optimistic, but remember that this argument only gives an upper bound on the required d and doesn't take into account the randomness in the choice of $\widehat{\mathbf{a}}$.

The situation for proper collisions is similar. Here, we shrink the input to all vectors in a *d*-dimensional subspace that have coefficients in $\{0, 1\}$. The size of this input space is $|D| = 2^d$. Again, collisions exist by the pigeonhole principle for all $d \geq 513$. This suggests that proper collisions are harder to find.

6.2 Experiments

For our experiments we chose the sublattice dimension where lattice basis reduction algorithms like LLL/BKZ behave optimal in practice (see Section 5). We then proceeded to compare the following lattice basis reduction algorithms to see which performs best in practice on the lattices in our experiment. BKZ as implemented in version 5.4.2 of the "Number Theory Library" (NTL) by Shoup [22], Primal-Dual (PD) as implemented by Filipović and Koy, and finally RSR as implemented by Ludwig. Both latter algorithms are available on request from the authors⁵. It became apparent that Primal-Dual runs much slower than both competitors, so for the main experiment we omitted it.

For our experiments, we fixed n = 64, m = 16 to their standard values and chose the third parameter p variable. This results in a steady decrease in the Hermite factor and increase in the dimension required to find pseudo-collisions (see Table 2). We found that for smaller values of p, corresponding to smaller

\overline{n}	m	p	δ	d
64	16	29	1.0140	125
64	16	33	1.0135	130
64	16	37	1.0131	134
64	16	41	1.0127	138
64	16	45	1.0124	141
64	16	49	1.0121	144
64	16	53	1.0119	147
64	16	57	1.0117	150
64	16	61	1.0115	152

Table 2. Parameters used for our experiments.

values of d, pseudo-collisions were found too fast to make sensible measurements.

For each of these 9 parameter sets, we created 10 random SWIFFT lattices using the PRNG which is part of NTL. We then proceeded to break all instances with the NTL floating-point variant of BKZ (bkzfp), by increasing the BKZ parameter β until a pseudo-collision was found and recording the total time taken in each case. We also broke all instances with a floating-point variant of Schnorr's random sampling reduction (RSR) algorithm [21] (rsrfp) implemented by Ludwig [5] using the parameters $\delta = 0.9, u = 22$ and again increasing β until a pseudo-collision was found.

In all cases, we computed the average runtime of both algorithms and plotted the base two log of this value relative to the dimension d. We also plotted a conservative extrapolation (assuming linear growth in logscale) for the average runtime of both algorithms (see Figure 1). The same growth assumption

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PSR, Christoph Ludwig, cludwig@cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de

has often been made when analyzing NTRU lattices [10]. These are similar to SWIFFT lattices as we will see in Section 6.3.




Fig. 1. Average runtimes of our experiments.

All our experiments where run on a single 2.3 GHz AMD Opteron processor. According to the predictions of Lenstra and Verheul [13] the computational hardness of a problem solved after t seconds on such a machine is comparable to breaking a k-bit symmetric cipher, where

 $k = \log_2(t) + \log_2(2300) - \log_2(60 \cdot 60 \cdot 24 \cdot 365.25) - \log_2(5 \cdot 10^5) + 56.$

Using the data in Figure 1, we can compute the security level k corresponding to the average runtime of each algorithm relative to the dimension d for each parameter set.

The rightmost side of Figure 1 corresponds to p = 257, i.e. a *real* SWIFFT lattice. The extrapolated symmetric bit security for finding pseudo-collisions on these lattices is k = 68.202. Any parameter set, where $d \ge 260$ would correspond to a cipher with symmetric bit-security at least 100 according to our extrapolation. Parameters realizing this paradigm are given in Section 5.1.

6.3 Hybrid lattice reduction

There is a *strong* similarity between NTRU lattices and SWIFFT lattices which we will make explicit. According to the most recent NTRU flavor [10], an NTRU trapdoor one-way function family is described by the parameters

 $(q^{NTRU}, p^{NTRU}, N^{NTRU}, d_f^{NTRU}, d_a^{NTRU}, d_r^{NTRU}).$

These relate to SWIFFT families in the following way. Choose $n = N^{NTRU}$, $m = 2, p = q^{NTRU}$. Use the polynomial $f(x) = x^n - 1$ for the ring $R_{p,n}$. Let \mathcal{T}_d be the set of trinary polynomials of degree n - 1 with d + 1 entries equal to 1 and d entries equal to -1. In the NTRU setting, we choose our hash-keys (a_1, a_2) not uniformly from $R_{p,n}^2$ but rather from $(1 + p^{NTRU}\mathcal{T}_{d_f^{NTRU}}) \times \mathcal{T}_{d_g^{NTRU}}$ which are the NTRU secret key spaces.

The strong limitation on the choice of keys allows the trapdoor to work. The use of a reducible polynomial does not guarantee collision resistance anymore [14], but one-wayness is sufficient for NTRUs security. In summation, the step from NTRU to SWIFFT is exchanging a huge $N^{NTRU} = 401, q^{NTRU} = 2048$ with n = 64, p = 257 but in turn increase m from 2 to 16. This seems risky because as we mentioned at the beginning of this section, the problem cannot become harder by increasing m beyond some unknown threshold which is at most 8. This upper bound for the threshold given by the dimension d of a sublattice in which short enough lattice vectors must exist (see Section 6.1).

The strongest attack on NTRU lattices is a hybrid method presented at CRYPTO 2007 by Howgrave-Graham [11]. It combines both Meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks by Odlyzko [12] and lattice reduction attacks by Coppersmith and Shamir [6]. In our brief summary of the attack we describe three distinct phases.

- 1. Reduce the public NTRU lattice and save the result in **B**.
- 2. Reduce the maximal *sublattice* of **B**, which satisfies the geometric series assumption (GSA), i.e. for which the $\|\mathbf{b}_i^*\|$ descend linearly in logscale.
- 3. Let k be the last index of a length contributing vector in \mathbf{B}^* , meaning $\|\mathbf{b}_i^*\| \approx 0$ for all i > k. Howgrave-Graham introduced a modification of Babai's Nearest Plane algorithm that allows us to perform a MITM attack on the final dim $(\mathbf{B}) k$ entries of the secret keys.

Phases 1–2 ensure that $\|\mathbf{b}_k^*\|$ is as big as possible. This allows Babai's original algorithm, and the modification to better approximate CVP in the lattice spanned by the first k basis vectors.

Stated in this form the same algorithm can be used to search for collisions (not pseudo-collisions) in SWIFFT lattices. However, preliminary experiments show that this methodology is not helpful. At the end of phase 2 we find that $k \approx 128$. Obviously, even if the CVP oracle works perfectly we would still have to do a MITM attack on the last dim $(\mathbf{B}) - k \approx 896$ entries. This is too much to be practical.

We are currently working on a generalization of the attack, where step 2 is iterated for m-1 different overlapping parts of the basis, namely

 $[\mathbf{b}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{b}_{2n}], [\mathbf{b}_{n+1}, \ldots, \mathbf{b}_{3n}], \ldots, [\mathbf{b}_{(m-2)n+1}, \ldots, \mathbf{b}_{mn}].$

This modification is only sensible for SWIFFT and not NTRU. It should bring k closer to dim(**B**) possibly at the expense of CVP approximation quality. It remains to be seen if this is a good strategy.

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We would like to thank Chris Peikert and Alon Rosen for helpful advice and encouragement. We also want to thank Bartol Filipović, Henrik Koy and Christoph Ludwig for letting us use their lattice reduction code. Finally, we thank Markus Rückert and Michael Schneider for their patience and unbounded cooperation.

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A SIS reduces to SIS'

Theorem 3. Let $n, q(n) \ge 2, m(n) \ge (1+\epsilon)n$ be positive integers, and $\beta(n) > 0$ be a positive real, then $SIS_{q(n),m(n),\beta(n)}$ reduces to $SIS'_{q(n),m(n),\beta(n)}$. Here, $\epsilon > 0$ is some real number independent of n.

Proof. Given an instance of SIS $(q(n), \mathbf{A}, \beta(n))$, let E be the event, that there are n column vectors in \mathbf{A} which are linearly independent mod q(n).

Assuming *E* holds, there is a permutation matrix $\mathbf{P} \in \{0, 1\}^{m(n) \times m(n)}$, such that $\mathbf{AP} = [\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{A}'']$ and \mathbf{A}' is invertible mod q(n). We let the SIS' oracle solve the instance $(q(n), [\mathbf{I}_n, \mathbf{A}'^{-1}\mathbf{A}''], \beta(n))$. This instance is distributed according to SIS', when the matrix $\mathbf{A}'^{-1}\mathbf{A}''$ is distributed according to $U(\mathbb{Z}_{q(n)}^{n \times (m(n)-n)})$. This is the case, since \mathbf{A}'' was distributed this way and \mathbf{A}'^{-1} is invertible mod q(n), so it is a permutation on the vectors $\mathbb{Z}_{q(n)}^{n}$ which does not effect the uniform

distribution. From the SIS' oracle, we obtain a solution \mathbf{z} . The vector \mathbf{Pz} solves our SIS instance because

$$\mathbf{0} = [\mathbf{I}_n, \mathbf{A}'^{-1}\mathbf{A}'']\mathbf{z} = [\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{A}'']\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{P}\mathbf{z} \pmod{q}.$$

We will show that the probability of E not occurring is negligible. For brevity, we will write q, m instead of q(n), m(n) for the remaining part. The number of matrices **A** with n linearly independent columns is equal to the number of matrices with n linearly independent rows. For E to occur, the first row may be anything but the zero-row giving $(q^m - 1)$ possibilities, the second row, can be all but multiples of the first giving $(q^m - q)$ possibilities and so on. The total number of matrices is q^{nm} , so we get

$$\Pr[\text{not } E] = 1 - q^{-nm} \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} (q^m - q^i) = 1 - \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} (1 - q^{i-m}).$$

Let $c = -2\ln(1/2)$, we bound the probability

$$1 - \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} (1 - q^{i-m}) = 1 - \exp((-1)^2 \ln(\prod_{i=0}^{n-1} (1 - q^{i-m})))$$
$$\stackrel{(1)}{\leq} \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} - \ln(1 - q^{i-m}) \stackrel{(2)}{\leq} c q^{-m} \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} q^i$$
$$= c(q^n - 1)/(q^m(q - 1)) \le c/q^{m-n} \stackrel{(3)}{\leq} c/2^{\epsilon n}$$

Inequality (1) holds, because for all real x, $1 - \exp(-x) \le x$. Similarly, inequality (2) holds because for all $0 \le x \le 1/2$ we have $-\ln(1-x) \le cx$. Finally, inequality (3) follows from the conditions stated in the theorem. The resulting function is negligible which completes the proof.

B ISIS reduces to ISIS'

Theorem 4. Let $n, m(n) \in \Omega(\log(n))$ be positive integers, $q(n) \in \omega(n)$ be prime, and $\beta(n) > 0$ be real, then $ISIS_{q(n),m(n),\beta(n)}$ reduces to $ISIS'_{q(n),m(n),\beta(n)}$.

Proof. Given an instance of ISIS $(q(n), \hat{\mathbf{a}}, \beta(n))$, let E be the event, that there is an index i, such that $\mathbf{a}' = \mathbf{a}_i$ is invertible mod q(n).

Assuming *E* holds, there is a permutation $\mathbf{P} \in \{0, 1\}^{m(n) \times m(n)}$, such that $\widehat{\mathbf{aP}} = [\mathbf{a}', \widehat{\mathbf{a}}'']$ and \mathbf{a}' is invertible mod q(n). We let the ISIS' oracle solve the instance $(q(n), [\mathbf{1}, \mathbf{a}'^{-1}\widehat{\mathbf{a}}''], \beta(n))$. This instance is distributed according to ISIS', when the tuple $\mathbf{a}'^{-1}\widehat{\mathbf{a}}''$ is distributed according to $U(R_{n,q}^{m(n)-1})$. This is the case, since $\widehat{\mathbf{a}}''$ was distributed this way and \mathbf{a}'^{-1} is invertible mod q(n), so it is a permutation on the elements $R_{n,q(n)}$ which does not effect the uniform distribution. From the ISIS' oracle, we obtain a solution $\widehat{\mathbf{z}}$. The vector $\mathbf{P}\widehat{\mathbf{z}}$ solves our ISIS instance.

$$\mathbf{0} = [\mathbf{1}, \mathbf{a}'^{-1}\widehat{\mathbf{a}}'']\widehat{\mathbf{z}} = [\mathbf{a}', \widehat{\mathbf{a}}'']\widehat{\mathbf{z}} = \widehat{\mathbf{a}}\mathbf{P}\widehat{\mathbf{z}} \pmod{q}.$$

We will show that the probability of E not occurring is negligible. For brevity, we will write q, m instead of q(n), m(n) for the remaining part. Let f be the minimal polynomial of ζ_n , and f_1, \ldots, f_k be the irreducible factors of f over \mathbb{Z}_q . Since q is prime, for any invertible element in $\mathbf{a} \in R_{n,q}$, it is necessary and sufficient that $\mathbf{a} \mod f_i \neq \mathbf{0}$. So, the number of invertible elements is $|R_{n,q}^*| = \prod_{i=1}^k (q^{\deg(f_i)} - 1)$. The total number of ring elements is $|R_{n,q}| = q^n$. For E to occur, only one of the m ring elements must be invertible, so we get

$$\Pr[\text{not } E] = (1 - q^{-n} \prod_{i=1}^{k} (q^{\deg(f_i)} - 1))^m = (1 - \prod_{i=1}^{k} (1 - q^{-\deg(f_i)}))^m$$

Let $c = -2\ln(1/2)$, we bound $(\Pr[\text{not } E])^{1/m}$

$$1 - \prod_{i=1}^{k} (1 - q^{-\deg(f_i)}) \stackrel{(1)}{\leq} \sum_{i=1}^{k} -\ln(1 - q^{-\deg(f_i)}) \stackrel{(2)}{\leq} c \sum_{i=1}^{k} q^{-\deg(f_i)}$$
$$= ck/q \leq cn/q \stackrel{(3)}{\in} 1/\omega(1).$$

Inequality (1) holds, because for all real x, $1 - \exp(-x) \le x$. Similarly, inequality (2) holds because for all $0 \le x \le 1/2$ we have $-\ln(1-x) \le cx$. Finally, (3) follows from the conditions stated in the theorem. Since $m(n) \in \Omega(\log(n))$, $\Pr[\operatorname{not} E]$ is negligible. \Box