

Multi-Key Authenticated Encryption with Corruptions: Reductions are Lossy

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Abstract. We study the security of symmetric encryption schemes in settings with multiple users and realistic adversaries who can adaptively corrupt encryption keys. To avoid confinement to any particular definitional paradigm, we propose a general framework for multi-key security definitions. By appropriate settings of the parameters of the framework, we obtain multi-key variants of many of the existing single-key security notions. This framework is instrumental in establishing our main results. We show that for all single-key secure encryption schemes satisfying a minimal key uniqueness assumption and almost any instantiation of our general multi-key security notion, any reasonable reduction from the multi-key game to a standard single-key game necessarily incurs a linear loss in the number of keys. We prove this result for all three classical single-key security notions capturing confidentiality, authenticity and the combined authenticated encryption notion.

1 Introduction

In theory, most symmetric and public key cryptosystems are considered by default in a single-key setting, yet in reality cryptographic ecosystems provide an abundance of keys—and hence targets—for an adversary to attack. Often one can construct a reduction that shows that single-key security implies multi-key security, but typically such a reduction is lossy: an adversary’s multi-key advantage is roughly bounded by the single-key advantage times the number of keys n in the ecosystem. The ramifications of such a loss can be debated [17], but undeniably in a concrete setting with perhaps 2^{30} to 2^{40} keys in circulation, an *actual* loss of 30 to 40 bits of security would be considerable. Therefore the natural question arises to what extent this loss in the reduction is inevitable, where our focus will be on authenticated encryption (AE).

This inevitability has previously been addressed by Bellare et al. [6] when introducing multi-key security for public key schemes. Specifically, they provided a counterexample: namely a pathological encryption scheme that has a small chance (about $\frac{1}{n}$, where n is a parameter) of leaking the key when used in a single-key environment. In a multi-key scenario, where n users use the scheme, insecurity of the scheme is amplified to the point where it becomes a constant. It follows that any *generic* reduction, i.e. a reduction that works for any scheme, from the multi-key to single-key security must lose a factor of about n . A similar example can be concocted for symmetric schemes to conclude that there cannot be a tight generic reduction from G to AE, i.e. a reduction that works for *all* encryption schemes, since the reduction will not be tight when instantiated by the pathological scheme.

However, when considering black-box reductions, it turns out there are many shades of black. Baecher et al. [4] presented a taxonomy of black-box reductions, where a distinction is made between quite *how* ‘black-box’ the reduction is supposed to be. Consider a setting with a security notion G for primitives (e.g. pseudorandomness for blockciphers), a security notion H for constructions (e.g. ciphertext integrity for authenticated encryption), and suppose we are given a specific construction $C[\mathcal{E}]$ building on any instantiation \mathcal{E} of the primitive. A reduction \mathcal{R} would take adversary \mathcal{A} against the H property of the construction and turn it into one against the G property of the primitive. To be black-box, the reduction \mathcal{R} should not depend on \mathcal{A} , but instead only use \mathcal{A} ’s input/output behaviour. The shades of black emerge when considering whether \mathcal{R} may depend on the construction C and/or the primitive \mathcal{E} or not. A *fully* black-box (BBB) reduction works for all C and \mathcal{E} , however we are interested in the partially black-box (NBN) reduction that can depend on the specific choice of C and \mathcal{E} .

The pathological encryption schemes are by nature rather contrived and the above ones [6] are of dubious security even in the single-key setting. The counter-examples suffice to rule out tight BBB




Fig. 1. A roadmap of our results, showing that some reductions between the security notions for authenticated encryption are necessarily lossy. A green arrow $G \rightarrow G'$ indicates that there is a non-lossy reduction from G' to G (so security in the sense of G implies security in the sense of G'). A red arrow $G \rightarrow G'$ indicates that all reductions from G' to G have a loss that is linear in n .

reductions, but they do *not* rule out the existence of potentially large classes of encryption schemes—perhaps practical ones, or even all *secure* ones—for which a tight reduction *does* exist. Clearly, such an NBN reduction could not be generic, but instead would have to exploit some feature of the specific scheme under consideration. Concluding, for secure schemes the relation between single-key and multi-key security is still largely unsettled.

A more potent tool to investigate the properties of reductions are *meta-reductions* [3, 15, 20]: here the reduction itself is turned (back) into an adversary \mathcal{A}' . A major benefit of meta-reductions is their scope, as they can easily deal with NBN reductions that depend on the construction C and scheme \mathcal{E} . The dependency on the scheme does lead to a minor complication when considering tightness (see Definition 4). Typically the proven ‘inevitable’ loss factor depends on the best possible adversary \mathcal{A}' , which renders the technique vacuous for insecure schemes \mathcal{E} . As a consequence it is not immediate which meta-reductions are of most interest for multi-key AE, given the abundance of relevant security notions (see Sections 2.1 and 3).

Our contribution. In this paper we use meta-reduction techniques to show, for a host of AE security notions, that for any single-key secure encryption scheme satisfying a minimal key uniqueness assumption, any reduction with a reasonable runtime from an n -key game to a single-key game must lose a factor approximately n . This result holds even for reductions that exploit features of the specific scheme.

General security definition The first complication we face is the choice of security notions. As we recall in more detail in Section 2.1, there are many different ways of defining single-key security for AE. For instance, the popular ‘joint’ AE notion decomposes in the orthogonal notions IND–PAS and CTI–CPA and there are different ways of treating nonces. It is not a priori clear which notion would be the ‘right’ one to target for a meta-reductions: picking too strong a notion leaves open the possibility of tighter reductions for schemes only meeting a weaker notion; picking too weak a notion leaves open tighter reductions based on stronger assumptions (so for schemes that meet the stronger notion).

When moving to a multi-key setting, the water becomes even more muddied, especially when considering adaptive corruptions as we do. Adaptive corruptions allow an adversary to learn some of the keys during the course of the multi-key game; it models the real-life circumstance that not all keys will remain secret and some *will* leak. In this setting, security can be formulated in (at least) two ways: firstly using a hidden bit b_i for each key K_i , with the adversary having to guess the bit b_i for a key K_i that has not been corrupted; and secondly, using a single hidden bit b determining the ‘challenge’ oracles for all n keys (e.g. left or right, real or random) with the adversary having to guess this bit b , under the restriction that no single key gets both corrupted and challenged.

As we explain in Appendix B, these two approaches do not appear to be tightly equivalent to each other. Furthermore, notions that used to be equivalent in the single-key setting suddenly start drifting apart, something previously observed in the multi-instance setting [9]. Again, this creates a bit of a conundrum as to what is the ‘right’ multi-key security notion, where we want to avoid a situation where

we show that a reduction loss targeting one security notion is inevitable, while leaving the door open for tight reductions targeting another.

To avoid having to make a choice, we instead provide a general definition for multi-key security game (Definition 7) that allows us to plug in the ‘flavour’ of AE security we desire, and of which the two approaches for dealing with corruptions in a multi-key setting are special cases.

Lower bounds on the loss for simple reductions Roughly speaking, we show that for any member G^n of a large class of n -key security games (for authenticated encryption) that allow for adaptive corruptions, any black-box reduction from G^n to a standard single-key security game H^1 incurs a loss that is close to n for most schemes \mathcal{E} .

Our result uses a meta-reduction idea pioneered for signature schemes [3]. We first consider a *very weak* n -key key-recovery security game, temporarily denoted K^n , and show that reductions from K^n to H^1 are lossy. Then, for any n -key game G^n that tightly implies K^n , the loss from G^n to H^1 will have to match that from K^n to H^1 (or a contradiction would appear when composing the reduction from K^n to G^n with that from G^n to H^1).

At the heart of our results are three meta-reductions showing that any reduction for a *key-unique* scheme from 1-out-of- n key recovery with semi-adaptive corruptions to various single-key authenticated encryption *must* lose $(\frac{1}{n} + \epsilon)^{-1}$, where ϵ is essentially the maximum advantage in the single-key AE security game of an adversary running in time $n \cdot t$. (A scheme is key unique if given sufficient plaintext–ciphertext pairs the key is *always* uniquely determined.) Fig. 1 shows both the logic of our approach and the overall results. The choice for the three H^1 notions AE–PAS, IND–PAS, and CT1–CPA is inspired by their ubiquity in current AE literature, where IND refers to indistinguishability from randomly sampled ciphertexts.

Adapting our meta-reduction to left-or-right indistinguishability appears challenging and it reveals an important distinction between our work and that of Bader et al. [3]. They considered as their H^1 notion a non-interactive assumption, whereas our H^1 games are highly interactive. The main obstacle here is that our meta-reduction needs to simulate an appropriate environment towards *multiple copies* of the reduction, while having access only to a single set of oracles for the considered single-user game. This is particularly challenging in a setting where the meta-reduction rewinds the reduction \mathcal{R} many times, since it is not obvious that the meta-reduction can simply forward queries from all copies of \mathcal{R} to these oracles, because queries across different invocations of \mathcal{R} may interfere with one-another and render the meta-reduction invalid. Thus, we have to devise an additional mechanism that allows to simulate responses to avoid queries that might render the meta-reduction invalid, but in a way such that \mathcal{R} cannot distinguish this simulation from the real oracles in its game.

Bader et al. [3] consider only meta-reductions from non-interactive problems, but there exist several other previous works describing meta-reduction from interactive problems, such as the *one-more discrete logarithm* (OMDL) problem [20,24,36,43]. However, all these works have in common that they consider a significantly simpler setting, where the reduction is rewound a much smaller number of times (typically only once), and with only a single oracle (the discrete logarithm oracle).

Related work. Multi-user security was first considered in the public key setting [6], extending the LOR-CCA notion to a multi-user setting without corruptions. A simple hybrid argument shows the loss of security is at most linear in the number of keys; furthermore this loss is inevitable as demonstrated by a *counterexample*. Relatedly, for many schemes a generic key recovery attack exists whose success probability is linear in both time and the number of keys n [11, 12, 23].

The danger of ignoring the loss in reductions between security notions is by now widely understood [16, 17] and has served as motivation for work on improved security analysis that avoid the loss of generic reductions. Recent results include multi-user security for Even–Mansour [34], AES-GCM as used in TLS [10], double encryption [27], and block ciphers [44].

Tightly secure cryptography is particularly well-understood in the world of public-key cryptography. There are, for instance, many constructions of (identity-based) public-key encryption [6, 14, 18, 25, 29],

digital signatures [1, 13, 28, 32, 33, 42], key exchange protocols [2], as well as several different types of lower bounds and impossibility results [19, 22, 24, 30, 36]. Thus, in comparison to the public-key world, tightness is not yet well-understood in symmetric-key cryptography.

2 Preliminaries

Notation. For any integer $n \geq 1$ we use $[n]$ to denote the set $\{1, \dots, n\}$ and for any $i \in [n]$ we use $[n \setminus i]$ to denote the set $[n] \setminus \{i\}$. For any finite set S we write $x \leftarrow_{\$} S$ to indicate that x is drawn uniformly at random from S . In any security experiment, if an adversary \mathcal{A} has worst-case runtime t , then we say \mathcal{A} is a t -adversary. When \mathcal{A} is clear from the context, we write $t_{\mathcal{A}}$ for its worst case runtime.

2.1 Authenticated Encryption

Syntax. Both the syntax and security definitions for symmetric and then authenticated encryption have evolved over the years. We will use the modern perspective where encryption is deterministic and takes in not just a key and a message, but also a nonce, which could be used to provide an explicit form of randomization. Our syntax is summarized in Definition 1 and is a simplification of that used for subtle authenticated encryption [5]. For simplicity, we omit any associated data, though our later results could be extended to that setting; moreover we are not interested in the ‘subtle’ aspect, where decryption might ‘leak’, e.g. unverified plaintext or multiple error symbols.

Definition 1 (Authenticated encryption). An authenticated encryption scheme is a pair of deterministic algorithms $(\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ satisfying

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E} &: \mathsf{K} \times \mathsf{N} \times \mathsf{M} \rightarrow \mathsf{C} \\ \mathcal{D} &: \mathsf{K} \times \mathsf{N} \times \mathsf{C} \rightarrow \mathsf{M} \cup \{\perp\} \end{aligned}$$

where K , M , N and C are subsets of $\{0, 1\}^*$ whose elements are called keys, messages, nonces and ciphertexts respectively. The unique failure symbol \perp indicates that C was not a valid encryption under the key K with nonce N .

As is customary, we abbreviate $\mathcal{E}(K, N, M)$ by $\mathcal{E}_K^N(M)$ and $\mathcal{D}(K, N, C)$ by $\mathcal{D}_K^N(C)$ and assume throughout that all authenticated encryption schemes satisfy, for all $K \in \mathsf{K}$, $N \in \mathsf{N}$, $M \in \mathsf{M}$ and all $C \in \mathsf{C}$, the following three properties:

1. (correctness) $\mathcal{D}_K^N(\mathcal{E}_K^N(M)) = M$,
2. (tidiness) $\mathcal{D}_K^N(C) \neq \perp \Rightarrow \mathcal{E}_K^N(\mathcal{D}_K^N(C)) = C$,
3. (length-regularity) $|\mathcal{E}_K^N(M)| = \text{enclen}(|M|)$ for some fixed function enclen .

Correctness and tidiness together imply that \mathcal{D} is uniquely determined by \mathcal{E} , allowing us to refer to the pair $(\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ simply by \mathcal{E} [35].

Single-key security notions. An authenticated encryption scheme should provide both *confidentiality* and *authenticity*. When defining an adversary’s advantage, we separate these orthogonal properties by looking at the IND–PAS and CTI–CPA security games, while also considering their combination AE–PAS in a single game [39]. Below we discuss these notions in more detail, however we defer formal definitions of the relevant games and advantages to the next section, where they will be viewed as a special case of the *multi-key* games given in Definition 7 (cf. Remark 9).

The notions IND–PAS, CTI–CPA and AE–PAS are commonly called IND–CPA, for indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack; INT–CTXT, for integrity of ciphertexts; and AE, for authenticated encryption (respectively). However, we adhere to the GOAL–POWER naming scheme [5]. It makes explicit that, in the first case, the adversary’s goal is to distinguish between real ciphertexts and random strings without access to any additional oracles; in the second case, the adversary has access to

an ‘always-real’ encryption oracle and their goal is to forge a well-formed ciphertext; and in the third case, the adversary tries to either distinguish real ciphertexts from random strings or forge a well-formed ciphertext, without having access to any additional oracles. For the notions above, we opted for minimal adversarial powers: it is often possible to trade queries to additional oracles (such as a true encryption oracle) for queries to the challenge oracle. We refer to Barwell et al. [5] for an overview of known relations between various notions.

Nonce usage convention. All three of the games above have variants according to how nonces may be used by the adversary in the game:

1. In the IV-based setting, denoted IV, the adversary is required to choose nonces uniformly at random for each encryption query.
2. In the nonce-respecting setting, denoted NR, the adversary adaptively chooses nonces for each encryption query, but may never use the same nonce in more than one encryption query.
3. In the misuse-resistant setting, denoted MR, the adversary adaptively chooses nonces for each encryption query and may use the same nonce in more than one encryption query.

Remark 2. The customary definition for IV-based security lets the game select the IVs [35]. We prefer the recent alternative [5] that provides the same interface across the various notions by restricting the class of valid adversaries (in the IV-based setting) to those who always provide uniformly random nonces in encryption queries. This gives a subtly stronger notion, as a reduction will no longer be able to ‘program’ the IV, which it would be allowed to do in the classical definition (cf. [21, 31]).

The results in this paper hold with the alternative formulation of IV-based encryption, with only cosmetic changes to the proof (to take into account the changed interface).

Different confidentiality goals. Above we captured the confidentiality goal IND as distinguishing between real ciphertexts and random strings of the appropriate length. However, there are several competing notions to capture confidentiality, all captured by considering a different challenge encryption oracle:

- In left-or-right indistinguishability (LRIND) the challenge oracle is LR; on input (M_0, M_1, N) , this oracle returns $\mathcal{E}_K^N(M_b)$ (here b is the hidden bit that the adversary must try to learn).
- In real-or-random indistinguishability the challenge oracle, on input (M, N) , returns either $\mathcal{E}_K^N(M)$ or $\mathcal{E}_K^N(\$)$, where $\$$ is a random string of the same length as M .
- In pseudorandom-injection indistinguishability the challenge oracle, on input (M, N) , returns either $\mathcal{E}_K^N(M)$ or $\rho^N(M)$, where ρ is a suitably sampled family of random injections [26, 39].

In the single-key setting, these four notions can be partitioned into two groups of two each, namely left-or-right and real-or-random on the one hand and IND and pseudorandom-injection indistinguishability on the other. Within each group, the two notions can be considered equivalent, as an adversary against one can be turned into an adversary against the other with the same resources and a closely related advantage. Furthermore, security in the IND setting trivially implies security in the LRIND setting, but not vice versa.

Summary. Thus, for each authenticated encryption scheme \mathcal{E} , we potentially obtain $5 \times 4 = 20$ security games (see Figure 2) and for each we need to consider three classes of adversary depending on nonce usage behaviour. However, for single-key security, we will concentrate on *nine* notions only, namely $G_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$, where $G \in \{\text{AE-PAS}, \text{IND-PAS}, \text{CTI-CPA}\}$ and $X \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$ and where the 1 in the superscript indicates that these are *single-key* security games.

Remark 3. In this paper we use meta-reductions to analyse reductions from multi-key games to single-key games for authenticated encryption. We show that, for any AE scheme that is secure in a single-key sense, any reduction from the multi-key game to the single-key game is lossy. We do not need to consider equivalent single-key notions separately, as any scheme that is secure according to one notion will be




Fig. 2. The oracles available to the adversary for each GOAL-POWER security notion. Formal definitions of each oracle are given in Fig. 4. (Many thanks to Guy Barwell for providing this diagram.)

secure according to the other, and one can convert between the single-key games without (significant) additional loss. From this perspective, we can leverage known equivalences as mentioned above. However, the set $\{\text{AE-PAS}, \text{IND-PAS}, \text{CTI-CPA}\}$ does not provide a comprehensive set of meta-reduction results; for that we would have to consider for example LRIND-PAS and IND-CCA as well (the full set would contain eight games). Nevertheless, our results capture the single-key notions that are most commonly used.

2.2 Black-Box Reductions

Informally, a *reduction* \mathcal{R} is an algorithm that transforms an adversary \mathcal{A} in some security game G into an adversary $\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A})$ in a different security game G' . One hopes that, if the advantage $\text{Adv}^G(\mathcal{A})$ of \mathcal{A} in G is high, then the advantage $\text{Adv}^{G'}(\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A}))$ is also high. Here \mathcal{R} breaks some scheme \mathcal{E} , given an adversary \mathcal{A} that breaks a construction $C[\mathcal{E}]$ that uses \mathcal{E} . The construction C is typically fixed, so the reduction \mathcal{R} may depend on it (though to unclutter notation we leave this dependency implicit). On the contrary, when discussing the reduction \mathcal{R} , \mathcal{E} is crucially quantified over some class of schemes \mathcal{C} .

Three properties of a reduction \mathcal{R} are usually of interest: how the resources, specifically run-time, of the resulting adversary $\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A})$ relate to those of \mathcal{A} ; how the reduction translates the success of \mathcal{A} to that of $\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A})$; and how ‘lossy’ this translation is, i.e. how $\text{Adv}^{G'}(\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A}))$ compares to $\text{Adv}^G(\mathcal{A})$. The overall picture for a reduction, especially its loss, strongly depends on the class \mathcal{C} of schemes considered.

Formally, we take into account both the translation \mathbb{S} and the relation \mathbb{T} in runtime into account by considering the quotient of \mathcal{A} and $\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A})$ ’s *work factors*, themselves defined as the quotient of time over success probability (cf. [3]).

Definition 4. We say that \mathcal{R} is a (\mathbb{S}, \mathbb{T}) reduction from G to G' if for every $t_{\mathcal{A}}$ -adversary \mathcal{A} against G , $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is an $\mathbb{T}(t_{\mathcal{A}})$ -adversary against G' and $\text{Adv}^{G'}(\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A})) = \mathbb{S}(\text{Adv}^G(\mathcal{A}))$. Furthermore, the *tightness* of a reduction \mathcal{R} relative to the class of schemes \mathcal{C} is defined as

$$\sup_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}} \frac{\text{Adv}^G(\mathcal{A}) \cdot t_{\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A})}}{\text{Adv}^{G'}(\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A})) \cdot t_{\mathcal{A}}} = \sup_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}} \frac{\mathbb{T}(t_{\mathcal{A}}) \cdot \text{Adv}^G(\mathcal{A})}{t_{\mathcal{A}} \cdot \mathbb{S}(\text{Adv}^G(\mathcal{A}))}$$

where the supremum is taken over all schemes \mathcal{E} in \mathcal{C} and all (valid) adversaries \mathcal{A} against \mathcal{E} .

Remark 5. Our quantification over *valid* adversaries only is inspired by the AE literature’s reliance on only considering adversaries satisfying certain behaviour (e.g. to avoid trivial wins, or distinguish between IV, NR, and MR settings). In all cases, one can recast to a security game that incorporates checks and balances to deal with arbitrary adversarial behaviour. This recasting is without loss of generality as an adversary in this more general game will be ‘aware’ that it is making a ‘bad’ query *and* this bad behaviour does not influence the state of the game (cf. [8]). Of course, when determining \mathbb{S} we do need to take into account whether the reduction \mathcal{R} preserves validity.

In this paper we are concerned with *simple, black-box reductions*: these are reductions that have only black-box access to adversary \mathcal{A} , and that run \mathcal{A} precisely once (without rewinding). For a (\mathbb{S}, \mathbb{T}) simple reduction \mathcal{R} we have that $\mathbb{T}(t_{\mathcal{A}}) = t_{\mathcal{A}} + t_{\mathcal{R}}$, where $t_{\mathcal{R}}$ is the time taken for whatever additional work \mathcal{R} does. Henceforth, we write $t_{\mathcal{R}}$ for this quantity, whenever \mathcal{R} is a simple reduction.

These reductions compose in the obvious way: if \mathcal{R}_1 is a simple $(\mathbb{S}_1, \mathbb{T}_1)$ reduction from G_1 to G_2 and \mathcal{R}_2 is a simple $(\mathbb{S}_2, \mathbb{T}_2)$ reduction from G_2 to G_3 , then we can construct a simple $(\mathbb{S}_3, \mathbb{T}_3)$ reduction \mathcal{R}_3 from G_1 to G_3 , where $\mathbb{S}_3(\epsilon) = \mathbb{S}_2(\mathbb{S}_1(\epsilon))$ and $\mathbb{T}_3(t) = \mathbb{T}_2(\mathbb{T}_1(t))$.

Bounding tightness. Precisely evaluating the tightness of a reduction can be difficult, yet to show that for schemes in \mathcal{C} any simple reduction \mathcal{R} loses at least some factor L , it suffices to show that for any \mathcal{R} there exists a scheme $\mathcal{E} \in \mathcal{C}$ and a valid adversary \mathcal{A} such that

$$\frac{\text{Adv}^G(\mathcal{A})}{\text{Adv}^{G'}(\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A}))} \geq L. \quad (1)$$

Indeed, the desired lower bound follows since, for simple reductions, $\mathbb{T}(t_{\mathcal{A}}) \geq t_{\mathcal{A}}$.

We briefly discuss two distinct techniques to establish a bound such as the one above, in which the order of quantifiers is $(\forall \mathcal{R} \exists \mathcal{E} \exists \mathcal{A})$:

- *Counterexample* ($\exists \mathcal{E} \forall \mathcal{A} \forall \mathcal{R}$). Here, one shows that there exists a scheme $\mathcal{E} \in \mathcal{C}$ such that for any adversary \mathcal{A} and any reduction \mathcal{R} , inequality 1 is satisfied. One drawback of such results is that they only imply the desired lowerbound for a class of schemes \mathcal{C} containing \mathcal{E} ; tighter reductions might be possible in the class $\mathcal{C}' := \mathcal{C} \setminus \{\mathcal{E}\}$. Moreover, if the counterexample scheme \mathcal{E} is an artificially insecure scheme (e.g. the one used by Bellare et al. [6]), then the lowerbound might not hold within the class of *secure* schemes, which are obviously of greater significance in practice.
- *Meta-reduction lowerbound* ($\forall \mathcal{E} \exists \mathcal{A} \forall \mathcal{R}$). For any $\mathcal{E} \in \mathcal{C}$, this technique constructs an idealised adversary \mathcal{A} with advantage 1 and then shows, via a meta-reduction simulating \mathcal{A} , that any simple reduction interacting with \mathcal{A} must have advantage at most L^{-1} , yielding inequality 1. Thus we show that the loss is a property of the reduction \mathcal{R} , and not of the particular choice of $\mathcal{E} \in \mathcal{C}$. The results in this paper, using the meta-reduction approach, hold when \mathcal{C} is any non-empty subset of the class of ‘secure’ schemes that satisfy the key uniqueness assumption.³ Since \mathcal{C} could contain just one element \mathcal{E} , our results show that even a reduction that is tailored to the specific details of \mathcal{E} cannot be tight. On the other hand, our results are not directly comparable to those of Bellare et al. [6], since the artificially insecure scheme used in their counterexample does not belong to any class \mathcal{C} we consider here.

Remark 6. An alternative definition of tightness might consider only ‘reasonable’ adversaries \mathcal{A} in the supremum, viz. those for which $t_{\mathcal{A}}$ is not too large. Our meta-reduction approach would not work in this setting, since the idealised adversary \mathcal{A} we construct has an extremely large (and wholly unfeasible) runtime as it performs an exhaustive search over all possible keys. Nevertheless, reductions \mathcal{R} that are black-box with respect to \mathcal{A} have no way of ‘excluding’ such unrealistic adversaries and so we feel it is not reasonable to exclude them in the definition of tightness. We remark that unrealistic adversaries are not uncommon in the meta-reduction literature [3].

3 Multi-Key Security Notions

Multi-key security with adaptive corruptions. In the single-key case, the challenge oracles depend on a single hidden bit b and it is the job of the adversary to try and learn b . The straightforward generalization [6] to a multi-key setting (with n keys) is to enrich all the oracles to include the index $i \in [n]$ of the key K_i that will then be used by the oracle. Thus the challenge oracles for distinct keys will all depend on the same single hidden bit b .

³ Here, ‘secure’ means that the advantage of any reasonable adversary in the single-key game is close to 0.

Experiment $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}(\mathcal{A})$:

$K_1, \dots, K_n \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{K}$
 $b_1, \dots, b_n \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}$
 $(j, b'_j) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}$
Return $(b'_j = b_j)$

Fig. 3. The $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}$ games, where $X \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$, $n \geq 1$, $\text{GOAL} \in \{\text{AE}, \text{LRAE}, \text{IND}, \text{LRIND}, \text{CTI}\}$ and $\text{POWER} \in \{\text{CCA}, \text{CPA}, \text{CDA}, \text{PAS}\}$. The oracles \mathcal{O} available to the adversary always include the corruption oracle Cor ; the other oracles depend on GOAL and POWER , as indicated in Fig. 2.

However, in a realistic multi-key setting, an adversary might well learn some of the keys. For instance, consider the situation where an attacker passively monitors millions of TLS connections and adaptively implants malware on particular endpoint devices in order to recover the session keys for those devices. We still want security for those keys that have not been compromised; the question is how to appropriately model multi-key security.

There are two natural approaches to model multi-key security games in the presence of an adaptive corruption oracle Cor that, on input $i \in [n]$, returns the key K_i . The approaches differ in how they avoid trivial wins that occur when the adversary corrupts a key that was used for a challenge query. In one approach, the same bit is used for the challenge queries throughout, but the adversary is prohibited from using the same index i for both a corruption and challenge query (cf. [37]). In another approach, for each index i there is an independent hidden bit b_i to guess and the adversary has to specify for which uncorrupted index its guess b' is intended (cf. [9]).

As far as we are aware, these two approaches have not been formally compared; moreover we could not easily establish a tight relationship between them. However, as we show, both options lead to a reduction loss linear in n . To do so, we will use a novel way of formalizing a multi-key security game with adaptive corruptions that encompasses *both* options mentioned above.

In our generalised game (Definition 7) there are n independently, uniformly sampled random bits b_1, \dots, b_n . Each challenge query from the adversary must specify two indices, $i, j \in [n]$, such that the response to the query depends on key K_i and hidden bit b_j . The two ‘natural’ multi-key games are special cases of this general game: in the single-bit game the adversary is restricted to challenge queries with $j = 1$, whereas in the multi-bit game only challenge queries with $i = j$ are allowed.

Our impossibility results hold regardless how the hidden bits are used: we only require that for any $i \in [n]$ there exists *some* $j \in [n]$ such that the adversary can make a challenge query corresponding to K_i and b_j . In other words, our impossibility results hold provided that the adversary can win the game by ‘attacking’ any of the n keys in the game, not just some subset of the keys.

Definition 7 (Security of Authenticated Encryption). *Let $n \geq 1$, $X \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$, $\text{GOAL} \in \{\text{AE}, \text{LRAE}, \text{IND}, \text{LRIND}, \text{CTI}\}$, and $\text{POWER} \in \{\text{CCA}, \text{CPA}, \text{CDA}, \text{PAS}\}$, then for any authenticated encryption scheme \mathcal{E} and adversary \mathcal{A} , the advantage of \mathcal{A} against \mathcal{E} with respect to $\text{GOAL-POWER}^{X,n}$ is defined as*

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL-POWER}, X, n}(\mathcal{A}) := 2 \cdot \Pr \left[\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, n}(\mathcal{A}) = 1 \right] - 1,$$

where the experiment $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}(\mathcal{A})$ is defined in Fig. 3, with the oracles’ behaviour shown in Fig. 4 and their GOAL-POWER -dependent availability in Fig. 2 (all games have access to Cor).

Whenever the experiment $G = \text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}(\mathcal{A})$ is clear from the context, we write $\text{Adv}^G(\mathcal{A})$ for the advantage of \mathcal{A} in experiment G .

The outline games are deliberately kept simple, but are trivial to win: if \mathcal{A} corrupts a key K_i and then issues a challenge query corresponding to K_i and a hidden bit b_j , then it is trivial for \mathcal{A} to compute b_j from the response to the query; successfully ‘guessing’ b_j does not represent a meaningful attack. In our formal syntax, we say j is *compromised* iff there is some $i \in [n]$ such that \mathcal{A} has issued a query

Oracle $\text{Enc}(i, j, M, N)$: if $b_j = 0$, $C \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_{K_i}^N(M)$ else $C \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\text{enclen}(M)}$ return C	Oracle $\mathcal{E}(i, M, N)$: return $\mathcal{E}_{K_i}^N(M)$
Oracle $\text{LR}(i, j, M_0, M_1, N)$: $C \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_{K_i}^N(M_{b_j})$ return C	Oracle $\mathcal{D}(i, C, N)$: return $\mathcal{D}_{K_i}^N(C)$
Oracle $\text{Dec}(i, j, C, N)$: if $b_j = 0$, $M \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{K_i}^N(C)$ else $M \leftarrow \perp$ return M	Oracle $\text{Cor}(i)$: return K_i

Fig. 4. Oracles for the $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}$ security games. Without loss of generality, we assume that all oracles return \perp if the input arguments do not belong to the relevant sets. For example, the \mathcal{E} oracle will return \perp on any input (i, M, N) that is not a member of $[n] \times \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{N}$.

$\text{Cor}(i)$ and \mathcal{A} has also issued some challenge query of the form $\text{Enc}(i, j, -, -)$, $\text{LR}(i, j, -, -, -)$ or $\text{Dec}(i, j, -, -)$. We disallow such trivial wins.

Relatedly, we follow the AE literature in disallowing certain combinations of queries that lead to trivial wins or that are inconsistent with the nonce notion under consideration. The relevant— and standard—definitions are given in Appendix A. Combining the various restrictions leads to the notion of valid adversaries (cf. Remark 5), as summarized in Definition 8 below.

Definition 8 (Valid adversaries). *An adversary \mathcal{A} against $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}$ is valid iff:*

1. *it does not output (j, b'_j) where j was compromised;*
2. *it does not make pointless or prohibited queries;*
3. *it uses nonces correctly with respect to X .*

Remark 9 (Recovering the single-key security notions). Setting $n = 1$ in Definition 7 yields formal definitions of the *single-key* security games for authenticated encryption, albeit with a more complicated interface than one is used to: the specification of i and j becomes redundant, as does the corruption oracle for valid adversaries. Indeed, to simplify notation in the case $n = 1$, we often omit i and j from the queries made, refer to the hidden bit b_1 as b , and only expect a simple guess b' by an adversary.

Relations between multi-key notions. We discuss the relations between different single-user and multi-user security notions in Appendix B.

Key recovery notions. For our meta-reduction, we use an auxiliary, key recovery game $\text{KEYREC}_{\mathcal{E}}^{M,n}$ (Definition 10). Here there are n unknown keys and the adversary is provided with encryptions under each of them of known messages $\mathbf{M} \in \mathcal{M}^l$, using known, yet random, nonces. Then the adversary provides an index $i^* \in [n]$, learns the $n - 1$ keys $(K_i)_{i \in [n] \setminus i^*}$ and tries to guess the uncorrupted key.

Definition 10. *For any AE scheme \mathcal{E} , integers $n, \ell \geq 1$, messages $\mathbf{M} = (M_1, \dots, M_\ell) \in \mathcal{M}^\ell$ and any adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$, the advantage of \mathcal{A} against $\text{KEYREC}_{\mathcal{E}}^{M,n}$ is defined as*

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{KEYREC}, M, n}(\mathcal{A}) := \Pr \left[\text{KEYREC}_{\mathcal{E}}^{M, n}(\mathcal{A}) = 1 \right],$$

where the experiment $\text{KEYREC}_{\mathcal{E}}^{M, n}(\mathcal{A})$ is given in Fig. 5.

Experiment $\text{KEYREC}_{\mathcal{E}}^{M,n}(\mathcal{A})$:

```

 $K_1, \dots, K_n \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$ 
for  $i$  in  $1, \dots, n$ ,
  for  $j$  in  $1, \dots, l$ ,
     $N_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{N}$ 
     $C_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_{K_i}^{N_{i,j}}(M_j)$ 
 $(i^*, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1 \left( (C_{i,j}, N_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [l]} \right)$ 
 $K^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2 \left( (K_i)_{i \in [n \setminus i^*]}, st \right)$ 
Return  $(K_{i^*} = K^*)$ 

```

Fig. 5. Key recovery game with n keys and the hard-coded messages M_1, \dots, M_l . Without loss of generality, we separate the adversary \mathcal{A} into two components \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 .

Of course, it might be the case that it is impossible to win the key recovery game with certainty, since there could be more than one key that ‘matches’ the messages, nonces and ciphertexts. For our tightness results, we need to assume that there is some reasonably small l and some messages M_1, \dots, M_l such that the key recovery game corresponding to M_1, \dots, M_l can be won with certainty; we call this the *key uniqueness* property; its definition is below.

Definition 11. Let \mathcal{E} be an authenticated encryption scheme. Suppose there is some integer $l \geq 1$ and certain messages $M_1, \dots, M_l \in \mathcal{M}$ such that, for all keys $K \in \mathcal{K}$ and all nonces $N_1, \dots, N_l \in \mathcal{N}$,

$$\left\{ K' \in \mathcal{K} : \mathcal{E}_{K'}^{N_i}(M_i) = \mathcal{E}_K^{N_i}(M_i) \text{ for all } i \in 1, \dots, l \right\} = \{K\}.$$

Then we say \mathcal{E} is M -key-unique, where $M = (M_1, \dots, M_l) \in \mathcal{M}^l$. This means that encryptions of M_1, \dots, M_l under the same key uniquely determine the key, regardless of the nonces used.

As mentioned above, $\text{KEYREC}_{\mathcal{E}}^{M,n}$ corresponds to a very weak notion of security. In the following Lemma, we prove that this weak notion of security is implied, with only a small loss, by many of the more reasonable n -key security notions given in Definition 7. For succinctness we present the reduction in a compact way, but split the analysis in different cases (depending on the adversary goal and on the requirements to respect uniqueness or not). We give the details of the proof in Appendix C.

Lemma 12. Let $\text{GOAL} \in \{\text{AE}, \text{LRAE}, \text{IND}, \text{LRIND}, \text{CTI}\}$, $\text{POWER} \in \{\text{CCA}, \text{CPA}\}$ and suppose \mathcal{E} is M -key-unique. Then there exists an (\mathbb{S}, \mathbb{T}) simple reduction from $\text{KEYREC}_{\mathcal{E}}^{M,n}$ to $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}$ with $\mathbb{T}(t_{\mathcal{A}}) = t_{\mathcal{A}} + (l + m_{\text{GOAL}})t_{\mathcal{E}}$ and $\mathbb{S}(\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}) = \delta_X \cdot \delta_{\text{GOAL}} \cdot \epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$, where $m_{\text{IND}} = m \geq 1$, an arbitrary integer; $m_{\text{GOAL}} = 1$ if $\text{GOAL} \neq \text{IND}$; $t_{\mathcal{E}}$ is a bound on the runtime of a single encryption with \mathcal{E} ;

$$\delta_X = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{nl(l-1) + m_{\text{GOAL}}(m_{\text{GOAL}} + 2l - 1)}{2^{|\mathcal{N}|}}, & \text{if } X = \text{NR} \\ 1, & \text{if } X \neq \text{NR} \end{cases}$$

and

$$\delta_{\text{GOAL}} = \begin{cases} 1 - \frac{1}{2^m}, & \text{if } \text{GOAL} = \text{IND} \\ 1, & \text{if } \text{GOAL} \neq \text{IND}. \end{cases}$$

Note that δ_X and δ_{GOAL} are both close to 1: m can be set arbitrarily large and, for useful encryption schemes, the nonce space \mathcal{N} is very large.

Remark 13. We are unable to show a corresponding result for $\text{POWER} \in \{\text{CDA}, \text{PAS}\}$. This is because we need the ‘always real’ encryption oracle \mathcal{E} to simulate the environment of \mathcal{A} in the key recovery game. As a consequence, looking forward, our lower bounds for tightness of simple reductions hold only for n -key games with such an oracle. Nevertheless, we feel it is natural to give the n -key adversary access to the \mathcal{E} oracle so that, for example, the adversary can use queries to this oracle to determine which keys to corrupt and which to challenge.

4 Multi-Key to Single-Key Reductions are Lossy

In this section we present our main results: any simple black-box reduction from multi-key security (in its many definitional variants) to single-key security loses a linear factor in the number of keys. Two remarks are in order. First, we show the lower bound for reductions from the security of an arbitrary construction of an (authenticated) encryption scheme $C[\mathcal{E}]$ to that of \mathcal{E} (and in particular for the case where $C[\mathcal{E}] = \mathcal{E}$). This more general setting encompasses interesting cases, e.g. where $C[\mathcal{E}]$ is *double encryption* with \mathcal{E} , i.e.

$$C[\mathcal{E}]_{(K_1, K_2)}^{(N_1, N_2)}(M) = \mathcal{E}_{K_2}^{N_2} \left(\mathcal{E}_{K_1}^{N_1}(M) \right),$$

which has been shown to have desirable multi-key properties [27]. Furthermore, showing the separation for $C[\mathcal{E}]$ and \mathcal{E} also suggests a workaround the lower bound for the loss which we provide. Our lower bound requires that $C[\mathcal{E}]$ satisfies key-uniqueness. It may therefore be possible to start from a secure single-key security that satisfies key-uniqueness, and show a tight reduction from multi-key security of a *variant* $C[\mathcal{E}]$ of \mathcal{E} , provided that $C[\mathcal{E}]$ somehow avoids key uniqueness.

We consider separately reductions between different security flavours (authenticated encryption, privacy, integrity). For each case in turn, we proceed in two steps. First, we establish that if \mathcal{E} is a (single-key) secure encryption scheme and $C[\mathcal{E}]$ is a key-unique encryption scheme, then all simple reductions from the multi-key key recovery game for $C[\mathcal{E}]$ to the single-key security game for \mathcal{E} are lossy. Since by Lemma 12 there is a tight reduction from multi-key key recovery to multi-key security, it is an immediate corollary that there is no tight reduction from the multi-key security of $C[\mathcal{E}]$ to the single-key security of \mathcal{E} .

An interesting remark is that the bound on the inherent loss of simple reductions depends on the security of the scheme \mathcal{E} : the more secure the scheme, the tighter the bound. While our bound is therefore not meaningful for insecure schemes, this case is of little interest in practice.

Authenticated encryption. We give the formal results for the case of authenticated encryption below.

Theorem 14. *Let \mathcal{E} and $C[\mathcal{E}]$ be authenticated encryption schemes such that $C[\mathcal{E}]$ is M -key-unique for some $M \in \mathbb{M}^l$. Then any simple reduction \mathcal{R} from $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$ to $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$, for $X \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$, loses at least $(\frac{1}{n} + 2\epsilon)^{-1}$, where ϵ is the maximum advantage for a valid adversary against $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ running in time at most $nt_{\mathcal{R}} + 2l(n-1)t_{C[\mathcal{E}]}$ (where $t_{C[\mathcal{E}]}$ is an upper-bound on the runtime of a single encryption with $C[\mathcal{E}]$).*

We sketch the proof and give its details in Appendix D. The crucial idea, following [3], is to construct a *meta-reduction* \mathcal{M} that *rewinds* the reduction \mathcal{R} in order to simulate its interaction with an ideal adversary \mathcal{A} against $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$. If the simulation works correctly, then the output of \mathcal{R} can be used by \mathcal{M} to win the $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game with probability $\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}}$. Then the (single-key) security of \mathcal{E} yields an upper-bound on the success probability of \mathcal{M} , i.e. an upper-bound on $\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}}$.

We view the reduction \mathcal{R} as a collection of three algorithms, $\mathcal{R} = (\mathcal{R}_1, \mathcal{R}_2, \mathcal{R}_3)$. The first, \mathcal{R}_1 , makes oracle queries in the $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game, then produces the ciphertexts and nonces that \mathcal{A} expects to receive in the $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$ game. The second, \mathcal{R}_2 , receives an index i^* from \mathcal{A} and the state st_1 of the previous algorithm, \mathcal{R}_1 . Then \mathcal{R}_2 makes oracle queries and eventually produces the vector of keys that \mathcal{A} expects to receive in the $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$ game. Finally, \mathcal{R}_3 receives a guessed key K^* from \mathcal{A} and the state st_2 of \mathcal{R}_2 . Then \mathcal{R}_3 makes oracle queries and outputs a guessed bit b' .

\mathcal{M} only rewinds \mathcal{R}_2 : \mathcal{M} executes \mathcal{R}_2 on each of the n possible indices i^* that could be returned by \mathcal{A} and each \mathcal{R}_2 then returns a set of keys. Then \mathcal{M} uses the keys returned by one execution of \mathcal{R}_2 to construct the input to a *different* execution of \mathcal{R}_3 , i.e. st_2 given to \mathcal{R}_3 will not be from the same execution of \mathcal{R}_2 used to construct the ‘guessed’ key K^* .

The main obstacle in arguing that the above strategy works is that \mathcal{M} needs to break $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$, which is an *interactive* assumption. So \mathcal{M} needs to simulate an appropriate environment towards multiple copies of \mathcal{R} , yet \mathcal{M} has access to a single set of oracles for the $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game. It is not obvious

that \mathcal{M} can simply forward queries from all copies of \mathcal{R} to these oracles, since queries across different invocations of \mathcal{R} may interfere with one-another and render \mathcal{M} invalid. The key observation is that we can leverage the single-key security of \mathcal{E} : instead of forwarding queries, \mathcal{M} simply simulates the Enc and Dec oracles by sampling random ciphertexts and returning \perp , respectively. We argue, based on the security of \mathcal{E} , that \mathcal{R} cannot distinguish this simulation from the real oracles in its game.

The previous theorem establishes that simple reductions from $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$ to $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ are lossy. Since by Lemma 12 there exists a tight reduction from $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$ to $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$, it immediately follows that simple reductions from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$ to $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ must be lossy as well. We formalize this intuition in the following corollary; we give its proof in Appendix E.

Corollary 15. *Let \mathcal{E} and $C[\mathcal{E}]$ be authenticated encryption schemes such that $C[\mathcal{E}]$ is M -key-unique for some $M \in \mathcal{M}^l$. Let $\text{GOAL} \in \{\text{AE}, \text{LRAE}, \text{IND}, \text{LRIND}, \text{CTI}\}$, $\text{POWER} \in \{\text{CCA}, \text{CPA}\}$, $X, X' \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$ and $n > 1$. Then all simple reductions from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$ to $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ must lose*

$$L = \delta_{\text{GOAL}} \cdot \delta_{X'} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{n} + 2\epsilon \right)^{-1},$$

where δ_{GOAL} and $\delta_{X'}$ are as in Lemma 12 and ϵ is as given in Thm. 14.

We emphasise that the ‘nonce use’ parameters $X', X \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$ can differ between the n -key game and the single key game. While it is natural to consider $X' = X$ we prefer to state the result in full generality and show that a very large class of reductions are necessarily lossy.

Privacy and integrity. The above results hold for notions of authenticated encryption schemes. It is natural to ask whether the loss for simple reductions from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$ to $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ is an artefact of considering the two orthogonal single-key security properties of secrecy and authenticity at the same time. Perhaps it is possible to circumvent the loss when looking at these properties separately, e.g. there could there be non-lossy simple reductions from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$ to $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ and from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$ to $\text{CTI-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$. We show that this is not the case.

We proceed as for the authenticated encryption case. For privacy and integrity, in turn, we show that reductions from multi-key key recovery to single-key security are inherently lossy; the lower bound then follows again by Lemma 12. We give the details in Appendix F.

5 Conclusion

We have presented a general family of multi-key security definitions for authenticated encryption, where the adversary can adaptively corrupt keys. We have shown, for a very large class of authenticated encryption schemes, for most members of our family of definitions and for widely-accepted single-key security definitions, that any black-box reduction from the n -key security of an encryption scheme to its single-key security will incur a loss close to n .

For practitioners who set security parameters based on provable guarantees, this shows that security reductions have an inherent shortcoming. Since keys are sampled independently, the corruption of one key should not affect the security of another, yet it is impossible in many cases to prove that security does not degrade from the single-key setting to the n -key setting. It appears that the loss of n is an unfortunate, unavoidable artefact of the proof.

We have shown that the loss of reductions is inevitable for multi-key definitions where the adversary has access to an honest encryption oracle. We therefore left open the possibility that for security notions without such an oracle, tight reductions may be found. Furthermore, our impossibility results apply to schemes where ciphertexts are indistinguishable from random strings. It may be possible that tight reductions for schemes that achieve weaker forms of confidentiality, such as left-or-right indistinguishability, exist. Historically, the community has tended to opt for stronger and stronger security notions, but perhaps a slightly weaker single-key notion would be preferred if it tightly implied a meaningful multi-key notion. We leave these interesting open questions for future work.

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A Valid Adversarial Behaviour for AE Games

Pointless and prohibited queries. Since encryption is deterministic, the response to certain oracle queries can be predicted in advance. Therefore the adversary learns nothing from these queries; we call them *pointless*. Without loss of generality we assume that valid adversaries do not make such queries. The following queries are pointless:

- Repeat a query to any oracle other than Enc(the Enc oracle sometimes samples random ciphertexts, but all other oracles are deterministic).
- Make a query $\mathcal{D}(i, C, N)$, where C was the response to a query $\mathcal{E}(i, M, N)$ (since the response will be M , by correctness).
- Make a query $\mathcal{E}(i, M, N)$, where $M \neq \perp$ was the response to a query $\mathcal{D}(i, C, N)$ (since the response will be C , by tidiness).
- Make a query $\mathcal{E}(i, M, N)$ or $\text{Enc}(i, j, M, N)$, where a query $\text{Dec}(i, j, C, N)$ was made with response $M \neq \perp$ (since the response $M \neq \perp$ reveals $b_j = 0$ and $\mathcal{E}_{K_i}^N(M) = C$ by tidiness).

Some other queries lead to hidden bits being trivial to recover (without having to corrupt a key); we call these queries *prohibited*, since valid adversaries are not permitted to make them. The following queries are prohibited:⁴

- Repeat a query $\text{Enc}(i, j, M, N)$ (if the response to both queries is the same, then with very high probability $b_j = 0$ and otherwise $b_j = 1$).
- Make a query of the form $\text{LR}(i, j, M_0, M_1, N)$ with $|M_0| \neq |M_1|$ (since the length of the ciphertext reveals the length of the plaintext, trivially revealing which of M_0 or M_1 was encrypted).
- Make two queries of the form $\text{LR}(i, j, M_0, M_1, N)$, $\text{LR}(i, j, M'_0, M'_1, N)$ such that $M_b = M'_b$ and $M_{1-b} \neq M'_{1-b}$ for some $b \in \{0, 1\}$ (if the response to both queries is the same, then $b_j = b$ by correctness, and otherwise $b_j = 1 - b$).

⁴ It is not necessary to prohibit queries being forwarded between the Enc and LR oracles, since we do not consider games where both these challenge oracles are present.

- Make two queries of the form $\text{Enc}(i, j, M, N)$ and $\mathcal{E}(i, M, N)$, in any order (which trivially reveals b_j).
- Make two queries of the form $\text{LR}(i, j, M_0, M_1, N)$ and $\mathcal{E}(i, M_b, N)$, in any order, for some $b \in \{0, 1\}$ (which trivially reveals b_j).
- Make a query $\mathcal{D}(i, C, N)$, where a query $\text{Enc}(i, j, M, N)$ or $\text{LR}(i, j, M_0, M_1, N)$ was made with response C (which trivially reveals b_j , by correctness).
- Make a query $\text{Dec}(i, j, C, N)$, where C was the response to a query $\mathcal{E}(i, M, N)$, $\text{Enc}(i, j, M, N)$ or $\text{LR}(i, j, M_0, M_1, N)$ (which trivially reveals b_j , by correctness).
- Make a query $\text{Enc}(i, j, M, N)$, $\text{LR}(i, j, M, M_1, N)$ or $\text{LR}(i, j, M_0, M, N)$, where $M \neq \perp$ was the response to a query $\mathcal{D}(i, C, N)$ (which trivially reveals b_j , by tidiness).

Correct nonce use. The parameter $X \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$ determines how the adversary may use nonces in encryption queries. We say \mathcal{A} uses nonces correctly with respect to X if the following statements hold:

- If $X = \text{IV}$, then for each query of the form $\text{Enc}(-, -, -, N)$, $\text{LR}(-, -, -, -, N)$ or $\mathcal{E}(-, -, N)$, N is sampled uniformly at random from \mathcal{N} .
- If $X = \text{NR}$, then each nonce appears in at most one encryption query *under the same key*. That is, for each $i \in [n]$, each nonce N appears in at most one query of the form $\text{Enc}(i, -, -, N)$, $\text{LR}(i, -, -, -, N)$ or $\mathcal{E}(i, -, N)$.
- If $X = \text{MR}$, then nonces may be chosen arbitrarily and repeated in different queries (modulo the pointless and prohibited queries specified above).

B Relations Between Security Notions

Reducing multi-key security to single-key security. To show that our lower tightness bounds are optimal, in the sense that they match the upper bound provided by simple generic reductions from single-user security to multi-user security with a loss linear in n , we consider the two natural formulations of multi-key security discussed at the beginning of Section 3.

The multi-bit setting. We start with considering the variant of the multi-key game of Definition 7 with many challenge bits, but where the adversary is restricted to challenge queries with $i = j$.

Theorem 16. *Let \mathcal{A}_n be an adversary such that for all queries to $\text{Enc}(i, j, M, N)$, $\text{LR}(i, j, M_0, M_1, N)$, and $\text{Dec}(i, j, C, N)$ holds that $i = j$. Then we can construct an adversary \mathcal{A}_1 such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL-POWER}, X, 1}(\mathcal{A}_1) \geq \frac{1}{n} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL-POWER}, X, n}(\mathcal{A}_n)$$

for all $\text{GOAL} \in \{\text{AE}, \text{LRAE}, \text{IND}, \text{LRIND}, \text{CTI}\}$, $\text{POWER} \in \{\text{CCA}, \text{CPA}, \text{CDA}, \text{PAS}\}$, $n \geq 1$, and $X \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$, and the running time of \mathcal{A}_1 is essentially identical to the running time of \mathcal{A}_n .

Proof. \mathcal{A}_1 runs \mathcal{A}_n as a subroutine, by simulating the $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, n}(\mathcal{A}_n)$ experiment. To this end, it first picks a random index $i^* \leftarrow \{1, \dots, n\}$, as well as $n - 1$ random keys k_i and random bits b_i , $i \in \{1, \dots, n\} \setminus \{i^*\}$. Then it starts \mathcal{A}_n and simulates its security experiment as follows:

- If \mathcal{A}_n ever queries $\text{Cor}(i^*)$, then \mathcal{A}_1 outputs a random bit and terminates.
- Whenever \mathcal{A}_n makes an oracle query with $i = i^*$, either to one of the GOAL -oracles $\{\text{Enc}, \text{LR}, \text{Dec}\}$ or to one of the POWER -oracles $\{\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D}\}$, then \mathcal{A}_1 forwards this query to the $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}(\mathcal{A}_1)$ experiment, and the response to \mathcal{A}_n .
- Whenever \mathcal{A}_n makes an oracle query with $i \neq i^*$, then \mathcal{A}_1 responds using k_i and b_i , exactly as the $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, n}(\mathcal{A}_n)$ security would do.
- When \mathcal{A}_n terminates and outputs a tuple (j, b') with $j \neq i^*$, then \mathcal{A}_1 outputs a random bit. Otherwise it outputs b' .

We say that event *bad* occurs, if \mathcal{A}_n ever queries $\text{Cor}(i^*)$ or if \mathcal{A}_n outputs a tuple (j, b') with $j \neq i^*$.

Running time of \mathcal{A}_1 . Note that the running time of \mathcal{A}_1 essentially consists of the running time of \mathcal{A}_n , plus a minor overhead to simulate the $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}$ experiment once.

Consistent simulation by \mathcal{A}_1 . To explain why \mathcal{A}_1 simulates the n -user experiment perfectly for \mathcal{A}_n , provided that bad does not occur, we make the following observations:

- \mathcal{A}_1 is able to answer all Cor-queries of \mathcal{A}_n , since it knows all secret keys k_i for $i \neq i^*$.
- When \mathcal{A}_n makes a query of the form $\mathcal{E}(i, M, N)$ or $\mathcal{D}(i, C, N)$, then \mathcal{A}_1 is able to respond directly iff $i \neq i^*$, since it knows k_i .
- When \mathcal{A}_n queries $\mathcal{E}(i^*, M, N)$ or $\mathcal{D}(i^*, C, N)$, then \mathcal{A}_1 is able to respond by relaying the query and the response between the $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{A}_1)$ experiment and \mathcal{A}_n .

This establishes the consistency of the simulation of responses to all possible POWER-oracle queries of \mathcal{A}_n .

In the simulation of responses to GOAL-oracle queries, we use the fact that \mathcal{A}_n only makes such queries with $i = j$. More precisely, when \mathcal{A}_n queries oracle $\text{Enc}(i, j, M, N)$, $\text{LR}(i, j, M_0, M_1, N)$, or $\text{Dec}(i, j, C, N)$, then:

- If $i \neq i^*$ then we have $j \neq i^*$, such that \mathcal{A}_1 is able to respond directly, using its knowledge of k_i and b_j .
- If $i = i^*$ then we have $j = i^*$. Therefore \mathcal{A}_1 is able to respond correctly by relaying the query and response between \mathcal{A}_n and its $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{A}_1)$ experiment.

Success probability of \mathcal{A}_1 . Since \mathcal{A}_1 simulates the $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}$ -experiment perfectly, until bad occurs (if it occurs at all), the choice of i^* by \mathcal{A}_1 is completely oblivious to \mathcal{A}_n . Therefore we have $\Pr[\neg\text{bad}] = 1/n$. Writing Z_n to denote the event $Z_n := \text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}(\mathcal{A}_n) = 1$ to abbreviate notation, it follows from the construction of \mathcal{A}_1 that

$$\Pr[Z_1 \mid \neg\text{bad}] = \Pr[Z_n] \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[Z_1 \mid \text{bad}] = 1/2$$

which yields

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[Z_1] &= \Pr[Z_1 \mid \neg\text{bad}] \cdot \Pr[\neg\text{bad}] + \Pr[Z_1 \mid \text{bad}] \cdot (1 - \Pr[\neg\text{bad}]) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{n} \left(\Pr[Z_n] - \frac{1}{2} \right) \end{aligned}$$

So we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL-POWER},X,1}(\mathcal{A}_1) &= 2 \cdot \Pr \left[\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{A}_1) = 1 \right] - 1 \\ &= \frac{1}{n} \cdot \left(2 \cdot \Pr \left[\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}(\mathcal{A}_n) = 1 \right] - 1 \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{n} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL-POWER},X,n}(\mathcal{A}_n) \end{aligned}$$

This yields the claim.

The single-bit setting. Since Theorem 16 covers only one of the two natural formulations of multi-key security discussed at the beginning of Section 3 and it is not clear whether both can be proven tightly equivalent, it is natural to ask whether a similar result can be proven for the other natural variant (the single-bit setting, where $j = 1$ for all queries made by the adversary). The following theorem gives an analogous result to Theorem 16, which covers this case.

Theorem 17. *Let \mathcal{A}_n be an adversary such that for all queries to $\text{Enc}(i, j, M, N)$, $\text{LR}(i, j, M_0, M_1, N)$, $\text{Dec}(i, j, C, N)$ holds that $j = 1$. Then we can construct an adversary \mathcal{A}_1 such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL-POWER},X,1}(\mathcal{A}_1) \geq \frac{1}{n} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL-POWER},X,n}(\mathcal{A}_n)$$

for all $\text{GOAL} \in \{\text{AE}, \text{LRAE}, \text{IND}, \text{LRIND}, \text{CTI}\}$, $\text{POWER} \in \{\text{CCA}, \text{CPA}, \text{CDA}, \text{PAS}\}$, $n \geq 1$ and $X \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$, and the running time of \mathcal{A}_1 is essentially identical to the running time of \mathcal{A}_n .

The proof of this theorem is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 16, and therefore omitted.

The general case. One may wonder why we had to distinguish between the multi-bit and the single-bit settings in Theorems 16 and 17, instead of directly proving a result for the generalized security notion from Definition 7. One may be tempted to think that this should be possible with a very similar proof, and again with a linear loss n . We remark that this seems not to be the case, and removing the assumptions on the adversary in Theorems 16 and 17 (that is, that \mathcal{A} always chooses $i = j$, or $j = 1$, respectively) appears difficult.

To explain where this difficulty comes from, consider again the proof of Theorem 16. Recall that we have simulated the response to GOAL-queries of \mathcal{A}_n as follows:

- If $i \neq i^*$ and $j \neq i^*$, then \mathcal{A}_1 responds directly, using its knowledge of k_i and b_j .
- If $i = j = i^*$, then \mathcal{A}_1 responds by relaying the query and its response between \mathcal{A}_n and the $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{A}_1)$ -experiment.

If we would simply remove the requirement that $i = j$ (resp. $j = 1$) holds for all queries, then we would have to explain how \mathcal{A}_1 is able to respond to a GOAL-query with i, j where $i \neq i^*$, but $j = i^*$, and we do not know how to accomplish this or whether this is accomplishable at all. Note that the difficulty here is that \mathcal{A}_1 knows k_i , but not the secret challenge bit of the $b_j = b_{i^*}$ of the $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{A}_1)$ -experiment, such that it is not clear how \mathcal{A}_1 could respond to such a query of \mathcal{A}_n consistently.⁵

Our main objective behind the introduction of the generalized security model of Definition 7 was to capture both natural variants of multi-key security within a unified framework. Theorems 16 and 17 show that security with respect to both these natural notions is implied by security with respect to a corresponding single-user security notion with identical GOAL and POWER oracles.

Relations between multi-key notions In the single-key case, many security notions that at first appear different are, in fact, equivalent [5,7]. We already mentioned the equivalence between left-or-right versus real-or-random challenge oracles. In a different dimension, some oracle access can become redundant, for instance LRIND-PAS and LRIND-CPA are equivalent: a valid adversary can use its challenge oracle LR to perfectly emulate access to a ‘true’ encryption oracle.

However, if the adversary plays a game with $n > 1$ keys *and* is allowed to adaptively corrupt some of these keys, achieving tight reductions between the various notions becomes considerably harder. For instance, the reduction used to show equivalence between LRIND-PAS and LRIND-CPA above no longer works for a valid LRIND-CPA adversary that made both a corrupt and a true encryption query to the same key: the reduction would not yield a valid LRIND-PAS adversary.

An alternative approach would be to relate the multi-key advantage relative to one notion to the single-key advantage of another notion, but in that case our meta-reductions and inevitable security losses kick in, forcing a loss at least linear in n .

The disappearance of known equivalences was previously observed by Bellare et al. [9] in the context of multi-instance security (here an adversary has to guess *all* the challenge bits). They argued why left-or-right security was the most ‘robust’ notion in their context. Rather than trying to determine the most robust notion in our context, we ensure that our negative results hold for almost all conceivable security notions covered by Definition 7. For instance, we treat *both* the real-or-random and left-or-right formulations of confidentiality, without having to worry how tightly they relate to one another in our multi-key setting. Thus we rule out bypassing our negative results simply by tweaking the multi-key security definition.

⁵ A similar difficulty arises for queries i, j where $i = i^*$, but $j \neq i^*$, even though here it is sometimes possible to resolve the issue: since \mathcal{A}_1 knows b_j , it may be possible to use the POWER-oracles provided by the $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{A}_1)$ -experiment to respond appropriately - but only if suitable oracles are available for the the given GOAL-POWER combination.

Lossy equivalence of different n -user models We observe that Theorems 16 and 17 can also be used to prove implications among different notions of n -user security, provided that there is a corresponding implication in the single-user security setting. The tightness loss when going from one n -user reduction to another is essentially identical to n -times the loss in the single-user setting.

Theorem 18. *Let GOAL, POWER, GOAL', POWER' be such that each adversary \mathcal{A}_1 implies an adversary \mathcal{A}'_1 with about the same running time, such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL}'\text{-POWER}',X,1}(\mathcal{A}'_1) \geq \frac{1}{L} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL-POWER},X,1}(\mathcal{A}_1)$$

for some loss L .

Then each adversary \mathcal{A}_n such that, for all queries to challenge oracles of the form $\text{Enc}(i, j, M, N)$, $\text{LR}(i, j, M_0, M_1, N)$, and $\text{Dec}(i, j, C, N)$, it holds that $i = j$ (or $i = 1$, respectively) there is an adversary \mathcal{A}'_n with about the same running time as \mathcal{A}_n and

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL}'\text{-POWER}',X,n}(\mathcal{A}'_n) \geq \frac{1}{n \cdot L} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL-POWER},X,n}(\mathcal{A}_n).$$

Proof. We first use Theorem 16 (or Theorem 17, respectively) to build an adversary \mathcal{A}_1 from \mathcal{A}_n with

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL-POWER},X,1}(\mathcal{A}_1) \geq \frac{1}{n} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL-POWER},X,n}(\mathcal{A}_n)$$

Next, we use the assumption from the theorem to build \mathcal{A}'_1 from \mathcal{A}_1 , with

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL}'\text{-POWER}',X,1}(\mathcal{A}'_1) \geq \frac{1}{L} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL-POWER},X,1}(\mathcal{A}_1)$$

and finally we apply the trivial tight implication

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL}'\text{-POWER}',X,n}(\mathcal{A}'_n) \geq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL}'\text{-POWER}',X,1}(\mathcal{A}'_1)$$

that a single-user adversary always implies an n -user adversary with respect to the same GOAL' and POWER' security definition and with identical running time and success probability. This yields the claim.

C Proof of Lemma 12

Proof. We construct $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ that runs the key recovery adversary \mathcal{A} to obtain the key used by the challenge oracle(s) and then uses it to guess the hidden bit b_1 . Therefore $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ will return $(1, b'_1)$ and wins if $b'_1 = b_1$.

For each $i \in [n]$ and $j \in [l]$, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ samples $N_{i,j} \leftarrow_{\mathcal{S}} \mathbb{N}$ and then queries the encryption oracle \mathcal{E} on input $(i, M_j, N_{i,j})$, receiving $C_{i,j}$ (unless $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ has made this query before, since this is a pointless query, in which case it just sets $C_{i,j}$ to be the response from the last time the query was made). Then $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ passes $(C_{i,j}, N_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [l]}$ to the key recovery adversary \mathcal{A} .

When \mathcal{A} returns an index i^* , $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ queries Cor on each $i \in [n \setminus i^*]$ and passes $(K_i)_{i \in [n \setminus i^*]}$ to \mathcal{A} .

When \mathcal{A} returns a key K^* , $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ checks if $\mathcal{E}_{K^*}^{N_{i^*,j}}(M_j) = C_{i^*,j}$ for each $j \in [l]$. If not, then \mathcal{A} has been unsuccessful, so $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ samples a random bit $b'_1 \leftarrow_{\mathcal{S}} \{0, 1\}$ and returns $(1, b'_1)$. If the tests all succeed, then by M -key-uniqueness, $K^* = K_{i^*}$. Then $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ does the following:

- If GOAL = IND, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ chooses random $M_i^* \leftarrow_{\mathcal{S}} \mathbb{M}$ and $N_i^* \leftarrow_{\mathcal{S}} \mathbb{N}$, for $i = 1, 2, \dots, m$ (for some “large” m) such that $M_i^* \neq M_j$ for all $j \in [l]$. Then $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ queries Enc on input $(i^*, 1, M_i^*, N_i^*)$, receiving C_i^* . If for all $i = 1, 2, \dots, m$ it holds that $\mathcal{E}_{K^*}^{N_i^*}(M_i^*) = C_i^*$ then $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ returns $(1, 0)$. Else, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ returns $(1, 1)$.

- If $\text{GOAL} = \text{LRIND}$, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ chooses random $M_0^*, M_1^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{M}$ and $N^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{N}$ such that $|M_0^*| = |M_1^*|$, $M_0^* \neq M_j$ and $M_1^* \neq M_j$ for all $j \in [l]$. Then $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ queries LR on input $(i^*, 1, M_0^*, M_1^*, N^*)$, receiving C^* . If $\mathcal{E}_{K^*}^{N^*}(M_0^*) = C^*$, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ returns $(1, 0)$. Else, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ returns $(1, 1)$.
- If $\text{GOAL} \in \{\text{AE}, \text{LRAE}, \text{CTI}\}$, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ chooses random $M^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{M}$ and $N^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{N}$ such that $M^* \neq M_j$ for all $j \in [l]$. Then $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ computes $C^* \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_{K^*}^{N^*}(M^*)$ and queries Dec on input $(i^*, 1, C^*, N^*)$, receiving M . If $M \neq \perp$, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ returns $(1, 0)$. Else, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ returns $(1, 1)$.

For $\text{GOAL} \in \{\text{LRIND}, \text{AE}, \text{LRAE}, \text{CTI}\}$, the adversary $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ returns $(1, b)$ with $b = b_1$ whenever the adversary \mathcal{A} against key recovery is successful.

For $\text{GOAL} \in \{\text{IND}\}$, the adversary $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ always returns the correct bit if $b_1 = 1$. It also returns the correct bit $b_1 = 0$, provided that the random ciphertexts $(C_i^*)_{i \in [m]}$ that oracle Enc returns do not all collide with the true ciphertexts $\mathcal{E}_{K^*}^{N^*}(M_i^*)$. This collision event occurs with probability at most $\frac{1}{2^m}$.

In other words, for $\text{GOAL} \in \{\text{IND}, \text{LRIND}, \text{AE}, \text{LRAE}, \text{CTI}\}$, \mathcal{R} succeeds whenever \mathcal{A} succeeds if $b_1 = 0$, while, if $b_1 = 1$, then \mathcal{R} succeeds with the same probability that \mathcal{A} succeeds multiplied by δ_{GOAL} , where $\delta_{\text{GOAL}} = 1$ for $\text{GOAL} \in \{\text{LRIND}, \text{AE}, \text{LRAE}, \text{CTI}\}$ and $\delta_{\text{GOAL}} = (1 - \frac{1}{2^m})$ for $\text{GOAL} = \text{IND}$.

Whenever \mathcal{A} does not recover K^* , $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ guesses correctly with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. Putting it all together we get the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \Pr \left[\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}(\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}) = 1 \right] \\
&= \Pr \left[\text{KEYREC}_{\mathcal{E}}^{M,n}(\mathcal{A}) = 1 \right] \cdot \left(1 - \frac{(1 - \delta_{\text{GOAL}})}{2} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left(1 - \Pr \left[\text{KEYREC}_{\mathcal{E}}^{M,n}(\mathcal{A}) = 1 \right] \right) \\
&= \Pr \left[\text{KEYREC}_{\mathcal{E}}^{M,n}(\mathcal{A}) = 1 \right] \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1 - \delta_{\text{GOAL}}}{2} \right) + \frac{1}{2},
\end{aligned}$$

from which we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{GOAL-POWER},X,n}(\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}) &= 2 \left(\Pr \left[\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}(\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}) = 1 \right] - \frac{1}{2} \right) \\
&= \delta_{\text{GOAL}} \cdot \Pr \left[\text{KEYREC}_{\mathcal{E}}^{M,n}(\mathcal{A}) = 1 \right] \\
&= \delta_{\text{GOAL}} \cdot \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{KEYREC},M,n}(\mathcal{A}) \\
&= \delta_{\text{GOAL}} \cdot \epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}.
\end{aligned}$$

Ignoring the time taken for random sampling, the runtime of $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is precisely the runtime of \mathcal{A} , plus the time taken for additional encryptions using K^* : if $\text{GOAL} = \text{IND}$, there are $l + m$ additional encryptions and, if $\text{GOAL} \neq \text{IND}$, there are $l + 1$ additional encryptions. It follows that

$$t_{\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}} = t_{\mathcal{A}} + (l + m_{\text{GOAL}})t_{\mathcal{E}},$$

where $m_{\text{IND}} = m$ and $m_{\text{GOAL}} = 1$ for $\text{GOAL} \neq \text{IND}$.

Moreover, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ doesn't compromise b_1 and makes no pointless or prohibited queries: no queries are repeated, the messages used to generate the challenge queries do not appear in any of the previous encryption queries under key K_{i^*} and, in the LRIND case, the challenge messages are of equal length. It follows that $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is a valid adversary against $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,n}$ for $X \in \{\text{IV}, \text{MR}\}$, since nonces are always chosen uniformly at random.

If $X = \text{NR}$, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ might not be a valid adversary, since the randomly chosen nonces might accidentally collide. So we modify $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ to abort and output a random bit whenever there is a collision among the l randomly chosen nonces $(N_{i,j})_{j \in [l]}$ for each $i \in [n \setminus i^*]$, or among the $l + m_{\text{GOAL}}$ randomly chosen nonces for encryptions under K_{i^*} : the $l + m$ nonces $(N_{i^*,j})_{j \in [l]}$ and $(N_i^*)_{i \in [m]}$, if $\text{GOAL} = \text{IND}$, and the $l + 1$ nonces $(N_{i^*,j})_{j \in [l]}$ and N^* , if $\text{GOAL} \neq \text{IND}$. Then $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is a valid adversary and its advantage is $\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$ multiplied by the probability that no such nonce collisions happen. By a simple union bound the

probability of a collision among the l randomly chosen nonces $(N_{i,j})_{j \in [l]}$ is at most $\frac{l(l-1)}{2|N|}$ for each $i \in [n \setminus i^*]$ and the probability of a collision among the $l + m_{\text{GOAL}}$ randomly chosen nonces for i^* is at most $\frac{(l+m_{\text{GOAL}})(l+m_{\text{GOAL}}-1)}{2|N|}$. Thus the probability of a collision among the nonces for any of the n keys is at most

$$\begin{aligned} (n-1) \frac{l(l-1)}{2|N|} + \frac{l+m_{\text{GOAL}}(l+m_{\text{GOAL}}-1)}{2|N|} &= \frac{nl(l-1) + m_{\text{GOAL}}(m_{\text{GOAL}} + 2l - 1)}{2|N|} \\ &= 1 - \delta_{\text{NR}}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus the advantage of $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is $\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}} \geq \delta_{\text{NR}} \cdot \delta_{\text{GOAL}} \cdot \epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$, as desired. \square

Remark 19. In the proof, we assumed that the adversary is allowed to associate the bit b_1 with any of the n keys K_1, \dots, K_n . While this is permitted according to our definition of the $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{n,X}$ game, in fact the result holds for more restrictive games: we only require that for all $i \in [n]$ there exists *some* $j \in [n]$ such that the adversary can associate the bit b_j with the key K_i . In this case, $\mathcal{R}_{\mathcal{A}}$ uses the recovered key K^* from \mathcal{A} to determine the value of any hidden bit b_j that can be associated with K_{i^*} .

D Proof of the Theorem 14

Proof. For ease of notation, let K , M , N and C be the sets of keys, messages, nonces and ciphertexts, respectively, for the *construction* $C[\mathcal{E}]$ (even though they may differ from the corresponding sets for \mathcal{E} , but we shall not need to refer to those in the proof).

Consider the following (inefficient) adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$ against $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$. On input

$$(C_{i,j}, N_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [l]},$$

\mathcal{A}_1 first checks that each $C_{i,j} \in \mathsf{C}$ and each $N_{i,j} \in \mathsf{N}$. If this check fails, then \mathcal{A}_1 aborts.⁶ If the check succeeds, then \mathcal{A}_1 chooses $i^* \in [n]$ uniformly at random, sets

$$st_{\mathcal{A}} \leftarrow \left(i^*, (C_{i,j}, N_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [l]} \right)$$

and outputs $(i^*, st_{\mathcal{A}})$. On input $\left((K_i)_{i \in [n \setminus i^*]}, st_{\mathcal{A}} \right)$, \mathcal{A}_2 checks that K_i is *valid* for each $i \in [n \setminus i^*]$, that is:

1. $K_i \in \mathsf{K}$
2. For each $j \in [l]$, $C[\mathcal{E}]_{K_i}^{N_{i^*,j}}(M_j) = C_{i^*,j}$.

If this check fails, then \mathcal{A}_2 outputs \perp . If the check succeeds, then \mathcal{A}_2 uses exhaustive search to find some $K^* \in \mathsf{K}$ such that $C[\mathcal{E}]_{K^*}^{N_{i^*,j}}(M_j) = C_{i^*,j}$ for each $j \in [l]$. Since $C[\mathcal{E}]$ is \mathbf{M} -key-unique, either K^* exists and is unique, or the ciphertexts $C_{i^*,j}$ were not all encryptions of the messages M_j with the nonces $N_{i^*,j}$ under the same key. So if \mathcal{A}_2 does not find a K^* with this property, it outputs \perp . Otherwise it outputs K^* .

It is clear that the advantage of \mathcal{A} is $\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}} = 1$ since, in the real $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$ game, all the checks performed by \mathcal{A} will succeed and K^* is uniquely defined.

We construct a meta-reduction \mathcal{M} that simulates the environment of \mathcal{R} in its interaction with this ideal adversary \mathcal{A} . Then \mathcal{M} will use the output of \mathcal{R} to play the $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game.

First, K^* is initialised to \perp . Then, \mathcal{M} uses its oracles to simulate the oracles used by \mathcal{R}_1 by simply forwarding the queries from \mathcal{R}_1 and the responses from the oracles, until \mathcal{R}_1 returns

$$\left((C_{i,j}, N_{i,j})_{i \in [n], j \in [l]}, st_1 \right).$$

⁶ Formally, \mathcal{A}_1 outputs a random index $i^* \in [n]$ and records an abort message in the state $st_{\mathcal{A}}$; when \mathcal{A}_2 receives $\left((K_i)_{i \in [n \setminus i^*]}, st_{\mathcal{A}} \right)$, it reads the abort message in $st_{\mathcal{A}}$ and outputs \perp .

Then \mathcal{M} checks that each $C_{i,j} \in \mathcal{C}$ and each $N_{i,j} \in \mathcal{N}$. If this check fails, \mathcal{M} ‘aborts’ just as \mathcal{A} would.⁷ If the check succeeds, then \mathcal{M} chooses i^* uniformly at random from $[n]$ and does the following for each $i \in [n]$:

1. \mathcal{M} runs \mathcal{R}_2 on input (i, st_1) , which we call \mathcal{R}_2^i for ease of readability.
2. When \mathcal{R}_2^i makes oracle queries:
 - (a) If $i = i^*$, \mathcal{M} uses its oracles to honestly answer all oracle queries; forwarding the queries to its oracles and then forwarding the replies to \mathcal{R}_2^i .
 - (b) If $i \neq i^*$, \mathcal{M} simulates the ‘fake’ oracles, i.e. the oracles Enc and Dec in the case $b = 1$. Concretely, when \mathcal{R}_2^i makes an encryption query (M, N) , \mathcal{M} samples $C \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\text{enclen}(|M|)}$ and returns this to \mathcal{R}_2^i .⁸ When \mathcal{R}_2^i makes a decryption query (C, N) , \mathcal{M} returns \perp to \mathcal{R}_2^i .
3. When \mathcal{R}_2^i outputs $\left((K_r^i)_{r \in [n \setminus i]}, st_2^i \right)$, if $i \neq i^*$ then \mathcal{M} checks if $K_{i^*}^i$ is *valid*, i.e.
 - (a) $K_{i^*}^i \in \mathcal{K}$,
 - (b) For each $j \in [l]$, $C[\mathcal{E}]_{K_{i^*}^i}^{N_{i^*,j}}(M_j) = C_{i^*,j}$.

If $K_{i^*}^i$ is valid, then $K^* \leftarrow K_{i^*}^i$. By M -key-uniqueness, $K_{i^*}^i$ is the only key with this property.

At the end of these runs of \mathcal{R}_2 , if $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$ did not provide a full set of valid keys, i.e. $K_r^{i^*}$ is not valid for some $r \in [n \setminus i^*]$, then \mathcal{M} sets $K^* \leftarrow \perp$ (mirroring the check performed by \mathcal{A}_2).

If $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$ did provide a full set of valid keys, but $K^* = \perp$, (so none of the $\mathcal{R}_2^i, i \neq i^*$ provided a valid key $K_{i^*}^i$), \mathcal{M} aborts the simulation and returns a random bit. We call this event BAD.

Otherwise, \mathcal{M} runs \mathcal{R}_3 on input (K^*, st_2^*) , forwarding oracle queries from \mathcal{R}_3 to its oracles and sending back the responses.

When \mathcal{R}_3 outputs a bit b' , \mathcal{M} returns this bit in its game.

Now we consider the resources of \mathcal{M} and its advantage in the $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game.

\mathcal{M} performs n runs of (part of) \mathcal{R} and carries out $2(n-1)l$ encryptions with $C[\mathcal{E}]$ (checking validity of $K_{i^*}^i$ for each $i \neq i^*$ and checking validity of $K_r^{i^*}$ for each $r \neq i^*$), so if we ignore the time taken for random sampling and checking set membership, the runtime of \mathcal{M} is at most $nt_{\mathcal{R}} + 2l(n-1)t_{C[\mathcal{E}]}$. Moreover, \mathcal{M} makes at most $q_{\mathcal{R}}$ oracle queries, since it only forwards the queries from $\mathcal{R}_1, \mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$ and \mathcal{R}_3 .

Now consider the advantage $\epsilon_{\mathcal{M}}$ of \mathcal{M} in $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$. From the definition of a simple reduction, \mathcal{R} must be a valid adversary in $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ whenever \mathcal{A} is a valid adversary in $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$. But all adversaries are automatically valid in $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$, so \mathcal{R} must always be a valid adversary against $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$. Now the oracle queries \mathcal{M} makes are exactly the same queries as $(\mathcal{R}_1, \mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}, \mathcal{R}_3)$ makes in the same game. Since \mathcal{R} is a valid adversary, this shows that \mathcal{M} does not make pointless or prohibited queries and uses nonces correctly with respect to X . Therefore \mathcal{M} is a valid adversary against $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ and so $\epsilon_{\mathcal{M}} \leq \epsilon$.

Note that for $\mathcal{R}_1, \mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$ and \mathcal{R}_3 , \mathcal{M} answers the oracle queries honestly with its own oracles. Therefore \mathcal{M} correctly simulates the view of $(\mathcal{R}_1, \mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}, \mathcal{R}_3)$ in the game $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$. However, \mathcal{M} might not correctly simulate the responses from \mathcal{A} . Indeed, to correctly simulate \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{M} requires that some $\mathcal{R}_2^i, i \neq i^*$ provides a valid key $K_{i^*}^i$, but the oracle queries from $\mathcal{R}_2^i, i \neq i^*$ are not handled honestly. The imperfect simulation of the view of \mathcal{R}_2^i might make it less likely to provide a valid key $K_{i^*}^i$. We will therefore need to show that the change in behaviour of the \mathcal{R}_2^i due to the imperfect simulation is small. The intuition for this claim is that if \mathcal{R}_2^i could distinguish between the honest and the simulated oracles (having only received an index i from the key-recovery adversary \mathcal{A} , not a key), then one can use $(\mathcal{R}_1, \mathcal{R}_2^i)$ directly, without \mathcal{A} , to win the single-key game $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$.

Consider the three possible scenarios:

1. $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$ did not provide a full set of valid keys.

⁷ That is, \mathcal{M} runs \mathcal{R}_2 on input (i, st_1) for a random index $i^* \in [n]$, forwarding oracle queries and responses, receives $\left((K_i)_{i \in [n \setminus i^*]}, st_2 \right)$ from \mathcal{R}_2 , runs \mathcal{R}_3 on input (\perp, st_2) , receives a bit b' and outputs this in its game.

⁸ Of course, here enclen refers to the lengths of ciphertexts from \mathcal{E} , not $C[\mathcal{E}]$.

2. $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$ did provide a full set of valid keys and, for some $i \neq i^*$, \mathcal{R}_2^i provided a valid key $K_{i^*}^i$.
3. $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$ did provide a full set of valid keys, but, for each $i \neq i^*$, \mathcal{R}_2^i did not provide a valid key $K_{i^*}^i$.

In the first case, both \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{A} submit \perp to \mathcal{R}_3 as their ‘key’, so the simulation is correct. In the second case, both \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{A} submit a key K^* to \mathcal{R}_3 that satisfies $C[\mathcal{E}]_{K^*}^{N_{i^*,j}}(M_j) = C_{i^*,j}$ for all $j \in [l]$, and K^* is the only key with this property by the M -key-uniqueness of $C[\mathcal{E}]$. So the simulation is correct in this case too.

The third case is the event BAD and is where the simulation fails. By construction \mathcal{M} aborts the simulation if BAD occurs and outputs a random bit. Given that BAD does not occur, the view of $(\mathcal{R}_1, \mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}, \mathcal{R}_3)$ in its interaction with \mathcal{A} and the $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ oracles is identical to its view in its interaction with \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{M} returns the bit b' returned by \mathcal{R}_3 . This shows that

$$\Pr \left[\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{R}) = 1 \right] = \Pr \left[\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{M}) = 1 \mid \neg \text{BAD} \right].$$

Write $W^X(\mathcal{M})$ (‘Win’) for the event $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{M}) = 1$. Then, as \mathcal{M} outputs a random bit if BAD occurs, we have $\Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \mid \text{BAD}] = \frac{1}{2}$ and it follows that:

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M})] \\ &= \Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \cap \neg \text{BAD}] + \Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \cap \text{BAD}] \\ &= \Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \mid \neg \text{BAD}] (1 - \Pr [\text{BAD}]) + \Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \mid \text{BAD}] \Pr [\text{BAD}] \\ &= \Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \mid \neg \text{BAD}] - \Pr [\text{BAD}] (\Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \mid \neg \text{BAD}] - \Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \mid \text{BAD}]) \\ &= \Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \mid \neg \text{BAD}] - \Pr [\text{BAD}] \left(\Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \mid \neg \text{BAD}] - \frac{1}{2} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-PAS},X,1}(\mathcal{M}) &= 2 \left(\Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M})] - \frac{1}{2} \right) \\ &= 2 \left[\Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \mid \neg \text{BAD}] - \Pr [\text{BAD}] \left(\Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \mid \neg \text{BAD}] - \frac{1}{2} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \right] \\ &= 2 \left(\Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \mid \neg \text{BAD}] - \frac{1}{2} \right) - \Pr [\text{BAD}] \cdot 2 \left(\Pr [W^X(\mathcal{M}) \mid \neg \text{BAD}] - \frac{1}{2} \right) \\ &= (1 - \Pr [\text{BAD}]) \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-PAS},X,1}(\mathcal{R}). \end{aligned}$$

It follows that:

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-PAS},X,1}(\mathcal{M}) \geq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-PAS},X,1}(\mathcal{R}) - \Pr [\text{BAD}].$$

To complete the proof we bound the probability of BAD (see the next Lemma) by $\Pr [\text{BAD}] \leq \frac{1}{n} + \epsilon$. We therefore get that

$$\epsilon \geq \epsilon_{\mathcal{M}} \geq \epsilon_{\mathcal{R}} - \Pr [\text{BAD}] \geq \epsilon_{\mathcal{R}} - \frac{1}{n} - \epsilon.$$

So, $\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}} \leq (\frac{1}{n} + 2\epsilon)$. Since $\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}} = 1$, we get that

$$\frac{\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}}{\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}}} \geq \left(\frac{1}{n} + 2\epsilon \right)^{-1},$$

as required to show that \mathcal{R} loses $(\frac{1}{n} + 2\epsilon)^{-1}$. □

Lemma 20.

$$\Pr [\text{BAD}] \leq \frac{1}{n} + \epsilon.$$

Proof. Consider a meta-reduction \mathcal{M}' in the $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game that executes \mathcal{R}_1 and each $\mathcal{R}_2^i, i \in [n]$ exactly as \mathcal{M} does, but without treating $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$ differently. That is, encryption and decryption queries from $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$ are ‘faked’ in the same way as for the other $\mathcal{R}_2^i, i \neq i^*$. Such an \mathcal{M}' could have chosen $i^* \leftarrow_{\$}[n]$ after executing each \mathcal{R}_2^i , simply by storing all the keys output by each \mathcal{R}_2^i , and then, once i^* had been chosen, checking if $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$ returned a full set of valid keys and if each $K_{i^*}^i$ was valid for $i \neq i^*$.

Note that the probability of BAD occurring for \mathcal{M}' does not depend on whether i^* was chosen at the start of executing the \mathcal{R}_2^i , or at the end, since \mathcal{M}' runs each \mathcal{R}_2^i in the same way. Moreover, after executing each \mathcal{R}_2^i , there can be at most one $i \in [n]$ such that \mathcal{R}_2^i returned a full set of valid keys but for each $j \neq i$, \mathcal{R}_2^j did not provide a full set of valid keys. Therefore there can be at most one $i \in [n]$ such that \mathcal{R}_2^i returned a full set of valid keys but for each $j \neq i$, \mathcal{R}_2^j did not provide a valid key K_i^j . Since i^* was sampled uniformly from $[n]$, the probability that i^* has the latter property, i.e. that BAD occurs for \mathcal{M}' , is at most $\frac{1}{n}$.

Now we compare the probability that BAD occurs for the two meta-reductions \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{M}' . Let $\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}} = \text{BAD}$ and let $\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'}$ be the event that BAD occurs in the game played by \mathcal{M}' .

Consider the hidden bit b in the game played by \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{M}' . If $b = 1$, then the views of \mathcal{R}_1 and each \mathcal{R}_2^i are identically distributed in their interactions with \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{M}' (since $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$ receives ‘fake’ responses to its queries, regardless of whether the meta-reduction forwards them to its own oracles or simulates the responses.) It follows that $\Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'} \mid b = 1] = \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}} \mid b = 1]$.

Then

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{BAD}] &= \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}}] - \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'}] + \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'}] \\ &\leq \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}}] - \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'}] + \frac{1}{n} \\ &= \frac{1}{2} (\Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}} \mid b = 0] - \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'} \mid b = 0]) + \frac{1}{n}. \end{aligned}$$

Now we construct an adversary \mathcal{B} that simulates the environment of \mathcal{R}_1 and the \mathcal{R}_2^i in their interaction with either \mathcal{M} or \mathcal{M}' , depending on the hidden bit b' in the game played by \mathcal{B} . If BAD occurs, \mathcal{B} will output 0. Otherwise \mathcal{B} will output 1.

Consider \mathcal{B} in the $\text{AE-CCA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game. That is, \mathcal{B} has access to the usual challenge oracles Enc and Dec, but can also query the ‘always real’ oracles \mathcal{E} and \mathcal{D} (provided it does not make pointless or prohibited queries). But if \mathcal{B} has significant advantage in this game, then there is another adversary, with the same resources as \mathcal{B} , that has significant advantage against $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$:

Lemma 21. *Suppose \mathcal{A} is a valid adversary against $\text{AE-CCA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$, where $X \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$. Then $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-CCA}, X, 1}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 2\epsilon$, where ϵ is the maximum advantage of a valid adversary against $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ that runs in the same time as \mathcal{A} and makes the same number of oracle queries as \mathcal{A} .⁹*

Proof. It is easy to show that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-CCA}, X, 1}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b = 1] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b = 0].$$

Now let $G_{b,b'}$ be the game played by \mathcal{A} where the Enc and Dec oracles respond according to b and, if $b' = 0$ the \mathcal{E} and \mathcal{D} oracles respond as normal, but if $b' = 1$ these oracles respond exactly as Enc and Dec respond when $b = 1$, i.e. with random strings of the appropriate length and \perp , respectively.

It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-CCA}, X, 1}(\mathcal{A}) &= \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b = 1, b' = 0] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b = 0, b' = 0] \\ &= (\Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b = 1, b' = 0] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b = 1, b' = 1]) \\ &\quad + (\Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b = 1, b' = 1] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b = 0, b' = 0]). \end{aligned}$$

⁹ We remark that a similar statement can be easily derived by combining results from an existing work [5]. However, this approach only shows that the advantage in $\text{AE-CCA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ is at most *four times* the maximum advantage in $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$, whereas proving the statement directly gives a tighter bound.

Now we construct adversaries \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 against $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ that run in the same time as \mathcal{A} and make the same number of oracle queries as \mathcal{A} . The adversaries \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 use their Enc and Dec oracles to simulate the environment of \mathcal{A} . Then when \mathcal{A} returns a bit, this is the bit that \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 output in their games.

When \mathcal{A} makes queries to Enc or Dec, \mathcal{A}_1 simulates the ‘fake oracles’, i.e. responds with random strings and \perp , respectively. When \mathcal{A} makes queries to \mathcal{E} or \mathcal{D} , \mathcal{A}_1 forwards these to its own Enc and Dec oracles and returns the responses to \mathcal{A} . Thus \mathcal{A}_1 correctly simulates the game $G_{1,b''}$ for \mathcal{A} , where b'' is the hidden bit in the game played by \mathcal{A}_1 .

On the other hand, \mathcal{A}_2 forwards all queries from \mathcal{A} , whether to the challenge oracles or the ‘always real’ oracles, to its challenge oracles Enc and Dec and returns the responses to \mathcal{A} . Thus \mathcal{A}_2 correctly simulates the game $G_{b'',b''}$ for \mathcal{A} , where b'' is the hidden bit in the game played by \mathcal{A}_2 .

It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-PAS},X,1}(\mathcal{A}_1) &= \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b'' = 1] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b'' = 0] \\ &= \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b = 1, b' = 0] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b = 1, b' = 1], \end{aligned}$$

and similarly,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-PAS},X,1}(\mathcal{A}_2) &= \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b'' = 1] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b'' = 0] \\ &= \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b = 1, b' = 1] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}} \mid b = 0, b' = 0]. \end{aligned}$$

Thus

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-CCA},X,1}(\mathcal{A}) = \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-PAS},X,1}(\mathcal{A}_1) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-PAS},X,1}(\mathcal{A}_2)$$

and the result follows if we can show that \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 are valid in $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$.

Since \mathcal{A} is a valid adversary in $\text{AE-CCA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$, \mathcal{A} uses nonces correctly with respect to X . Therefore the same is true of \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 . It remains to check that \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 make no pointless or prohibited queries, given that \mathcal{A} makes no pointless or prohibited queries.

If \mathcal{A}_1 repeated a query to Dec or Enc, these would be repeated queries to \mathcal{E} or \mathcal{D} from \mathcal{A} , which would be pointless or prohibited queries for \mathcal{A} . If \mathcal{A}_1 made a query $\text{Enc}(M, N)$, where $M \neq \perp$ was the response to a query $\text{Dec}(C, N)$, then this would be a query $\mathcal{E}(M, N)$ from \mathcal{A} , where $M \neq \perp$ was the response to a query $\mathcal{D}(C, N)$, which would be a pointless query for \mathcal{A} . Finally if \mathcal{A}_1 made a query $\text{Dec}(C, N)$, where C was the response to a query $\text{Enc}(M, N)$, then this would be a query $\mathcal{D}(C, N)$ from \mathcal{A} , where C was the response to a query $\mathcal{E}(M, N)$, which would be a pointless query for \mathcal{A} . Thus, \mathcal{A}_1 makes no pointless or prohibited queries.

Similarly, if \mathcal{A}_2 repeated a query to Dec or Enc, then either: \mathcal{A} repeated a query to \mathcal{E} , \mathcal{D} , Enc or Dec, which would be a pointless or prohibited query for \mathcal{A} ; or \mathcal{A} made the same query to \mathcal{E} and Enc, in either order, which would be a prohibited query for \mathcal{A} ; or \mathcal{A} made the same query to \mathcal{D} and Dec, in either order. The latter repeated query is valid for \mathcal{A} , but leads to a pointless repeated query to Dec for \mathcal{A}_2 . To avoid this pointless query, \mathcal{A}_2 can just return the response from the first query (and correctly simulate \mathcal{A} 's environment in the game where \mathcal{D} has been replaced by Dec). If \mathcal{A}_2 made a query $\text{Enc}(M, N)$, where $M \neq \perp$ was the response to a query $\text{Dec}(C, N)$, then this would be a query $\mathcal{E}(M, N)$ or $\text{Enc}(M, N)$ from \mathcal{A} , where $M \neq \perp$ was the response to a query $\mathcal{D}(C, N)$ or $\text{Dec}(C, N)$, which is either a pointless or prohibited query for \mathcal{A} . Finally if \mathcal{A}_2 made a query $\text{Dec}(C, N)$, where C was the response to a query $\text{Enc}(M, N)$, then this would be a query $\mathcal{D}(C, N)$ or $\text{Dec}(C, N)$ from \mathcal{A} , where C was the response to a query $\mathcal{E}(M, N)$ or $\text{Enc}(M, N)$, which is either a pointless or prohibited query for \mathcal{A} . Thus, \mathcal{A}_2 makes no pointless or prohibited queries. \square

Now we describe the adversary \mathcal{B} in the $\text{AE-CCA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game. First, \mathcal{B} runs \mathcal{R}_1 , but all queries are forwarded to the *genuine* oracles \mathcal{E} and \mathcal{D} . Then \mathcal{B} carries out the same checks as \mathcal{M} (or \mathcal{M}') and, if the checks succeed, \mathcal{B} samples $i^* \leftarrow_{\$} [n]$ and, for each $i \in [n]$, \mathcal{B} runs \mathcal{R}_2 on input (i, st_1) .

When \mathcal{R}_2^i makes oracle queries:

1. If $i = i^*$, \mathcal{B} uses its *challenge* oracles Enc and Dec to honestly answer all oracle queries; forwarding the queries to its oracles and then forwarding the replies to $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$.
2. If $i \neq i^*$, \mathcal{B} simulates the ‘fake’ oracles, i.e. the oracles Enc and Dec with $b = 1$, just as \mathcal{M} (or \mathcal{M}') does.

Finally, \mathcal{B} checks if BAD has occurred. If so \mathcal{B} outputs 0. Otherwise, \mathcal{B} outputs 1.

Let b' be the hidden bit in the game played by \mathcal{B} . So the oracle queries from \mathcal{R}_1 will always be ‘real’ (as they are for \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{M}' , given that $b = 0$), the oracle queries from \mathcal{R}_2^i for $i \neq i^*$ will always be ‘fake’ (as they are for \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{M}') and, depending on b' , the oracle queries from $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$ will be real (like \mathcal{M} , given that $b = 0$), or fake (like \mathcal{M}'). It follows that $\Pr[0 \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \mid b' = 0] = \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}} \mid b = 0]$ and $\Pr[0 \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \mid b' = 1] = \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'} \mid b = 0]$. Now,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{AE-CCA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{B}) = 1] &= \frac{1}{2} (\Pr[0 \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \mid b' = 0] + \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \mid b' = 1]) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} (\Pr[0 \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \mid b' = 0] - \Pr[0 \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \mid b' = 1]) + \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

and so

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-CCA},X,1}(\mathcal{B}) &= 2 \left(\Pr[\text{AE-CCA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{B}) = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right) \\ &= \Pr[0 \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \mid b' = 0] - \Pr[0 \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \mid b' = 1] \\ &= \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}} \mid b = 0] - \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'} \mid b = 0] \\ &\geq 2 \left(\Pr[\text{BAD}] - \frac{1}{n} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Like \mathcal{M} (or \mathcal{M}'), \mathcal{B} performs n runs of (part of) \mathcal{R} and carries out $2(n-1)l$ encryptions to check if BAD has occurred. So the runtime of \mathcal{B} is at most $nt_{\mathcal{R}} + 2l(n-1)t_{C[\mathcal{E}]}$. Moreover \mathcal{B} makes at most $q_{\mathcal{R}}$ oracle queries (only forwarding queries from \mathcal{R}_1 and $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$).

Consider $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-CCA},X,1}(\mathcal{B})$. Firstly, note that \mathcal{B} uses nonces correctly with respect to X , since any query to Enc or \mathcal{E} is a query made to Enc by $(\mathcal{R}_1, \mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}, \mathcal{R}_3)$ and \mathcal{R} is a valid adversary against $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$. Also, \mathcal{B} will not make pointless queries:

- A repeated query to \mathcal{E} or \mathcal{D} by \mathcal{B} would be a repeated query to Enc or Dec from \mathcal{R}_1 , which is a pointless or prohibited query in the game played by \mathcal{R} .
- A repeated query to Dec by \mathcal{B} would be a repeated query to Dec from $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$, which is a pointless query in the game played by \mathcal{R} .
- A query $\mathcal{D}(C, N)$ by \mathcal{B} , where C was the response to a query $\mathcal{E}(M, N)$, would be a query $\text{Dec}(C, N)$ from \mathcal{R}_1 , where C was the response to a query $\text{Enc}(M, N)$, which is a prohibited query in the game played by \mathcal{R} .
- A query $\mathcal{E}(M, N)$ by \mathcal{B} , where $M \neq \perp$ was the response to a query $\mathcal{D}(C, N)$, would be a query $\text{Enc}(M, N)$ from \mathcal{R}_1 , where $M \neq \perp$ was the response to a query $\text{Dec}(C, N)$, which is a pointless query in the game played by \mathcal{R} .
- Finally, suppose \mathcal{B} makes a query $\mathcal{E}(M, N)$ or $\text{Enc}(M, N)$, where $M \neq \perp$ was the response to a query $\text{Dec}(C, N)$. The query $\text{Dec}(C, N)$ from \mathcal{B} would correspond to a query $\text{Dec}(C, N)$ from $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$ and so the subsequent encryption query would correspond to a query $\text{Enc}(M, N)$ from $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$. But as $M \neq \perp$ this is a pointless query for \mathcal{R} .

Moreover, \mathcal{B} will not make prohibited queries:

- A repeated query to Enc by \mathcal{B} would be a repeated query to Enc from $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$, which is a prohibited query in the game played by \mathcal{R} .
- Suppose \mathcal{B} makes two queries of the form $\text{Enc}(M, N)$ and $\mathcal{E}(M, N)$. Each of these queries would correspond to the same query $\text{Enc}(M, N)$ from \mathcal{R} , which is prohibited in the game played by \mathcal{R} .

- A query $\mathcal{D}(C, N)$ from \mathcal{B} , where C was the response to a query $\text{Enc}(M, N)$, is impossible since \mathcal{B} only queries Enc and Dec after querying \mathcal{E} and \mathcal{D} .
- A query $\text{Dec}(C, N)$ from \mathcal{B} , where C was the response to a query $\mathcal{E}(M, N)$ or $\text{Enc}(M, N)$, would correspond to a query $\text{Dec}(C, N)$ from $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$, where C was the response to a query $\text{Enc}(M, N)$ from \mathcal{R}_1 or $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$, which is a prohibited query in the game played by \mathcal{R} .
- A query $\text{Enc}(M, N)$ from \mathcal{B} , where $M \neq \perp$ was the response to a query $\mathcal{D}(C, N)$, would correspond to a query $\text{Enc}(M, N)$ from $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$, where $M \neq \perp$ was the response to a query $\text{Dec}(C, N)$ from \mathcal{R}_1 , which is a pointless query in the game played by \mathcal{R} .

It follows that \mathcal{B} is a valid adversary against $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-CCA}, X, 1}(\mathcal{B})$. Then, by Lemma 21, we have

$$2 \left(\Pr[\text{BAD}] - \frac{1}{n} \right) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-CCA}, X, 1}(\mathcal{B}) \leq 2\epsilon,$$

from which the result follows. \square

E Proof of Corollary 15

Proof. Recall the (\mathbb{S}, \mathbb{T}) -simple reduction from $\text{KEYREC}_{\mathcal{E}}^{M, n}$ to $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, n}$ constructed in Lemma 12, where $\mathbb{S}(\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}) = \delta_X \cdot \delta_{\text{GOAL}} \cdot \epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$ and $\mathbb{T}(t_{\mathcal{A}}) = t_{\mathcal{A}} + (l + m_{\text{GOAL}})t_{\mathcal{E}}$. Relabelling, we obtain a $(\mathbb{S}', \mathbb{T}')$ -simple reduction from $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M, n}$ to $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X', n}$, where $\mathbb{S}'(\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}) = \delta_{X'} \cdot \delta_{\text{GOAL}} \cdot \epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$ and $\mathbb{T}'(t_{\mathcal{A}}) = t_{\mathcal{A}} + (l + m_{\text{GOAL}})t_{C[\mathcal{E}]}$, which we call \mathcal{R} .

We argue by contradiction. Suppose that there is a simple reduction \mathcal{R}' from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X', n}$ to $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$ such that, for all valid adversaries \mathcal{B} against $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, n}$, $\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}'} > L^{-1}\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}$.

Then we can form a simple reduction \mathcal{R}'' from $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M, n}$ to $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$: for any adversary \mathcal{A} against $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M, n}$, running \mathcal{R} with \mathcal{A} provides a valid adversary \mathcal{B} against $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X', n}$ for \mathcal{R}' to turn into a valid adversary against $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$.

By construction, the advantage $\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}''}$ of \mathcal{R}'' is equal to the advantage of \mathcal{R}' with access to an adversary with advantage $\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}}$, i.e. $\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}''} > L^{-1}\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}}$. Since $\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}} \geq \delta_{X'} \cdot \delta_{\text{GOAL}} \cdot \epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$ for all adversaries \mathcal{A} against $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M, n}$, we have

$$\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}''} > L^{-1} \cdot \delta_{X'} \cdot \delta_{\text{GOAL}} \cdot \epsilon_{\mathcal{A}} = \left(\frac{1}{n} + 2\epsilon \right) \epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}.$$

But this is a contradiction, since, by Theorem 14, for any simple reduction \mathcal{R}'' from $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M, n}$ to $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$, there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} against $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M, n}$ such that

$$\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}''} \leq \left(\frac{1}{n} + 2\epsilon \right) \epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}.$$

It follows that for any simple reduction \mathcal{R}' from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X', n}$ to $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$ there exists a valid adversary \mathcal{B} against $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X', n}$ such that $\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}'} \leq L^{-1}\epsilon_{\mathcal{B}}$, i.e. \mathcal{R}' loses L . \square

F Lower bounds for Simple Reductions for Secrecy and Integrity Notions

In this section we provide lower bounds on simple reductions to single-key security notions for privacy. Informally, we show that for all $C[\mathcal{E}]$ is M -key-unique for some $M \in \mathbb{M}^l$ then: if all reasonable adversaries have small $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$ advantage, then any simple reduction from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X', n}$ to $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$ loses approximately n .

We proceed in the same way as for $\text{AE-PAS}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$: we first prove an impossibility result for reductions from $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$ to the relevant single-key game, and then combine this with the non-lossy reduction from $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$ to $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$ from Lemma 12 (after relabelling X and \mathcal{E}). The proofs is similar to those of Thm. 14 and Cor. 15. We omit some of the details and highlight the main differences.

Secrecy notions. We start with lowerbounds for simple reductions from multi-key to single-key secrecy properties.

Theorem 22. *Let \mathcal{E} and $C[\mathcal{E}]$ be authenticated encryption schemes such that $C[\mathcal{E}]$ is M -key-unique for some $M \in \mathbb{M}^l$. Then, for $X \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$, any simple reduction \mathcal{R} from $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$ to $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ loses $L = \left(\frac{1}{n} + 2\epsilon\right)^{-1}$. Here ϵ is the maximum advantage of a valid adversary against $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ that runs in time at most $nt_{\mathcal{R}} + 2l(n-1)t_{C[\mathcal{E}]}$ and $t_{C[\mathcal{E}]}$ is an upper-bound on the runtime of a single encryption with $C[\mathcal{E}]$.*

Proof. We reuse the hypothetical adversary \mathcal{A} against $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$ that was described in the proof of Thm. 14. We construct a meta-reduction \mathcal{M} that simulates the environment of \mathcal{R} in its interaction with \mathcal{A} and uses the output of \mathcal{R} to play the $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game.

The meta-reduction \mathcal{M} is exactly as is described in the proof of Thm. 14, except that now \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{R} may only query an encryption oracle, not a decryption oracle. As before, queries from \mathcal{R}_2^* are forwarded, while queries from $\mathcal{R}_2^i, i \neq i^*$ are simulated: when \mathcal{R}_2^i makes an encryption query (M, N) , \mathcal{M} samples $C \leftarrow_{\mathcal{S}} \{0, 1\}^{\text{enclen}(|M|)}$ and returns this to \mathcal{R}_2^i . How \mathcal{M} computes K^* and the conditions under which \mathcal{M} aborts and returns a random bit are exactly as before.

We remark that, since \mathcal{R} is a valid adversary against $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ and all the oracle queries made by \mathcal{M} were chosen by $\mathcal{R}_1, \mathcal{R}_2^*$ or \mathcal{R}_3 , \mathcal{M} uses nonces correctly with respect to X and does not make pointless or prohibited queries. So \mathcal{M} is a valid adversary against $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ and $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{IND-PAS},X,1}(\mathcal{M}) \leq \epsilon$.

As before, \mathcal{M} correctly simulates the view of $(\mathcal{R}_1, \mathcal{R}_2^*, \mathcal{R}_3)$ in the game $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ and correctly simulates the responses from \mathcal{A} , provided that the event BAD does not occur.

This shows that

$$\Pr \left[\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{R}) = 1 \right] = \Pr \left[\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{M}) = 1 \mid \neg \text{BAD} \right]$$

and hence:

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{IND-PAS},X,1}(\mathcal{M}) \geq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{IND-PAS},X,1}(\mathcal{R}) - \Pr[\text{BAD}].$$

We now show that $\Pr[\text{BAD}] \leq \frac{1}{n} + \epsilon$, which proves the Theorem.

As in the proof of Lemma 20, we consider an alternative meta-reduction \mathcal{M}' that simulates the encryption queries from all \mathcal{R}_2^i , including \mathcal{R}_2^* . With $\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}}$ and $\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'}$ defined as before, we have

$$\Pr[\text{BAD}] = \frac{1}{2} (\Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}} \mid b = 0] - \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'} \mid b = 0]) + \frac{1}{n}.$$

We construct an adversary \mathcal{B} that simulates the environment of \mathcal{R}_1 and the \mathcal{R}_2^i in their interaction with either \mathcal{M} or \mathcal{M}' , depending on the hidden bit b' in the game played by \mathcal{B} . If BAD occurs, \mathcal{B} will output 0. Otherwise \mathcal{B} will output 1. In this case, \mathcal{B} plays the $\text{IND-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game where, in addition to the ‘challenge’ oracle Enc , one can query a genuine encryption oracle \mathcal{E} , provided that one does not make pointless or prohibited queries. It has been shown that the advantage of an adversary in this game is at most twice the maximum advantage of an adversary, with the same resources, in the standard $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game [5].

As in the proof of Thm. 14, \mathcal{B} uses its genuine encryption oracle to answer queries from \mathcal{R}_1 , simulates the fake encryption oracle to answer queries from $\mathcal{R}_2^i, i \neq i^*$ and uses its challenge encryption oracle to answer queries from \mathcal{R}_2^* .

Since \mathcal{R} is a valid adversary in $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$, it is clear that \mathcal{B} uses nonces correctly with respect to X . Moreover, \mathcal{B} makes no pointless or prohibited queries:

- A repeated query to \mathcal{E} by \mathcal{B} would correspond to a repeated query to Enc by \mathcal{R}_1 , which would be a prohibited query in the game played by \mathcal{R} .
- A repeated query to Enc by \mathcal{B} would correspond to a repeated query to Enc by $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$, which would be a prohibited query in the game played by \mathcal{R} .
- If \mathcal{B} were to make two queries of the form Enc(M, N) and $\mathcal{E}(M, N)$, then these would correspond to a query Enc(M, N) by \mathcal{R}_1 and a query Enc(M, N) by $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$, but the latter would be a prohibited query in the game played by \mathcal{R} .

Thus \mathcal{B} is a valid adversary in $\text{IND-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ and $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{IND-CPA},X,1}(\mathcal{B}) \leq 2\epsilon$.

It follows that:

$$\begin{aligned}
2\epsilon &\geq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{IND-CPA},X,1}(\mathcal{B}) = 2 \left(\Pr \left[\text{IND-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{B}) = 1 \right] - \frac{1}{2} \right) \\
&= \Pr [0 \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \mid b' = 0] - \Pr [0 \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \mid b' = 1] \\
&= \Pr [\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}} \mid b = 0] - \Pr [\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'} \mid b = 0] \\
&= 2 \left(\Pr [\text{BAD}] - \frac{1}{n} \right),
\end{aligned}$$

which yields the result. □

Corollary 23. *Let \mathcal{E} and $C[\mathcal{E}]$ be authenticated encryption schemes such that $C[\mathcal{E}]$ is M -key-unique for some $M \in M^l$. Let $\text{GOAL} \in \{\text{AE}, \text{LRAE}, \text{IND}, \text{LRIND}, \text{CTI}\}$, $\text{POWER} \in \{\text{CCA}, \text{CPA}\}$, $X, X' \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$ and $n > 1$. Then, all simple reductions from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$ to $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ must lose*

$$L = \delta_{X'} \cdot \delta_{\text{GOAL}} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{n} + 2\epsilon \right)^{-1},$$

with $\delta_{X'}$ as given in Lemma 12 and ϵ as given in Thm. 22.

Proof. Recall, from the proof of Lemma 12, the reduction \mathcal{R} from $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$ to $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$ (after relabelling \mathcal{E} and X). Suppose there is a simple reduction \mathcal{R}' from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$ to $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$, where the loss is less than L for all valid adversaries against $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$. Then one can combine \mathcal{R} and \mathcal{R}' to obtain a reduction $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$ to $\text{IND-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ that contradicts Thm. 22. □

Integrity notions. We prove similar results for integrity. Specifically we show that if all reasonable adversaries have small $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ advantage, then any simple reduction from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$ to $\text{CTI-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ loses approximately n .

Notice that to show the lower bound for reductions from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X',n}$ to $\text{CTI-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$, we have to assume \mathcal{E} has both authenticity *and* secrecy. While this suffices for authenticated encryption schemes, it does not rule out non-lossy reductions for schemes that have authenticity but not secrecy. The technical reason for this additional assumption is that, to make sure that the meta-reduction \mathcal{M} is a valid adversary against $\text{CTI-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$, i.e. does not attempt to decrypt a ciphertext that was output of the encryption oracle, \mathcal{M} must suppress both the encryption and decryption queries made during the rewinding of the reduction \mathcal{R} . For the case $X = \text{IV}$, it should be possible to argue that prohibited decryption queries are unlikely to occur, even if \mathcal{R} can make encryption queries during the rewinding phase, as the nonces are chosen independently at random for each encryption query. We leave this for future work. In any case, if nonces are chosen (possibly deterministically) by \mathcal{R} and \mathcal{M} does not suppress the encryption queries made by \mathcal{R} during the rewinding phase, then it is impossible to avoid \mathcal{M} making prohibited queries.

Theorem 24. Let \mathcal{E} and $C[\mathcal{E}]$ be authenticated encryption schemes such that $C[\mathcal{E}]$ is M -key-unique for some $M \in \mathcal{M}^l$. Then, for $X \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$, any simple reduction \mathcal{R} from $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M,n}$ to $\text{CTI-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ loses $L = \left(\frac{1}{n} + 3\epsilon\right)^{-1}$. Here ϵ is the maximum advantage of a valid adversary against $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ running in time at most $nt_{\mathcal{R}} + 2l(n-1)t_{C[\mathcal{E}]}$ and $t_{C[\mathcal{E}]}$ is an upper-bound on the runtime of a single encryption with $C[\mathcal{E}]$.

Proof. The proof is similar to that of Thm. 14. Indeed, we do not modify the meta-reduction \mathcal{M} or its variant \mathcal{M}' at all, since \mathcal{R} , \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{M}' have access to both an encryption oracle and a decryption oracle in the $\text{CTI-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game, just as in the $\text{AE-PAS}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game.¹⁰

However, whereas before we had $\Pr[\text{BAD}] \leq \frac{1}{n} + \epsilon$, when \mathcal{M} plays the $\text{CTI-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game we can only obtain the looser bound $\Pr[\text{BAD}] \leq \frac{1}{n} + 2\epsilon$. When $b = 1$ in the game played by \mathcal{M} or \mathcal{M}' , the meta-reductions have access to a *real* encryption oracle and a *fake* decryption oracle, so \mathcal{M} responds to the encryption queries from \mathcal{R}_2^{i*} with real ciphertexts, while \mathcal{M}' responds with random strings. Thus there is a difference in the view of \mathcal{R}_2^{i*} between \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{M}' even when $b = 1$, which was not the case in the proof of Thm. 14.

Accordingly, $\Pr[\text{BAD}] \leq \frac{1}{n} + \gamma$, where γ is given by:

$$\frac{1}{2} (\Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}} \mid b = 0] - \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'} \mid b = 0]) + \frac{1}{2} (\Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}} \mid b = 1] - \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'} \mid b = 1]).$$

We construct adversaries \mathcal{B}_0 and \mathcal{B}_1 , running in time at most $nt_{\mathcal{R}} + 2l(n-1)t_{C[\mathcal{E}]}$ and making at most $q_{\mathcal{R}}$ oracle queries, such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-CCA},X,1}(\mathcal{B}_0) = \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}} \mid b = 0] - \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'} \mid b = 0]$$

and

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-CCA},X,1}(\mathcal{B}_1) = \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}} \mid b = 1] - \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'} \mid b = 1]$$

and we show that both \mathcal{B}_0 and \mathcal{B}_1 are valid adversaries. By Lemma 21, this shows that $\Pr[\text{BAD}] \leq \frac{1}{n} + 2\epsilon$ and hence

$$\epsilon_{\mathcal{R}} \leq \frac{1}{n} + 3\epsilon$$

as required.

For \mathcal{B}_0 we simply use the adversary \mathcal{B} described in the proof of Thm. 14. The adversary \mathcal{B}_1 is as follows: first, \mathcal{B}_1 runs \mathcal{R}_1 , forwarding all encryption queries to the genuine encryption oracle and responding to all decryption queries with \perp . Then \mathcal{B}_1 carries out the same checks as \mathcal{M} (or \mathcal{M}') and, if the checks succeed, \mathcal{B}_1 samples $i^* \leftarrow_{\$} [n]$ and, for each $i \in [n]$, \mathcal{B}_1 runs \mathcal{R}_2 on input (i, st_1) .

When \mathcal{R}_2^i makes oracle queries:

1. If $i = i^*$, \mathcal{B}_1 answers all *encryption* queries with its challenge encryption oracle, but answers all *decryption* queries with \perp .
2. If $i \neq i^*$, \mathcal{B}_1 simulates the ‘fake’ oracles, Enc and Dec in the case $b = 1$, just as \mathcal{M} (or \mathcal{M}') does.

Finally, \mathcal{B}_1 outputs 0 if BAD has occurred and 1 otherwise.

Let b' be the hidden bit in the $\text{AE-CCA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game played by \mathcal{B}_1 and recall that b is the hidden bit in the $\text{CTI-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}$ game played by \mathcal{M} or \mathcal{M}' . Then, given that $b = 1$, \mathcal{B}_1 correctly simulates the view of \mathcal{R}_1 and the \mathcal{R}_2^i in their interaction with \mathcal{M} (respectively, \mathcal{M}') if $b' = 0$ (respectively, $b' = 1$). This shows that $\Pr[0 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_1 \mid b' = 0] = \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}} \mid b = 1]$ and $\Pr[0 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_1 \mid b' = 1] = \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'} \mid b = 1]$. Then we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-CCA},X,1}(\mathcal{B}_1) &= 2 \left(\Pr[\text{AE-CCA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X,1}(\mathcal{B}_1) = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right) \\ &= \Pr[0 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_1 \mid b' = 0] - \Pr[0 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_1 \mid b' = 1] \\ &= \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}} \mid b = 1] - \Pr[\text{BAD}_{\mathcal{M}'} \mid b = 1]. \end{aligned}$$

¹⁰ Even though \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{M}' now query the oracles \mathcal{E} and Dec instead of Enc and Dec.

Now consider $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{AE-CCA}, X, 1}(\mathcal{B}_1)$. Clearly \mathcal{B}_1 uses nonces correctly with respect to X , since \mathcal{R} is a valid adversary against $\text{CTI-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$. Moreover, \mathcal{B}_1 does not make pointless or prohibited queries: there are no queries to Dec or \mathcal{D} ; repeated queries to \mathcal{E} or Enc by \mathcal{B}_1 would correspond to repeated queries to \mathcal{E} by \mathcal{R} (which are pointless); and if \mathcal{B} were to make two queries of the form Enc(M, N) and $\mathcal{E}(M, N)$, then these would correspond to a query $\mathcal{E}(M, N)$ by \mathcal{R}_1 and a query $\mathcal{E}(M, N)$ by $\mathcal{R}_2^{i^*}$, but the latter would be a pointless query in the game played by \mathcal{R} . Therefore \mathcal{B}_1 is a valid adversary against $\text{AE-CCA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$.¹¹ \square

Corollary 25. *Let \mathcal{E} and $C[\mathcal{E}]$ be authenticated encryption schemes such that $C[\mathcal{E}]$ is M -key-unique for some $M \in M^l$. Let $\text{GOAL} \in \{\text{AE}, \text{LRAE}, \text{IND}, \text{LRIND}, \text{CTI}\}$, $\text{POWER} \in \{\text{CCA}, \text{CPA}\}$, $X, X' \in \{\text{IV}, \text{NR}, \text{MR}\}$ and $n > 1$. Then all simple reductions from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X', n}$ to $\text{CTI-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$ must lose*

$$L = \delta_{X'} \cdot \delta_{\text{GOAL}} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{n} + 3\epsilon \right)^{-1},$$

with $\delta_{X'}$ as given in Lemma 12 and ϵ as given in Thm. 24.

Proof. Again, we use the reduction \mathcal{R} from $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M, n}$ to $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X', n}$ given in the proof of Lemma 12 (after relabelling X and \mathcal{E}). If there were a simple reduction \mathcal{R}' from $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X', n}$ to $\text{CTI-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$, where the loss was less than L for all valid adversaries against $\text{GOAL-POWER}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{X', n}$, one could combine \mathcal{R} and \mathcal{R}' to obtain a reduction $\text{KEYREC}_{C[\mathcal{E}]}^{M, n}$ to $\text{CTI-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$ that contradicted Thm. 24. \square

¹¹ In fact, \mathcal{B}_1 can be viewed as a valid adversary against $\text{IND-CPA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$, but we have to assume both integrity and secrecy for the rest of the proof, so it is simpler to view \mathcal{B}_1 as an adversary against $\text{AE-CCA}_{\mathcal{E}}^{X, 1}$.