

# Virtual Black-Box Obfuscation for All Circuits via Generic Graded Encoding

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## Abstract

We present a new general-purpose obfuscator for all polynomial-size circuits. The obfuscator uses graded encoding schemes, a generalization of multilinear maps. We prove that the obfuscator exposes no more information than the program’s black-box functionality, and achieves *virtual black-box security*, in the generic graded encoded scheme model. This proof is under the Bounded Speedup Hypothesis (BSH, a plausible worst-case complexity-theoretic assumption related to the Exponential Time Hypothesis), in addition to standard cryptographic assumptions. We also show that the weaker notion of *indistinguishability obfuscation* can be achieved without BSH.

Very recently, Garg et al. (FOCS 2013) used graded encoding schemes to present a candidate obfuscator for indistinguishability obfuscation. They posed the problem of constructing a provably secure indistinguishability obfuscator in the generic graded encoding scheme model. Our obfuscator resolves this problem. Indeed, under BSH it achieves the stronger notion of virtual black box security, which is our focus in this work.

Our construction is different from that of Garg et al., but is inspired by it, in particular by their use of permutation branching programs. We obtain our obfuscator by developing techniques used to obfuscate  $d$ -CNF formulas (ePrint 2013), and applying them to permutation branching programs. This yields an obfuscator for the complexity class  $\mathcal{NC}^1$ . We then use homomorphic encryption to obtain an obfuscator for any polynomial-size circuit.

## 1 Introduction

Code obfuscation is the task of taking a program, and making it “unintelligible” or impossible to reverse engineer, while maintaining its input-output functionality. While this is a foundational question in the theory and practice of cryptography, until recently very few techniques or heuristics were known. Recently, however, several works have leveraged new constructions of cryptographically secure graded encoding schemes (which generalize multilinear maps) [GGH13a, CLT13] to propose obfuscators for complex functionalities [BR13a, BR13b] and, in a fascinating recent work of Garg et al [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b], even for arbitrary polynomial size circuits.

In this work, we propose a new code obfuscator, building on techniques introduced in [BR13a, GGH<sup>+</sup>13b, BR13b]. The obfuscator works for any polynomial-time circuit, and its security is analyzed in the idealized generic graded encoding scheme model. We prove that, in this idealized model, the obfuscator achieves the strong “virtual black-box” security notion of Barak et al. [BGI<sup>+</sup>12] (see below). Security in the idealized model relies on a worst-case exponential assumption on the

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hardness of the  $\mathcal{NP}$ -complete 3SAT problem (in the flavor of the well known exponential time hypothesis). Our construction relies on *asymmetric graded encoding schemes*, and can be instantiated using the new candidate constructions of Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13a], or of Coron, Lepoint and Tibouchi [CLT13].

**Obfuscation: Definitions.** Intuitively, an obfuscator should generate a new program that preserves the the original program’s functionality, but is impossible to reverse engineer. The theoretical study of this problem was initiated by Barak et al. [BGI<sup>+</sup>12]. They formalized a strong simulation-based security requirement of *black box obfuscation*: namely, the obfuscated program should expose nothing more than what can be learned via oracle access to its input-output behavior. We refer to this notion as “black-box” obfuscation, and we use this strong formalization throughout this work.

A weaker notion of obfuscation, known as *indistinguishability* or *best-possible* obfuscation was studied in [BGI<sup>+</sup>12, GR07]. An indistinguishability obfuscator guarantees that the obfuscations of any two programs (boolean circuits) with identical functionalities are indistinguishable. We note that, unlike the black-box definition of security, indistinguishability obfuscation does not quantify or qualify what information the obfuscation might expose. In particular, the obfuscation might reveal non-black-box information about the functionality. Recently, Sahai and Waters [SW13] showed that indistinguishability obfuscation suffices for many cryptographic applications, such as transforming private key cryptosystems to public key, and even for constructing deniable encryption schemes.

**Prior Work: Negative Results.** In their work, [BGI<sup>+</sup>12] proved the *impossibility* of general-purpose black-box obfuscators (i.e. ones that work for any polynomial-time functionality) in the virtual black box model. This impossibility result was extended by Goldwasser and Kalai [GK05]. Goldwasser and Rothblum [GR07] showed obstacles to the possibility of achieving indistinguishability obfuscation with information-theoretic security, and to achieving it in the idealized random oracle model.

Looking ahead, we note that the impossibility results of [BGI<sup>+</sup>12, GK05] *do not extend* to idealized models, such as the random oracle model, the generic group model, and (particularly relevant to our work) the generic graded encoding model.

**Prior Work: Positive Results.** Positive results on obfuscation focused on specific, simple programs. One program family, which has received extensive attention, is that of “point functions”: password checking programs that only accept a single input string, and reject all others. Starting with the work of Canetti [Can97], several works have shown obfuscators for this family under various assumptions [CMR98, LPS04, Wee05], as well as extensions [CD08, BC10]. Canetti, Rothblum and Varia [CRV10] showed how to obfuscate a function that checks membership in a hyperplane of constant dimension (over a large finite field). Other works showed how to obfuscate cryptographic function classes under different definitions and formalizations. These function classes include checking proximity to a hidden point [DS05], vote mixing [AW07], and re-encryption [HRSV11]. Several works [Can97, CMR98, HMLS10, HRSV11] relaxed the security requirement so that obfuscation only holds for a random choice of a program from the family.

More recently, Brakerski and Rothblum [BR13a] showed that graded encoding schemes could be used to obfuscate richer function families. They constructed a black-box obfuscator for *conjunctions*, the family of functions that test whether a subset of the input bits take on specified values. Building on this result, in a followup work [BR13b], they constructed a black-box obfuscator for

$d$ -CNFs and (more generally) conjunctions of  $\mathcal{NC}^0$  circuits. These constructions were proved secure in the generic graded encoding model. The conjunction obfuscator was also shown to be secure under falsifiable (see [Nao03]) multilinear DDH-like assumptions, so long as the conjunction is drawn from a family with sufficient entropy.

In recent work, Garg et al. [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b] use cryptographic graded encoding schemes to construct a candidate indistinguishability obfuscator (see above) for all polynomial-size circuits. This is the first non-trivial candidate in the literature for general-purpose obfuscation. The main differences between our results and theirs are: (i) we construct an obfuscator with the stronger security notion of black-box obfuscation (for the same class of functions), and (ii) we provide a security proof in the generic graded encoding scheme model. This was posed as a major open question in [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b].<sup>1</sup>

Canetti and Vaikuntanathan [CV13] outline a candidate obfuscator and prove its security in an idealized pseudo-free group model. They also use Barrington’s theorem and randomization techniques. The main difference from our work is in the nature of their idealized pseudo-free group model: in particular, there are no known candidates for concretely instantiating such groups.

## 1.1 Our Work: Black-Box Obfuscation for all of $\mathcal{P}$

In this work we construct an obfuscator for any function in  $\mathcal{P}$ , using cryptographic graded encoding schemes. Our obfuscator can be instantiated using recently proposed candidates [GGH13a, CLT13]. The main component of our construction is an obfuscator for the complexity class  $\mathcal{NC}^1$ , which is then leveraged to an obfuscator for  $\mathcal{P}$  using homomorphic encryption. Our main contribution is a proof that the main component is a secure black-box obfuscator in the generic graded encoding scheme model, assuming the *bounded speedup hypothesis* (BSH) [BR13b], a generalization of the exponential time hypothesis. More details follow.

**Theorem 1.1.** *There exists an obfuscator PObf for any circuit in  $\mathcal{P}$ , which is virtual black-box secure in the generic graded encoding scheme model, assuming the bounded speedup hypothesis, and the existence of homomorphic encryption with an  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  decryption circuit.*

We also prove that our obfuscator is an indistinguishability obfuscator in the generic graded encoding scheme model (in fact, we show that this is true even for a simplified variant of the construction). This proof does not require the bounded speedup hypothesis.<sup>2</sup>

**Theorem 1.2.** *There exists an obfuscator PIndObf for any circuit in  $\mathcal{P}$ , which is an indistinguishability obfuscator in the generic graded encoding scheme model, assuming the existence of homomorphic encryption with an  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  decryption circuit.*

To prove Theorem 1.2, we introduce a novel but equivalent formulation for the security of indistinguishability obfuscators. This formulations requires the existence of a *computationally unbounded* simulator, which only has *black-box access* to the obfuscated program. We find this formulation (and its equivalence) intriguing, and we hope that it will find further applications.

For the remainder of this section, we focus our attention on black-box obfuscation. Our construction proceeds in two steps. As hinted above, the first (and main) step is an obfuscator for  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  circuits. Then, in the second step, we use homomorphic encryption [RAD78, Gen09] to obfuscate

<sup>1</sup>[GGH<sup>+</sup>13b] provide a proof of security in a more restricted “generic colored matrix model”.

<sup>2</sup>Under the BSH, the claim follows immediately from Theorem 1.1, because any virtual black-box obfuscator is also an indistinguishability obfuscator [GR07].

any polynomial-size circuit. (Which is done by encrypting the input circuit using the homomorphic scheme, and obfuscating a “verified decryption” circuit, see Section 4.)

Our obfuscator for  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  circuits combines ideas from: (i) the  $d$ -CNF obfuscator of [BR13b] and its security proof. In particular, we build on their technique of *randomizing sub-assignments* to prove security in the generic model based on the bounded speedup hypothesis, and we also build on their use of random generators in each ring of the graded encoding scheme. We also use ideas from (ii) the indistinguishability obfuscator of [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b], in particular their use of Barrington’s theorem [Bar86] and randomization techniques for permutation branching programs. See Section 1.2 for an overview of the construction and its proof, and Section 3 for the full details.

**The Generic Graded Encoding Scheme Model.** We prove that our construction is a black-box obfuscator in the generic graded encoding scheme model. In this model, an adversary must operate independently of group elements’ representations. The adversary is given arbitrary strings representing these elements, and can only manipulate them using oracles for addition, subtraction, multilinear operations and more. See Section 2.5 for more details.

**The Bounded Speedup Hypothesis.** We prove security based on the *Bounded Speedup Hypothesis*, as introduced by [BR13b]. This is a worst-case assumption about exponential hardness of 3SAT, a strengthening of the long-standing exponential time hypothesis (ETH) for solving 3SAT [IP99]. The exponential-time hypothesis states that no sub-exponential time algorithm can resolve satisfiability of 3CNF formulas. Intuitively, the bounded-speedup hypothesis states that no polynomial-time algorithm for resolving satisfiability of 3CNFs can have “super-polynomial speedup” over a brute-force algorithm that tests assignments one-by-one. More formally, there does not exist an ensemble of polynomial-size circuits  $\{\mathcal{A}_n\}$ , and an ensemble of super-polynomial-size sets of assignments  $\{\mathcal{X}_n\}$ , such that on input a 3CNF  $\Phi$  on  $n$ -bit inputs, w.h.p.  $\mathcal{A}_n$  finds a satisfying assignment for  $\Phi$  in  $\mathcal{X}_n$  if such an assignment exists. We emphasize that this is a worst-case hypothesis, i.e. it only says that for every ensemble  $\mathcal{A}$ , there *exists* some 3CNF on which  $\mathcal{A}$  fails. See Section 2.2 for the formal definition.<sup>3</sup>

**Perspective.** Barak et al. [BGI<sup>+</sup>12] show that there are function families that are impossible to obfuscate under the black-box security definition. Their results *do not apply to idealized models* such as the random oracle model, the generic group model, and the generic graded encoding model. This is because their adversary needs to be able to execute the obfuscated circuit on parts of its own explicit description. In idealized models, the obfuscated circuit does not have a succinct explicit description, and so these attacks fail. Indeed, our main result, Theorem 1.1, shows that *general-purpose black-box obfuscation is possible in the generic graded encoding model* (under plausible assumptions). How should one interpret this result in light of the impossibility theorems?

One immediate answer, is that if one implements a graded encoding scheme using opaque secure hardware (essentially implementing the generic model), then the hardware can be used to protect any functionality (under plausible assumptions). The hardware is (arguably) natural, simple, stateless, and independent of the functionality being obfuscated.

Another answer, is that the security proof shows that (under plausible assumptions) our obfuscator is provably resilient to attacks from a rich family: namely, to all attacks that are independent

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<sup>3</sup>We note that if both the adversary and the simulator are allowed to run in quasi-polynomial time, security can be based on the (standard) Exponential-Time Hypothesis.

of the encoding scheme’s instantiation. While we find this guarantee to be of value, we caution that it should not be over-interpreted. The results of [BGI<sup>+</sup>12] imply that, for any concrete instantiation of the graded encoding scheme, the obfuscation of their unobfuscatable functions *is not secure*. In particular, their result (applied to our construction) provides a *non-generic attack* against any graded encoding candidate. This is similar to the result of [CGH98], showing an attack against any instantiation of a random oracle in a particular protocol. Somewhat differently from their result, however, in our case the primitive in question is altogether impossible in the standard model. In the result of [CGH98], the primitive is not achieved by a specific construction when the idealized model is instantiated with *any* concrete functionality. We find this state of affairs to be of interest, even irrespective of the applications to code obfuscation.

Taking a more optimistic view, the new construction invites us to revisit limits in the negative results: both in the unobfuscatable functionalities, and in the nature of the attacks themselves. It may suggest new relaxations that make obfuscation achievable in standard models, e.g. obfuscating functionalities that inherently do not allow self-execution, or protecting against a class of attackers that cannot execute the obfuscated code on itself.

Finally, the relaxed notion of indistinguishability obfuscation, where only limited hardness and impossibility results are known, remains a promising avenue for future research. Our construction is the first provably secure indistinguishability obfuscator in the generic graded encoding model. It is interesting to explore whether indistinguishability obfuscation can be proved in the standard model under falsifiable assumptions.

## 1.2 Construction Overview

We proceed with an overview of the main step in our construction: an obfuscator for  $\mathcal{NC}^1$ . We are assuming basic familiarity with graded encoding schemes. The full construction, and proof of its security in the generic model, are in Section 3.

**Permutation Branching Programs.** The obfuscator  $\mathcal{NC}^1\text{Obf}$  takes as input an  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  program, represented as an oblivious width 5 permutation branching program  $C$ , as in [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b]. Let  $m$  denote the depth of  $C$  (as is necessary, we allow the obfuscator to expose  $m$  or some upper bound thereof). Let  $C = \{M_{j,0}, M_{j,1}\}_{j \in [m]}$ , where  $M_{j,b} \in \{0,1\}^{5 \times 5}$  are matrices, and let  $i = \ell(j)$  indicate which variable  $x_i$  controls the  $j$ th level branch. See Section 2.1 for more background on (oblivious) branching programs.

**Graded Encoding Schemes.** We begin by recalling the notion of multilinear maps, due to Boneh and Silverberg [BS02]. Rothblum [Rot13] considered the asymmetric case, where the groups may be different. The obfuscator makes (extensive) use of an asymmetric graded encoding schemes, which are an extension of multilinear maps.

Similarly to [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b], we assign a group  $\text{prog}_j$  to each level  $j$  of the branching program, and encode the matrices  $M_{j,b}$  in the group  $\text{prog}_j$ . This encoding is done as in [BR13a, BR13b]: we encode each matrix  $M_{j,b}$  relative to a unique generator of  $\text{prog}_j$  (denoted  $\rho_{\text{prog}_j,b}$ ), and also provide an encoding of the generators. In other words, in the  $j$ -th group  $\text{prog}_j$ , we have two pairs:

$$(\rho_{\text{prog}_j,0}, (\rho_{\text{prog}_j,0} \cdot M_{j,0})) \text{ and } (\rho_{\text{prog}_j,0}, (\rho_{\text{prog}_j,0} \cdot M_{j,1}))$$

We note that this encoding, relative to a random generator, is different from what was done in [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b], and plays a crucial role in the security proof.

**Randomizing The Matrices.** As computed above, the encoded pairs clearly hide nothing:  $M_{j,b}$  are binary matrices, and so they are completely revealed (via zero-testing). As a first step, we use the  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  randomization technique (see [Bab85, Kil88, FKN94]), as was done in [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b] (however, unlike [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b], we don't need to extend the matrix dimensions beyond  $5 \times 5$ ). The idea is to generate a sequence of random matrices  $\mathcal{Y}_j$  (over the ring  $R$  underlying the encoding scheme), and work with encodings of  $\mathcal{N}_{j,b} = \mathcal{Y}_{j-1}^{-1} \cdot M_{j,b} \cdot \mathcal{Y}_j$  instead of the original  $M_{j,b}$ . This preserves the program's functional behavior, but each matrix, examined in isolation, becomes completely random. In fact, even if we take one matrix out of each pair, the joint distribution of these  $m$  matrices is uniformly random (see Section 2.1).

There is an obstacle here, because using the standard graded encoding interface, we can generate a random level 0 encoding of  $\mathcal{Y}$ , but we cannot derive  $\mathcal{Y}^{-1}$  (in fact, this is not possible even for scalars). Indeed, to perform this step, [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b] rely on the properties of a specific graded encoding instantiation. We propose a difference solution that works with any graded encoding scheme: instead of  $\mathcal{Y}^{-1}$ , we use the adjoint matrix  $\mathcal{Z} = \text{adj}(\mathcal{Y})$ , which is composed of determinants of minors of  $\mathcal{Y}$ , and is therefore computable given the level 0 encoding of  $\mathcal{Y}$ . We know that  $\mathcal{Y} \cdot \mathcal{Z} = \det(\mathcal{Y}) \cdot I$ , which will be sufficient for our purposes.<sup>4</sup> Using the encoding scheme from [BR13a, BR13b], in the  $j$ -th group  $\text{prog}_j$  we encode two pairs:

$$(\rho_{\text{prog}_j,b}, (\rho_{\text{prog}_j,b} \cdot \mathcal{N}_{j,b}))_{b \in \{0,1\}}, \text{ where } \mathcal{N}_{j,b} = \mathcal{Z}_{j-1} \cdot M_{j,b} \cdot \mathcal{Y}_j$$

To efficiently *evaluate* this program, we need an additional group, which we denote by  $\text{chk}$ . In this group we encode a random generator  $\rho_{\text{chk}}$ , and the element  $(\rho_{\text{chk}} \cdot (\prod_j \det(\mathcal{Y}_j)) \cdot \mathcal{Y}_m[1,1])$ . We evaluate the branching program using the graded encoding scheme's zero-test feature, by checking whether:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left( (\rho_{\text{prog}_1, x_{\ell(1)}} \mathcal{N}_{1, x_{\ell(1)}}) \cdots (\rho_{\text{prog}_m, x_{\ell(m)}} \mathcal{N}_{m, x_{\ell(m)}}) \cdot \rho_{\text{chk}} \right) [1,1] - \\ & \rho_{\text{prog}_1, x_{\ell(1)}} \cdots \rho_{\text{prog}_m, x_{\ell(m)}} \cdot (\rho_{\text{chk}} \cdot (\prod_j \det(\mathcal{Y}_j)) \cdot \mathcal{Y}_m[1,1]) = 0 . \end{aligned}$$

This provides the required functionality, but it does not provide a secure construction.

**Enforcing Consistency.** An obvious weakness of the above construction is that it does not verify *consistency*. For a variable  $x_i$  that appears multiple time in the program, the above scheme does not enforce that the same value will be used at all times. This will be handled, similarly to [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b, BR13b], by adding *consistency check variables*. In each group  $\text{grp}$  that is “associated” with a variable  $x_i$  (so far, these only include groups of the form  $\text{prog}_j$  s.t.  $\ell(j) = i$ ), the obfuscator generates two random variables  $\beta_{\text{grp},i,0}$  and  $\beta_{\text{grp},i,1}$ , and multiplies the relevant variables. Namely, in group  $\text{prog}_j$  with  $\ell(j) = i$ , we provide encodings of

$$(\rho_{\text{prog}_j,b}, (\rho_{\text{prog}_j,b} \cdot \beta_{\text{prog}_j,i,b} \cdot \mathcal{N}_{j,b}))_{b \in \{0,1\}}$$

To preserve functionality, we would like to choose the  $\beta$  variables so that the product of all zero-choices and the product of all one-choices are the same (one might even consider imposing a

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<sup>4</sup>We use here the fact that all matrices we work with are of constant dimension, and so we can compute the determinants of the minors in polynomial time while using only multilinear operations.

constraint that the product is 1). For clarity of exposition, we prefer the following solution: we use an additional auxiliary group  $\text{cc}_i$  for every variable  $x_i$ , such that

$$\beta_{\text{cc}_i, \mathbf{0}} = \beta'_{\text{cc}_i} \cdot \prod_{j: \ell(j)=i} \beta_{\text{prog}_j, \mathbf{1}} ,$$

and vice versa (and  $\beta'_{\text{cc}_i}$  is the same for both cases). This guarantees that the product of all zero-choices, and the product of all one-choices, is the same. We denote this value by  $\gamma_i$ .

To preserve functionality, we multiply the element in the  $\text{chk}$  group by  $\prod_i \gamma_i$ . Now in the  $\text{chk}$  group we have encodings of:

$$(\rho_{\text{chk}}, (\rho_{\text{chk}} \cdot \prod_i \gamma_i \cdot (\prod_j \det(\mathcal{Y}_j)) \cdot \mathcal{Y}_m[1, 1]))$$

Intuitively, it seems that this change renders inconsistent assignments useless: if, for some bit  $i$  of the input, the  $\beta$  values for  $i$  are not all taken according to the same value (0 or 1), then the constraint does not come into play. Therefore, the  $\beta$  values completely randomize these selected values.

One could postulate that the above construction is secure. In fact, we do not know of an explicit generic-model attack on this construction. Still, there are challenges to constructing a simulator. The crux of the difficulty is that an attacker might somehow efficiently produce a multilinear expression that corresponds to the evaluation of *multiple (super-polynomially many) consistent inputs* at the same time (or some function of super-polynomially many inputs: e.g. checking if the circuit accepts all of them simultaneously). This would break the obfuscator's security, since an (efficient) simulator cannot evaluate the function on super-polynomially many inputs.

**Indistinguishability Obfuscation via Inefficient Simulation.** If we allow a computationally unbounded simulator, then the above is not a problem. We show that the existence of a computationally unbounded black-box simulator implies indistinguishability obfuscation. In fact, the notions are equivalent both in the standard model and in the generic graded encoding scheme model. *Indistinguishability obfuscation* for  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  therefore follows, and an indistinguishability obfuscator for  $\mathcal{P}$  can be derived using the  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  to  $\mathcal{P}$  transformation of [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b].

We note that the main conceptual difference that allows us to prove indistinguishability obfuscation for our construction, as opposed to [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b]'s, is our use of the randomized  $\rho$  generators. This allows us, for any multilinear expression computed by the adversary, to isolate the relevant consistent inputs that affect the value of that expression.

**Efficient Simulation and Virtual Black-Box Obfuscation.** To get efficient black-box simulation (and virtual black-box security), we need to address the above difficulty. To do so, we build on the *randomizing sub-assignments* technique from [BR13b]. Here, we use this technique to *bind the variables together* into triples. This done by adding  $\binom{n}{3}$  additional groups, denoted  $\text{bind}_T$ , where  $T \in \binom{[n]}{3}$  (i.e. one for each triple of variables). The group  $\text{bind}_T$  is associated with the triple of variables  $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \in T$ , and contains 8 pairs of encodings:

$$(\rho_{\text{bind}_T, b_1 b_2 b_3}, (\rho_{\text{bind}_T, b_1 b_2 b_3} \cdot \beta_{\text{bind}_T, i_1, b_1} \cdot \beta_{\text{bind}_T, i_2, b_2} \cdot \beta_{\text{bind}_T, i_3, b_3}))_{b_1 b_2 b_3 \in \{0,1\}^3}$$

In evaluating the program on an input  $x$ , for each group  $\text{bind}_T$ , the evaluator chooses one of these 8 pairs according to the bits of  $x|_T$ . The aforementioned consistency variables  $\beta_{\text{cc}_i,b}$  will now take these new  $\beta$ 's into account, and will accordingly be computed as

$$\beta_{\text{cc}_i,0} = \beta'_{\text{cc}_i} \cdot \prod_{j:\ell(j)=i} \beta_{\text{prog}_j,1} \cdot \prod_{T:i \in T} \beta_{\text{bind}_T,i,1} ,$$

and vice versa. The  $\gamma_i$  values are modified in the same way.

Intuitively, in order to evaluate the program, the adversary now needs not only to consistently choose the value of every single variable, but also to *jointly commit* to the values of each triple, consistently with its choices for the singleton variables. We show that if a polynomial adversary is able to produce an expression that corresponds to a sum of superpolynomially many consistent evaluations, then it can also evaluate a 3SAT formula on superpolynomially many values simultaneously, which contradicts the bounded speedup hypothesis (BSH, see Section 2.2).

**A Taste of the Security Proof.** The (high-level) intuition behind the security proof is as follows. In the idealized generic graded encoding scheme model, an adversary can only compute (via the encoding scheme) multilinear arithmetic circuits of the items encoded in the obfuscation. Moreover, the expansion of these multilinear circuits into a sum-of-monomials form, will only have one element from each group in each monomial (note that this expansion may be inefficient and the number of monomials can even be exponential). We call this a *cross-linear polynomial*.

The main challenge for simulation is “zero testing” of cross linear polynomials, given their circuit representation:<sup>5</sup> determining whether or not a polynomial  $f$  computed by the adversary takes value 0 on the items encoded in the obfuscation. We note that this is where we exploit the generic model—it allows us to reason about what functions the adversary is computing, and to assume that they have the restricted cross-linear form. We also note that zero-testing is a serious challenge, because the simulator does not know the joint distribution of the items encoded in the obfuscation (their joint distribution depends on the branching program  $C$  in its entirety). See Section 3.1 for details on the simulator and on why zero testing is the main challenge for simulation.

A cross-linear polynomial  $f$  computed by the adversary can be decomposed using monomials that only depend on the  $\rho$  variables in the construction outlined above.  $f$  must be a sum of such “ $\rho$ -monomials”, each multiplied with a function of the other variables (the variables derived from the matrices of the branching program and the randomized elements used in the obfuscation). Because of the restricted structure of these  $\rho$ -monomials, they each implicitly specify an assignment to every program group  $\text{prog}_j$  (a bit value for the  $\ell(j)$ -th bit), every binding group  $\text{bind}_T$  (a triple of bit values for the input bits in  $T$ ), and every consistency variable  $\text{cc}_i$  (a bit value for the  $i$ -th bit). We say that the assignment is *full and consistent*, if all of these groups are assigned appropriate values, and the value assigned to each bit  $i$  (0 or 1) is the same in throughout all the groups. We show that if a polynomial  $f$  computed by the adversary contains even a single such  $\rho$ -monomial that is *not full and consistent*, then it will not take 0 value (except with negligible probability over the obfuscator’s coins), and thus it can be simulated. Further, if  $f$  contains only full and consistent  $\rho$ -monomials, the simulator can isolate each of these monomials, discover the associated full and consistent input assignment, and then zero-test  $f$ .

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<sup>5</sup>In fact, all we need is black-box access to the polynomial, and the *guarantee* that it is computable by a polynomial-size arithmetic circuit.



The main remaining concern, as hinted at above, is that  $f$  *might have super-polynomially many* full and consistent  $\rho$ -monomials. Isolating these monomials as described above would then take super-polynomial time (whereas we want a polynomial time black-box simulator). Intuitively, this corresponds to an adversary that can test some condition on the obfuscated circuit’s behavior over super-polynomially many inputs (which the black-box simulator cannot do). Let  $X \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$  denote the (super-polynomial) set of assignments associated with the above  $\rho$ -monomials. We show that given such  $f$  (even via black-box access), it is possible to test whether any given 3CNF formula  $\Phi$  has a satisfying assignment in  $X$ . This yields a *worst-case* “super-polynomial speedup” in solving 3SAT. Since the alleged  $f$  is computable by a polynomial size arithmetic circuit, we get a contradiction to the Bounded Speedup Hypothesis.

This connection to solving 3SAT is proved by building on the “randomizing sub-assignment” technique from [BR13b] and the groups  $\text{bind}_T$ . The intuition is as follows. The generic adversary implicitly specifies a polynomial-size arithmetic circuit that computes the function  $f$ . Recall that  $f$  has many full and consistent  $\rho$ -monomials, each associated with an input  $x \in X \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$ . For a given 3CNF formula  $\Phi$ , we can compute a restriction of  $f$  by setting some of the variables  $\rho_{\text{bind}_T, i, \vec{v}}$  to 0, in a way that “zeroes out” every  $\rho$ -monomial associated with an input  $x \in X$  that does not satisfy  $\Phi$ , which is possible since the binding variables correspond exactly to all possible clauses in a 3CNF formula (see below). We then test to see whether or not the restricted polynomial (which has low degree) is identically 0, i.e. whether any of the  $\rho$ -monomials were *not* “zeroed out” by the above restriction. This tells us whether there exists  $x \in X$  that satisfies  $\Phi$ .

All that remains is to compute the restriction claimed above. For every clause in the 3CNF formula  $\Phi$ , operating on variables  $T = \{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ , there is an assignment  $\vec{v} \in \{0, 1\}^3$  that fails to satisfy the clause. For each such clause, we set the variable  $\rho_{\text{bind}_T, \vec{v}}$  to be 0. This effectively “zeroes out” all of the  $\rho$ -monomials whose associated assignments do not satisfy  $\Phi$  (i.e., the  $\rho$ -monomials whose assignments simultaneously fail to satisfy *all* clauses in  $\Phi$ ).

The full construction and security proof are in Section 3.

## 2 Preliminaries

For all  $n, d \in \mathbb{N}$  we define  $\binom{[n]}{d}$  to be the set of lexicographically ordered sets of cardinality  $d$  in  $[n]$ . More formally:

$$\binom{[n]}{d} = \left\{ \langle i_1, \dots, i_d \rangle \in [n]^d : i_1 < \dots < i_d \right\}.$$

Note that  $\left| \binom{[n]}{d} \right| = \binom{n}{d}$ .

For  $\vec{x} \in \{0, 1\}^n$  and  $I = \langle i_1, \dots, i_d \rangle \in \binom{[n]}{d}$ , we let  $\vec{x}_I \in \{0, 1\}^d$  denote the vector  $\langle \vec{x}[i_1], \dots, \vec{x}[i_d] \rangle$ . We often slightly abuse notation when working with  $\vec{s} = \vec{x}_I$ , and let  $\vec{s}[i_j]$  denote the element  $x[i_j]$  (rather than the  $i_j$ th element in  $\vec{s}$ ).

### 2.1 Branching Programs and Randomizations

A width-5 length- $m$  permutation branching program  $C$  for  $n$ -bit inputs is composed of: a sequence of pairs of permutations represented as 0/1 matrices  $(M_{j,v} \in \{0, 1\}^{5 \times 5})_{j \in [m], v \in \{0, 1\}}$ , a labelling function  $\ell : [m] \rightarrow [n]$ , an accepting permutation  $Q_{\text{acc}}$ , and a rejecting permutation  $Q_{\text{rej}}$  s.t.  $Q_{\text{acc}}^T \cdot \vec{e}_1 = \vec{e}_1$

and  $Q_{\text{rej}}^T \cdot \vec{e}_1 = \vec{e}_k$  for  $k \neq 1$ . Without loss of generality, we assume that all permutation branching programs have the same accepting and rejecting permutations.

For an input  $\vec{x} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , taking  $P = \prod_{j \in [m]} M_{j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]}$ , the program's output is 1 iff  $P = Q_{\text{acc}}$ , and 0 iff  $P = Q_{\text{rej}}$ . If  $P$  is not equal to either of these permutations, then the output is undefined (this will never be the case in any construction we use).

Barrington's Theorem [Bar86] shows that any function in  $\mathcal{NC}^1$ , i.e. a function that can be computed by a circuit of depth  $d$  can be computed by a permutation branching program of length  $4^d$ . Moreover, the theorem is constructive, and gives an algorithm that efficiently transforms any depth  $d$  circuit into a permutation branching program in time  $2^{O(d)}$ . This program is *oblivious*, in the sense that its labeling function is independent of the circuit  $C$  (and depends only on its depth). An immediate implication is that  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  circuits, which have depth  $d(n) = \log(n)$ , can be transformed into polynomial length branching program, in polynomial time.

**Theorem 2.1** (Barrington's Theorem [Bar86]). *For any circuit depth  $d$  and input size  $n$ , there exists a length  $m = 4^d$ , a labeling function  $\ell : [m] \rightarrow [n]$ , an accepting permutation  $Q_{\text{acc}}$  and a rejecting permutation  $Q_{\text{rej}}$ , s.t. the following holds. For any circuit with input size  $n$ , depth  $d$  and fan-in 2, which computes a function  $f$ , there exists a permutation branching program of length  $m$  that uses the labeling function  $\ell(\cdot)$ , has accepting permutation  $Q_{\text{acc}}$  and rejecting permutation  $Q_{\text{rej}}$ , and computes the same function  $f$ .*

*The permutation branching program is computable in time  $\text{poly}(m)$  given the circuit description.*

**Randomized Branching Programs.** Permutation branching programs are amenable to randomization techniques that have proved very useful in cryptography and complexity theory [Bab85, Kil88, FKN94, AIK06]. The idea is to “randomize” each matrix pair while preserving the program's functional behavior. Specifically, taking  $p$  to be a large prime, for  $i \in [m]$  multiply the  $i$ -th matrix pair (on its right) by a random invertible matrix  $\mathcal{Y}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{*5 \times 5}$ , and multiply the  $(i + 1)$ -th pair by  $\mathcal{Y}_i^{-1}$  (on its left). This gives a new branching program:

$$(\mathcal{N}_{j,v})_{j \in [m], v \in \{0,1\}} : \mathcal{N}_{j,v} = (\mathcal{Y}_{j-1}^{-1} \cdot M_{j,v} \cdot \mathcal{Y}_j)$$

(where we take  $\mathcal{Y}_0^{-1}$  to be the identity). The new randomized program preserves functionality in the sense that intermediate matrices cancel out. For an input  $\vec{x} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , taking  $P = \prod_j \mathcal{N}_{j,v}$ , the program accepts  $\vec{x}$  if  $P = (Q_{\text{acc}} \cdot \mathcal{Y}_m)$  (or, equivalently  $P[1,1] = \mathcal{Y}_m[1,1]$ ) and rejects  $\vec{x}$  if  $P = (Q_{\text{rej}} \cdot \mathcal{Y}_m)$  (or, equivalently,  $P[1,1] = \mathcal{Y}_m[k,1]$ , for  $k \neq 1$ ). We note that there is a negligible probability of error due to the multiplication by  $\mathcal{Y}_m$ . In terms of randomization, one can see that for any assignment  $y : [m] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ , the collection of matrices  $(\mathcal{N}_{j,y(j)})_{j \in [m]}$  are uniformly random and independent invertible matrices. We note that this holds even if  $y$  is not a “consistent” assignment: for  $j, j' \in [m] : \ell(j) = \ell(j') = i$ ,  $y$  can assign different values to  $j$  and  $j'$  (corresponding to an inconsistent assignment to the  $i$ -th bit of  $\vec{x}$ ).

Implementing the randomization idea over graded encoding schemes (see Section 2.4) is not immediate, because we do not know an efficient procedure for computing inverses, and we also do not know how to sample random invertible matrices. To handle these difficulties, we utilize a variant of the above idea (see the discussion in Section 1.2).

Instead of  $\mathcal{Y}_j^{-1}$ , we use the adjoint matrix  $\mathcal{Z}_j = \text{adj}(\mathcal{Y}_j)$ , which is composed of determinants of minors of  $\mathcal{Y}$ , and satisfies  $\mathcal{Y} \cdot \mathcal{Z} = \det(\mathcal{Y}) \cdot I$ . We take:

$$(\mathcal{N}_{j,v})_{j \in [m], v \in \{0,1\}} : \mathcal{N}_{j,v} = (\mathcal{Z}_{j-1} \cdot M_{j,v} \cdot \mathcal{Y}_j)$$

(where  $Z_0$  is again the identity matrix). Observe that for  $\vec{x} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , taking  $P = \prod_j \mathcal{N}_{j,v}$ , the program accepts  $\vec{x}$  if  $P[1, 1] = ((\prod_{j \in [m-1]} \det(\mathcal{Y}_j)) \cdot \mathcal{Y}_m)[1, 1]$  and rejects  $\vec{x}$  if  $P[1, 1] = ((\prod_{j \in [m-1]} \det(\mathcal{Y}_j)) \cdot \mathcal{Y}_m)[k, 1]$ . It is not hard to see that this also preserves the randomization property from above. The only remaining subtlety is that we do not know how to pick a uniformly random invertible matrix (without being able to compute inverses). This is not a serious issue, because for a large enough prime  $p$ , we can simply sample uniformly random matrices in  $\mathbb{Z}_p^{5 \times 5}$ , and their joint distribution will be statistically close to uniformly random *and invertible* matrices.

**Lemma 2.2** (Randomized Branching Programs). *For security parameter  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , let  $p_\lambda$  be a prime in  $[2^\lambda, 2^{\lambda+1}]$ . Fix a length- $\ell$  permutation branching program, and let  $y : [m] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  be any assignment function. Let  $(\mathcal{Y}_j)_{j \in [m]}$  be chosen uniformly at random from  $\mathbb{Z}_{p_\lambda}^{5 \times 5}$ , and for  $j \in [m], v \in \{0, 1\}$  take  $\mathcal{N}_{j,v} = (Z_{j-1} \cdot M_{j,v} \cdot \mathcal{Y}_j)$ . (where  $Z_0$  is the identity matrix).*

*Then the joint distribution of  $(\mathcal{N}_{j,y(j)})_{j \in [m]}$  is  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ -statistically close to uniformly random and independent.*

## 2.2 The Bounded Speedup Hypothesis (BSH)

The *Bounded Speedup Hypothesis* was introduced in [BR13b] as a strengthening of the exponential time hypothesis (ETH). Formally, the hypothesis is as follows.

**Definition 2.3** ( $\mathcal{X}$ -3-SAT Solver). Consider a family of sets  $\mathcal{X} = \{X_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  such that  $X_n \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$ . We say that an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  is a  $\mathcal{X}$ -3-SAT solver if it solves the 3-SAT problem, restricted to inputs in  $\mathcal{X}$ . Namely, given a 3-CNF formula  $\Phi : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ ,  $\mathcal{A}$  finds whether there exists  $x \in X_n$  such that  $\Phi(x) = 1$ .

**Assumption 2.4** (Bounded Speedup Hypothesis). *There exists a polynomial  $p(\cdot)$ , such that for any  $\mathcal{X}$ -3-SAT solver that runs in time  $t(\cdot)$ , the family of sets  $\mathcal{X}$  is of size at most  $p(t(\cdot))$ .*

The plausibility of this assumption is discussed in [BR13b, Appendix A], where it is shown that a quasi-polynomial variant of BSH follows from ETH. Further evidence comes from the field of parameterized complexity.

## 2.3 Obfuscation

**Definition 2.5** (Virtual Black-Box Obfuscator [BGI<sup>+</sup>12]). Let  $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  be a family of polynomial-size circuits, where  $\mathcal{C}_n$  is a set of boolean circuits operating on inputs of length  $n$ . And let  $\mathcal{O}$  be a PPTM algorithm, which takes as input an input length  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , a circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}_n$ , a security parameter  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , and outputs a boolean circuit  $\mathcal{O}(C)$  (not necessarily in  $\mathcal{C}$ ).

$\mathcal{O}$  is a (black-box) *obfuscator* for the circuit family  $\mathcal{C}$  if it satisfies:

1. *Preserving Functionality*: For every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , and every  $C \in \mathcal{C}_n$ , and every  $\vec{x} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , with all but  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$  probability over the coins of  $\mathcal{O}$ :

$$(\mathcal{O}(C, 1^n, \lambda))(\vec{x}) = C(\vec{x})$$

2. *Polynomial Slowdown*: For every  $n, \lambda \in \mathbb{N}$  and  $C \in \mathcal{C}$ , the circuit  $\mathcal{O}(C, 1^n, 1^\lambda)$  is of size at most  $\text{poly}(|C|, n, \lambda)$ .

3. *Virtual Black-Box*: For every (non-uniform) polynomial size adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a (non-uniform) polynomial size simulator  $\mathcal{S}$ , such that for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  and for every  $C \in \mathcal{C}_n$ :

$$\left| \Pr_{\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{O}(C, 1^n, 1^\lambda)) = 1] - \Pr_{\mathcal{S}}[\mathcal{S}^C(1^{|C|}, 1^n, 1^\lambda) = 1] \right| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

**Remark 2.6.** A stronger notion of functionality, which also appears in the literature, requires that with overwhelming probability the obfuscated circuit is correct on every input simultaneously. We use the relaxed requirement that for every input (individually) the obfuscated circuit is correct with overwhelming probability (in both cases the probability is only over the obfuscator's coins). We note that our construction can be modified to achieve the stronger functionality property (by using a ring of sufficiently large size and the union bound).

**Definition 2.7** (Indistinguishability Obfuscator [BGI<sup>+</sup>12]). Let  $\mathcal{C}$  be a circuit family and  $\mathcal{O}$  a PPTM as in Definition 2.5.  $\mathcal{O}$  is an *indistinguishability obfuscator* for  $\mathcal{C}$  if it satisfies the preserving functionality and polynomial slowdown properties of Definition 2.5 with respect to  $\mathcal{C}$ , but the virtual black-box property is replaced with:

3. *Indistinguishable Obfuscation*: For every (non-uniform) polynomial size adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  and for every  $C_1, C_2 \in \mathcal{C}_n$  s.t.  $|C_1| = |C_2|$  and  $C_1 \equiv C_2$ :

$$\left| \Pr_{\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{O}(C_1, 1^n, 1^\lambda)) = 1] - \Pr_{\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{O}(C_2, 1^n, 1^\lambda)) = 1] \right| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

**Definition 2.8** (iO2: Indistinguishability Obfuscator, Alternative Formulation). Let  $\mathcal{C}$  be a circuit family and  $\mathcal{O}$  a PPTM as in Definition 2.5.  $\mathcal{O}$  is an *indistinguishability obfuscator2* (iO2) for  $\mathcal{C}$  if it satisfies the preserving functionality and polynomial slowdown properties of Definition 2.5 with respect to  $\mathcal{C}$ , but the virtual black-box property is replaced with:

3. *Unbounded simulation*: For every (non-uniform) polynomial size adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a computationally unbounded simulator  $\mathcal{S}$ , such that for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  and for every  $C \in \mathcal{C}_n$ :

$$\left| \Pr_{\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{O}(C, 1^n, 1^\lambda)) = 1] - \Pr_{\mathcal{S}}[\mathcal{S}^C(1^{|C|}, 1^n, 1^\lambda) = 1] \right| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

**Lemma 2.9.** Let  $\mathcal{C}$  be a circuit family and  $\mathcal{O}$  a PPTM as in Definition 2.5. Then  $\mathcal{O}$  is iO if and only if it is iO2.

*Proof.* Assume that  $\mathcal{O}$  is iO2, let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary and let  $C_1 \equiv C_2 \in \mathcal{C}_n$  s.t.  $|C_1| = |C_2|$ . Then by Definition 2.8 there exists a computationally unbounded  $\mathcal{S}$  such that

$$\left| \Pr_{\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{O}(C_1, 1^n, 1^\lambda)) = 1] - \Pr_{\mathcal{S}}[\mathcal{S}^{C_1}(1^{|C_1|}, 1^n, 1^\lambda) = 1] \right| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

and also

$$\left| \Pr_{\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{O}(C_2, 1^n, 1^\lambda)) = 1] - \Pr_{\mathcal{S}}[\mathcal{S}^{C_2}(1^{|C_2|}, 1^n, 1^\lambda) = 1] \right| = \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

However, since  $C_1 \equiv C_2$ , then  $|C_1| = |C_2|$  and an oracle to  $C_1$  is identical to an oracle to  $C_2$ , and in particular

$$\Pr_{\mathcal{S}}[\mathcal{S}^{C_1}(1^{|C_1|}, 1^n, 1^\lambda) = 1] = \Pr_{\mathcal{S}}[\mathcal{S}^{C_2}(1^{|C_2|}, 1^n, 1^\lambda) = 1] .$$

The triangle inequality immediately implies that

$$\left| \Pr_{\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{O}(C_1, 1^n, 1^\lambda)) = 1] - \Pr_{\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{O}(C_2, 1^n, 1^\lambda)) = 1] \right| = \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

and therefore  $\mathcal{O}$  is iO.

In the opposite direction, let  $\mathcal{O}$  be iO and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary. We define the following simulator  $\mathcal{S}^C(1^{|C|}, 1^n, 1^\lambda)$ . The simulator first queries the oracle  $C$  on all  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , thus obtaining its truth table. Then it performs exhaustive search over all  $C'$  of size  $1^{|C|}$  and finds  $C' \in \mathcal{C}$  such that  $C' \equiv C$  (this can be tested using the truth table). Finally the simulator outputs  $\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{O}(C', 1^n, 1^\lambda))$ .

By definition we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \left| \Pr_{\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{O}(C, 1^n, 1^\lambda)) = 1] - \Pr_{\mathcal{S}}[\mathcal{S}^C(1^{|C|}, 1^n, 1^\lambda) = 1] \right| = \\ \left| \Pr_{\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{O}(C, 1^n, 1^\lambda)) = 1] - \Pr_{\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}}[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{O}(C', 1^n, 1^\lambda)) = 1] \right| , \end{aligned}$$

and since  $C \equiv C'$  and  $\mathcal{O}$  is iO, this quantity is negligible and iO2 follows.  $\square$

## 2.4 Graded Encoding Schemes

We begin with the definition of a graded encoding scheme, due to Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13a]. While their construction is very general, for our purposes a more restricted setting is sufficient as defined below.

**Definition 2.10** ( $\tau$ -Graded Encoding Scheme [GGH13a]). A  $\tau$ -encoding scheme for an integer  $\tau \in \mathbb{N}$  and ring  $R$ , is a collection of sets  $\mathcal{S} = \{S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha)} \subset \{0, 1\}^* : \vec{v} \in \{0, 1\}^\tau, \alpha \in R\}$  with the following properties:

1. For every index  $\vec{v} \in \{0, 1\}^\tau$ , the sets  $\{S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha)} : \alpha \in R\}$  are disjoint, and so they are a partition of the indexed set  $S_{\vec{v}} = \bigcup_{\alpha \in R} S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha)}$ .

In this work, for a  $5 \times 5$  matrix  $\mathcal{Y}$ , we use  $S_{\vec{v}}^{(\mathcal{Y})}$  to denote the set of  $5 \times 5$  matrices where for all  $i, j \in [5]$ , the matrix's  $[i, j]$ -th entry contains an element in  $S_{\vec{v}}^{(\mathcal{Y}[i, j])}$ .

2. There are binary operations “+” and “−” such that for all  $\vec{v} \in \{0, 1\}^\tau$ ,  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in R$  and for all  $u_1 \in S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha_1)}$ ,  $u_2 \in S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha_2)}$ :

$$u_1 + u_2 \in S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)} \quad \text{and} \quad u_1 - u_2 \in S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha_1 - \alpha_2)} ,$$

where  $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2$  and  $\alpha_1 - \alpha_2$  are addition and subtraction in  $R$ .

3. There is an associative binary operation “ $\times$ ” such that for all  $\vec{v}_1, \vec{v}_2 \in \{0, 1\}^\tau$  such that  $\vec{v}_1 + \vec{v}_2 \in \{0, 1\}^\tau$ , for all  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in R$  and for all  $u_1 \in S_{\vec{v}_1}^{(\alpha_1)}$ ,  $u_2 \in S_{\vec{v}_2}^{(\alpha_2)}$ , it holds that

$$u_1 \times u_2 \in S_{\vec{v}_1 + \vec{v}_2}^{(\alpha_1 \cdot \alpha_2)} ,$$

where  $\alpha_1 \cdot \alpha_2$  is multiplication in  $R$ .

In this work, the ring  $R$  will always be  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  for a prime  $p$ .

For the reader who is familiar with [GGH13a], we note that the above is the special case of their construction, in which we consider only binary index vectors (in the [GGH13a] notation, this corresponds to setting  $\kappa = 1$ ), and we construct our encoding schemes to be *asymmetric* (as will become apparent below when we define our zero-text index  $\mathbf{vzt} = \vec{1}$ ).

**Definition 2.11** (Efficient Procedures for a  $\tau$ -Graded Encoding Scheme [GGH13a]). We consider  $\tau$ -graded encoding schemes (see above) where the following procedures are efficiently computable.

- **Instance Generation:**  $\text{InstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\tau)$  outputs the set of parameters  $params$ , a description of a  $\tau$ -Graded Encoding Scheme. (Recall that we only consider Graded Encoding Schemes over the set indices  $\{0, 1\}^\tau$ , with zero testing in the set  $S_{\vec{1}}$ ). In addition, the procedure outputs a subset  $evparams \subset params$  that is sufficient for computing addition, multiplication and zero testing<sup>6</sup> (but possibly insufficient for encoding or for randomization).
- **Ring Sampler:**  $\text{samp}(params)$  outputs a “level zero encoding”  $a \in S_0^{(\alpha)}$  for a nearly uniform  $\alpha \in_R R$ .
- **Encode and Re-Randomize:**<sup>7</sup>  $\text{encRand}(params, i, a)$  takes as input an index  $i \in [\tau]$  and  $a \in S_0^{(\alpha)}$ , and outputs an encoding  $u \in S_{\vec{e}_i}^{(\alpha)}$ , where the distribution of  $u$  is (statistically close to being) only dependent on  $\alpha$  and not otherwise dependent of  $a$ .
- **Addition and Negation:**  $\text{add}(evparams, u_1, u_2)$  takes  $u_1 \in S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha_1)}$ ,  $u_2 \in S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha_2)}$ , and outputs  $w \in S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)}$ . (If the two operands are not in the same indexed set, then  $\text{add}$  returns  $\perp$ ). We often use the notation  $u_1 + u_2$  to denote this operation when  $evparams$  is clear from the context. Similarly,  $\text{negate}(evparams, u_1) \in S_{\vec{v}}^{(-\alpha_1)}$ .
- **Multiplication:**  $\text{mult}(evparams, u_1, u_2)$  takes  $u_1 \in S_{\vec{v}_1}^{(\alpha_1)}$ ,  $u_2 \in S_{\vec{v}_2}^{(\alpha_2)}$ . If  $\vec{v}_1 + \vec{v}_2 \in \{0, 1\}^\tau$  (i.e. every coordinate in  $\vec{v}_1 + \vec{v}_2$  is at most 1), then  $\text{mult}$  outputs  $w \in S_{\vec{v}_1 + \vec{v}_2}^{(\alpha_1 \cdot \alpha_2)}$ . Otherwise,  $\text{mult}$  outputs  $\perp$ . We often use the notation  $u_1 \times u_2$  to denote this operation when  $evparams$  is clear from the context.
- **Zero Test:**  $\text{isZero}(evparams, u)$  outputs 1 if  $u \in S_{\vec{1}}^{(0)}$ , and 0 otherwise.

In the [GGH13a, CLT13] constructions, encodings are *noisy* and the noise level increases with addition and multiplication operations, so one has to be careful not to go over a specified noise bound. However, the parameters can be set so as to support  $O(\tau)$  operations, which are sufficient for our purposes. We therefore ignore noise management throughout this manuscript. An additional subtle issue is that with negligible probability the initial noise may be too big. However this can be avoided by adding rejection sampling to  $\text{samp}$  and therefore ignored throughout the manuscript as well.

<sup>6</sup>The “zero testing” parameter  $\mathbf{pzt}$  defined in [GGH13a] is a part of  $evparams$ .

<sup>7</sup>This functionality is not explicitly provided by [GGH13a], however it can be obtained by combining their encoding and re-randomization procedures.

As was done in [BR13a, BR13b], our definition deviates from that of [GGH13a]. We define two sets of parameters  $params$  and  $evparams$ . While the former will be used by the obfuscator in our construction (and therefore will not be revealed to an external adversary), the latter will be used when evaluating an obfuscated program (and thus will be known to an adversary). When instantiating our definition, the guideline is to make  $evparams$  minimal so as to give the least amount of information to the adversary. In particular, in the known candidates [GGH13a, CLT13],  $evparams$  only needs to contain the zero-test parameter  $\mathbf{pzt}$  (as well as the global modulus).

## 2.5 The Generic Graded Encoding Scheme Model

We would like to prove the security of our construction against *generic adversaries*. To this end, we will use the *generic graded encoding scheme* model, which was previously used in [BR13a], and is analogous to the *generic group model* (see Shoup [Sho97] and Maurer [Mau05]). In this model, an algorithm/adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  can only interact with the graded encoding scheme via oracle calls to the `add`, `mult`, and `isZero` operations from Definition 2.11. Note that, in particular, we only allow access to the operations that can be run using  $evparams$ . To the best of our knowledge, non-generic attacks on known schemes, e.g. [GGH13a], require use of  $params$  and cannot be mounted when only  $evparams$  is given.

We use  $\mathcal{G}$  to denote an oracle that answers adversary calls. The oracle operates as follows: for each index  $\vec{v} \in \{0, 1\}^\tau$ , the elements of the indexed set  $S_{\vec{v}} = \bigcup_{\alpha \in R} S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha)}$  are arbitrary binary strings. The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  can manipulate these strings using oracle calls (via  $\mathcal{G}$ ) to the graded encoding scheme’s functionalities. For example, the adversary can use  $\mathcal{G}$  to perform an `add` call: taking strings  $s_1 \in S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha_1)}$ ,  $s_2 \in S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha_2)}$ , encoding indexed ring elements  $(\vec{v}, \alpha_1)$ ,  $(\vec{v}, \alpha_2)$  (respectively), and obtaining a string  $s \in S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)}$ , encoding the indexed ring element  $(\vec{v}, (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2))$ .

We say that  $\mathcal{A}$  is a generic algorithm (or adversary) for a problem on graded encoding schemes (e.g. for computing a moral equivalent of discreet log), if it can accomplish this task with respect to *any* oracle representing a graded encoding scheme, see below.

In the `add` example above, there may be many strings/encodings in the set  $S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha_1 + \alpha_2)}$ . One immediate question is *which* of these elements should be returned by the call to `add`. In our abstraction, for each  $\vec{v} \in \{0, 1\}^\tau$  and  $\alpha \in R$ ,  $\mathcal{G}$  always uses a *single unique encoding* of the indexed ring element  $(\vec{v}, \alpha)$ . I.e. the set  $S_{\vec{v}}^\alpha$  is a singleton. Thus, the representation of items in the graded encoding scheme is given by a map  $\sigma(\vec{v}, \alpha)$  from  $\vec{v} \in \{0, 1\}^\tau$  and  $\alpha \in R$ , to  $\{0, 1\}^*$ . We restrict our attention to the case where this mapping has polynomial blowup.

**Remark 2.12** (Unique versus Randomized Representation). *We note that the known candidates of secure graded encoding schemes [GGH13a, CLT13] do not provide unique encodings: their encodings are probabilistic. Nonetheless, in the generic graded encoding scheme abstraction we find it helpful to restrict our attention to schemes with unique encodings. For the purposes of proving security against generic adversaries, this makes sense: a generic adversary should work for any implementation of the oracle  $\mathcal{G}$ , and in particular also for an implementation that uses unique encodings.*

*Moreover, our perspective is that unique encodings are more “helpful” to an adversary than randomized encodings: a unique encoding gives the adversary the additional power to “automatically” check whether two encodings are of the same indexed ring element (without consulting the oracle). Thus, we prefer to prove security against generic adversaries even for unique representations.*

It is important to note that the set of legal encodings may be very sparse within the set of images of  $\sigma$ , and indeed this is the main setting we will consider when we study the generic model.

In this case, the only way for  $\mathcal{A}$  to obtain a valid representation of any element in any graded set is via calls to the oracle (except with negligible probability). Finally, we note that if oracle calls contain invalid operators (e.g. the input is not an encoding of an element in any graded set, the inputs to **add** are not in the same graded set, etc.), then the oracle returns  $\perp$ .

**Random Graded Encoding Scheme Oracle.** We focus on a particular randomized oracle: the random generic encoding scheme (GES) oracle  $\mathcal{RG}$ .  $\mathcal{RG}$  operates as follows: for each indexed ring element (with index  $\vec{v} \in \{0,1\}^\tau$  and ring element  $\sigma \in R$ ), its encoding is of length  $\ell = (|\tau| \cdot \log |R| \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda))$  (where  $|\tau|$  is the bit representation length of  $\tau$ ). The encoding of each indexed ring element is a uniformly random string of length  $\ell$ . In particular, this implies that the only way that  $\mathcal{A}$  can obtain valid encodings is by calls to the oracle  $\mathcal{RG}$  (except with negligible probability).

The definitions of secure obfuscation in the random GES model are as follows.

**Definition 2.13** (Virtual Black-Box in the Random GES Model). Let  $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  be a family of circuits and  $\mathcal{O}$  a PPTM as in Definition 2.5.

A generic algorithm  $\mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{RG}}$  is an obfuscator *in the random generic encoding scheme model*, if it satisfies the functionality and polynomial slowdown properties of Definition 2.5 with respect to  $\mathcal{C}$  and to *any* GES oracle  $\mathcal{RG}$ , but the virtual black-box property is replaced with:

3. *Virtual Black-Box in the Random GES Model:* For every (non-uniform) polynomial size *generic* adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a (non-uniform) generic polynomial size simulator  $\mathcal{S}$ , such that for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  and every  $C \in \mathcal{C}_n$ :

$$\left| \left( \Pr_{\mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}} [\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{RG}}(\mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{RG}}(C, 1^n, 1^\lambda))] = 1 \right) - \left( \Pr_{\mathcal{S}} [\mathcal{S}^C(1^{|C|}, 1^n, 1^\lambda)] = 1 \right) \right| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

**Remark 2.14.** We remark that it makes sense to allow  $\mathcal{S}$  to access the oracle  $\mathcal{RG}$ . However, this is in not really necessary. The reason is that  $\mathcal{RG}$  can be implemented in polynomial time (as described below), and therefore  $\mathcal{S}$  itself can implement  $\mathcal{RG}$ .

**Definition 2.15** (GiO: Indistinguishability Obfuscator in the Random GES Model). Let  $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  be a family of circuits and  $\mathcal{O}$  a PPTM as in Definition 2.5. A generic algorithm  $\mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{RG}}$  is an indistinguishability obfuscator *in the random generic encoding scheme model*, if it satisfies the functionality and polynomial slowdown properties of Definition 2.5 with respect to  $\mathcal{C}$  and to *any* GES oracle  $\mathcal{RG}$ , but the virtual black-box property is replaced with:

3. *Indistinguishable Obfuscation in the Random GES Model:* For every (non-uniform) polynomial size *generic* adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  and for every  $C_1, C_2 \in \mathcal{C}_n$  s.t.  $C_1 \equiv C_2$  and  $|C_1| = |C_2|$ :

$$\left| \left( \Pr_{\mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}} [\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{RG}}(\mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{RG}}(C_1, 1^n, 1^\lambda))] = 1 \right) - \left( \Pr_{\mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}} [\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{RG}}(\mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{RG}}(C_2, 1^n, 1^\lambda))] = 1 \right) \right| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

**Definition 2.16** (GiO2: Indistinguishability Obfuscator in the Random GES Model, Alternative Formulation). Let  $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  be a family of circuits and  $\mathcal{O}$  a PPTM as in Definition 2.5. A generic algorithm  $\mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{RG}}$  is an *indistinguishability obfuscator2* *in the random generic encoding scheme model* (GiO2), if it satisfies the functionality and polynomial slowdown properties of Definition 2.5 with respect to  $\mathcal{C}$  and to *any* GES oracle  $\mathcal{RG}$ , but the virtual black-box property is replaced with:



3. *Indistinguishable Obfuscation2 in the Random GES Model:* For every (non-uniform) polynomial size *generic* adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a (possibly computationally unbounded) simulator  $\mathcal{S}$ , such that for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  and every  $C \in \mathcal{C}_n$ :

$$|\left(\Pr_{\mathcal{RG}, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{A}}[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{RG}}(\mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{RG}}(C, 1^n, 1^\lambda))] = 1\right) - (\Pr_{\mathcal{S}}[\mathcal{S}^C(1^{|C|}, 1^n, 1^\lambda)] = 1)| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

The following lemma asserts the equivalence between GiO and GiO2 in the generic model. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 2.9 (note that  $\mathcal{S}$  does not need access to  $\mathcal{RG}$ ).

**Lemma 2.17.** *Let  $\mathcal{C}$  be a circuit family and  $\mathcal{O} = \mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{RG}}$  an oracle PPTM as in Definition 2.5. Then  $\mathcal{O}$  is GiO if and only if it is GiO2.*

**Online Random GES Oracle.** In our proof, we will use the property that the oracle  $\mathcal{RG}$  can be approximated to within negligible statistical distance by an *online polynomial time process*, which samples the representations on-the-fly. Specifically, the oracle will maintain a table of entries of the form  $(\vec{v}, \alpha, \text{label}_{\vec{v}, \alpha})$ , where  $\text{label}_{\vec{v}, \alpha} \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$  is the representation of  $S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha)}$  in  $\mathcal{RG}$  (the table is initially empty). Every time  $\mathcal{RG}$  is called for some functionality, it checks that its operands indeed correspond to an entry in the table, in which case it can retrieve the appropriate  $(\vec{v}, \alpha)$  to perform the operation (if the operands are not in the table,  $\mathcal{RG}$  returns  $\perp$ ). Whenever  $\mathcal{RG}$  needs to return a value  $S_{\vec{v}}^{(\alpha)}$ , it checks whether  $(\vec{v}, \alpha)$  is already in the table, and if so returns the appropriate  $\text{label}_{\vec{v}, \alpha}$ . Otherwise it samples a new uniform label, and inserts a new entry into the table.

When interacting with an adversary that only makes a polynomial number of calls, the online version of  $\mathcal{RG}$  is within negligible statistical distance of the offline version (in fact, the statistical distance is exponentially small in  $\lambda$ ). This is because the only case when the online oracle implementation differs from the offline one is when the adversary guesses a valid label that it has not seen (in the offline setting). This can only occur with exponentially small probability due to the sparsity of the labels. The running time of the online oracle is polynomial in the number of oracle calls.

### 3 Obfuscating $\mathcal{NC}^1$

See Section 1.2 for an overview of the construction. We proceed with a formal description of the obfuscator. Functionality follows by construction, virtual black-box security is proved in Section 3.1 below.

**Obfuscator  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}$ , on input**  $(1^\lambda, 1^n, C = (\dots, (M_{j,0}, M_{j,1}), \dots)_{j \in [m]})$

**Input:** Security parameter  $\lambda$ ; Number of input variables  $n$ ; Oblivious permutation branching program  $C$  (with labeling function  $\ell$ ), where  $(M_{j,b})_{j \in [m], b \in \{0,1\}}$  are  $5 \times 5$  permutation matrices. Let  $Q_{\text{acc}}, Q_{\text{rej}}$  be the accepting and rejecting permutations for  $C$  (see Section 2.1).

**Output:** Obfuscated program for  $C$ .

**Execution:**

1. **Generate asymmetric encoding scheme.**

Generate  $(\text{params}, \text{evparams}) \leftarrow \text{InstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\tau)$ , where  $\tau = m + n + \binom{n}{3} + 1$ .

Namely, we have  $\tau$  level-1 groups. As explained above, we denote these groups as follows:

- Groups  $1, \dots, m$  are related to the execution of the branching program and are denoted  $\text{prog}_1, \dots, \text{prog}_m$ .
- Groups  $m+1, \dots, m+n$  are related to consistency check and are denoted  $\text{cc}_1, \dots, \text{cc}_n$ .
- Groups  $m+n+1, \dots, m+n+\binom{n}{3}$  are used to bind triples of variables and are denoted  $\text{bind}_T$ , for  $T \in \binom{[n]}{3}$ .
- Lastly, the group  $m+n+\binom{n}{3}+1$  is the check group and is denoted  $\text{chk}$ .

We let  $L(i)$  denote the set of groups that are related to the  $i$ th variable:

$$L(i) = \{\text{prog}_j : i = \ell(j)\} \cup \{\text{bind}_T : i \in T\} \cup \{\text{cc}_i\}.$$

We let  $L$  denote the set of all groups:  $L = \cup_{i \in [n]} L(i) \cup \text{chk}$ .

## 2. Generate consistency check variables.

For all  $i \in [n]$ :

- (a) for each  $\text{grp} \in (L(i) \setminus \{\text{cc}_i\})$  and  $v \in \{0, 1\}$ :  $b_{\text{grp}, i, v} \leftarrow \text{samp}(params) \in S_0^{(\beta_{\text{grp}, i, v})}$ .<sup>8</sup>
- (b)  $b'_{\text{cc}_i} \leftarrow \text{samp}(params) \in S_0^{(\beta'_{\text{cc}_i})}$   
for  $v \in \{0, 1\}$ :  $b_{\text{cc}_i, i, v} \leftarrow b'_{\text{cc}_i} \times \left( \prod_{\text{grp} \in (L(i) \setminus \{\text{cc}_i\})} b_{\text{grp}, i, (1-v)} \right) \in S_0^{(\beta_{\text{cc}_i, v})}$
- (c)  $c_i \leftarrow \prod_{\text{grp} \in L(i)} b_{\text{grp}, i, 0} \in S_0^{(\gamma_i)}$ , where  $\gamma_i = \prod_{\text{grp} \in L(i)} \beta_{\text{grp}, i, 0} = \prod_{\text{grp} \in L(i)} \beta_{\text{grp}, i, 1}$

## 3. Generate randomizing matrices.

For each  $j \in [m]$ :

Sample  $Y_j \leftarrow \text{samp}(params)^{5 \times 5} \in S_0^{(\mathcal{Y}_j)}$ ,

and compute  $Z_j = \text{adj}(Y_j) \in S_0^{(\mathcal{Z}_j)}$ , s.t.  $\mathcal{Y}_j \cdot \mathcal{Z}_j = \det(\mathcal{Y}_j) \cdot I$

Sample  $Z_0 \leftarrow \text{samp}(params)^{5 \times 5} \in S_0^{(\mathcal{Z}_0)}$

## 4. Encode elements in program groups (prog).

For each  $j \in [m]$  and  $v \in \{0, 1\}$ :

$$D_{\text{prog}_j, v} \leftarrow b_{\text{prog}_j, v} \cdot (Z_{j-1} \times M_{j, v} \times Y_j) \in S_0^{(\mathcal{D}_{j, v})}, \text{ where } \mathcal{D}_{j, v} = (\beta_{\text{prog}_j, v} \cdot \underbrace{(Z_{j-1} \cdot M_{j, v} \cdot \mathcal{Y}_j)}_{\mathcal{N}_{j, v}})$$

$$r_{\text{prog}_j, v} \leftarrow \text{samp}(params) \in S_0^{(\rho_{\text{prog}_j, v})}, K_{\text{prog}_j, v} \leftarrow (\rho_{\text{prog}_j, v} \times D_{j, v}) \in S_0^{(\rho_{\text{prog}_j, v} \cdot \mathcal{D}_{j, v})}$$

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<sup>8</sup>For notational convenience, we drop  $i$  when it is uniquely defined by  $\text{grp}$ . E.g., we use  $\beta_{\text{prog}_j, v}$  to refer to  $\beta_{\text{prog}_j, \ell(j), v}$ .

$$w_{\text{prog}_j,v} \leftarrow \text{encRand}(params, \text{prog}_j, r_{j,v}) \in S_{\vec{e}_{\text{prog}_j}}^{(\rho_{\text{prog}_j,v})},$$

$$U_{\text{prog}_j,v} \leftarrow \text{encRand}(params, \text{prog}_j, K_{\text{prog}_j,v}) \in S_{\vec{e}_{\text{prog}_j}}^{(\rho_{\text{prog}_j,v} \cdot \mathcal{D}_{j,v})}$$

5. **Encode elements in consistency check groups (cc).**

For each  $i \in [n]$  and  $v \in \{0, 1\}$ :

$$d_{\text{cc}_i,v} \leftarrow b_{\text{cc}_i,\vec{v}[i]} \in S_0^{(\delta_{\text{cc}_i,v})}, \text{ where } \delta_{\text{cc}_i,v} = \beta_{\text{cc}_i,v}.$$

$$r_{\text{cc}_i,v} \leftarrow \text{samp}(params) \in S_0^{(\rho_{\text{cc}_i,v})}, q_{\text{cc}_i,v} \leftarrow (r_{\text{cc}_i,v} \cdot d_{\text{cc}_i,v}) \in S_0^{(\rho_{\text{cc}_i,v} \cdot \delta_{\text{cc}_i,v})}$$

$$w_{\text{cc}_i,v} \leftarrow \text{encRand}(params, \text{cc}_i, r_{\text{cc}_i,v}) \in S_{\vec{e}_{\text{cc}_i}}^{(\rho_{\text{cc}_i,v})}$$

$$u_{\text{cc}_i,v} \leftarrow \text{encRand}(params, \text{cc}_i, q_{\text{cc}_i,v}) \in S_{\vec{e}_{\text{cc}_i}}^{(\rho_{\text{cc}_i,v} \cdot \delta_{\text{cc}_i,v})}$$

6. **Encode elements in binding groups (bind).**

For each  $T \in \binom{[n]}{3}$  and  $\vec{v} \in \{0, 1\}^3$ :

$$d_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}} \leftarrow (\prod_{i \in T} b_{\text{bind}_T,i,\vec{v}[i]}) \in S_0^{(\delta_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}})}, \text{ where } \delta_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}} = \prod_{i \in T} \beta_{\text{bind}_T,i,\vec{v}[i]}$$

$$r_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}} \leftarrow \text{samp}(params) \in S_0^{(\rho_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}})}, q_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}} \leftarrow (r_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}} \cdot d_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}}) \in S_0^{(\rho_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}} \cdot \delta_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}})}$$

$$w_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}} \leftarrow \text{encRand}(params, \text{bind}_T, r_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}}) \in S_{\vec{e}_{\text{bind}_T}}^{(\rho_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}})},$$

$$u_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}} \leftarrow \text{encRand}(params, \text{bind}_T, q_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}}) \in S_{\vec{e}_{\text{bind}_T}}^{(\rho_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}} \cdot \delta_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}})}$$

7. **Encode elements in last group (chk).**

$$d_{\text{chk}} \leftarrow ((\prod_{i \in [n]} c_i) \cdot (\prod_{j \in [m-1]} \det(Y_j)) \cdot Z_0 \cdot Y_m)[1, 1] \in S_0^{(\delta_{\text{chk}})},$$

$$\text{where } \delta_{\text{chk}} = ((\prod_{i \in [n]} \gamma_i) \cdot (\prod_{j \in [m-1]} \det(\mathcal{Y}_j)) \cdot Z_0 \cdot \mathcal{Y}_m)[1, 1]$$

$$r_{\text{chk}} \leftarrow \text{samp}(params) \in S_0^{(\rho_{\text{chk}})}, q_{\text{chk}} \leftarrow r_{\text{chk}} \cdot d_{\text{chk}} \in S_0^{(\rho_{\text{chk}} \cdot \delta_{\text{chk}})}$$

$$w_{\text{chk}} \leftarrow \text{encRand}(params, \text{chk}, r_{\text{chk}}) \in S_{\vec{e}_{\text{chk}}}^{(\rho_{\text{chk}})},$$

$$u_{\text{chk}} \leftarrow \text{encRand}(params, \text{chk}, q_{\text{chk}}) \in S_{\vec{e}_{\text{chk}}}^{(\rho_{\text{chk}} \cdot \delta_{\text{chk}})}$$

8. **Output.**

Output  $evparams$  and the obfuscation:

$$\left( \{(w_{\text{prog}_j,v}, U_{\text{prog}_j,v})\}_{j \in [m], v \in \{0,1\}}, \{(w_{\text{cc}_i,v}, u_{\text{cc}_i,v})\}_{i \in [n], v \in \{0,1\}}, \right.$$

$$\left. \{(w_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}}, u_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}})\}_{T \in \binom{[n]}{3}, \vec{v} \in \{0,1\}^3}, (w_{\text{chk}}, u_{\text{chk}}) \right)$$

**Evaluation, on input  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$**

1.  $\mathbf{t} \leftarrow (u_{\text{chk}} \cdot (\prod_{j \in [m]} U_{\text{prog}_j, x[\ell(j)]}) \cdot (\prod_{T \in \binom{[n]}{3}} u_{\text{bind}_T, x|_T}) \cdot (\prod_{i \in [n]} u_{\text{cc}_i, x[i]})) [1, 1]$
2.  $\mathbf{t}' \leftarrow (u_{\text{chk}} \cdot (\prod_{j \in [m]} w_{\text{prog}_j, x[\ell(j)]}) \cdot (\prod_{T \in \binom{[n]}{3}} w_{\text{bind}_T, x|_T}) \cdot (\prod_{i \in [n]} w_{\text{cc}_i, x[i]}))$
3. output the bit:  $\text{isZero}(\text{evparams}, (\mathbf{t} - \mathbf{t}'))$ .

### 3.1 Security Proof

We prove the security of  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}$  in the generic GES model (Section 2.5), under the Bounded Speedup Hypothesis (Section 2.2), as stated below.

**Theorem 3.1.** *Under the bounded speedup hypothesis,  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}$  is a virtual black-box obfuscator in the random GES model for the class  $\text{NC}^1$ .*

In the course of the proof, we will also derive the indistinguishability obfuscation property of  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}$ , which will follow without requiring BSH. To this end, recall that by Lemma 2.17, the existence of an exponential-time black-box simulator implies indistinguishability obfuscation. See Remark 3.13 in the body of the proof. Further, we note that, for only achieving indistinguishability obfuscation, the construction can also be simplified, and the groups  $\text{bind}$  are not needed.

**Theorem 3.2.**  *$\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}$  is an indistinguishability obfuscator in the random GES model for the class  $\text{NC}^1$ .*

We show how to simulate the a random GES oracle  $\mathcal{RG}$ , for an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , using only black-box access to the obfuscated circuit  $C$ . The high-level simulation strategy follows the methodology of [BR13a, BR13b]. Similarly to the  $\mathcal{RG}$  oracle, the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  will generate labels for new elements on the fly, and will maintain a table with all previously returned labels and the ring elements that they encode.

As the simulation proceeds,  $\mathcal{S}$  needs to produce encodings of unknown ring elements. For example, to begin the simulation,  $\mathcal{S}$  generates a dummy obfuscated circuit composed of labels that are uniformly random strings. Here,  $\mathcal{S}$  does not know (some of) the underlying ring elements in the obfuscation’s labellings ( $\mathcal{S}$  cannot produce a correct simulated program together with the underlying ring elements without the code of  $C$ ). Throughout the execution (and in this initial step), when  $\mathcal{S}$  needs to produce labellings of unknown ring elements, it returns a uniformly random string of the appropriate length, and lists the respective ring element as an “unknown variable” in its table. When group operations are performed on the labellings of unknown variables,  $\mathcal{S}$  derives an arithmetic circuit that represents the result (as a function of the unknown variables), and stores that circuit in the table together with the output’s labelling. Thus,  $\mathcal{S}$  maintains a list of labellings, together with either the underlying ring element, or a variable that represents its unknown value (for labellings in the obfuscation itself), or an arithmetic circuit over these “basic unknown variables”. The only thing that is missing in order to simulate  $\mathcal{RG}$  perfectly, is maintaining consistency: If two unknown variables are supposed to be equal (when the real  $\mathcal{RG}$  is used), then they should also be given the same label in the simulation (and in particular an  $\text{isZero}$  call on their difference should return 1). The main difficulty in simulation is identifying whether an arithmetic circuit over the unknown variables computes the zero function when the basic variables are properly distributed

(i.e. jointly distributed as in the distribution produced by an execution of  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}(C)$ ). This is the only ability that  $\mathcal{S}$  needs in order to simulate  $\mathcal{RG}$  perfectly.

We proceed with a high level description of the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$ . We will denote by  $\vec{\rho}$  the collection of all  $\rho$  variables generated by  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}$ , by  $\vec{\delta}$  the collection of all  $\delta$  variables, and by  $\vec{\mathcal{D}}$  the collection of all elements of the  $\mathcal{D}$  matrices (see a full description below in Section 3.1.1). We say that a variable  $d \in \vec{\delta} \cup \vec{\mathcal{D}}$  is *associated with* a variable  $\rho \in \vec{\rho}$ , if an encoding of  $\rho \cdot d$  appears in the obfuscated program. Note that this is an asymmetric and non-commutative relation. Note also that in the  $\text{prog}_j$  groups, each  $\rho$  variable is associated with a number of variables that correspond to the elements of the matrix  $\mathcal{D}$ , whereas in the other groups, each  $\rho$  variable is only associated with a single  $\delta$  variable.

Consider the distribution of the ring elements that underly the labellings in the obfuscation. There are labellings of the  $\vec{\rho}$  variables, and for each  $\rho$  variables, there are labelings of its product with the variables (or variable) that are associated with it. The distribution of the  $\vec{\rho}$  variables is known (they are uniformly random), and so the simulator can generate them itself. The (joint) distribution of the  $\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}}$  variables depends on the circuit  $C$ , and is not known to the simulator. These are the “basic unknown variables” referred to above.

The simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  starts by generating a simulated obfuscated program as discussed above. The labellings in this dummy obfuscation are all uniformly random strings. Claim 3.8 shows that, with all but negligible probability, the underlying ring elements in the *real* obfuscation are all distinct w.h.p. In particular, the real distribution of the obfuscation of any circuit  $C$  (in the random GES model) is statistically close to uniformly random strings. Thus, the initial real and simulated obfuscation labellings are statistically close, and  $\mathcal{S}$  proceeds to simulate  $\mathcal{A}$  as explained above.

The detailed technical description of how  $\mathcal{S}$  maintains its table, and produces the arithmetic circuits, is identical to [BR13a, BR13b], and is therefore omitted here. From those works, it follows that all of the elements underlying labellings that are produced by the adversary can be represented by multilinear polynomials in the variables  $\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}}$ . Moreover, due to constraints induced by the random GES model, these multilinear polynomials have a special *cross-linear* structure. They are *cross-linear* polynomials:

**Definition 3.3** (cross-linear monomial). A *cross-linear monomial*  $g(\vec{\rho})$  is a multilinear monomial of  $\rho$  variables, where each variable  $\rho_{\text{grp},i}$  comes from a different group  $\text{grp}$ . A cross-linear monomial is *full* if it contains exactly one variable from each group.

Given a cross-linear monomial  $g(\vec{\rho})$ , we say that a variable in  $\vec{\delta} \cup \vec{\mathcal{D}}$  is *associated with*  $g$  if it is associated with one of the variables in  $g$ .

**Definition 3.4** (cross-linear term, cross-linear polynomial). A *cross-linear term* is a multilinear function  $f(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}})$  which can be expressed as  $f(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}) = g(\vec{\rho}) \cdot h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}})$ , such that  $g(\vec{\rho})$  is a cross-linear monomial, and  $h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}})$  is a multilinear function of the  $\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}}$  variables that are induced by  $g$ .

A *cross-linear polynomial* is a sum of cross-linear terms.

**Organization.** The remainder of the security proof is organized as follows. In Section 3.1.1, we analyze the joint distribution  $\text{ODist}_C$  of the  $\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}}$  variables in the obfuscation. In Section 3.1.2, we show how to determine, given oracle access to the circuit  $C$ , whether an arithmetic circuit  $f(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}})$ , which computes a cross-linear polynomial, computes the zero function over the distribution  $\text{ODist}_C$  produced by  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}(C)$  (we emphasize again that this distribution is not known to  $\mathcal{S}$ ).

### 3.1.1 The Basic Variables and the Distribution $\text{ODist}_C$

For a security parameter  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , consider the obfuscation of an  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  circuit  $C$ . The obfuscation is generated by choosing parameters for a graded encoding scheme, and then picking ring elements for the various labelings. The output labelings are defined by the underlying matrices and ring elements:

$$\begin{aligned} & \{(\rho_{\text{prog}_j, v}, \mathcal{D}_{\text{prog}_j, v})\}_{j \in [m], v \in \{0,1\}}, \\ & \{(\rho_{\text{bind}_T, \vec{v}}, \delta_{\text{bind}_T, \vec{v}})\}_{T \in \binom{[n]}{3}, \vec{v} \in \{0,1\}^3}, \\ & \{(\rho_{\text{cc}_i, v}, \delta_{\text{cc}_i, v})\}_{i \in [n], v \in \{0,1\}}, \\ & (\rho_{\text{chk}}, \delta_{\text{chk}}) \end{aligned}$$

Note that these matrix entries and ring elements are *not independently distributed* (though each of them, on its own, is close to uniformly random in  $R$ ). In the security proof, we treat these matrices and ring elements as variables, since they are unknown to the simulator (all that  $\mathcal{S}$  knows is that these variables were sampled in the process of obfuscating a circuit).

We divide these variables into three vectors as follows:

- The  $\rho$  random variables:

$$\vec{\rho} = ((\rho_{\text{prog}_j, v})_{j \in [m], v \in \{0,1\}}, (\rho_{\text{bind}_T, \vec{v}})_{T \in \binom{[n]}{3}, \vec{v} \in \{0,1\}^3}, (\rho_{\text{cc}_i, v})_{i \in [n], v \in \{0,1\}}, \rho_{\text{chk}}).$$

- The  $\mathcal{D}$  random-variable matrices:  $\vec{\mathcal{D}} = (\mathcal{D}_{\text{prog}_j, v})_{j \in [m], v \in \{0,1\}}.$

- The  $\delta$  random variables:  $\vec{\delta} = ((\delta_{\text{bind}_T, \vec{v}})_{T \in \binom{[n]}{3}, \vec{v} \in \{0,1\}^3}, (\delta_{\text{cc}_i, v})_{i \in [n], v \in \{0,1\}}, \delta_{\text{chk}}).$

For a circuit  $C$ , we consider the joint distribution of these variables:

**Definition 3.5** (Distribution  $\text{ODist}_C$ ). For an  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  circuit  $C$ , we define the distribution  $\text{ODist}_C$  over  $(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\mathcal{D}}, \vec{\delta})$  to be the *joint* distribution of the  $\rho$  variables, the  $\mathcal{D}$  matrices, and the  $\delta$  variables, in an obfuscation of  $C$  using the obfuscator  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}$ .

In this section, we analyze the structure and properties of the  $\text{ODist}_C$  distribution. These properties will be used to show efficient simulation. Note that, by the construction of  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}$ , the  $\vec{\rho}$  variables are uniformly and independently random, regardless of the circuit  $C$ . The joint distribution of the  $\vec{\mathcal{D}}$  matrices and  $\vec{\delta}$  variables, on the other hand, is not independent and is determined by the circuit  $C$ . These are themselves products of more basic variables, and we analyze their structure below. First, we define the notion of an assignment to the groups in  $L$ . This notion, and the properties of such assignments, will be helpful in analyzing the distribution  $\text{ODist}_C$ .

**Definition 3.6** (Assignments and associated variables). An *assignment*  $y$  to the groups in  $L$  is a partial function  $y : L \rightarrow \{0,1\} \cup \{0,1\}^3$ . An assignment maps a subset of the programs groups  $\{\text{prog}_j\}_{j \in [m]}$  to bits in  $\{0,1\}$ , a subset of the binding groups  $\{\text{bind}_T\}_{T \in \binom{[n]}{3}}$  to 3-tuples in  $\{0,1\}^3$ , a subset of the consistency groups  $\{\text{cc}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ , to bits in  $\{0,1\}$ , and the check group  $\text{chk}$  always to 0.

For an assignment  $y$ , the *variables associated with the assignment* are: (i) for each group  $\text{prog}_j$  on which  $y$  is defined, the  $\mathcal{D}$  matrix  $\{\mathcal{D}_{\text{prog}_j, y(\text{prog}_j)}\}$  (at most one out of each pair), (ii) for each group  $\text{bind}_T$  on which  $y$  is defined, the variable  $\delta_{\text{bind}_T, y(T)}$  (one out of each 8-tuple), (iii) for each group  $\text{cc}_i$  on which  $y$  is defined, the variable  $\delta_{\text{cc}_i, y(i)}$  (at most one out of each pair), and (iv) for the group  $\text{chk}$ , if  $y$  is defined on it, the variable  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$ .

**Definition 3.7** (Consistent and full assignments). Let  $y : L \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \cup \{0, 1\}^3$  be a partial function (i.e. one that is not necessarily defined on its entire domain). We say that  $y$  is *consistent with*  $\vec{x} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , if: (i) for all  $j \in [m]$  s.t.  $y(\text{prog}_j)$  is defined,  $\vec{x}_{\ell(j)} = y(\text{prog}_j)$ , (ii) for all  $T \in \binom{[n]}{3}$  s.t.  $y(\text{bind}_T)$  is defined,  $\vec{x}_T = y(\text{bind}_T)$ , and (iii) for all  $i \in [n]$  s.t.  $y(\text{cc}_i)$  is defined,  $\vec{x}_i = y(\text{cc}_i)$ .

We say that  $y$  is *consistent* if it is consistent with some  $\vec{x} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ .

If  $y$  is a total function, we say that it is also *full*.

**Underlying Variables.** Recall the underlying variables and their distributions:

1. Matrices  $\{\mathcal{N}_{j,v}\}_{j \in [m], v \in \{0,1\}}$ . Recall that these matrices are computed by taking  $\mathcal{N}_{j,v} \leftarrow \mathcal{Z}_{j-1} \cdot M_{j,v} \cdot \mathcal{V}_j$ , where  $\mathcal{V}_j$  is a uniformly random  $5 \times 5$  matrix. In particular, for any assignment  $y : [m] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ , the matrices  $(\mathcal{N}_{j,y(j)})_{j \in [m]}$  are  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ -statistically close to uniformly random and independent  $5 \times 5$  matrices over the ring  $R$  (see Lemma 2.2).  
We further recall that  $\mathcal{Z}_{j-1} = \text{adj}(\mathcal{V}_{j-1})$ , and therefore each element in  $\mathcal{N}_{j,v}$  is in fact a degree 5 multilinear polynomial in the  $\mathcal{V}$  variables (which are all uniformly random).
2. Program  $\beta$ -variables  $\{\beta_{\text{prog}_j,v}\}_{k \in [m], v \in \{0,1\}}$ . These are all uniformly random and independent over  $R$  (even conditioned on the  $\mathcal{N}$  matrices).
3. Binding  $\beta$ -variables  $\{\beta_{\text{bind}_T,i,\vec{v}}\}_{T \in \binom{[n]}{3}, i \in T, \vec{v} \in \{0,1\}^3}$ . These are all uniformly random and independent over  $R$  (even conditioned on the  $\mathcal{N}$  matrices and the program  $\beta$ -variables).
4. Consistency  $\beta$ -variables  $\{\beta_{\text{cc}_i,v}\}_{i \in [n], v \in \{0,1\}}$ . For each  $i \in [n]$ , we choose a uniformly random  $\beta'_{\text{cc}_i}$  variable, and take  $\beta_{\text{cc}_i,v} \leftarrow \beta'_{\text{cc}_i} \cdot (\prod_{\text{grp} \in L(i)} \beta_{\text{grp},i,(1-v)})$ . The uniformly random  $\beta'_{\text{cc}_i}$  “randomizes” the  $i$ -th pair of consistency variables: for any assignment  $y : [n] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ , the collection of variables  $(\beta_{\text{cc}_i,y(i)})_{i \in [n]}$  are  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ -close to uniformly random and independent (even conditioned on the  $\mathcal{N}$  matrices, and on the program and binding  $\beta$ -variables).

**$\mathcal{D}$  matrices and  $\delta$  variables.** In turn, the underlying  $\mathcal{N}$  matrices and  $\beta$  variables whose distributions are specified above completely determine the  $\mathcal{D}$  matrices and  $\delta$  variables, whose distributions will be discussed throughout the simulation proof, as follows:

1. Matrices  $\{\mathcal{D}_{j,v}\}_{j \in [m], v \in \{0,1\}}$ , where  $\mathcal{D}_{j,v} \leftarrow \beta_{\text{prog}_j,v} \cdot \mathcal{N}_{j,v}$ . By the above, we get that for any assignment  $y : [m] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  (i.e. when choosing one matrix from each pair), the matrices  $(\mathcal{D}_{j,y(j)})_{j \in [m]}$  are  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ -statistically close to uniformly random.
2. Binding  $\delta$ -variables  $\{\delta_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}}\}_{T \in \binom{[n]}{3}, \vec{v} \in \{0,1\}^3}$ , where  $\delta_{\text{bind}_T,\vec{v}} \leftarrow \prod_{i \in T} \beta_{\text{bind}_T,i,\vec{v}[i]}$ . By the above, these variables are all  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ -close to uniformly random and independent (even conditioned on the  $\mathcal{D}$  matrices).
3. Consistency  $\delta$ -variables  $\{\delta_{\text{cc}_i,v}\}_{i \in [n], v \in \{0,1\}}$ , where  $\delta_{\text{cc}_i,v} \leftarrow \beta_{\text{cc}_i,v}$ . By the above, for any assignment  $y : [n] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  (i.e. when choosing one  $\delta$  from each pair), these variables  $(\delta_{\text{cc}_i,y(i)})_{i \in [n]}$  are  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ -close to uniformly random and independent (even conditioned on the  $\mathcal{D}$  matrices and on the  $\delta$  binding variables).

4. Checking  $\delta$ -variable  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$ . The main difficulty for simulation is that the distribution of  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$  is *not independent* of the other variables, in fact it is completely determined by them, via a function that depends on the obfuscated circuit  $C$  (see more below). Since  $\mathcal{S}$  does not know the explicit function  $C$ , it does not know the joint distribution of the  $(\vec{\mathcal{D}}, \vec{\delta})$  variables.

**Properties of  $\text{ODist}_C$ .** We proceed to analyze the distribution of the  $\mathcal{D}$  matrices and  $\vec{\delta}$  variables in  $\text{ODist}_C$ , with the goal of understanding dependencies between these variables (and achieving efficient simulation for the obfuscation). The dependence of  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$  on the other variables is of particular interest.

First, in Claim 3.8, we prove that with high probability the ring elements encoded in the obfuscation are all distinct w.h.p. This, in turn, implies that in the GES model they will all be represented by uniformly random strings.

**Claim 3.8.** *For any  $C \in \mathcal{NC}^1$ , with all but  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$  probability over  $(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}}) \sim \text{ODist}_C$ , the encoded ring elements in the obfuscation are all distinct.*

*Proof.* By the properties of the probability space underlying  $\text{ODist}_C$ , we observe that with all but  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$  probability it is the case that: (i) the entries of every  $\mathcal{D}$  matrix are distinct and not in  $\{0, 1\}$ . This because each of these matrices is uniformly random on its own (even though each matrix pair is not independent of each other). Moreover (ii) none of the  $\vec{\delta}$  variables are in  $\{0, 1\}$ . The  $\vec{\rho}$  variables are all uniform and independently random ring elements, and they are each multiplied with distinct items, none of which is 0 or 1.

Now, since the encoded ring elements are the  $\vec{\rho}$  variables, and the products of a  $\vec{\rho}$  variables with a  $\mathcal{D}$  matrix or a  $\delta$  variable (each  $\rho$  variable is multiplied with a single matrix or a single  $\delta$  variable), then the difference between two such values always takes the form  $\rho_1 d_1 - \rho_2 d_2$  (where the  $d$  values are 0 only with negligible probability). If the  $\rho$  values are different, then the difference is 0 with negligible probability. If the  $\rho$  values are the same, then either  $d_1 = 1$  (w.l.o.g), or both  $d_1, d_2$  are both elements of the same matrix  $\mathcal{D}$ . In both cases, since the marginal distribution of  $\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}}$  is uniform and pairwise independent as explained above, the probability that the difference is 0 is negligible. Taking the union bound over all pairs completes the proof.  $\square$

Now consider an assignment  $y : L \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \cup \{0, 1\}^3$  (possibly a partial or non-consistent assignment). Recall from above, that the variables associated with the assignment  $y$  (see Definition 3.6) are all independent and uniformly random. *The only dependent variable is  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$* , which might be completely determined by the other variables (in a way that depends on the circuit  $C$ ).

We show that if  $y$  is not a full and consistent assignment (see Definition 3.7), then all the variables associated with  $y$  are (negligibly close to being) jointly uniform and independent. This is shown in Lemma 3.9. On the other hand, if  $y$  is a full and consistent assignment corresponding to some input  $\vec{x} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , then the joint distribution of the associated variables is completely determined by  $C(x)$  (regardless of any other property of  $C$ ). In particular,  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$  is completely determined by the other variables via a fixed multilinear function that is efficiently computable from  $C(x)$ . This is stated in Lemma 3.9. Looking ahead, it implies that  $\mathcal{S}$  can simulate the joint distribution of all variables *together with  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$*  given only  $C(\vec{x})$  (which is available from black-box access).

**Lemma 3.9** (marginal distribution for *inconsistent* assignment). *For any assignment  $y : L \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \cup \{0, 1\}^3$  that is not full and consistent, the joint distributions of the the variables associated with  $y$  is  $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ -statistically close to uniformly random.*



*Proof.* We prove that if  $\text{samp}(params)$  samples labelings of uniform elements in  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  (rather than in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ ), then the variables stated in the claim are uniform in  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  and independent. Since the statistical distance from the real setting is  $(poly(m)/p)$ , the claim follows.

We consider two cases. The easy case is where  $y$  is not defined on  $\text{chk}$ . In which case,  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$  is not associated with  $y$ . Since all other variables are jointly uniform and independent for *any* assumption as we explained above, the result will follow.

Let us now consider the case where  $y$  is defined over  $\text{chk}$ , but is still not full or is inconsistent. We know that for any assignment  $y$ , the joint distribution of the variables associated with  $y$ , without  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$ , is  $negl(\lambda)$ -close to uniformly random. We want to show if  $y$  is not full and consistent, then even given all of these variables,  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$  is still close to uniformly random.

Consider an assignment  $y$  that is not full or is not consistent. Namely, either there exists  $\text{grp} \in L$  corresponding to an input bit  $i^* \in [n]$ , s.t.  $\text{grp}$  is not in the domain of  $y$ , or there exist  $\text{grp}_1, \text{grp}_2 \in L$  that do not agree on the value that should be assigned to some bit  $i^*$  of  $\vec{x}$ .

We have:

$$\delta_{\text{chk}} = \gamma_{i^*} \cdot \left( \left( \prod_{i \in [n]: i \neq i^*} \gamma_i \right) \cdot \left( \prod_{j \in [m]} \det(\mathcal{Y}_j) \right) \cdot \mathcal{Y}_m[1, 1] \right)$$

We show below that  $\gamma_{i^*}$  is uniformly random and independent of the variables associated with  $y$ . In particular, this implies that it is also uniformly random and independent conditioned on the product  $\left( \left( \prod_{i \in [n]: i \neq i^*} \gamma_i \right) \cdot \left( \prod_{j \in [m]} \det(\mathcal{Y}_j) \right) \cdot \mathcal{Y}_m[1, 1] \right)$ . When we multiply this product by  $\gamma_{i^*}$  we get a uniformly random  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$  that is independent of the variables associated with  $y$  (recall that we've assumed that the ring elements are all drawn from  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , in particular this means that the product by which we multiply  $\gamma_{i^*}$  is non-zero). The lemma follows.

To prove independence of  $\gamma_{i^*}$ , first observe that  $\gamma_{i^*}$  is independent and uniformly random conditioned on the variables associated with  $y$  that are not in  $L(i^*)$ . It remains to show that it is further independent of the variables that are associated with  $y$  and are also in  $L(i^*)$ , let us slightly abuse notation and denote them by  $y \cap L(i^*)$ .

First, consider the case where  $y$  is not associated with any variable in  $\text{cc}_{i^*}$ . Recall that we can express  $\gamma_{i^*}$  as

$$\gamma_{i^*} = \beta'_{\text{cc}_{i^*}} \cdot \prod_{v \in \{0,1\}} \left( \prod_{j \in [m]: \ell(j)=i^*} \beta_{\text{prog}_j, v} \right) \cdot \left( \prod_{T \in \binom{[n]}{3}: i^* \in T} \beta_{\text{bind}_T, i^*, v} \right).$$

From this expression it follows that  $\gamma_{i^*}$  is independent of all others, due to the variable  $\beta'_{\text{cc}_{i^*}}$ .

Otherwise, Let  $v \in \{0,1\}$  be such that  $y$  is associated with  $\delta_{\text{cc}_{i^*}, v}$ . Then there exists a variable of the form  $\delta_{\text{prog}_j, i^*, v}$  or  $\delta_{\text{bind}_T, i^*, v}$  s.t.  $\vec{v}[i^*] = v$  which is not associated with  $y$ . If we express  $\gamma_{i^*}$  as

$$\gamma_{i^*} = \left( \prod_{j \in [m]: \ell(j)=i^*} \beta_{\text{prog}_j, v} \right) \cdot \left( \prod_{T \in \binom{[n]}{3}: i^* \in T} \beta_{\text{bind}_T, i^*, v} \right) \cdot (\beta_{\text{cc}_{i^*}, v}),$$

we can see that one of the  $\beta$  values in the product is independent of the variables in  $y \cap L(i^*)$ . The independence of  $\gamma_{i^*}$  follows.  $\square$

**Lemma 3.10** (marginal distribution for *consistent* assignment). *For any full and consistent assignment  $y : L \rightarrow \{0,1\} \cup \{0,1\}^3$ , which is consistent with an input  $\vec{x} \in \{0,1\}^n$ , the joint distribution of the variables associated with  $y$  is uniformly random.*

Given these variables, and the value of  $C(\vec{x})$ , the value of  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$  is completely determined. It is given by a fixed and known multi-linear polynomial in the variables, and can be computed in polynomial time.

*Proof.* By the above, the variables are all uniformly random. Let  $\vec{x}$  be the input that is consistent with  $y$ . Recall that the circuit  $C$  is an oblivious permutation branching program, with pairs of matrices  $(M_{j,0}, M_{j,1})_{j \in [m]}$ , the accepting permutation is  $Q_{\text{acc}}$ , and the rejecting permutation is  $Q_{\text{rej}}$  (see Section 2.1). Note that the accepting and rejecting permutations are fixed and public, and so their inverses  $Q_{\text{acc}}, Q_{\text{rej}}$  are also fixed, known and public.

Observe that, by the definition of the branching program, for any input  $\vec{x} \in \{0, 1\}^n$  (accepting or rejecting), we have:

$$\prod_{j \in [m]} M_{j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]} = C(x)Q_{\text{acc}} + (1 - C(x))Q_{\text{rej}} ,$$

which implies that

$$\prod_{j \in [m]} \mathcal{N}_{j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]} = \left( \prod_{j \in [m]} \mathcal{Z}_{j-1} M_{j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]} \mathcal{Y}_j \right) = \left( \prod_{j \in [m-1]} \det(\mathcal{Y}_j) \right) (C(x)Q_{\text{acc}} + (1 - C(x))Q_{\text{rej}}) \mathcal{Y}_m . \quad (1)$$

We note that  $(C(x)Q_{\text{acc}} + (1 - C(x))Q_{\text{rej}})^{-1} = (C(x)Q_{\text{acc}}^{-1} + (1 - C(x))Q_{\text{rej}}^{-1})$  (to see this, check the two possible values for  $C(x)$ ). Therefore Eq. (1) is equivalent to

$$(C(x)Q_{\text{acc}}^{-1} + (1 - C(x))Q_{\text{rej}}^{-1}) \prod_{j \in [m]} \mathcal{N}_{j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]} = \left( \prod_{j \in [m-1]} \det(\mathcal{Y}_j) \right) \mathcal{Y}_m . \quad (2)$$

Let us multiply both sides of the equation by  $\prod_j \beta_{\text{prog}_j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]}$ , and recall that by definition  $\mathcal{D}_{j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]} = \beta_{\text{prog}_j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]} \cdot \mathcal{N}_{j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]}$ . We get

$$(C(x)Q_{\text{acc}}^{-1} + (1 - C(x))Q_{\text{rej}}^{-1}) \prod_{j \in [m]} \mathcal{D}_{j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]} = \left( \prod_j \beta_{\text{prog}_j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]} \right) \left( \prod_{j \in [m-1]} \det(\mathcal{Y}_j) \right) \mathcal{Y}_m . \quad (3)$$

We now multiply both sides of the equation by  $\prod_T \prod_{i \in T} \beta_{\text{bind}_T, i, x_i} = \prod_T \delta_{\text{bind}_T, x|_T}$ , and by  $\prod_i \beta_{\text{cc}_i, x_i} = \prod_i \delta_{\text{cc}_i, x_i}$ :

$$\begin{aligned} & (C(x)Q_{\text{acc}}^{-1} + (1 - C(x))Q_{\text{rej}}^{-1}) \cdot \left( \prod_i \delta_{\text{cc}_i, x_i} \right) \cdot \left( \prod_T \delta_{\text{bind}_T, x|_T} \right) \cdot \left( \prod_{j \in [m]} \mathcal{D}_{j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]} \right) = \\ & \left( \prod_i \beta_{\text{cc}_i, x_i} \right) \cdot \left( \prod_T \prod_{i \in T} \beta_{\text{bind}_T, i, x_i} \right) \cdot \left( \prod_j \beta_{\text{prog}_j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]} \right) \left( \prod_{j \in [m-1]} \det(\mathcal{Y}_j) \right) \mathcal{Y}_m . \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Finally, we note that

$$\left( \prod_i \beta_{\text{cc}_i, x_i} \right) \cdot \left( \prod_T \prod_{i \in T} \beta_{\text{bind}_T, i, x_i} \right) \cdot \left( \prod_j \beta_{\text{prog}_j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]} \right) = \prod_i \left( \prod_{\text{grp} \in L(i)} \beta_{\text{grp}, i, x_i} \right) = \prod_i \gamma_i . \quad (5)$$

Combining Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), we get that

$$\begin{aligned} \delta_{\text{chk}} &= \left( \prod_i \gamma_i \right) \cdot \left( \prod_{j \in [m-1]} \det(\mathcal{Y}_j) \right) \cdot \mathcal{Y}_m[1, 1] \\ &= (C(x)Q_{\text{acc}}^{-1} + (1 - C(x))Q_{\text{rej}}^{-1}) \cdot \left( \prod_i \delta_{\text{cc}_i, x_i} \right) \cdot \left( \prod_T \delta_{\text{bind}_T, x|_T} \right) \cdot \left( \prod_{j \in [m]} \mathcal{D}_{j, \vec{x}[\ell(j)]} \right)[1, 1] , \end{aligned}$$

which is indeed a multilinear function of the variables associated with  $y$ , which depends only on  $C(x)$ , and can be computed in time  $\text{poly}(m)$ .  $\square$

### 3.1.2 The Zero-Testing Procedure

In this section, we describe how the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$ , given oracle access to the circuit  $C$ , performs the following zero-testing procedure. Given an arithmetic circuit that computes a cross-linear polynomial  $f(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{D})$ , the simulator has to decide whether when  $(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{D})$  are chosen according to the distribution  $\text{ODist}_C$ ,  $f$  is equivalent to the zero polynomial. We denote this by  $f(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{D})|_{\text{ODist}_C} \equiv 0$ . We recall that the distribution  $\text{ODist}_C$  depends only on  $C$ .

We recall from Section 3.1.1, that the  $\vec{\rho}$  variables are completely uniform and independent. The  $\vec{\delta}, \vec{D}$  variables  $\text{poly}(m)$ -degree polynomials in underlying variables  $\beta, \mathcal{Y}$ , which are themselves uniformly random. Thus, any multi-linear function  $h$  of  $(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{D})$  (and in particular  $f$  and all of its terms), is a polynomial of total degree  $\text{poly}(m) \ll p$  (where  $\mathbb{Z}_p = R$ , the underlying ring for the encoding scheme) over a set of variables that are chosen independently and uniformly at random (the  $\rho$ 's,  $\beta$ 's and  $\mathcal{Y}$ 's). By the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, either  $h(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{D})|_{\text{ODist}_C}$  is zero everywhere, or it is only zero with negligible probability. Therefore, sampling from the distribution  $h(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{D})|_{\text{ODist}_C}$  lets us zero-test.

Since  $f$  is a cross-linear, it can be written as  $f = \sum_{g \in G} g(\vec{\rho}) \cdot h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{D})$ , where  $g(\vec{\rho})$  is a cross-linear monomial, and  $h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{D})$  only contains variables that are associated with  $g$ . We further notice that each cross-linear monomial defines an assignment  $y_g$  in the obvious way: if the variable  $\rho_{\text{grp}, \text{val}}$  appears in  $g$ , then  $y_g(\text{grp}) = \text{val}$ .

The simulator will perform zero-testing by going over the terms and inspecting them one by one (or at least attempting to go over all of them). Since the  $\vec{\rho}$  variables are uniform and independent of each other and of the  $\vec{\delta}, \vec{D}$ , it follows that  $f(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{D})|_{\text{ODist}_C} \equiv 0$  if and only if for all  $g \in G$  we have  $h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{D})|_{\text{ODist}_C} \equiv 0$ . The simulator, therefore, will attempt to go over all possible terms  $g$  and check for each of them whether  $h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{D})|_{\text{ODist}_C} \equiv 0$ . An outline of the zero-test procedure follows:

1. Repeat  $B(n) = \text{poly}(n)$  times (for a polynomial  $B(n)$  which may depend on the running time of  $\mathcal{A}$  and will be explained later):
  - (a) Find an arithmetic circuit that computes one of the cross-linear terms  $t(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{D}) = g(\vec{\rho}) \cdot h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{D})$  of  $f$ . Also compute the assignment  $y_g$ .  
This is done by finding a maximal set of  $\vec{\rho}$  that can be set to zero without zeroing out  $f$  altogether. Such a maximal set is easy to find by finding a  $\rho$  value that was not set to 0 yet, setting it to 0 and checking whether  $f$  remains nonzero (which is tested using Schwartz-Zippel). This process converges since a value that is set to 0 is never unset. The set of surviving  $\rho$  variables define  $y_g$ , and the resulting circuit computes  $t$ .
  - (b) For the term  $t$ , find whether  $h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{D})|_{\text{ODist}_C} \equiv 0$ . If not, output **nonzero**.
  - (c) Set  $f := f - t$  (and find the appropriate arithmetic circuit). If  $f(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{D}) \equiv 0$  (over the variables  $\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{D}$ , not their  $\text{ODist}_C$  value), output **zero**.
2. Output **nonzero**.

We begin by explaining how to perform Step 1b of the above procedure. Namely, how to check, given a cross-linear term  $t$ , whether  $h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}})|_{\text{ODist}_C} \equiv 0$ . This follows from the two lemmas below, depending whether  $y_g$  is consistent and full, or not (which can be checked efficiently).

**Lemma 3.11.** *Let  $g(\vec{\rho})$  be a cross-linear monomial. If the assignment  $y_g$  is not full and consistent, then  $h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}})|_{\text{ODist}_C} \equiv 0$  if and only if  $h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}}) \equiv 0$ .*

*Consequently, in such case there is an efficient way to determine whether  $h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}})|_{\text{ODist}_C} \equiv 0$ .*

*Proof.* This follows from Lemma 3.9, which asserts that in this case, the  $\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}}$  variables associated with  $\vec{\rho}$  are (statistically close to being) jointly uniform and independent.

Since checking whether  $h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}}) \equiv 0$  can be done efficiently by assigning random values, the simulator can also efficiently test whether  $h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}})|_{\text{ODist}_C} \equiv 0$ .  $\square$

**Lemma 3.12.** *Let  $g(\vec{\rho})$  be a cross-linear monomial. If the assignment  $y_g$  is full and consistent, then there is an efficient sampler for the variables associated with  $g$ , according to  $\text{ODist}_C$ .*

*Consequently, in such case there is an efficient way to determine whether  $h_g(\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}})|_{\text{ODist}_C} \equiv 0$ .*

*Proof.* This follows from Lemma 3.10. Let  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$  be the input with which  $y_g$  is consistent. Then the distribution of the  $\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}}$  associated with  $g$  only depend on  $C(x)$ . In particular, all of these variables except  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$  are independent and uniformly random. Thus, their joint distribution can be simulated, and moreover by Lemma 3.10, they uniquely determine the value of  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$ . Given  $C(x)$ , we can compute  $\delta_{\text{chk}}$  efficiently, and thus we can sample from the distribution  $\text{ODist}_C$  and perform a zero test.  $\square$

We conclude that if  $f$  contains less than  $B(n)$  terms, the zero test will be carried out successfully. Furthermore, even if  $f$  contains more than  $B(n)$  terms, but at least one of them is inconsistent, then we will still output the correct value. This is due to Step 2 and Lemma 3.11. The only remaining case is when there are more than  $B(n)$  full and consistent terms. We show that there exists some polynomial  $B(\cdot)$  for which this will contradict the bounded speedup hypothesis (BSH).

**Remark 3.13.** *Theorem 3.2 already follows from the above, by allowing the black-box simulator to run in exponential time. Consider an unbounded simulator that runs for  $B(n) = 2^n + 1$  iterations (larger than the maximal possible number of full and consistent terms): if there exists a nonzero term, it will be found (except with negligible probability) and the simulation will be successful. We emphasize that BSH is not needed for this part of the argument, and one can verify that the argument goes through even without the binding groups  $\text{bind}_T$ .*

Suppose that no such polynomial  $B(n)$  exists, This means that we are in a situation where  $\mathcal{A}$  can (with non-negligible probability) generate a polynomial-size arithmetic circuit, that computes a sum of super-polynomially many full and consistent terms. The following lemma shows that this implies a 3SAT solver that contradicts the BSH. (the lemma gives a randomized solver. It can be converted into a polynomial-size circuit via a standard averaging argument). This completes the proof.

**Lemma 3.14.** *For  $n, \lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , and  $X \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$ , let  $f$  be any cross-linear polynomial of  $(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}})$  s.t.*

$$f = \sum_{x \in X} g_x(\vec{\rho}) \cdot h_{g_x}(\vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}})$$

where  $\forall x \in X$ ,  $g_x$  is a full  $\rho$ -monomial which is consistent with  $x$ , and  $h_{g_x} \neq 0$ .

Then there exists a polynomial-size circuit  $\mathcal{A}^f$  s.t. for any 3-CNF formula  $\Phi$  on  $n$ -bit inputs, the circuit  $\mathcal{A}^f$  on input  $\Phi$  decides whether there exist  $x \in X$  that satisfies  $\Phi$ . I.e.:

$$\forall \text{ 3-CNF } \Phi : \Pr_{\mathcal{A}^f}[\mathcal{A}(\Phi) = \mathbf{1}_{\exists x \in X: \Phi(x)=1}] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

*Proof.* Given a 3CNF formula  $\Phi$ , we construct a distribution  $\text{Dist}_\Phi$  over  $(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}})$  s.t.  $f(\vec{\rho}, \vec{\delta}, \vec{\mathcal{D}})|_{\text{Dist}_\Phi} \equiv 0$  iff there is no satisfying assignment for  $\Phi$  in  $X$ . By efficiently sampling in this distribution, we can perform a zero-test and obtain a (probabilistic) algorithm as claimed in the lemma. We emphasize that the distribution  $\text{Dist}_\Phi$  is quite different from the distribution  $\text{ODist}_C$  we considered elsewhere in this section, and in fact it is completely independent of the circuit  $C$ .

To construct  $\text{Dist}_\Phi$ , consider all triples  $T = \{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ . For each  $T$ , consider all clauses in  $\Phi$  that are supported over exactly  $x_{i_1}, x_{i_2}, x_{i_3}$ . If one of these clauses is *not satisfied* by setting  $(x_{i_1}, x_{i_2}, x_{i_3}) = \vec{v}$ , then set  $\rho_{\text{bind}_T, \vec{v}} \leftarrow 0$ . Otherwise, leave it unassigned. We claim that after these assignment,  $f$  will be equivalent to 0 if and only if there is no  $x \in X$  for which  $\Phi(x) = 1$ .

To see this, consider  $f$  after making the aforementioned 0 assignments. Any term that is consistent with  $x$  s.t.  $\Phi(x) = 0$  will be zeroed, because at least one clause will be unsatisfied, and the  $\rho_{\text{bind}_T, \vec{v}}$  that corresponds to the variables of this clause will be zeroed. Therefore, we will be left with only the terms that correspond to inputs that are accepting w.r.t  $\Phi$ .

Now, by choosing all unassigned variables to be uniformly random, and using the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, we get a zero tester. Notice that this only uses black-box access to  $f$ : we only assign 0 to some variables and random values to others and check the result. (as stated above, this procedure does not use  $C$  at all).  $\square$

## 4 Obfuscating $\mathcal{P}$

In this section we show how to leverage the obfuscator for  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  into one that works for all of  $\mathcal{P}$ . This is done using homomorphic encryption. We start with some background in Section 4.1 and present the obfuscator in Section 4.2.

### 4.1 Homomorphic Encryption

A homomorphic (public-key) encryption scheme  $\text{HE} = (\text{HE.Keygen}, \text{HE.Enc}, \text{HE.Dec}, \text{HE.Eval})$  is a quadruple of PPT algorithms as follows ( $\lambda$  is the security parameter):

- **Key generation**  $(pk, evk, sk) = \text{HE.Keygen}(1^\lambda)$ : Outputs a public encryption key  $pk$ , a public evaluation key  $evk$  and a secret decryption key  $sk$ .
- **Encryption**  $c = \text{HE.Enc}_{pk}(m)$ : Using the public key  $pk$ , encrypts a message  $m$  into a ciphertext  $c$ .
- **Decryption**  $m = \text{HE.Dec}_{sk}(c)$ : Using the secret key  $sk$ , decrypts a ciphertext  $c$  to recover the message  $m$ .
- **Homomorphic evaluation**  $c_f = \text{HE.Eval}_{evk}(f, c_1, \dots, c_\ell)$ : Using the evaluation key  $evk$ , applies a function  $f$  to  $c_1, \dots, c_\ell$ , and outputs a ciphertext  $c_f$ . This function is deterministic.

A homomorphic encryption scheme is said to be secure if it is semantically secure (note that the adversary is given both  $pk$  and  $evk$ ).

Homomorphism w.r.t a class of circuits is defined next.

**Definition 4.1** ( $\mathcal{C}$ -homomorphism). A scheme HE is  $\mathcal{C}$ -homomorphic, for a class of circuits  $\mathcal{C}$ , if for any circuit  $C \in \mathcal{C}$ , and any set of inputs  $m_1, \dots, m_\ell$ , it holds that

$$\Pr [\text{HE.Dec}_{sk}(\text{HE.Eval}_{evk}(f, c_1, \dots, c_\ell)) \neq f(m_1, \dots, m_\ell)] = \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

where  $(pk, evk, sk) = \text{HE.Keygen}(1^\lambda)$  and  $c_i = \text{HE.Enc}_{pk}(m_i)$ .

The existence of homomorphic encryption schemes with shallow decryption has been established in previous works, starting with Gentry's first scheme [Gen09]. The best security currently known is achieved by [BV13], who base security on a standard worst-case lattice hardness assumption.

**Corollary 4.2** ([BV13]). *Let  $s = s(\lambda)$  be a polynomial and let  $\mathcal{C}_s$  be the class of size  $s$  circuits. Then there exists a  $\mathcal{C}_s$ -homomorphic encryption scheme with  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  decryption circuit, whose security is based on the worst-case hardness of the  $\text{GapSVP}_{\text{poly}(n)}$  problem.*

We note that we do not need to assume circular security of the scheme. We only need the standard worst-case lattice assumption that  $\text{GapSVP}_{\text{poly}(n)}$  is hard in the worst case.

## 4.2 The Obfuscator PObf

Our obfuscator PObf is a combines the  $\mathcal{NC}^1$  obfuscator  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}$  from Section 3 with a  $\mathcal{C}_s$ -homomorphic encryption scheme as in Corollary 4.2. It takes a circuit  $C$ , and outputs an obfuscated circuit that reveals nothing except the size of  $C$ .

### Obfuscator PObf, on input $(1^\lambda, C)$

**Input:** Security parameter  $\lambda$ ; Circuit  $C$  of size  $|C| = s$ .

**Output:** Obfuscated program for  $C$ .

**Execution:**

1. Consider the function family which runs an input circuit  $F$  of size  $s$  on a parameter  $x$ . Formally:  $\text{RunMe}_x(F) = F(x)$ . Note that the circuit size of  $\text{RunMe}$  is independent of  $x$  and only depends on  $s$ , denote this value by  $t$ .

Let HE be  $\mathcal{C}_t$ -homomorphic as guaranteed by Corollary 4.2. Generate keys  $(pk, evk, sk) = \text{HE.Keygen}(1^\lambda)$ .

2. Encrypt the input circuit  $C$ :  $\hat{C} = \text{HE.Enc}_{pk}(C)$ .
3. Further consider the function family that applies  $\text{RunMe}$  homomorphically on the encryption of  $C$ :  $\text{EvalMe}_{\hat{C}}(x) = \text{HE.Eval}_{evk}(\text{RunMe}_x, \hat{C})$ . Let  $m$  be the circuit size of  $\text{EvalMe}$ .
4. Consider the verified decryption function  $\text{VerDec}(\hat{v}, w)$ , where  $\hat{v}$  is an encryption of some bit output by  $\text{HE.Eval}$ , and  $w \in \{0, 1\}^m$  is a witness to the execution of  $\text{EvalMe}$ . Namely,  $w$  is the set of values for all wires in the execution of  $\text{EvalMe}$  on some input. The function  $\text{VerDec}$  will first verify that  $w$  is indeed a valid witness to the computation, if not it will return 0 and if yes it will return  $\text{HE.Dec}_{sk}(\hat{v})$ .

Note that  $\text{VerDec}$  is computable in  $\mathcal{NC}^1$ .

5. Let  $O = \text{NC}^1\text{Obf}(\text{VerDec})$ . Output the obfuscation  $(O, \hat{C}, evk)$ .

**Evaluation, on input  $x$**

1. Compute  $\hat{v} = \text{EvalMe}_{\hat{C}}(x)$ , and let  $w \in \{0, 1\}^m$  be the set of values on the wires of  $\text{EvalMe}$  during this computation.
2. Output  $O(\hat{v}, w)$ .

Correctness is immediate by the correctness of HE and  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}$ . Security is proven next.

**Lemma 4.3.** *If  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}$  is virtual black-box secure in the generic GES model, and if HE is semantically secure, then PObf is virtual black-box secure in the generic GES model.*

*Proof.* For and adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , the simulator  $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{P}}$  for PObf will work as follows.

1. Generate keys  $(pk, evk, sk)$  for the homomorphic encryption scheme.
2. Generate  $\hat{C}$  as an encryption of (say) the size  $s$  circuit that always returns 1.
3. Consider the adversary  $\mathcal{A}_1$  against  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}(\text{VerDec})$ : This adversary starts by running PObf with the aforementioned keys and  $\hat{C}$ , and then runs  $\mathcal{A}$  on the output obfuscated program. Let  $\mathcal{S}_{\text{NC}^1}^{(\cdot)}$  be the simulator for  $\mathcal{A}_1$  w.r.t  $\text{NC}^1\text{Obf}(\text{VerDec})$ .
4. Define the function  $\text{VerDec}'(\hat{v}, w)$  as follows: First verify that  $w$  is indeed a witness to an execution of  $\text{EvalMe}$  (with the aforementioned  $\hat{C}$ ). If not, return 0, if yes, extract from  $w$  the input  $x$  to the computation (this is without loss of generality just the first  $n$  values in  $w$ ). Finally, output  $C(x)$ .  
Note that the function  $\text{VerDec}'(\hat{v}, w)$  can be computed by  $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{P}}$  using its oracle access to  $C$ . (Note that unlike the original  $\text{VerDec}$ , the new  $\text{VerDec}'$  does not need the secret key  $sk$ .)
5. Execute  $\mathcal{S}_{\text{NC}^1}^{\text{VerDec}'}$ . (Note that  $\mathcal{S}_{\text{NC}^1}^{(\cdot)}$  is actually prescribed to work with a  $\text{VerDec}$  oracle and not the one we provide.)

To see why the simulation process succeeds, we use a hybrid argument:

- In the first hybrid, we just run  $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{P}}^C$  as described above and output its output.
- We now change  $\hat{C}$  to be the actual encryption of  $C$ , rather than an encryption of a dummy circuit. The rest of  $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{P}}^C$  works the same. This hybrid is indistinguishable from the previous one since  $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{P}}^C$  does not use the secret key, and therefore distinguishing this hybrid from the previous one will break the semantic security of the homomorphic encryption scheme.
- We now replace  $\text{VerDec}'$  with the prescribed  $\text{VerDec}$ . The witness verification that is being performed by  $\text{VerDec}'$ , together with the correctness of the homomorphic evaluation process guarantee that the output of  $\mathcal{S}_{\mathcal{P}}^C$  in this hybrid is negligibly close to the previous one.
- We now replace  $\mathcal{S}_{\text{NC}^1}^{\text{VerDec}'}$  with the actual execution of  $\mathcal{A}_1$ . The virtual black box property guarantees that this hybrid is indistinguishable from the previous one.

However, this hybrid is exactly identical to a proper execution of  $\mathcal{A}(\text{PObf}(C))$ .

The simulation's correctness follows. □

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