

AES Variants Secure Against Related-Key Differential and Boomerang Attacks*

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Abstract. In this paper, we summarize the recent related-key differential and boomerang attacks on AES by Biryukov et al. and present a framework for protection against these attacks. Then we study an alternative AES key schedule proposed by May et al. at ACISP 2002 as a possible candidate to protect against these related key attacks. We find that there exist equivalent keys for this key schedule and in response, we propose an improvement to overcome this weakness. We proceed to prove, using our framework, that our improved May et al.'s key schedule is secure against related-key differential and boomerang attacks. Since May et al.'s key schedule is not on-the-fly (which is a requirement for some hardware implementations), we propose an on-the-fly AES key schedule that is resistant against related-key differential and boomerang attacks.

Keywords: Related-key attacks, differential cryptanalysis, boomerang attacks, AES key schedule.

1 Introduction

In [4], Biryukov et al. launched the first known key-recovery attack on AES-256. It is a related-key differential attack that exploits a differential characteristic path of high probability, where we allow both the plaintext and key to have non-zero differentials. The attack has a time/data complexity of 2^{131} and requires 2^{65} memory in addition to 2^{35} related key pairs. Later in [3], Biryukov and Khovratovich used a shortened version of the related-key differential characteristic of [4] to construct a distinguisher for the related-key boomerang attack on AES-256.

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This allowed the authors to avoid the majority of the active S-boxes in the differential characteristic of [4], which resulted in a much improved attack with time and data complexity of $2^{99.5}$, requiring 2^{77} memory and just 4 related keys. A similar approach was used to derive a related-key boomerang attack on AES-192 with data complexity 2^{123} , time complexity 2^{176} , and memory complexity 2^{152} in addition to 4 related keys. This is also the first known key-recovery attack on full AES-192. However, we need adaptive ciphertext decryption for the attack of [3] whereas only chosen plaintext encryption is needed for the attack of [4].

We shall summarize Biryukov et al.’s attacks from [3, 4] and present a framework for protection against related-key differential attack. Basically, we want the number of active S-boxes in a differential characteristic of the key schedule and the number of active S-boxes in the differential characteristic of the main cipher, conditioned on subkey differences from the key schedule, to be large enough. In that case, we say the cipher has practical resistance against related-key differential and boomerang attacks.

The structure of the AES-256 cipher is still very secure as the best non related-key attacks can work up to at most 8 of the 14 rounds [11]. The more devastating related key attacks [3, 4] exploits the high linearity in the AES-256 key schedule. If we look only at a key schedule differential characteristic path, it is possible to find paths which involve only one active S-box. Thus a key point in securing AES against the latest related-key differential/boomerang attacks is to make the key schedule more nonlinear, so that any related-key differential path would involve more active S-boxes in the subkey differences⁴.

1.1 Our Contribution

We design two new AES variants to protect against the related-key attacks of [3, 4] by making the AES key schedule more nonlinear, while keeping the main AES cipher the same. Thus we retain the strong security of AES against non related-key attacks.

Construction 1: In Section 3, we consider the possibility of using an alternative AES key schedule by May et al. [13]. This key schedule was shown to have good statistical properties while achieving the strong property of round key irreversibility and resistance against previously known related-key attacks [1]. However, we show in Section 3.1 that there are pairs of equivalent keys that produce the same encryption functions. We propose an improvement of their key schedule in Section 3.2 that avoids this weakness. Based on our framework, we prove in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 that the improved May et al.’s key schedules for AES have practical resistance against related-key differential and boomerang attacks. This key schedule is also secure against related-cipher attacks and slide attacks, and has round key irreversibility.

⁴ Our observations also correspond with those made by Kim et al. in Section 2.6 of [12] where it is mentioned that if the key schedule of the cipher is complex enough and does not have “good” differential properties, then the number of keys required for the attack becomes infeasibly large.

Construction 2: However, our improved May et al.’s design uses three AES rounds to derive a subkey. This is too expensive for hardware implementation, which requires on-the-fly key schedule. In Section 4, we propose an on-the-fly key schedule design for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256, where the time needed to derive each round key is no more than the computation of 1.25 (amortized) AES rounds. Furthermore, we prove that this new key schedule has practical resistance against related-key differential and boomerang attacks. This key schedule is also secure against related-cipher attacks and slide attacks, and has partial round key irreversibility.

Comparison with obvious counter-measures: There are some intuitive ways to protect against the related-key attacks of [3, 4]. One way is to increase the number of rounds of AES (e.g. doubling the number of rounds, so that the number of active S-boxes in Biryukov et al.’s differential path would become too numerous for their attack to be feasible). The other way is to hash the secret key before passing it through the AES key schedule (so that it is hard for an adversary to control the key differences into the AES key schedule). So why do we need to design a separate AES key schedule instead of using these obvious fixes? The advantages of our constructions are:

- (1) We use a systematic approach to prove protection against the related-key attacks of [3, 4] by bounding the related-key differential probability for any characteristic path, while the obvious counter measures are more intuitive.
- (2) In the two obvious counter-measures mentioned above (increasing the number of rounds and hashing the key), the AES key schedule is used. This allows the adversary to deduce all the other round keys from 1 round key (respectively 2 round keys) by working through the key schedule backwards for AES-128 (respectively AES-256). Our improved May et. al.’s key schedule of Section 3 provides round key irreversibility, which forces an adversary to attack every round key. Our on-the-fly key schedule of Section 4 provides partial round key irreversibility.
- (3) The obvious counter-measure of increasing the number of rounds (e.g. doubling the number of rounds) will slow down encryption speed while the other counter-measure of hashing the secret key does not allow it to be on-the-fly in hardware (because of the extra hashing per key set-up). In comparison, our AES key schedule of Section 4 is on-the-fly and has comparable encryption speed as AES.

2 Framework for Protection Against Related Key Differential and Boomerang Attacks

2.1 Some Definitions and Notation

We first define some notation and concepts which form the basis of differential attacks.

Given a block cipher, the plaintext, secret key and ciphertext are denoted by P , K and C respectively. The encryption and decryption processes are denoted

by $C = E_K(P)$ and $P = E_K^{-1}(C)$ respectively. We denote the input of the first round by P_0 , and the output of the i^{th} round by P_i , $i = 1, \dots, NR$, where NR is the number of rounds. We see that the input of round i is P_{i-1} , and that $P_0 = P$ and $P_{NR} = C$. Similarly, we write K_i , $i = 0, \dots, m$, for the $m + 1$ subkeys generated by the key schedule.

To launch a differential attack, one attempts to find a pair of differences in the plaintext and ciphertext that occur with high probability. This usually involves finding a sequence of round inputs and outputs that occur with high probability. We write ΔP and ΔC to denote a plaintext and ciphertext difference respectively, and ΔP_i to denote the difference in the round output of round i . A *differential characteristic* refers to a sequence of input differences to the rounds

$$(\Delta P_0 \longrightarrow \Delta P_1 \longrightarrow \dots \longrightarrow \Delta P_{NR})$$

We abbreviate the above expression to $(\Delta P \xrightarrow{dc} \Delta C)$.

Similarly, to launch a related-key differential attack, one attempts to find a set of differences for (P, K, C) that hold with high probability. We shall see that this can be done by finding a sequence of differences in the key and subkeys generated by the key schedule, and the plaintext and round outputs generated by the main cipher, such that these differences occur with high probability.

We first consider a differential characteristic in the key schedule alone. We denote a difference in the key by ΔK , and differences in the subkeys ΔK_i , $i = 0, \dots, m$. We note that the subkeys are not necessarily derived sequentially from each other, so the concept of a differential characteristic ‘path’ may not exist in this sense. We therefore write $(\Delta K \xrightarrow{dc} \Delta K_0, \dots, \Delta K_m)$ for a differential characteristic in the key schedule.

Now we consider a differential characteristic in the key schedule and the main cipher. We write this as

$$(\Delta K \xrightarrow{dc} \Delta K_0, \dots, \Delta K_m, \Delta P_0 \longrightarrow \dots \longrightarrow \Delta P_{NR})$$

which we abbreviate to $(\Delta P, \Delta K \xrightarrow{dc} \Delta C)$. We also define:

$$p_k = \text{Prob}(\Delta K \xrightarrow{dc} \Delta K_0, \dots, \Delta K_m),$$

$$p_{c|k} = \text{Prob}(\Delta P \xrightarrow{dc} \Delta C | \Delta K \xrightarrow{dc} \Delta K_0, \dots, \Delta K_m).$$

It is easy to see that $\text{Prob}(\Delta P, \Delta K \xrightarrow{dc} \Delta C) = p_k \times p_{c|k}$ by Bayes’ Theorem.

2.2 Related-Key Differential Attack of [4]

In [4], Biryukov et al. highlighted two main observations of AES-256: slow diffusion in the key schedule reversal and the presence of local collisions due to the matching differential properties between the key schedule and the main cipher. By exploiting these weaknesses, they found a related-key key-recovery attack on full-round AES-256 with total complexity of 2^{131} time and 2^{65} memory, and an

average of 2^{35} related keys. In this section, we give a gist of the attack. The interested reader should refer to [4] for the details.

All 128-bit state blocks of AES are written as a 4×4 array of bytes. The byte in the i -th row and j -th column is denoted by $M[i, j]$. We write the main cipher as follows:

- Let $B_0 = P$.
- For rounds $r = 1, \dots, 13$,
 - $A_r = \text{SubBytes}(B_{r-1} \oplus K_{r-1})$
 - $B_r = \text{MixColumns}(\text{ShiftRows}(A_r))$
- Let $A_{14} = \text{ShiftRows}(\text{SubBytes}(B_{13} \oplus K_{13}))$ for round 14
- Let $A_{14} \oplus K_{14} = C$.

The authors placed the 2-round characteristic called a local collision in rounds 12 and 13, i.e. $r = 12$ and thus, $\Delta B_{12} = \Delta A_{14} = 0$. Working backwards from there, the aim then is to construct a differential characteristic of high probability. Biryukov et al. managed to find such a characteristic with specified differences such that there are 5 active S-boxes in the key schedule and 15 active S-boxes in the main cipher from ΔA_2 onwards. Therefore, the attack works for 1 out of 2^{35} key pairs and the differential characteristic probability in the main cipher is 2^{-93} .

After a differential characteristic of high probability, $(\Delta P, \Delta K \xrightarrow{dc} \Delta C)$, has been identified, the key-recovery attack works as follows. For each of the 2^{35} related-key pairs,

- (1) Repeat 2^{31} times:
 - (a) Fix P and P' such that $P' = P \oplus (v_1, v_1, v_1, v_1)$ where v_1 is a particular column difference determined in the path.
 - (b) Construct two structures, each with 2^{64} plaintexts, by varying the 8 bytes of $P[i, j]$ and those of $P'[i, j]$, where $i + j$ is even.
 - (c) Encrypt the first structure with K and the second with $K \oplus \Delta K$.
 - (d) Find a C from the first structure and a C' from the second structure such that $C \oplus C' = \Delta C$. Save this pair.
- (2) For each candidate pair, derive 2^{16} variants for the ten key bytes: $K_0[i, k]$ ($i + j$ even) and $K_1[0, 0]$, $K_1[0, 2]$.
- (3) Pick the key candidate with the maximal number of votes.

Note that with a good related-key pair that satisfies the specified key schedule characteristic, $(\Delta K \xrightarrow{dc} \Delta K_0, \dots, \Delta K_{14})$, there will be, on average, 4 good plaintext-ciphertext pairs satisfying the main cipher differential characteristic $(\Delta P \xrightarrow{dc} \Delta C | \Delta K \xrightarrow{dc} \Delta K_0, \dots, \Delta K_{14})$ in addition to 2^{31} wrong pairs. This is because for a fixed key, each structure will contain 2^{64} pairs with the right differences after the S-boxes of the 2^{nd} round. The remaining active S-boxes in rounds 3-14 satisfy the characteristic with probability 2^{-93} . Therefore, each structure produces a pair of ciphertexts with the right differences with probability $2^{64-93} = 2^{-29}$. Consequently, 2^{31} structures produces on average $2^{31-29} = 4$ right pairs and $2^{31+128-128} = 2^{31}$ wrong pairs. All 4 right pairs will vote for

the correct 80-bit key while the 2^{31} wrong pairs will suggest 2^{47} random keys. Each wrong key is thus expected to occur 2^{-33} times only, which is much less than 4. On the other hand, with a wrong related-key pair that fails to satisfy the required key schedule characteristic, there will also be about 2^{31} wrong plaintext-ciphertext pairs, which will give rise to approximately 2^{47} random key suggestions and hence, each wrong key also only appears at most once on average. Therefore, no wrong key guesses will survive the last step, and the correct 80 key bits will be found as a result.

Protection Against Related-Key Differential Attack: The attacker must run through p_k^{-1} key pairs on average in order to find one that satisfies the specified differential characteristic in the key schedule. For each key pair, the differential attack has complexity $O(p_{c|k}^{-1})$ and needs the same number of chosen plaintexts, so in total the complexity is $O((p_{c|k}p_k)^{-1})$. In the attack of [4], we have $p_k = 2^{-35}$, $p_{c|k} = 2^{-93}$, and with some computational overheads get an attack complexity of 2^{131} .

We can defend against this attack by having $p_k \times p_{c|k} < 2^{-NK}$ where NK is the key size of the cipher, for any related-key differential characteristic, i.e. no good distinguisher can be found that can be exploited in a related-key differential attack. The attack also cannot be applied if $p_{c|k} < 2^{-NB}$, where NB is the block size of the cipher, as there would be insufficient plaintexts to launch the attack.

2.3 Related-Key Boomerang Attack of [3]

The main idea behind the boomerang attack [2, 17] is to use two short differential characteristics of high probabilities instead of one long differential characteristic of low probability. We assume that a block cipher $E : \{0, 1\}^{NB} \times \{0, 1\}^{NK} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{NB}$ can be described as a composition of two sub-ciphers, i.e. $E = E_1 \circ E_0$. Here, NB and NK denote the block size and key size of the cipher respectively. Suppose we have a related-key differential characteristic $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ of E_0 (excluding a couple of rounds at the beginning of the cipher) under a key difference ΔK_0 with probability p and another related-key differential characteristic $\gamma \rightarrow \delta$ for E_1 under key difference ΔK_1 with probability q . Here, $p = p_k \times p_{c|k}$ where p_k is the probability that the differential characteristic path in the key schedule corresponding to E_0 will be satisfied while $p_{c|k}$ is the probability that the differential characteristic path in the main cipher, $\alpha \rightarrow \beta$ in E_0 , will be satisfied given that the key differential characteristic is satisfied. Likewise, $q = q_k \times q_{c|k}$ with similar definitions pertaining to E_1 . The differential characteristic trails of E_0 and E_1 are called *upper* and *lower* trails respectively.

The related-key boomerang process involves four different unknown but related keys. The relation between the keys can be an arbitrary bijective function R chosen in advance by the attacker. A plaintext pair results in a *quartet* with probability p^2q^2 whereas for a random permutation, the probability of obtaining a good quartet is 2^{-NB} .

More concretely, for AES-256, the related-key boomerang attack [3] exploits local collisions (as explained in Section 2.2) and ladder switching to gain a middle round for free. The upper trail for AES-256 covers rounds 1-8 and the lower trail covers rounds 8-14. There are four related keys: K^a , K^b , K^c and K^d . The switching state is the state A_9 and a special key state K_S , which is the concatenation of K_7 and K_8 . The plaintext difference is specified in 9 bytes and the probability of the boomerang quartet after the first round is 2^{-96} .

The attack works as follows. Do the following steps $2^{25.5}$ times:

- (1) Prepare a structure of 2^{72} plaintexts where the following 56 bits are constant: $P[0, 1]$, $P[0, 2]$, $P[0, 3]$, $P[2, 1]$, $P[2, 3]$, $P[3, 1]$, and $P[3, 2]$. The remaining bits are varied over all possibilities.
- (2) Encrypt it on keys K^a and K^b and keep the resulting sets S_a and S_b in memory.
- (3) XOR ΔC to all the ciphertexts in S_a and decrypt the resulting ciphertexts with K^c . Denote the new set of plaintexts by S_c .
- (4) Repeat the previous step for the set S_b and the key K^d . Denote the set of plaintexts by S_d .
- (5) Compose from S_c and S_d all the possible pairs of plaintexts that are equal in 56 bits: $P[0, 1]$, $P[0, 2]$, $P[0, 3]$, $P[2, 1]$, $P[2, 3]$, $P[3, 1]$, and $P[3, 2]$.
- (6) For every remaining pair, check if the difference in $P[i, 0]$, $i > 1$ is equal on both sides of the boomerang quartet (16-bit filter).
- (7) Filter out the quartets whose difference cannot be produced by active S-boxes in the first round and active S-boxes in the key schedule (6-bit filter).
- (8) Gradually recover key values and differences, simultaneously filtering out the wrong quartets.

We can obtain 2^{144} ordered pairs for each structure. Of these pairs, 2^{72} will pass the first round. Therefore, we can expect one right quartet per $2^{96-72} = 2^{24}$ structures and three right quartets out of $2^{25.5}$ structures. On the other hand, there will be approximately $2^{91.5}$ noisy quartets in total. These candidate quartets will then be used to vote for the right key values. The probability that three wrong quartets propose the same candidate key values does not exceed 2^{-80} . The attack has $2^{99.5}$ data and time complexity and requires $2^{77.5}$ memory for the filtering step.

Protection Against Related-Key Boomerang Attack: The attacker must run through $(p_k q_k)^{-2}$ quartets of related keys on average in order to find one that satisfies the specified differential characteristic in the key schedule. For each quartet, the attack has complexity $O((p_{c|k} q_{c|k})^{-2})$, so in total the complexity is $O(1/(p_{c|k} p_k))$. In the attack of [3], we have $(p_k q_k)^2 = 1$, $(p_{c|k} q_{c|k})^2 = 2^{-96}$, and with some computational overheads get an attack complexity of $2^{99.5}$.

We can defend against this attack by having $(p_k q_k)^2 (p_{c|k} q_{c|k})^2 < 2^{-NK}$ where NK is the key size of the cipher, for all decompositions of the cipher into two smaller sub-ciphers and for all differential characteristics for these sub-ciphers. This would mean that there do not exist any boomerang quartets of

high probability that can be exploited. The attack also cannot be applied if $(p_{c|k}q_{c|k})^{-2} < 2^{-NB}$, where NB is the block size of the cipher, as there would be insufficient plaintexts to launch the attack.

3 Security of Improved May et al.'s AES Key Schedule Against Related-key Attack

To protect AES against related-key differential and boomerang attacks, one strategy is to use a strengthened key schedule with good differential properties. One possible candidate is an alternative key schedule for AES proposed by May et al. in [13] in 2002. At that time, there was already a 9-round related-key square attack [11] on AES-256 which exploited the slow diffusion of relatively few non-linear elements in the key schedule. May et al. wanted to design an efficient key schedule with more nonlinear components and better diffusion to defend against such attacks.

Their key schedule for AES-256 is shown below. Here, $NR=14$ is the number of rounds; a, b are 128-bit values derived from the Master Key $MK = MK_0|MK_1|\dots|MK_{32}$, $a = a_0|a_1|\dots|a_{15}$ (the MK_i and a_i are 8-bit values, and $|$ represents concatenation), r is the round number and K_r is the 128-bit round subkey for Round q . Each round subkey is the 128-bit output after the execution of three rounds of the cipher algorithm, using the master key (with the addition of different round constants) as both data and key input.

```

for  $r = 0$  to  $NR$ 
  for  $j = 0$  to 15
     $a_j = MK_j \oplus S[r * 16 + j] \oplus S[MK_{j+16}]$ 
     $b_j = MK_{j+16} \oplus S[r * 16 + j] \oplus S[MK_j]$ 
  for  $i = 0$  to 2
    SubBytes( $a$ )
    ShiftRows( $a$ )
    MixColumns( $a$ )
    AddRoundKey( $a, b$ )
   $K_r = a$ 

```

May et al.'s Key Schedule for AES-256

In [13], the authors conducted statistical tests to show that for their proposal, there is no bit leakage between round subkeys. Furthermore, each round key satisfies both the frequency and Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) tests, indicating good pseudorandomness properties such as bit confusion and diffusion. The authors concluded that previously published attacks that exploit the key schedule such as the standard related-key attacks [1] will not work on their proposed key schedule.

Moreover, the key schedule achieves the property of round key irreversibility, by which we mean that given any subset of the round keys, it is hard to derive the remaining round keys. This forces an adversary to attack all the round keys. This is in contrast to the AES key schedule, which is reversible - given any two round keys, one can derive all the other round keys. The obvious countermeasures for preventing related-key attacks on AES mentioned in the introduction, namely,

increasing the number of rounds and hashing the key before expanding it, also produce key schedules which are also reversible.

3.1 Equivalent Keys in May et al.'s Key Schedule

Despite the good cryptographic properties of May et al.'s key schedule as mentioned in the previous section, we shall show that their key schedule has equivalent keys as shown in the following proposition.

Proposition 1 *In May et al.'s key schedule for AES-256, there are 2^{271} equivalent key pairs $\{(MK, MK') : MK \neq MK'\}$ such that $AES_{MK}(\cdot) = AES_{MK'}(\cdot)$, i.e. they produce the same encryption output.*

Proof. Consider the 4-byte tuple $(MK_i, MK'_i, MK_{i+16}, MK'_{i+16})$ for each index i . We look for those that satisfy the equations:

$$MK_i \oplus MK'_i = S[MK_{i+16}] \oplus S[MK'_{i+16}], \quad S[MK_i] \oplus S[MK'_i] = MK_{i+16} \oplus MK'_{i+16}. \quad (1)$$

By a computer simulation, there are 65644 tuples $(MK_i, MK'_i, MK_{i+16}, MK'_{i+16})$ that satisfy equation (1). In that case,

$$\Delta a_i = \Delta MK_i \oplus \Delta S[MK_{i+16}] = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \Delta b_i = \Delta MK_{i+16} \oplus \Delta S[MK_i] = 0$$

Thus for $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots, 15$, if we let $(MK_i, MK'_i, MK_{i+16}, MK'_{i+16})$ satisfy equation (1) for $s \geq 1$ of the indices i and let $(MK_i, MK_{i+16}) = (MK'_i, MK'_{i+16})$ for the rest of the $16 - s$ indices, we will have $\Delta a = 0 = \Delta b$. From the definition of May et al.'s key schedule, this implies the subkeys derived from MK and MK' are the same and they will produce the same encryption output. The number of such equivalent key pairs are given by:

$$\sum_{s=1}^{16} \binom{16}{s} \times 65644^s \times (256^2)^{16-s} \approx 2^{272}.$$

When (MK, MK') is an equivalent key pair, (MK', MK) is also an equivalent key pair. Thus we divide the total number of equivalent key pairs by 2 to get 2^{271} .

□

Example 1. As an example, we list the first and last few of the 65644 solutions $(MK_i, MK'_i, MK_{i+16}, MK'_{i+16})$ to equation (1):

$(00, 02, aa, be), (00, 02, be, aa), (00, 03, cc, d4), (00, 03, d4, cc), \dots, (ff, fd, 15, 57), (ff, fd, 57, 15)$.

By using the idea in the proof of Proposition 1, we form a weak key pair by letting MK_i, MK'_i take the same values in byte position $i = 2, 18, 10, 26, 16, 32$ and satisfy equation (1) for the other byte positions:

Byte Position	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
MK	00	17	00	ff	ff	00	00	ff	ff	68	ff	ff	ff	00	ff	2b	aa	9e	cc	15	57	aa	cc	15	15	8b	57	15	57	d4	57	e6
MK'	02	17	03	fd	fd	02	03	fd	fd	68	fd	fd	fd	03	fd	2b	be	9e	d4	57	15	be	d4	57	57	8b	15	57	15	cc	15	e6

3.2 An Improved May et al.'s Key Schedule

From Section 3.1, we have seen that the three AES rounds used to generate each round key in May et al.'s key schedule help to ensure that the round keys have good statistical properties and attain round key irreversibility. The problem is the initialization of a and b which allows an adversary to force a, b to have zero differential by choosing an appropriate pair of related secret keys.

Below, we propose an improved version of the May et al.'s key schedule. Basically, we simplify the initialization of a, b so that each byte of a and b only depends on one instead of two bytes of the secret key. This prevents an adversary from using the technique in Proposition 1 to force Δa and Δb to be zero. We also make use of key-length-dependent counters $keylen$ to defend against the related-cipher attack [18], which was first applied to the alternative AES key schedule proposed by May et al. In the algorithm shown, $keylen - 1$ refers to the key length of the cipher (minus 1) encoded as a byte. A more detailed explanation of the related-cipher attack can be found in Appendix B.

This key schedule, as with the original key schedule by May et al., has the property of round key irreversibility.

Next, we shall show in the following section that the improved May et al.'s key schedule can protect AES against related-key differential and boomerang attacks.

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for  $r = 0$  to  $NR$ 
  for  $j = 0$  to 15
     $a_j = S[MK_j] \oplus S[r * 16 + j] \oplus (keylen - 1)$ 
     $b_j = S[MK_{j+16}] \oplus S[r * 16 + j] \oplus (keylen - 1)$ 
  for  $i = 0$  to 2
    SubBytes( $a$ )
    ShiftRows( $a$ )
    MixColumns( $a$ )
    AddRoundKey( $a, b$ )
   $K_r = a$ 

```

Improved May et al.'s Key Schedule AES-256

3.3 Improved May et al.'s Key Schedule is Secure Against Related-Key Differential Attack

Our aim in this section is to study the security of our improved May et al.'s key schedule against the related-key differential attack which was recently used by Biryukov et al. [4, 3, 5] to attack full-round AES-256.

We have the following technical lemma which will be used to prove the main results of this section later on.

Lemma 1. *For any round subkey generation using the key schedule proposal described above, if we have a pair of master keys with nonzero difference, then*

the differential characteristic path either has at least four active S-boxes, or it has at least three active S-boxes and an additional four active S-boxes resulting from the generation of a and b .

The proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix C of this paper. Based on the above result, we may deduce the following corollary.

Corollary 1. *If we have a pair of master keys with nonzero difference, then our improved May et al.'s key schedule for AES-256 has at least 43 active S-boxes involved in the generation of 13 subkeys.*

Proof. By Lemma 1, the differential characteristic path for each subkey generation has at least three active S-boxes, and if there exists a subkey whose differential characteristic path produces only three active S-boxes occurs, then there will be four additional S-boxes involved in generating a and b . This would give at least $13 \times 3 + 4 = 43$ S-boxes in total. On the other hand, if the differential characteristic path for each subkeys produces at least four active S-boxes, there are at least $13 \times 4 > 43$ S-boxes in total. \square

In the attacks on AES, we always consider an $(NR-2)$ -round attack involving $NR - 1$ subkeys, in keeping with [4] where the attack is based on an $(NR - 2)$ -round related-key differential characteristic.

Theorem 1. *AES-256 using our improved May et al.'s key schedule is resistant to related-key differential attack.*

Proof. We apply Corollary 1 for AES-256 assuming an $NR - 2$ round attack, i.e. a 12-round attack which involves 13 subkeys. Since each active S-box has probability at most 2^{-6} , this gives a probability of at most $p_k \times p_{c|k} = (2^{-6})^{43} \times p_{c|k} = 2^{-258} \times p_{c|k} < 2^{-256}$. Therefore, we may conclude that AES-256 with the strengthened key schedule is indeed resistant to related-key differential attacks. \square

May et al. also proposed alternative key schedules for AES-128 and AES-192. The key schedules proposed by May et al. in [13] for AES-128 and AES-192 are largely the same as that for AES-256, except that a and b are generated in slightly different ways: for $r = 0$ to NR , $j = 0$ to 15.

- (1) For AES-128: $a_j = b_j = MK_j \oplus S[r * 16 + j]$.
- (2) For AES-192: $a_j = MK_j \oplus S[r * 16 + j] \oplus S[MK_{j+8}]$; $b_j = MK_{j+8} \oplus S[r * 16 + j] \oplus S[MK_j]$.

It is easy to see that equivalent keys similar to those in Proposition 1 exist for May et al.'s key schedule for AES-192. Thus we propose a similar improvement to May et al.'s key schedule for AES-192 below. As before, we also tweaked the key schedules a bit by introducing key-length-dependent counters *keylen* for protection against the related-cipher attack [18].

- (1) Improvement for AES-128: $a_j, b_j = MK_j \oplus S[r * 16 + j] \oplus (\text{keylen} - 1)$.

- (2) Improvement for AES-192: $a_j = MK_j \oplus S[r * 16 + j] \oplus (keylen - 1); b_j = MK_{j+8} \oplus S[r * 16 + j] \oplus (keylen - 1)$.

Based on the above description of the schedules for AES-128 and AES-192, it is easy to deduce the following corollary from the proof of Lemma 1.

Corollary 2. *If we have a pair of master keys with nonzero difference in our proposed improvement of the key schedule of [13] for AES-128 and AES-192, then there are at least 3 active S-boxes involved in the generation of each subkey.*

Corollary 2 allows us to prove Theorem 2.

Theorem 2. *AES-128 and AES-192 using the key schedule of [13] for AES-128 and our improvement for AES-192 are also resistant to related-key differential attack.*

Proof. In our improved key schedule for AES-128 and AES-192, we see that if a pair of master keys has non-zero difference, then one of Δa or Δb is non-zero. Thus we can use the fact that every differential characteristic path of a round subkey generation has at least 3 active S-boxes (excluding the generation of a and b) from the proof of Lemma 1.

For AES-128, an 8-round attack involves 9 subkeys. Assuming that each active S-box has probability 2^{-6} , this gives a probability of at least $p_k \times p_{c|k} = (2^{-6})^{(9 \times 3)} \times p_{c|k} = 2^{-162} \times p_{c|k} < 2^{-128}$.

Similarly for AES-192, a 10-round attack involves 11 subkeys. The differential characteristic probability is at least $p_k \times p_{c|k} = (2^{-6})^{(11 \times 3)} \times p_{c|k} = 2^{-198} \times p_{c|k} < 2^{-192}$.

Therefore, AES-128 and AES-192 with the strengthened key schedule are resistant to differential related-key attacks. \square

Remark 1. Our proofs show that the original May et al.'s key schedule is also resistant against related-key differential attack. This is because if a pair of keys is an equivalent weak key pair, then they produce the same roundkeys and we have normal differential attack instead of related-key differential attack. If they are not an equivalent key pair, then Δa or Δb is non-zero and we can apply⁵ Lemma 1 to prove Theorem 1 for May et al.'s key schedule.

3.4 Improved May et al.'s Key Schedule is Secure Against Related-Key Boomerang Attack

From Section 2.3, we have seen that given a decomposition of a cipher, including its key schedule, into two smaller sub-ciphers E_0 and E_1 , and given related-key differential characteristics for E_0 and E_1 , if we let the probabilities of their key schedule differential characteristics be p_k and q_k respectively, the probability of getting a boomerang quartet is less than $(p_k q_k)^2$.

⁵ We can apply Lemma 1 because both the improved and original May et al.'s key schedule uses the same 3-round AES structure to generate each roundkey.

We consider an arbitrary decomposition of AES, with our improved key schedule, into two smaller sub-ciphers. The generation of the subkeys by the key schedule will be split between the two sub-ciphers. Since the subkeys are independently generated, $p_k q_k$ is simply the product of the probabilities that the differential characteristics hold for the generation of each subkey.

We note that it may be possible to bypass one subkey for the round at which the cipher is split into two using a boomerang switch. Furthermore, we assume that two rounds at the start can be ignored by not specifying the differences in the differential trail (as in [3], where one round at the start is ignored). Hence, for AES-128, we consider the generation of 7 subkeys; for AES-192, 9; and for AES-256, 11.

By Lemma 1 and Corollary 2, we see that there are at least 3 active S-boxes involved in the generation of each subkey for all three versions of AES. For t subkeys, the product of the probabilities that the differential characteristics hold for each subkey is $(2^{-6})^{3t}$. Since $p_k q_k \leq 2^{-18t}$, $(p_k q_k)^2 < 2^{-NK}$ holds if $(2^{-18t})^2 < 2^{-NK}$.

If $t \geq 4$, we have $(p_k q_k)^2 < 2^{-128}$; if $t \geq 6$, we have $(p_k q_k)^2 < 2^{-192}$; and if $t \geq 8$, we have $(p_k q_k)^2 < 2^{-256}$. For AES-128, $t = 7$; for AES-192, $t = 9$; and for AES-256, $t = 11$. Hence, for AES with the strengthened key schedule, for any decomposition into two sub-ciphers, there does not exist a boomerang quartet of high probability which can be exploited. Therefore, we have proved that AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 using the strengthened key schedule of [13] are resistant to related-key boomerang attack.

Remark 2. By a reasoning similar to Remark 1, the original May et al.'s key schedule is also resistant against related-key boomerang attack.

4 A New On-the-fly Key Schedule for AES Secure Against Related-Key Differential and Boomerang Attacks

We present here a new key schedule for AES that offers several advantages over both the original key schedule (security against related-key differential and boomerang attacks) and that proposed by May et al. [13] (better efficiency).

The key schedule shown below generates fifteen 128-bit round keys $K_i, 0 \leq i \leq NR = 14$ from a 256-bit master key or thirteen 128-bit round keys $K_i, 0 \leq i \leq NR = 12$ from a 192-bit master key. Round key K_i is used in the i^{th} round of encryption. For a 256-bit master key, one subkey SK_0 is not converted into a usable round key, and for a 192-bit master key, three subkeys $SK_{0..2}$ are not converted into usable round keys.

Here, C_j denote 128-bit strings which are initialized by equating them to integers j encoded as 128-bit strings. $keylen - 1$ refers to the key length of the cipher (minus 1) also encoded as a 128-bit string. $1R_AES(x)$ refers to one round of unkeyed AES with the plaintext x . The *AddRoundKey* operation in the AES round can be omitted or provided with a null key.

```

if AES-192
    f = 1
if AES-256
    f = 2

for j = 0 to 15
    K1j = MKj
    K2j = MKj+(8*f)

for j = 0 to 15
    Cj = j
C0 = C0 ⊕ K1 ⊕ (keylen - 1)
C4 = C4 ⊕ K2
C8 = C8 ⊕ K1
C12 = C12 ⊕ K2

SK-1 = K1, I-1 = 0
for i = 0 to 15
    Ii = 1R.AES(Ii-1 ⊕ Ci)
    SKi = Ii ⊕ SKi-1
    if AES-192
        Ki-3 = SKi
    if AES-256
        Ki-1 = SKi

```

New key schedule proposal for 192-bit and 256-bit keys

These proposed key schedules for AES-192 and AES-256 are partially irreversible, by which we mean that, given two round keys, it is hard to derive the rest of the round keys. However, given certain combinations of three or more round keys, it may be possible to derive the rest of the round keys. For example, if we have SK_i, SK_{i+1} for $i = 1$ or 2 , as well as SK_4 , then we can obtain $K1$ from SK_i, SK_{i+1} , and then we either have, or can compute SK_3 , and then use SK_4 to get $K2$. In this sense, this proposed key schedule is weaker than the original and improved key schedules by May et al. Nonetheless, partial irreversibility is a desirable property which is lacking in the original AES-192 and AES-256 key schedules.

The following key schedule shown generates eleven 128-bit round keys $K_i, 0 \leq i \leq NR = 10$ from a 128-bit master key. One subkey SK_0 is not converted into a usable round key.

```

for j = 0 to 11
    Cj = j
C0 = C0 ⊕ MK ⊕ (keylen - 1)
C4 = C4 ⊕ MK
C8 = C8 ⊕ MK

SK-1 = MK, I-1 = 0
for i = 0 to 11
    Ii = 1R.AES(Ii-1 ⊕ Ci)
    SKi = Ii ⊕ SKi-1
    Ki-1 = SKi

```

New key schedule proposal for 128-bit keys

Our proposed key schedule for AES-128 is also partially irreversible in that at least two round keys are needed to derive the rest of the round keys, and only certain combinations of keys can work. In contrast, the original AES-128 key schedule requires only one round key to derive all the other round keys.

Theorem 3. *AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 with the key schedules proposed in this section are resistant against related-key differential and boomerang attacks.*

Proof. In this proof, we will make use of the following result by Daemen and Rijmen in their specification for Rijndael [8, page 33]:

- The minimum number of active S-boxes in any 4-round differential is 25, independent of the value of the round keys. The maximum differential probability of any differential path through 4 rounds is 2^{-150} .

Note that the above results hold only for 4 AES rounds when the input differential is non-zero and encryption is under a fixed key, i.e. the subkey differentials are zero.

In all three key schedules, the internal state I_i is essentially the AES cipher, except that it is keyed by MK or a part of MK every 4 rounds. The round outputs of the key schedule internal state are then processed to form the round keys K_i of the main cipher. For an attacker to control the round key differences ΔK_i to launch a related-key attack, he would need to control the output differential ΔI_i of the key schedule internal state. Thus our job is to prove that the differential probability of this internal state is low enough to prevent related-key differential and boomerang attacks.

Since we are considering related key differential attack, we assume $\Delta MK \neq 0$.

Key schedule for AES-128: $\Delta MK \neq 0$ implies the input differential to the first four AES rounds of the internal state is non-zero. Therefore we can bound the differential characteristic probability of the key schedule internal state I_i by 2^{-150} .

Key schedule for AES-192, AES-256: $\Delta MK \neq 0$ implies $\Delta(K1, K2) \neq 0$. Thus, we consider the three cases $\Delta K1 \neq 0, \Delta K2 = 0$; $\Delta K1 = 0, \Delta K2 \neq 0$ and $\Delta K1 \neq 0, \Delta K2 \neq 0$.

When $\Delta K1 \neq 0, \Delta K2 = 0$, the first round corresponding to internal state I_0 will have a non-zero differential input $\Delta K1$. Rounds 2 to 8 corresponding to I_1 to I_7 will have zero input key differences. Thus the differential characteristic probability of these eight rounds, and consequently, of the entire key schedule internal state I_i is at most $(2^{-150})^2 = 2^{-300}$.

When $\Delta K1 = 0, \Delta K2 \neq 0$, the first four rounds corresponding to I_0 to I_3 will have zero differential characteristic probability since there is a zero input difference and no input key differences for all four rounds. The fifth round corresponding to I_4 will have a non-zero differential input $\Delta K2$. Following this, rounds 6 to 12 corresponding to internal state I_5 to I_{11} will have zero input key differences. Thus the differential characteristic probability of these eight rounds, and consequently, of the entire key schedule internal state I_i is at most $(2^{-150})^2 = 2^{-300}$.

When $\Delta K1 \neq 0, \Delta K2 \neq 0$, the first round corresponding to internal state I_0 will have a non-zero differential input $\Delta K1$ while rounds 2 to 4 corresponding to I_1 to I_3 will have zero input key differences. This gives a differential characteristic

probability of at most 2^{-150} for the first four rounds. The differential output after these four rounds is ΔI_3 . If $\Delta I_3 \oplus \Delta K2 \neq 0$, then we have a non-zero differential input to the next four AES rounds corresponding to I_4 to I_7 . Since rounds 6 to 8 corresponding to internal states I_5 to I_8 have zero key differences, this gives a differential characteristic probability of at most 2^{-150} for rounds 5 to 8. If $\Delta I_3 \oplus \Delta K2 = 0$, then there is no differential characteristic probability associated with rounds 5 to 8. But $\Delta K1$ will be a non-zero differential input to the next four AES rounds while rounds 10 to 12 corresponding to internal states I_8 to I_{11} have zero input key differences. This gives a differential characteristic probability of at most 2^{-150} for rounds 9 to 12. In both cases, the differential characteristic probability of the key schedule internal state I_i is at most $(2^{-150})^2 = 2^{-300}$.

For protection against related-key boomerang attack, it is not hard to see from the above proof that when we split the cipher into two sub-ciphers E_0, E_1 , the corresponding internal state I_i of the key schedule for one of the sub-cipher will contain 4 unkeyed AES rounds with a non-zero input differential. This means one of p_k or q_k is bounded by 2^{-150} and that $(p_k q_k)^2 \leq 2^{-300}$. Thus our cipher is secure against related-key boomerang attack. □

For protection against other attacks on the key schedule, the use of round counters defeats slide attacks [6, 7]. As in the case for the improved May et al.'s key schedule, the use of key-length-dependant counters *keylen* defeats the related-cipher attack [18].

The key schedule offers better efficiency than the proposal by May et al. which invokes three AES rounds and a few S-box lookups per round key. Our key schedule proposal invokes at most an (amortized) 1.25 AES rounds per round key, making it more suitable for hardware implementation. If two AES round functions are implemented in parallel, it is three times as fast as the May et al. key schedule to encrypt; or if a single AES round function is implemented, it is twice as fast.

4.1 Hardware Implementation

Usually hardware implementations of encryption algorithms are optimized for high throughput, i.e. first for speed and then for area. If we look on these typically round-based architectures, our proposed new AES key schedule introduces only minor timing overheads compared to the original AES key schedule. Then for the encryption of one block with a 128-bit key 11 clock cycles are required (compared to 10 clock cycles for standard AES) and for 192-bit and 256-bit keys we need 15 clock cycles compared to 12 and 14 clock cycles, respectively. Note that for AES-256 -which suffers most from recent related key attacks and needs to be fixed most urgently- this is an overhead of only 7%.

At the same time, the similarity of the key schedule and the data path allows a better time-area trade-off and thus more flexibility for implementation. A designer can choose to implement both data paths (as described above, variant A) or to share resources between them (variant B). The latter variant B allows to save area at the cost of additional clock cycles (21 for AES-128, 25 for AES-192

and 29 for AES-256). The proposal by May *et al.* invokes three AES rounds and a few S-box lookups per round key. Therefore it cannot compute the round keys on-the-fly and will never achieve the same speed as the standard AES or our proposal, regardless of the hardware spent. Using a shared data path (variant B), our proposal is twice as fast as the proposal by May *et al.*, and using two separate data paths (variant A) it is three times faster.

Also the area overhead of our proposal is very moderate as the following estimations, which are based on the 180 nm *UMCL18G212D3* standard-cell library from UMC [16], indicate. In a round-based implementation, we need two 128-bit XOR gates to add MK and SK (600 GE) and a 4-bit XOR gate to add C_i (10 GE). Depending on the key length we need a 7-bit XOR gate (17 GE) or an 8-bit XOR gate (19 GE) and for AES-192 and AES-256 we also need a 128-bit MUX (342 GE). Finally a 128-bit AND gate (170 GE) is required to handle the proper addition of MK and the variables I and SK need to be stored in flip-flops (1536 GE). If the master key is never changed, it can be hardwired and requires no gates. Otherwise we have an additional storage overhead of 768 GE for AES-128, 1152 GE for AES-192, and 1536 GE for AES-256. For variant A an additional complete round of AES is required. Since the gate count for an AES round depends on a wide variety of design choices, an estimation of the total overhead for variant A is difficult. We therefore concentrate on variant B, which only needs an additional 128-bit AND gate (170 GE). For variant B our proposal introduces an overhead of 2505 GE with a hardwired MK and 3270 GE with a flexible MK for AES-128. For AES-192 it sums up to 2850-4000 GE and for AES-256 to 2850-4385 GE.

To put these overhead figures into perspective, please note that a typical throughput-optimized co-processor implementation of AES-128 requires tens of thousands of GE: Satoh *et al.* report such an implementation on a 0.11 μm technology with 54,000 GE [15], while the implementation of Pramstaller *et al.* on a 0.6 μm technology requires 85,000 GE [14].

5 Conclusion

We summarized the related-key differential and boomerang attacks on AES-256 and developed a framework for the protection of block ciphers against both attacks. It can be easily observed that the main cipher of AES is still secure against conventional non related-key attacks. So a natural approach to strengthen AES against these latest attacks is to strengthen the key schedule of AES.

We analyzed May *et al.*'s key schedule and found equivalent keys associated with it. Therefore, using our developed framework, we suggested an improvement to their key schedule. In addition, we also proposed a key schedule of our own. The main advantages of these two schedules over the original AES key schedule are that both achieve related-key differential and boomerang attack resistance, and both provide partial or full round key irreversibility.

Comparing the two new key schedules, the significant advantage of the improved May *et al.*'s key schedule over our second proposed key schedule is that

it has full round key irreversibility. However, it suffers from the disadvantage that it uses three AES rounds to derive a subkey and thus, cannot be on-the-fly. Therefore, the improved May et al.’s key schedule is suitable for use in software applications where the key schedule is only run once, or in hardware applications where high speed is not very crucial.

On the other hand, the advantage of our second proposed key schedule over the improved May et al.’s key schedule is that it is much more efficient and can be implemented on-the-fly, rendering it suitable for hardware applications. However, the trade-off is that the latter has only partial round key irreversibility. A summary of our analysis is shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Summary of our analysis.

Key Schedule	Related-Key Diff/Boom Attacks		Irreversibility	On-the-fly
	Security	Proof		
Original AES Key Schedule in [8]	×	[3, 4]	×	✓
Improved May et al.’s Key Schedule	✓	[This paper]	✓	×
Key Schedule Proposed in Sect. 4	✓	[This paper]	✓ (partial)	✓

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A Figures




Fig. 1. Flow of differences for one round subkey generation

B Related-Cipher Attack of [18]

The related-cipher attack [18] is applicable to related block ciphers with the same round function but different round numbers, and whose key schedules do not depend on the total round number. More concretely, consider two related block ciphers with round numbers r and $r + \Delta r$ respectively. If the same key is used in these two ciphers to encrypt the same message, then a related-cipher attack can be carried out on a Δr -round cipher. For this Δr -round cipher, the plaintext is the ciphertext of the r -round cipher and the ciphertext is that of the $r + \Delta r$ -round cipher. The key can be easily found if Δr is small.

To defend against the related-cipher attack, the key schedule should be related to the total round number so that when the same key is used to encrypt the same plaintext, the intermediate value after the i^{th} round in the r -round cipher will be different from that in the r' -round cipher ($r \neq r'$).

Now let us consider a related-cipher attack on AES-192 and AES-256, both based on May et al.'s original key schedules as described in Section 3. Suppose the 192- and 256-bit keys are formed by a concatenation of a 64-bit key. Then one can easily check that the first 12 round keys for AES-192 and AES-256 produced by May et al.'s original key schedule would be identical and for the same plaintext, the ciphers would produce the same output after 12 rounds. Thus we can use the ciphertext of AES-192 as the input to round 13 in AES-256. Together with the ciphertext of AES-256, we can implement a 2-round attack.

In contrast, we included the XOR of $keylen - 1$ in the computation of a_j and b_j for our improved May et al.'s key schedule. Therefore, the first twelve subkeys for AES-192 and AES-256 would be different since the two corresponding key schedules are initialized with different constants, 191 and 255 respectively. Thus the related-cipher attack of [18] will not work in this instance. Similarly, our second proposed key schedule as described in Section 4 also resists the related-cipher attack since C_0 is always taken to be the XOR of the Master Key and $keylen - 1$.

C Proof of Lemma 1

C.1 Notation

First, we define some notation. Referring to Figure 1 in Appendix A which shows the generation of one round subkey, we number the rounds $i = 0, 1, 2$ and let

$\Delta a_0^{(i)}$ = the input difference to the SubBytes operation in the i^{th} round of the subkey generation,
 $\Delta a_1^{(i)}$ = the input difference to the MixColumns operation in the i^{th} round of the subkey generation,
 $\Delta a_2^{(i)}$ = the input difference to the AddRoundKey operation in the i^{th} round of the subkey generation,
 Δb = the difference in b at each round.

Therefore, $\Delta a_0^{(0)}$ is the data input difference to the subkey generation function and Δb is the key input difference to each round of the subkey generation

function, where $(\Delta a_0^{(0)})_j = \Delta a_j = \Delta S(MK_j)$ and $(\Delta b)_j = \Delta S(MK_{j+16})$. The output difference $\Delta a_0^{(3)}$ is the difference in the round subkey.

We make a few observations about these differences.

- (1) After applying the SubBytes operation to the state, the positions of the active bytes are unchanged. The ShiftRows operation preserves the number of active bytes, so the input difference to the SubBytes operation $\Delta a_0^{(i)}$ and the output difference of the ShiftRows operation $\Delta a_1^{(i)}$ have the same number of active bytes.
- (2) Furthermore, if $\Delta a_1^{(i)}$ has one active column, and it contains more than one active byte, ShiftRows⁻¹ spreads them to different columns, so $\Delta a_0^{(i)}$ must have more than one active column, each containing one active byte.
- (3) $\Delta a_2^{(i)} = \text{MixColumns}(\Delta a_1^{(i)})$. The MixColumns function is maximal distance separable, so its branch number is 5. Thus t active bytes in one column of $\Delta a_1^{(i)}$ spread to at least $5 - t$ active bytes in the same column of $\Delta a_2^{(i)}$. In particular, one active byte in $\Delta a_0^{(i)}$ gives one active byte in $\Delta a_1^{(i)}$ which spreads to one column of at least four active bytes in $\Delta a_2^{(i)}$.
- (4) The AddRoundKey operation gives $\Delta a_0^{(i+1)} = \Delta a_2^{(i)} \oplus \Delta b$.

C.2 Proof of Lemma 1

We restate the lemma.

For any round subkey generation using the key schedule proposal described above, if we have a pair of master keys with nonzero difference, then the differential characteristic path either has at least four active S-boxes, or it has at least three active S-boxes and an additional four active S-boxes resulting from the generation of a and b .

Proof. We denote n and m to be the number of nonzero bytes in Δa and Δb respectively, and we write k and l for the number of nonzero bytes in $\Delta a_0^{(1)}$ and $\Delta a_0^{(2)}$ respectively. Then the number of active S-boxes in the differential characteristic path is $n + k + l$. We also note that if $\Delta MK \neq 0$, then $\Delta(a, b) \neq (0, 0)$. We consider the various cases below.

- (1) $n = 0$

We have $\Delta a = 0$, so $\Delta b \neq 0$ and $m \neq 0$. Since $\Delta a_0^{(1)} = \Delta b$, we must have $k = m$.

If $\Delta a_2^{(1)}$ has one active column, then it has at least $5 - m$ active bytes, and the active bytes of $\Delta a_0^{(1)} = \Delta b$ are all in different columns. Then $\Delta a_0^{(2)} = \Delta a_2^{(1)} \oplus \Delta b$ has at least $5 - m - 1$ active bytes, i.e. $l \geq 4 - m$. Then $n + k + l \geq 0 + m + 4 - m = 4$.

If $\Delta a_2^{(1)}$ has more than one active column, then, $\Delta a_2^{(1)}$ has at least $8 - m$ active bytes. If $m \geq 4$, we have $n + k + l \geq 4$. If $m \leq 3$, then $\Delta a_0^{(2)} = \Delta a_2^{(1)} \oplus \Delta b$ has at least $8 - 2m$ active bytes, i.e. $l \geq 8 - 2m$, which gives

$$n + k + l \geq 0 + m + 8 - 2m = 8 - m \geq 5.$$

(2) $k = 0$

We have $\Delta b = \Delta a_2^{(0)}$, so $m \geq 5 - n$. We also have $\Delta a_0^{(2)} = \Delta b$, so $l = m$. Then $n + k + l \geq n + 0 + 5 - n = 5$.

(3) $n \geq 1, k \geq 1, l = 0$

From $l = 0$ we have $\Delta b = \Delta a_2^{(1)} = \text{MixColumns}(\Delta a_1^{(1)})$.

If $k = 1$, $\Delta a_0^{(1)} = \Delta a_2^{(0)} \oplus \Delta b$ has one active byte. We have $\Delta a_2^{(0)} = \text{MixColumns}(\Delta a_1^{(0)})$, and we can write $\Delta a_0^{(1)} = \text{MixColumns}(\alpha)$, where α has four active bytes. Equating the two expressions for Δb , we get $\Delta a_2^{(1)} = \Delta a_0^{(1)} \oplus \Delta a_2^{(0)}$, and by the linearity of MixColumns we get $\Delta a_1^{(0)} = \Delta a_1^{(1)} \oplus \alpha$. Then $\Delta a_1^{(0)}$ has at least three active bytes, as does $\Delta a_0^{(0)}$, and so $n \geq 3$, giving $n + k + l \geq 3 + 1 + 0 = 4$.

If $k = 2$, $\Delta b = \Delta a_2^{(1)}$ has either one or two columns active. If it has two columns active, then all eight bytes in the two columns are active, and we also know that $\Delta a_0^{(1)}$ has two active bytes. If $\Delta a_2^{(1)}$ has one column active, then at least three of the bytes in that column are active, and the two bytes of $\Delta a_0^{(1)}$ must be in different columns. Either way, $\Delta a_2^{(0)} = \Delta a_0^{(1)} \oplus \Delta b$ has at least two active columns, so we must have $n \geq 2$. Then $n + k + l \geq 2 + 2 + 0 = 4$. If $k \geq 3$, then because $n \geq 1$, we have $n + k + l \geq 4$.

(4) $n \geq 1, k \geq 1, l \geq 1$

We either have $n = k = l = 1$, or $n + k + l \geq 4$. Assume $n = k = l = 1$. Then $n + k + l = 3$, and since $\Delta a_2^{(0)}$ has four active bytes and $\Delta a_0^{(1)}$ has one active byte, $\Delta b = \Delta a_2^{(0)} \oplus \Delta a_0^{(1)}$ has at least three active bytes, i.e. $m \geq 3$. Since $n + m \geq 4$, we have at least four active S-boxes from the generation of a and b .

□