

Cryptanalysis of Cho *et al.*'s Protocol, A Hash-Based Mutual Authentication Protocol for RFID Systems

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Abstract. Radio frequency identification systems need protocols to provide confidentiality, user privacy, mutual authentication and etc. These protocols should resist active and passive attacks such as forgery, traceability, replay and desynchronization attacks.

In this paper we cryptanalysis a hash based RFID mutual authentication protocol which has been recently proposed by Cho *et al.* More precisely, we present the following attacks on this protocol:

1. **Desynchronization attack:** the success probability of attack is “1” while the attack complexity is one run of protocol.
2. **Tag impersonation attack:** the success probability of attack is “ $\frac{1}{4}$ ” for two runs of protocol.
3. **Reader impersonation attack:** the success probability of attack is “ $\frac{1}{4}$ ” for two runs of protocol.

Keywords: RFID, Authentication, Desynchronization Attack, Tag Impersonation Attack, Reader Impersonation Attack.

1 Introduction

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is a new wireless technology that has a great capability to find many applications and influence many aspects of life in the near future. It has already been used in libraries, e-passports, manufacturing, inventory control, supply chain management, e-health and so on. The tag, the reader and the back-end data base are three basic components of an RFID system. Tags are connected to the objects that are supposed to be identified through radio frequency signals by the reader. The back-end data base mainly aids the reader by an extra storage space and further computational capability. That extra storage space can be used to keep the information of all tags that can be accessed by the reader. However, the main problem that impacts RFID system application is data security which may waive all its benefits. For example, an RFID system may lead to privacy problems for the object which is supposed to be identified through the tag. Hence, the end users need a guarantee to be sure that they will not be spoofed by any non-legitimate reader, their data will remain secure, receive a reliable service and etc. On the other hand, it should not be possible for any invalid tag to spoof an authenticated reader as a legitimate tag. To address these requirements, several RFID mutual authentication protocols [1–18] have already been proposed in the literatures, the security of many of them has already been violated [19–30].

Recently Cho *et al.* has proposed a hashed based mutual authentication protocol [15] and claimed that their protocol completely solves the privacy concerns [31] and forgery concerns [32, 33] of RFID systems. However, we show that their protocol does not satisfy the claimed requirement. More precisely, we present tag impersonation, reader impersonation and desynchronization attacks on this protocol. All attacks have the high success probability and negligible complexity.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section § 2 we describe some notations and preliminaries that used thorough this paper. We briefly review Cho *et al.* 's protocol in section § 3. Our desynchronization, tag impersonation and reader impersonation attacks are presented in sections § 4, § 5 and § 6 respectively. Concluding remarks are presented in Section § 7.

2 Preliminaries

The notations that used through of this paper are as follows:

- ID_k : Identifier of the k^{th} tag.
- $h(\cdot)$: One way hash function.
- $\|$: A concatenation operation.
- $\oplus$: Exclusive-or operation.
- s : An 96-bit secret value which is shred between tag and back-end server.
- s_j : A secret value used in the j^{th} session.
- $DATA$: Tag's related information.
- RID_i : An 96-bit Group ID of random number.
- R_r : Random number generated by reader.
- R_t : Random number generated by tag.
- α : Message generated by tag for authentication.
- β : Blind factor.
- $X_{(a:b)}$: A fraction of value X includes the a^{th} -bit to the b^{th} -bit.
- X^i : Parameter X related to the i^{th} tag.

3 Cho *et al.*'s RFID Hash-based Mutual Authentication Protocol

Recently, Cho *et al.* [15] proposed a mutual authentication protocol for RFID systems. The proposed protocol uses a one way hash function in its structure and expected to provide enough security against various attacks. In addition, they randomize each session of mutual authentication by employing two random values R_r and R_t , respectively generated by the reader and the tag and a value denoted by RID_i which is supposed to be dependent on R_t . Since the secret value of tag s_j get updated at each successful run of protocol, to avoid the desynchronization attack the back-end database keeps a record of two latest secret value of tag denoted by s_{old} and s_{new} respectively. The protocol, see also Fig. 1, works as follows:

1. The reader generates a random number R_r and sends *request* along with R_r to the tag.
2. As the tag receives the message, it generates another random number R_t and does as follows:




Fig. 1. The Cho *et al.*'s hash-based RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol.

- (a) It computes $RID_i = (R_t - R_r \bmod s_j + 1)_{(0:47)} \parallel (R_t + s_j - R_r \bmod s_j)_{(48:95)}$, $\alpha = h(ID_k \oplus R_t \oplus R_r \oplus RID_i)$ and $\beta = (s_j)_{(0:47)} \parallel (ID_k)_{(48:95)}$.
- (b) It sends α and $R_t \oplus \beta$ to the reader.
3. As the reader receives α and $R_t \oplus \beta$, passes them to the back-end data base.
4. To authenticate the tag and update the secret value s , the back-end data base does as follows:
 - (a) for any record i on its data base (the i^{th} record includes $(ID_k^i, s_{old}^i, s_{new}^i, Data^i)$ of a tag) it computes β for each tuple (ID_k^i, s_{old}^i) and (ID_k^i, s_{new}^i) , extracts R_t from $R_t \oplus \beta$ for any computed β , calculates RID_i' and $\alpha' = h(ID_k \oplus R_t \oplus R_r \oplus RID_i')$.
 - (b) If it finds a match between the received α and a retrieved α' , it will authenticate the tag and updates its record. Assuming that (ID_k^i, s_j^i) is a tuple for which tag i has been authenticated, the back-end data base will authenticate the record of the authenticated tag as follows:
 - it assigns s_j^i to s_{old}^i ,
 - generates a new secret value s_{j+1} and assigns it to s_{new}^i .
 - (c) The back-end data base generates $\text{DATA} \parallel h(\beta \oplus RID_i) \parallel R_t \oplus s_{j+1}$ and sends it to the reader.
5. The reader passes $h(\beta \oplus RID_i) \parallel R_t \oplus s_{j+1}$ to the tag.
6. The tag extracts $h(\beta \oplus RID_i)$ from the received value and verifies it to whether authenticate the reader.
7. If the tag authenticated the reader it extracts s_{j+1} from $R_t \oplus s_{j+1}$ and updates its secret value s_j to s_{j+1} .

The authors have claimed several security properties for the protocol [15, Section 6.] including but not limited to the following properties:

- resistance against the desynchronization attack.
- resistance against the spoofed reader attack, in which the adversary sends intended or meaningless request and tries to $h(\beta \oplus RID_i)$ to be authenticated by the tag.
- resistance against the spoofed tag attack, in which the adversary tries to generate a valid α to be authenticated by the reader.

However, in the following sections we present several attacks on this protocol that contradicted the above mentioned authors' claims.

4 Desynchronization Attack

Cho *et al.* [14] claim that their protocol is resistant against the desynchronization attack. More precisely, the authors state that the protocol prevents the problem of desynchronization via keeping a record of *old* secret value s to avoid from get desynchronized when tag does not receive the last message of protocol properly. However, we observed a flaw on the protocol that can be used to desynchronize the tag and the reader easily. To desynchronize the tag T_i and the reader R the adversary can follow the steps described below:

1. Eavesdrop one session of protocol.
2. Change the last message that sent by R to T_i from $h(\beta \oplus RID_i) || R_t \oplus s_{j+1}$ to $h(\beta \oplus RID_i) || R_t \oplus s_{j+1} \oplus \Delta$, for $\Delta \neq 0$.
3. The tag authenticates the reader based on the received $h(\beta \oplus RID_i)$ and assigns $s_{j+1} \oplus \Delta$ to s_{j+1} .

Following the above attack the secret value contained in T_i is set to $s_{j+1} \oplus \Delta$ while the stored values on R are s_j and s_{j+1} and the reader has no record of $s_{j+1} \oplus \Delta$. Hence, R never authenticates T_i in the next sessions of protocol. The success probability of our desynchronization attack is “1” and the complexity of attack is only one run of protocol.

5 Tag Impersonation Attack

Cho *et al.* [14] claim that it would not be possible for the adversary to generate a tuple α and $\beta \oplus R_t$ such that the reader authenticate the adversary as a valid Tag. More precisely, the authors state that to generate a valid α and $\beta \oplus R_t$ and impersonate the tag, the adversary at least requires to find the secret values s_j and ID_k that are protected by $h(\cdot)$. However, we present a rather simple attack which can impersonate a legitimate tag without any knowledge of the secret values s_j and ID_k . Our attack is based on this fact that for $a < b$ we can state that:

$$a \bmod b \equiv a$$

Given this fact and assuming that $R_t < s_j$ we have:

$$RID_i = (R_t - R_t \bmod s_j + 1)_{(0:47)} || (R_t + s_j - R_t \bmod s_j)_{(48:95)} = (1)_{(0:47)} || (s_j)_{(48:95)}$$

which independents on R_t . Now, we use this observation on the tag impersonation attack which its steps are described below:

1. Adversary eavesdrops one session of protocol and obtains R_r , α , $R_t \oplus \beta$, where assuming that $R_t < s_j$ then $RID_i = (1)_{(0:47)} || (s_j)_{(48:95)}$.
2. On the next session of protocol, when the reader sends *request* along with R'_r , adversary impersonates the tag and replies with the tuple α and $R_t \oplus \beta \oplus R_r \oplus R'_r$.
3. The back-end server uses the tuple (ID_k, s_j) of the tag to generate β and extracts $R'_t = R_t \oplus R_r \oplus R'_r$ and RID'_i .
4. The back-end data base uses the extracted R'_t and RID'_i to verify whether $\alpha \stackrel{?}{=} h(ID_k \oplus R'_t \oplus R'_r \oplus RID'_i)$.

5. If $R'_t < s_j$ then $RID'_i = (1)_{(0:47)} \parallel (s_j)_{(48:95)} = RID_i$ and we have:

$$h(ID_k \oplus R'_t \oplus R'_r \oplus RID'_i) = h(ID_k \oplus R_t \oplus R_r \oplus R'_r \oplus R'_t \oplus RID_i) = h(ID_k \oplus R_t \oplus R_r \oplus RID_i) = \alpha$$

6. Since $\alpha = h(ID_k \oplus R'_t \oplus R'_r \oplus RID'_i)$ the back-end data base authenticates the adversary as a legitimate tag.

The adversary will be succeed in its attack if the assumptions are correct. For random selection of R_t and R_r , the success probability of each assumption is " $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Hence the total probability of the above tag impersonation attack is " $\frac{1}{4}$ " and the complexity of attack is two runs of protocol.

Remark 1. The above attack works as long as the tag has not updated its secret value s . However, when the adversary does the eavesdropping phase at step 1. of the above attack, if it blocks the last message of protocol, on which the reader sends $h(\beta \oplus RID_i) \parallel R_t \oplus s_{j+1}$ to the tag, then the attack can be applied even after one updating of secret value s . The reason comes from this property of protocol that the back-end data base keeps a record of s_{old} .

6 Reader Impersonation Attack

The authors [14] claim that the proposed protocol is very secure against an intended request because the adversary has no control on the generated R_t and the related RID_i that are changed every session, even if the secret value s has not been updated. However, we present an attack which can impersonate a legitimate reader without any knowledge of the secret values s_j and ID_k and any control over the generated R_t . Our attack is based on the given observation that for $R_t < s_j$ one can state that:

$$RID_i = (1)_{(0:47)} \parallel (s_j)_{(48:95)}$$

which is independent on R_t . The proposed reader impersonation attack is as bellow:

1. Adversary eavesdrops one session of protocol and obtains R_r , α , $R_t \oplus \beta$ and $h(\beta \oplus RID_i) \parallel R_t \oplus s_{j+1}$, where for $R_t < s_j$ one can state that:

$$RID_i = (1)_{(0:47)} \parallel (s_j)_{(48:95)}$$

2. It blocks the last message from the reader to the tag, $h(\beta \oplus RID_i) \parallel R_t \oplus s_{j+1}$. Hence, the tag does not update its secret value s .
3. Adversary supplants a legitimate reader and sends *request* with the stored R_r to the tag and receives tag's response, α' and $R'_t \oplus \beta'$, where $\beta' = \beta$ because the secret value s has not been updated.
4. For $R'_t < s_j$ we can state that:

$$RID'_i = (1)_{(0:47)} \parallel (s_j)_{(48:95)} = RID_i$$

5. The adversary replies to the tag with $h(\beta \oplus RID_i) \parallel \mathcal{A}$, where $\mathcal{A}$ can be any random value.
6. For the given assumptions, $h(\beta \oplus RID_i) = h(\beta' \oplus RID'_i)$ and the tag authenticates the adversary as a legitimate reader.

The adversary will be succeed in its attack if the assumptions are correct, i.e. $R_t < s_j$ and $R'_t < s_j$. For random selection of R_t and R'_t , the success probability of each assumption is " $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Hence, the total probability of the above reader impersonation attack is " $\frac{1}{4}$ " and the complexity of attack is eavesdropping one run of protocol and supplant a session following it.

Remark 2. The given attack desynchronizes the tag from the reader, because after the supplanted run of protocol the tag updates its secret value s to $s_j = R'_t \oplus \Delta$ which the legitimate reader has no knowledge of it.

7 Conclusion

In this paper we analyzed the security of Cho *et al.* mutual authentication protocol which is a hash based protocol to be employed in RFID systems. We demonstrated desynchronization, tag impersonation and reader impersonation attacks on this protocol. The success probability of these attacks are "1", " $\frac{1}{4}$ " and " $\frac{1}{4}$ " respectively and the complexity of each attack is at most two runs of protocol.

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