# Cryptanalysis of Some Protocols for RFID Systems

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Abstract—In this paper we analyze the security of the mutual authentication and ownership transfer protocols which have been recently proposed by Kulseng *et al.* Our analysis demonstrates a variety of attacks against these protocols. We present a secret parameters disclosure attack which discloses any secret parameter between the tag and the reader. Our disclosure attack can be easily used as an impersonation attack against the mutual authentication protocol. In addition, we present an attack that retrieves the *PIN*-value in the ownership transfer protocol, where the *PIN*-value is a parameter that must be kept secret from any party including the owner of the tag.

All the attacks presented in this work are passive, have low complexity and have the success probability of 1.

Index Terms—RFID, Lightweight Mutual Authentication, Ownership Transfer Protocol, PUF, LFSR.

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Mutual authentication protocols are employed by readers and tags in RFID systems to authenticate each other. Commonly, a mutual authentication protocol includes a game playing argument between the tag and the reader. One of the principals in the protocol poses some challenge(s) to the other principal and then verifies the response(s) received. In general, RFID authentication protocols need to authenticate both the entities to one another. Such protocols are referred to as mutual authentication protocols. On the other hand, an ownership transfer protocol is a protocol that transfers the ownership right of a tag securely from the old owner to the new owner such that:

- The old owner can not access the new RFID transactions after the occurrence of ownership transfer.
- The new owner can not access the old RFID transactions after the occurrence of ownership transfer.

Common use of an ownership transfer protocol is to reissue a tag attached with one product to another product in a shopping mall.

Several mutual authentication protocols [3], [10], [8], [9], [11] and ownership transfer protocols [5], [4], [12], [15] have been proposed in the literature recently. All the protocols mentioned here are claimed to be "lightweight protocols", i.e. they require low power to operate and require (non-specialized) low cost RFID tags/readers to operate. Some of these protocols, e.g. [13], [14], [7], rely on encryption or cryptographic hash functions for their security. However, Feldhofer and Rechberger [1] have shown that the number of gates required to implement most common hash functions on an RFID chip is very high. Consequently, the use of standard hash functions on RFID chips, and hence in RFID protocols,

is ruled out. In fact, in order to promote the use of RFID technology in authentication, the cost of the RFID tags must be competitive with the available low cost solutions, e.g. bar codes, otherwise there is no incentive for businesses to use the RFID technology. Hence, the available protocols are not applicable in many applications which need low cost tags.

To overcome the above problems, Kulseng *et al.* have recently proposed a lightweight mutual authentication protocol and an ownership transfer protocol for RFID Systems[6]. Both these protocols do not use a block cipher or a hash function in their designs. These protocols rely on Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) for their security. The designers' motivation was the efficiency of PUFs and LFSRs in hardware.

The designers have claimed optimal security for both the proposed mutual authentication protocol and ownership transfer protocol. However, in this work, we exhibit a variety of weaknesses in these protocols. We present an efficient attack which discloses any secret parameter, including the tagidentifier ID, which was shared between the tag and the reader prior to running the protocol. As an extension of this attack, we also develop an impersonation attack against the mutual authentication protocol. In addition, we present an attack that retrieves the PIN in the ownership transfer protocol. The PIN is a secret preloaded value in the tag which must be kept secret even from the owner of the tag.

#### II. PRELIMINARIES

Through the paper, we use the following notations:

- *ID*: It is the static tag identifier which is always fixed, even through the ownership right transfer.
- *IDS*: It is the tag pseudonym which is updated after each successful run of the protocol.
- *P*(.): It is the tag's random permutation function based on Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). Different tag's PUFs will produce different outputs for a certain input value.
- F(.): It is a public random permutation function based on a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). The LFSR is assumed to be maximal length, which means its period for a non zero seed is  $2^L - 1$  when the state of the LFSR is L bits long.
- $G_n$ : It is a greeting number which is produced by the tag, utilizing the tag's P(.)-function and shared with the reader. After each successful run of protocol  $G_n$  is get updated.

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- $K_n$ ,  $K'_n$  and  $K''_n$ : They are parameters which are used through the authentication and ownership transfer processes. These parameters are computed and updated by utilizing a public F(.)-function.
- $K_t$ : It is a parameter which is computed as  $K_t = LFSR(G_n \oplus G_{n+1})$ .
- *PIN*: It's an identifier of tag which is shared between the Trusted Third Party (TTP) and the tag.
- All parameters in the protocol are of length L-bit.
- The expression  $A \rightarrow B$  refers to assigning A to B.

#### **III. PROTOCOLS DESCRIPTION**

The kulseng *et al.* mutual authentication protocol and ownership transfer protocol are depicted in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 respectively.

The mutual authentication protocol includes two phase that are the setup phase and the mutual authentication phase. In the setup phase the secret values are preloaded to the tag and the reader. These secret values are IDS, ID and  $G_n$  where IDand  $G_n$  are updated in each round and the reader also keep  $G_{n+1}$ . In addition, they share a permutation function F. This function can be an LFSR which its implementation details are known to all parities includes the adversary [[6], Section III]. Tag also employs a random function P based on PUF.

In the mutual authentication phase, the reader sends Reqand the tag responses with its IDS. The reader uses this value to find the shared secret values with this tag and sends  $ID \oplus G_n$  to the tag. The tag use this value to authentication the reader. Whenever the tag authenticates the reader it updates  $G_n$  and sends  $G_{n+1} \oplus F(G_n)$  and  $G_{n+2} \oplus F(F(G_n))$  to the reader. The reader knows  $G_n$  and F. Hence, it can extract  $G_{n+1}$  from  $G_{n+1} \oplus F(G_n)$  which can be used as a measure to authenticate the tag. Whenever the reader authenticates the tag it extract $G_{n+2}$  from  $G_{n+2} \oplus F(F(G_n))$  and consider it as the new value of  $G_{n+1}$  while it use  $G_{n+1}$  as the new value of  $G_n$ . In addition, the tag and the reader updates IDSto  $F(IDS \oplus G_n)$ . The details of the mutual authentication protocol is depicted in Fig. 1.

The ownership transfer protocol includes two phase that are the setup phase and the Ownership transfer phase. In the setup phase, the old reader pass the stored  $\{IDS, ID, G_{n+1}\}$  to the new reader and the verification pair  $\{G_n, G_{n+1}\}$  to TTP. TTP and tag also share the secret value PIN.

The details of ownership transfer phase is depicted in Fig. 2. In this phase the new reader pass a secure request to TTP and use  $G_{n+1}$  as a proof for its claim to access the tag. TTP sends  $F(PIN) \oplus PIN \oplus G_n$  to the new reader and it pases this value to the tag. The tag extract  $G_n$  for the received value and uses it to authenticate TTP. Whenever the tag authenticates TTP it computes a new pair of  $G'_n$  and  $G'_{n+1}$  to replace the old values such that  $G'_n = P(G_{n+2})$  and  $G'_{n+1} = P(G'_n)$ . The tag pases  $G'_n \oplus F(F(G_n))$ ,  $G'_{n+1} \oplus F(F(F(G_n)))$  and  $K_t = F(G_n \oplus G_{n+1})$  to the new reader. The new reader pass the received value to TTP. TTP verifies the correctness of  $K_t$  and extract  $G'_n$  and  $G'_{n+1}$  form the received values and sends them through a secret channel to the new reader. Finlay, the tag and TTP update PIN to  $F(PIN \oplus G_n)$ .

Algorithm 1: Secret parameters disclosure attack against the Kulseng *et al.* mutual authentication protocol.

#### **Online Phase**;

Eavesdrop the first run of the mutual authentication protocol and store the

 $((IDS)_1, (ID \oplus G_n)_1, (G_{n+1} \oplus K_n)_1, (G_{n+2} \oplus K'_n)_1)$ triplet;

Eavesdrop the second run of the mutual authentication protocol and store the

 $((IDS)_2, (ID \oplus G_n)_2, (G_{n+1} \oplus K_n)_2, (G_{n+2} \oplus K'_n)_2)$ triplet;

#### Off line Phase;

$F^{-1}((IDS)_2) \to (IDS)_1 \oplus (G_n)_1;$	
$(IDS)_1 \oplus (G_n)_1 \oplus (IDS)_1 \to (G_n)_1;$	$// (G_n)_1$
disclosures;	
$(ID \oplus (G_n))_1 \oplus (G_n)_1 \to ID;$	// ID
disclosures;	
$F(G_n) \to K_n;$	
$F(K_n) \to K'_n;$	
$(G_{n+1}\oplus K_n)_1\oplus K_n\to G_{n+1};$	$// (G_{n+1})_1$
disclosures;	
$(G_{n+2} \oplus K'_n)_1 \oplus K'_n \to G_{n+2};$	$// (G_{n+2})_1$
disclosures;	
$G_{n+1} \to G_n;$	
$G_{n+2} \to G_{n+1};$	
$F(IDS \oplus G_n) \rightarrow IDS;$ // $IDS$ dis	closures;
$F(G_n) \to K_n;$	
$F(K_n) \to K'_n;$	
$(G_{n+1} \oplus K_n)_2 \oplus K_n \to G_{n+1};$	$// (G_n)_2$
disclosures;	
$(G_{n+2} \oplus K'_n)_2 \oplus K'_n \to G_{n+2};$	$// (G_{n+1})_2$
disclosures;	
$G_{n+1} \rightarrow G_n;$ // $G_n$ disclos	ures;
$G_{n+2} \rightarrow G_{n+1};$ // $G_{n+1}$ discl	osures;
return $(IDS, ID, G_n, G_{n+1});$	



Fig. 1. The mutual authentication protocol of Kulseng et al.



Fig. 2. The ownership transfer protocol of Kulseng et al.

 $if(K_t = F(G'_n \oplus G'_{n+1})): F(PIN \oplus G_n) \to PIN$ 

## IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL

 $F(PIN \oplus G_n) \rightarrow PIN$ 

In this section we analyze the security of the Kulseng *et al.* mutual authentication protocol. Our attacks is based on an observation that for a publicly known LFSR of length L, given any L-bit sequence of its output is enough to determine the internal state of LFSR in any given time by clocking the LFSR in backward or forward manner [2]. Briefly, an LFSR corresponds to a recurrence relation and if the recurrence relation is publicly known then any given LFSR state can be extended in both forward and backward directions to know the state of the LFSR at any given time. On the other hand, the designers of the protocols state that [[6], Section III]:

The implementation of F function needs not to be secret, so even adversaries know how to construct this function.

It means that any one, including the adversary, knows the LFSR length L and its irreducible feedback polynomial over finite field GF(2) of degree L. In addition, any parameter which is exchanged in this protocol is L bits long. Hence, given F(X), where F(.) is an LFSR implementation, it would be easy to clock the LFSR backward and determine X. We denote by  $F^{-1}(.)$  a function that implements the inverse of F(.). That is, the output of  $F^{-1}(F(X))$  would be the value X. In the rest of this work, we use the observation mentioned above to mount various attacks on the mutual authentication protocol.

#### A. Secret Parameters Disclosure Attack

We now show how an adversary can disclose any secret parameter stored with either the reader or the tag. Recall that the reader parameters are  $(IDS, ID, G_n, G_{n+1})$  and the tag parameters are  $(IDS, ID, G_n)$ . Given those parameters any one can deceive the reader to be a legitimate tag and vise versa. The adversary eavesdrops two sequential successive runs of Kulseng *et al.* mutual authentication protocol and outputs  $(IDS, ID, G_n, G_{n+1})$ . The details of the attack are presented in Algorithm 1. Any parameter related to the first run (resp. second) of protocol is indexed by 1 (resp. indexed by 2), e.g.  $IDS_1$  (resp.  $IDS_2$ ). Recall from the description of the protocol that  $(G_{n+1})_1 = (G_n)_2$  and  $(G_{n+2})_1 = (G_{n+1})_2$ .

#### B. Impersonation Attack

After disclosure attack, the adversary has retrieved IDS, ID,  $G_n$  and  $G_{n+1}$ . So it can impersonate any legitimate reader for this tag and vise versa.

#### V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OWNERSHIP TRANSFER PROTOCOL

Now we analyze the security of the Kulseng *et al.* ownership transfer protocol. Our attack against this protocol is based on the same observation that is mentioned in section IV.

We show how can an adversary retrieve the PIN in Kulseng *et al.* ownership transfer protocol, despite the claims of the protocol designers. The details of attack are presented in Algorithm 2.

In this attack, the attacker eavesdrops the full transactions between the new reader and the tag through the ownership transfer protocol as well the following successive run of Kulseng *et al.* mutual authentication protocol between the new owner and the tag. In addition, we assume that the reader knows the  $(IDS, ID, G_n, G_{n+1})$  triplet that the tag has shared with the old owner. Note that these assumptions are achievable in practice since a passive adversary can listen to all the messages being exchanged between the tag and the reader. Further, as mentioned earlier, the designers of the protocol allow the design of the LFSR to be public and hence also available to the adversary.

The attack is described in Algorithm 2. All parameters related to the ownership transfer protocol in this attack are indexed by OT. At the end of Algorithm 2, the attacker outputs the  $PIN_{old}$ -value and  $PIN_{new}$ -value.

#### VI. CONCLUSIONS

In this work, we have analyzed the security of recently proposed mutual authentication and ownership transfer protocols by Kulseng *et al.*. Our attacks completely break the protocols. We have shown the following two attacks in this work.

- An attack on the mutual authentication protocol which discloses any secret parameter which is shared between the tag and the reader, given the information exchanged in two sequential runs of the protocol. The attacker is a passive attacker and the success probability of the attack is "1".
- 2) An attack against the ownership transfer protocol which retrieves the *PIN* value, given the transferred information through the ownership transfer phase and next run of protocol by the new owner. Again, the attacker is a passive attacker and the success probability of the attack is "1".

We do not see any minor tweak of the protocols of Kulseng *et al.* which would allow them to withstand our attacks.

Algorithm 2: Retrieving the *PIN* of the tag in the Kulseng *et al.* ownership transfer protocol.

**input** : IDS, ID,  $G_n$ ,  $G_{n+1}$  which is shared between the tag and old owner(reader);

#### **Online Phase;**

Eavesdrop the transactions between the tag and the new owner through the ownership transfer phase and store the  $(K_n \oplus G_n \oplus PIN)_{OT}, (G'_n \oplus K'_n)_{OT}, (G'_{n+1} \oplus K''_n)_{OT})$ triplet;

Eavesdrop the first run of mutual authentication protocol by the new owner and store the

 $((IDS)_1, (ID \oplus G_n)_1, (G_{n+1} \oplus K_n)_1, (G_{n+2} \oplus K'_n)_1)$ triplet; // Recall that  $(G_n)_1 = (G'_n)_{OT}$  and  $(G_{n+1})_1 = (G'_{n+1})_{OT}$ ;

### Off line Phase;

 $F^{-1}((IDS)_2) \rightarrow (IDS)_1 \oplus (G_n)_1;$  $(IDS)_1 \oplus (G_n)_1 \oplus (IDS)_1 \rightarrow (G_n)_1;$  $// (G_n)_1$ disclosures;  $(ID \oplus (G_n))_1 \oplus (G_n)_1 \to ID;$ // ID is not changed when the ownership is transferred;  $G_n \to G'_n;$   $F(G_n) \to K_n;$ //  $G'_n$  disclosures;  $(G_{n+1} \oplus K_n)_1 \oplus K_n \to G_{n+1};$  $// (G_{n+1})_1$ disclosures; //  $G_{n+1}^{\prime}$  disclosures;  $G_{n+1} \to G'_{n+1};$  $\begin{array}{l} (G'_n \oplus K'_n)_{OT} \oplus G'_n \to (K'_n)_{OT}; \\ F^{-1}((K'_n)_{OT}) \to (K_n)_{OT}; \end{array}$  $F^{-1}((K_n)_{OT}) \to PIN_{old};$ // PINold disclosures;  $F(PIN_{old} \oplus G_n) \rightarrow PIN_{new};$ // PINnew disclosures;

return (*PIN*<sub>old</sub>, *PIN*<sub>new</sub>);

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