Code Offset in the Exponent

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Abstract

Fuzzy extractors transform a noisy source \mathbf{e} into a stable key which can be reproduced from a nearby value \mathbf{e}' . They are a fundamental tool for key derivation from biometric sources. This work introduces *code offset in the exponent* and uses this construction to build the first reusable fuzzy extractor that simultaneously supports structured, low entropy distributions with correlated symbols and *confidence information*. These properties are specifically motivated by the most pertinent applications—key derivation from biometrics and physical unclonable functions—which typically demonstrate low entropy with additional statistical correlations and benefit from extractors that can leverage confidence information for efficiency.

Code offset in the exponent is a group encoding of the code offset construction (Juels and Wattenberg, CCS 1999) that stores the value \mathbf{e} in a one-time pad which is sampled as a codeword, \mathbf{Ax} , of a linear error-correcting code: $\mathbf{Ax} + \mathbf{e}$. Rather than encoding $\mathbf{Ax} + \mathbf{e}$ directly, code offset in the exponent calls for encoding by exponentiation of a generator in a cryptographically strong group. We demonstrate security of the construction in the generic group model, establishing security whenever the inner product between the error distribution and all vectors in the null space of the code is unpredictable. We show this condition includes distributions supported by multiple prior fuzzy extractors.

Our analysis also shows a prior construction of pattern matching obfuscation (Bishop et al., Crypto 2018) is secure for more distributions than previously known.

Keywords fuzzy extractors; code offset; learning with errors; error-correction; generic group model;

1 Introduction

Fuzzy extractors [DORS08] permit derivation of a stable key from a noisy *source*. Specifically, given a reading \mathbf{e} from the noisy source, the fuzzy extractor produces a pair (key, pub), consisting of a derived key and a public value; the public value pub must then permit key to (only) be recovered from any \mathbf{e}' that is sufficiently close to \mathbf{e} in Hamming distance. Fuzzy extractors are the emblematic technique for robust, secure key derivation from biometrics and physical unclonable functions. These applications place special emphasis on the source distribution and for this reason a principal goal of fuzzy extractor design is to precisely identify those distributions over \mathbf{e} for which extraction is possible and, moreover, produce efficient constructions for these distributions.

Despite years of work, existing constructions do not simultaneously secure practical sources while retaining efficient recovery. Canetti et al.'s construction [CFP+16, CFP+21] is secure for the widest

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variety of sources. However, Simhadri et al.'s [SSF19] implementation for the iris estimates only 32 bits of security with algorithms that take ≈ 10 seconds on a 32-core machine.

The fuzzy extraction problem is well-understood in the information-theoretic setting, where the fundamental quantity of interest is the *fuzzy min-entropy* [FRS16, FRS20] of the distribution of \mathbf{e} ; this measures the total weight of an arbitrarily centered ball of radius t in the probability distribution over \mathbf{e} . While this measure is sufficient for determining the feasibility of information-theoretic fuzzy extraction for a distribution, it doesn't indicate whether it is possible in polynomial time [FRS16, WCD⁺17]. In the information-theoretic setting it is not possible to build an information-theoretic fuzzy extractor that simultaneously works for all distributions [FRS16, FP19, FRS20]. That is, a fuzzy extractor exists for each distribution with fuzzy min-entropy but no construction can secure all such distributions.

One can hope to sidestep these limitations by providing only computational security [FMR13, FMR20], supporting broader families of source distributions. No universal theory has emerged without resorting to general purpose obfuscation. Two known fuzzy extractors use "computational" tools¹ to correct errors, they are:

- Canetti et al.'s [CFP⁺16, CFP⁺21] construction explicitly places random subsets of **e** in a *digital locker* [CD08] and records the indices used in each subset. To recover, one attempts to open each digital locker with subsets of the value **e'**. Canetti et al.'s construction is secure when a random subset of locations is hard to predict (Definition 5). However, Simhadri's implementation for the iris provides poor security (32 bits) in order to run in 10 seconds and still requires millions of digital lockers [SSF19].
- Fuller et al. [FMR13, FMR20] modify the *code-offset* construction [JW99]. The code-offset construction construction is determined by a linear error-correcting code A ∈ F^{n×k}_q and a secret, uniformly random x ∈ F^k_q; given a sample e ∈ Fⁿ_q from the noisy source, the construction publishes the pair pub = (A, Ax + e). All operations are carried out over the field with q elements. To *reproduce* the value e note that with a second sample e' from the source—which we assume has small Hamming distance from e²—the difference (Ax+e) e' = Ax + (e e') is evidently close to the codeword Ax. By decoding the error correcting code one can recover x (and e).³ Security analysis of the code offset treats Ax as a biased one time pad, proving that Ax + e leaks no more than (n k) log q bits about e. However, many real distributions have entropy less than (n k) log q, which we call *low entropy*, for which this analysis provides no security guarantee. To support low entropy distributions, Fuller et al. instantiate this construction with A being randomly distributed and show security whenever the distribution over e yields a secure learning with errors (LWE) instance. Known LWE error distributions consider i.i.d. symbols (discretized Gaussian [Reg05] and uniform interval [DMQ13]).

The digital locker construction supports more distributions (i.i.d. symbols implies that all subsets have entropy). Both constructions use information set decoding [Pra62], that is, repeated selection of random subsets of coordinates with the hope to find a subset with no errors.

The digital locker construction comes with an important drawback. Many physical sources are sampled along with correlated side information that is called *confidence*. Confidence information is a secondary probability distribution \mathbf{z} (correlated with the reading \mathbf{e}) that can predict the error rate in a symbol \mathbf{e}_i .

¹Multiple computational fuzzy extractors retain the information-theoretic core and analyze it using standard informationtheory techniques [WL18, WLG19]; these works are subject to the above limitations.

²It is also possible to consider other distances between \mathbf{e} and \mathbf{e}' . However the error correction techniques required are different. We consider Hamming error in this work.

³Applying a randomness extractor [NZ93] on either \mathbf{x} or \mathbf{e} yields a uniform key.

When \mathbf{z}_i is large this indicates that the symbol of \mathbf{e}_i is less likely to differ. Examples include the magnitude of a convolution in the iris [SSF19] and the magnitude of the difference between two circuit delays in ring oscillator PUFs [HRvD⁺16]. By considering bits with high confidence it is possible to reduce the effective error rate from t = n/10 to $t = 3n/10^6$ [HRvD⁺16]. For a subset size of 128 and t = n/10 unlocking with 95% probability requires testing approximately $2 \cdot 10^6$ subsets while $t = 3n/10^6$ requires testing a single subset. This confidence information cannot be used in the digital locker construction as subsets are specified at enrollment time whereas confidence information is determined when \mathbf{e} is drawn. The LWE construction can use this information [JHR⁺17] as it allows on-the-fly testing of all large enough subsets. Confidence information is critical: fuzzy extractors that secure low entropy distributions do not support $t = \Theta(n)$ which is demonstrated in practice, leading to inefficient implementations. Because constructions are used with sources beyond their designed error tolerance any reduction in error rate has a drastic impact on efficiency (see Section 3.2).

Our contributions. This work introduces *code offset in the exponent*. Code offset in the exponent is the first reusable fuzzy extractor that simultaneously

- allows the symbols of **e** to be correlated,
- supports structured but low entropy distributions over **e** (less than $(n-k)\log q$), and
- allows the use of confidence information for improved efficiency.

This work introduces the Code Offset in the Exponent problem:

Distinguish $r^{\mathbf{Ax+e}}$, given (\mathbf{A}, r) , from a random tuple of group elements, where r is a random generator of a prime order group, **A** is a suitable linear code, and **x** is a uniform.

A natural fuzzy extractor constructor exists when $r^{\mathbf{Ax}+\mathbf{e}}$ has such pseudorandom properties. We show that when the group effectively limits the adversary to linear operations—by adopting the generic group model—the resulting fuzzy extractor is secure for many low entropy distributions while retaining the ability to use confidence information. This allows code offset in the exponent to benefit from the efficiency gains of using confidence information while remaining secure for a large family of distributions. Specifically, we present three contributions:

- Sec 1.1 We define the code offset in the exponent construction and show that it yields a reusable fuzzy extractor if the distribution on \mathbf{e} is *good enough*.
- Sec 1.2 We establish an information-theoretic sufficient condition called MIPURS for *good enough* in the generic group model. (MIPURS is described in Section 1.2.)
- Sec 1.3 We characterize MIPURS, establishing containment relations between MIPURS and the secured distributions in Canetti et al. [CFP⁺16] and Fuller et al. [FMR13] (see Figure 1).

In Section 1.4 we introduce a second application of code offset in the exponent to pattern matching obfuscation. We then review further related work and show that (very structured) distributions can be shown secure assuming only discrete log (Sec 1.5). Section 2 covers definitions and preliminaries including the MIPURS condition. Section 3 details the code offset in the exponent construction. Section 4 characterizes MIPURS distributions. Section 5 a second application to pattern matching obfuscation [BKM⁺18].

1.1 Code offset in the exponent

Code offset in the exponent is motivated by the observation that *reproduction* of \mathbf{e} in the LWE construction uses only linear operations. Thus, we explore an adaptation of the code offset construction that effectively limits the adversary to linear operations by translating all relevant arithmetic into a "hard" group. Specifically, we introduce *code offset in the exponent*: If r is a random generator for a cyclic group \mathbb{G} of prime order q, we consider

$$\mathsf{pub} = (\mathbf{A}, r, r^{\mathbf{Ax} + \mathbf{e}}),$$

where we adopt the shorthand notation $r^{\mathbf{v}}$, for a vector $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \ldots, v_n)^{\mathsf{T}} \in (\mathbb{Z}_q)^n$, to indicate the vector $(r^{v_1}, \ldots, r^{v_n})^{\mathsf{T}}$. This construction possesses strong security properties under natural cryptographic assumptions on the group \mathbb{G} . We focus on code-offset in the exponent with a random linear code (given by \mathbf{A}) and adopt the generic group model [Sho97] to reflect the cryptographic properties of the underlying group. As stated above, the goal is to characterize the distributions on \mathbf{e} for which $r^{\mathbf{Ax}+\mathbf{e}}|(\mathbf{A},r)$ is pseudorandom. Pseudorandomness suffices to show security of a fuzzy extractor that leaks nothing about \mathbf{e} . Analysis of this construction is most natural when \mathbf{e} has symbols over a large alphabet, but binary \mathbf{e} can be amplified (see Section 3.1).

Looking ahead, if one uses a random generator in each enrollment the construction allows multiple (noisy) enrollments of \mathbf{e} , known as a reusable fuzzy extractor [Boy04]. The reusability proof uses the details of the generic group proof, while the one time analysis is just based on pseudorandomness (Section 3.3).

1.2 When is code offset in the exponent hard?

In the generic group model, we establish (Theorem 2) that distinguishing code offset in the exponent from a random vector of group elements is hard for any error distribution \mathbf{e} where the following game is hard to win for any information-theoretic adversary \mathcal{A} :⁴

Experiment
$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{A},\mathbf{e}}^{\mathsf{MIPURS}}(n,k)$$
:
 $\psi \leftarrow \mathbf{e}; \mathbf{A} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}_{q}^{n \times k}$.
 $(b,g) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A})$.
If $b \in \mathsf{null}(\mathbf{A}), b \neq \vec{0}$ and $\langle b, \psi \rangle = g$ output 1.
Output 0.

Observe that the role of the random matrix \mathbf{A} in the game above is merely to define a random subspace of (typical) dimension k.

We call this condition on an error distribution MIPURS or maximum inner product unpredictable over random subspace. Specifically, a random variable \mathbf{e} over \mathbb{F}_q^n is (k,β) -MIPURS if for all \mathcal{A} (which knows the distribution of \mathbf{e}), $\Pr[\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{A},\mathbf{e}}^{\mathsf{MIPURS}}(n,k)=1] \leq \beta$. When \mathbf{e} is a $(k - \Theta(1),\beta)$ -MIPURS distribution for a code with dimension k and $\beta = \operatorname{ngl}(n)$ then

When **e** is a $(k - \Theta(1), \beta)$ -MIPURS distribution for a code with dimension k and $\beta = ngl(n)$ then code-offset in the exponent yields a fuzzy extractor in the generic group model (Theorem 3). Showing this requires one additional step of key extraction; we use a result of Akavia, Goldwasser, and Vaikuntanathan [AGV09, Lemma 2] which states that dimensions of **x** become hardcore once there are enough dimensions for LWE to be indistinguishable. This reduction is entirely linear and holds in the generic group setting.

⁴We use boldface to represent random variables, capitals to represent random variables over matrices, and plain letters to represent samples. We use ψ to represent samples from **e** to avoid conflict with Euler's number.

MIPURS is necessary. When \mathcal{A} is information theoretic, for all distributions **e** that are not MIPURS one can find a nonzero vector b in the null space of A whose inner product with **e** is predictable, thus predicting

$$\langle b, \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e} \rangle = \langle b, \mathbf{e} \rangle \stackrel{?}{=} g.$$

This is not the case for a uniform distribution, U: the value $\langle b, \mathbf{U} \rangle$ is uniform (and thus is $\langle b, \mathbf{U} \rangle = g$ with small probability if the size of q is super polynomial). Thus b serves as a way to distinguish $\mathbf{Ax} + \mathbf{e}$ from U.

Beullens and Wee [BW19] recently introduced the KOALA assumption which roughly assumes that an adversary's only mechanism for distinguishing a vector from a subspace from random is by outputting a vector that is likely to be the null space of the provided vector. (This can be seen as specializing [CRV10, Assumption 5] that vectors can only be distinguished by fixed inner products.)

The adversary has more power in the MIPURS setting (than in KOALA) in three ways. First, the distribution \mathbf{e} and thus $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}$ is not linear, second the adversary doesn't have to "nullify" the entire space \mathbf{B} —only a single vector, and third, the adversary can predict any inner product, not just 0. One can view MIPURS as an assumption on a group: whenever an adversary can distinguish a (nonlinear) vector \mathbf{v} from uniform that there is another adversary that can choose some \mathbf{b} and predict $\langle \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{v} \rangle$ (in our setting this choice of \mathbf{b} is after seeing \mathbf{A} which is correlated to \mathbf{v}). Theorem 2 can be interpreted as the MIPURS "assumption" holding in the generic group model.

1.3 Supported Distributions

Our technical work characterizes the MIPURS property (summarized in Figure 1). The most involved relationship is showing that all high entropy sources are MIPURS. To provide intuition for our results, we summarize this result here.

For any d = poly(n) there is an efficiently constructible distribution **e** whose entropy is approximately $log(dq^{n-k-1})$ where the MIPURS game is winnable by an efficient adversary with noticeable probability: For $1 \le i \le d$, sample some d random linear spaces \mathbf{B}_i of dimension n - k - 1 and define \mathbf{E}_i to be all points in a random coset g_i of \mathbf{B}_i . Consider the following distribution **e**:

- 1. Pick $i \leftarrow \{1, ..., d\}$ for some polynomial size d.
- 2. Output a random element of \mathbf{E}_i .

The support size of this distribution is approximately dq^{n-k-1} . Then since $\operatorname{null}(\mathbf{A})$ has dimension at least n-k, $\exists b_i \neq \vec{0}$ such that $b_i \in \operatorname{null}(\mathbf{A}) \cap \operatorname{null}(\mathbf{B}_i)$ (since $\dim(\operatorname{null}(\mathbf{A})) + \dim(\operatorname{null}(\mathbf{B}_i)) > n$). The adversary can calculate these b_i 's. Then the adversary just picks a random *i* and predicts (b_i, g_i) .⁵ This result is nearly tight: all distributions whose entropy is greater than $\log(\operatorname{poly}(n)q^{n-k})$ are MIPURS. (Note this is a factor of *q* away from matching the size of our counterexample for a random code.) Informally, this yields the following (see Corollary 27):

Theorem 1 (Informal). Let $n, k \in \mathbb{Z}$ be parameters. Let q = q(n) be a large enough prime. For all $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ whose minentropy is at least $\omega(\log n) + \log(q^{n-k})$, there exists some $\beta = \operatorname{ngl}(n)$ for which \mathbf{e} is (k, β) -MIPURS.

As mentioned above, information theoretic analysis of code offset provides a key of length $\omega(\log n)$ when the initial entropy of **e** is at least $\omega(\log n) + (n-k)\log(q)$. However, information theoretic analysis of

⁵If **A** is some fixed code (chosen before adversary specifies **e**), then **E**_i can directly be a coset of **A** and one can increase the size of **E** to dq^{n-k} .




Figure 1: Implications between different types of supported distributions for fuzzy extraction. Arrows are implications. All shown implications are proper. Location sources are those that have random group elements in some locations with zeroes in other locations but it is hard to find a subset of all zero locations. A location source can be produced as the component wise product of a binary source where all subsets have entropy and a random vector of group elements. We consider this type of distribution in Section 3.1.

code offset reduces the entropy of \mathbf{e} which may allow prediction of sensitive attributes. In the generic group analysis no predicate of \mathbf{e} is leaked. The generic group analysis also allows the construction to be safely reused multiple times (with independent generators).

Proof Intuition Suppose in the above game the adversary generated **e** as the span of a linear space **E** with the goal that $\operatorname{null}(\mathbf{A}) \cap \operatorname{null}(\mathbf{E}) \supset \{\vec{0}\}$. For a random, independent $\mathbf{B} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \operatorname{null}(\mathbf{A})$, the probability of **B** and $\operatorname{null}(\mathbf{E})$ overlapping is noticeable only if the sum of the dimensions is more than n (Lemma 21). This creates an upper bound on the dimension of **E** of n - k (ignoring the unlikely case when **A** is not full rank).

Our proof is dedicated to showing that the general case (where **E** is not linear) does not provide the adversary with more power. First we upper bound the size of a set E where each vector is predictable in the MIPURS game. We show for a random sample from E to have a large intersection with a low dimensional space requires E to have size at least that of the low dimensional space (Lemma 20). In Lemma 22, we switch from measuring the size of intersection of a sample of E with respect to the worst case subspace to how "linear" E is with respect to the worst vector in an average case subspace. This result thus controls an "approximate" algebraic structure in the sense of additive combinatorics. We show the adversary can't do much better on a single vector b as long as it is chosen from a random **B**.

The above argument considers the event that the adversary correctly predicts an inner product of 0; this can be transformed to an arbitrary inner product by a compactness argument which introduces a modest loss in parameters (Theorem 24). Once we have a bound on how large a predictable set E can be, another superlogarithmic factor guarantees that all distributions \mathbf{e} with enough minentropy are not predictable.

1.4 Second Application: Pattern Matching Obfuscation

In addition to fuzzy extractors, we apply our techniques to pattern matching obfuscation. Bishop et al. [BKM⁺18] show how to obfuscate a pattern \mathbf{v} where each $\mathbf{v}_i \in \{0, 1, \bot\}$ indicates that the bit \mathbf{v}_i should match 0, 1 or either value. The goal is to allow a user to check for input string \mathbf{y} , if \mathbf{y} and \mathbf{v} are the same on all non-wildcard positions. Their construction was stated for Reed-Solomon codes but works for any linear code. We state the construction for a random linear code: Let $|\mathbf{v}| = n$ and assume $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow (\mathbb{F}_q)^{2n \times n}$. Then for a random \mathbf{x} the construction outputs the following obfuscation (for a group \mathbb{G}_q of prime order q):⁶

$$\mathcal{O}_w = \left\{ o_i = \left\{ \begin{matrix} (g^{\mathbf{A}_{2i}\mathbf{x}}, r_{2i+1}), r_{2i+1} \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_q & \mathbf{v}_i = 1 \\ (r_{2i}, g^{\mathbf{A}_{2i+1}\mathbf{x}}), r_{2i} \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_q & \mathbf{v}_i = 0 \\ (g^{\mathbf{A}_{2i}\mathbf{x}}, g^{\mathbf{A}_{2i+1}\mathbf{x}}) & \mathbf{v}_i = \bot \end{matrix} \right\}_{i=0}^{|\mathbf{v}|-1}$$

In the above \mathbf{A}_j is the *j*th row of \mathbf{A} . Bishop et al. prove security of the scheme in the generic group model. Their analysis focuses on allowing a large number of randomly placed wildcards with the uniform distribution for nonwildcard bits of \mathbf{v} . We show the same construction is secure for more structured distributions over \mathbf{v} (also improving flexibility over concurrent work of Bartusek, Lepoint, Ma, and Zhandry [BLMZ19]).

1.5 Further Related Work

We have already introduced the work of Canetti et al. $[CFP^+16]$ and Fuller et al. [FMR20]. Canetti et al. $[CFP^+16]$ explicitly place some subsets into a digital locker, for security they require that an average subset has average min-entropy, which we call *average subsets have entropy*.

Lemma 15 shows that the MIPURS condition is contained in average subsets have entropy. This containment is proper, we actually show that there are distributions where all subsets have entropy that are not MIPURS. Suppose that \mathbf{e} is a Reed-Solomon code, then all subsets of \mathbf{e} have entropy but as long as the dimension of the code < n - k - 1 then the null space of \mathbf{e} is likely to intersect with $\mathsf{null}(\mathbf{A})$ (Prop. 18).

There are also MIPURS sources where not all subsets have entropy. Consider a uniform distribution over n - k coordinates with a fixed value in the remaining k coordinates (Prop. 17). Since null(A) is unlikely to have non zero coordinates only at these fixed k coordinates, predicting the inner product remains difficult. Fortunately, multiplying a binary source where all subsets have entropy by a random vector produces a location source which is contained in MIPURS. It is this transformation we recommend for actual biometrics, see Section 3.1.

One can additionally build a good fuzzy extractor assuming a variant of multilinear maps [BCKP14]. Concurrent work of Galbraith and Zobernig [GZ19] introduces a new subset sum assumption to build a secure sketch that is able to handle $t = \Theta(n)$ errors; they conjecture hardness for all securable distributions. A secure sketch is the error correction component in most fuzzy extractors. Their assumption is security of the cryptographic object and deserves continued study. A line of works [WL18, WLG19] use information-theoretic tools for error correction and computational tools to achieve additional properties. Those constructions embed a variant of the code offset. Table 1 summarizes constructions that use computational tools for the "correction" component and the traditional information theoretic analysis of the

⁶Bishop et al. state their construction where $\mathbf{x}_0 = 0$ to allow the user to check whether they matched the pattern. In this description, we allow the user to get out a key contained in $g^{\mathbf{x}_0}$ when they are correct.

Construction	Supported low entropy dist.	Reuse	Error rate	Weakness
Code Offset [DORS08]	-	•	$t = \Theta(n)$	
LWE [ACEK17, FMR13]	Independent	igodol	t = o(n)	
Subset sum [GZ19]	Fuzzy min-ent.	0	$t = \Theta(n)$	Assumes security
Grey box obf. [BCKP14]	Fuzzy min-ent.	0	$t = \Theta(n)$	Multilinear maps
Digital Locker $[CFP^+16]$	Average Subsets have Ent.	•	t = o(n)	No confidence info
Code Offset in Exponent	MIPURS	•	t = o(n)	

Table 1: Comparison of computational techniques for fuzzy extractors. Many schemes [WL18, WLG19] use information theoretic techniques for information reconciliation and these are grouped together. These techniques all inherit the information theoretic analysis on the strength of information reconciliation. Reuse is denoted as \bullet if reuse is supported with some assumption about how multiple readings are correlated and \bullet if no assumption is made. See Figure 1 for relations between supported distributions. The LWE works considered the setting when $k = \Theta(n)$ which leads to $t = \Theta(\log n)$. If one sets $k = \omega(\log n)$ one can achieve error tolerance of o(n) using the analysis in this work, we thus present the more favorable regime for the above comparison.

code offset construction..

Connection to LWE The hardness of the code offset in the exponent problem is equivalent to asking what error distributions make distinguishing LWE (learning with errors) hard in the generic group model, though this is an unusual setting for LWE as it requires a super-polynomial-size field and the notion of "small" is destroyed by the generic group model—in particular, "rounding" is not possible. Thus, we refer to the construction as code offset rather than LWE. Despite this, some prior attacks on LWE can be instantiated in the generic group model (with **A** provided in the clear). Arora and Ge's attack [AG11] distinguishes LWE samples from uniform. The complexity of the attack strongly depends on the number of possible values for each dimension of the error distribution with polynomial efficiency for a constant number of values. The attack works in two stages, linearizing polynomials whose degree depends on the number of possible errors and then performing Gaussian elimination. Only the Gaussian elimination stage requires $\mathbf{Ax} + \mathbf{e}$ and can be done in a generic group (of known order). For binary errors, as considered by Micciancio and Peikert [MP13], the attack works when $n = \Theta(k^2)$. Thus, the generic group model captures interesting LWE attacks. To the best of our knowledge this is first time this question has been considered.⁷ Brakerski and Döttling [BD20] considered the question of distribution flexibility for \mathbf{x} : showing hardness when the conditional entropy of \mathbf{x} conditioned on $\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}$ is large for Gaussian \mathbf{e} .

Decoding in the generic group model Peikert [Pei06] showed that when **A** is a Reed-Solomon code, decoding "in the exponent" is hard in the generic group model. Specifically, Peikert's result considers a class of distributions $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ that are determined by placing α uniformly selected elements of \mathbb{F}_q in α randomly selected coordinates, while assigning other coordinates the value 0. The adversary can also perform information test decoding, succeeding with noticeable probability if $\alpha k = O(n \log n)$; recall that k is the dimension of the code. Peikert's results show that this is tight: no attacker can distinguish $r^{\mathbf{Ax}+\mathbf{e}}$ from uniform elements when $\alpha k = \omega(n \log n)$. The question of hardness for more general distributions on \mathbf{e} —essential in our setting—remained open.

⁷Dagdelan et al. [DGG15] consider a version of this problem where \mathbf{A} is only provided in the group and show this problem is hard assuming DDH. It is crucial in our applications that \mathbf{A} is provided in the clear.

In Appendix B, we consider the problem of decoding linear codes with independent, random errors in the exponent assuming the hardness of discrete log. Prior work by Peikert showed such a result for Reed-Solomon codes [Pei06, Theorem 3.1]. We quantitatively improve Peikert's result for Reed-Solomon codes (Theorem 33) and present a similar result for random linear codes (Theorem 31).⁸ Both results slightly improve parameters over Peikert's result [Pei06, Theorem 3.1]. These arguments require that a random point lies close to a codeword with noticeable probability. As q increases this probability decreases but discrete log becomes harder, creating a tension between these parameters. Peikert's result requires that $q \leq {n \choose k+1}/n^2$. In an application to the fuzzy extractors reducing k leads to improve efficiency, meaning the goal is to have small k for which $k = \omega(\log n)$. This means that the upper bound on q may be just superpolynomial. Our results allow q to grow more quickly, improving the bound by a modest factor of n^2 (requiring that $q \leq {n \choose k+1}$). We note the wide gap between error distributions we can show in the generic group model and assuming discrete log.

2 Preliminaries

We use boldface to represent random variables, capitals to represent random variables over matrices or sets, and corresponding plain letters to represent samples. As one notable exception, we use ψ to represent samples from **e** to avoid conflict with Euler's number. We denote the exponential function with $\exp(\cdot)$. When defining ranges for parameters, we use [and] to indicate ranges inclusive of indicated values and (and) to indicate ranges exclusive of the indicated values. For random variables \mathbf{x}_i over some alphabet \mathcal{Z} we denote the tuple by $\mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{x}_1, ..., \mathbf{x}_n)$. For a vector \mathbf{v} we denote the *i*th entry as \mathbf{v}_i . For a set of indices J, \mathbf{x}_J denotes the restriction of \mathbf{x} to the indices in J. For $m \in \mathbb{N}$, we let $[m] = \{1, ..., m\}$, so that $[0] = \emptyset$. We use the notation span(S) to denote the linear span of a set S of vectors and apply the notation to sequences of vectors without any special indication: if $F = (f_1, ..., f_m)$ is a sequence of vectors, span $(F) = \text{span}(\{f_i \mid i \in [m]\})$.

The min-entropy of a random variable \mathbf{x} is $H_{\infty}(\mathbf{x}) = -\log(\max_{x} \Pr[\mathbf{x} = x])$. The average (conditional) min-entropy [DORS08, Section 2.4] of \mathbf{x} given \mathbf{y} is

$$\tilde{\mathrm{H}}_{\infty}(\mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{y}) = -\log \left(\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{y \in \mathbf{y}} \max_{x} \Pr[\mathbf{x} = x \mid \mathbf{y} = y] \right).$$

For a metric space $(\mathcal{M}, \operatorname{dis})$, the (closed) ball of radius t around x is the set of all points within radius t, that is, $B_t(x) = \{y \mid \operatorname{dis}(x, y) \leq t\}$. If the size of a ball in a metric space does not depend on x, we denote by $\operatorname{Vol}(t)$ the size of a ball of radius t. We consider the Hamming metric. Let \mathcal{Z} be a finite set and consider elements of \mathcal{Z}^n ; then we define $\operatorname{dis}(x, y) = |\{i \mid x_i \neq y_i\}|$. For this metric, we denote volume as $\operatorname{Vol}(n, t, |\mathcal{Z}|)$ and $\operatorname{Vol}(n, t, \mathcal{Z}) = \sum_{i=0}^t \binom{n}{i} (|\mathcal{Z}| - 1)^i$. For a vector in $x \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ let $\operatorname{wt}(x) = |\{i \mid x_i \neq 0\}|$. U_n denotes the uniformly distributed random variable on $\{0, 1\}^n$. Logarithms are base 2. We denote the vector of all zero elements as 0. We let \cdot_c denote component-wise multiplication. In our theorems we consider a security parameter γ , when we use the term negligible and super polynomial, we assume other parameters are functions of γ . We elide this notation the dependence of other parameters on γ .

2.1 Fuzzy Extractors

Our motivating application is a new fuzzy extractor that performs error correction "in the exponent." A fuzzy extractor is a pair of algorithms designed to extract stable keys from a physical randomness source

⁸Both results require the error **e** to have independent symbols, with **e** possessing α randomly chosen nonzero positions.

that has entropy but is noisy. If repeated readings are taken from the source one expects these readings to be close in an appropriate distance metric but not identical. We consider a generic group version of security (computational security is defined in [FMR13], information-theoretic security in [DORS08]).

Before introducing the definition, we review some notation from the generic group model; the model is reviewed in detail in Appendix A. Let \mathbb{G} be a group of prime order q. For each element $r \in \mathbb{G}$ in the standard game, rather than receiving r, the adversary receives a handle $\sigma(r)$ where σ is a random function with a large range. The adversary is given access to an oracle, which we denote as $\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\sigma}$, which given $x = \sigma(r_1), y = \sigma(r_2)$ computes $\sigma(\sigma^{-1}(x) + \sigma^{-1}(y))$; when σ can be inferred from context, we write $\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}$. Since the adversary receives random handles they cannot infer anything about the underlying group elements except using the group operation and testing equality. We assume throughout that the range of σ is large enough that the probability of a collision is statistically insignificant (that is $\ll 1/q$).

Notation. We overload the notation $\sigma()$ to apply to tuples and, furthermore, adopt the convention that $\sigma()$ is the identity on non-group elements; thus, it can be harmlessly applied to all inputs provided to the adversary. Specifically, when $z \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} z_1, \ldots, z_n$ then $\sigma(z)$ only passes z_i through σ if $z_i \in \mathbb{G}_q$. For example, if $z = (r, \mathbf{A}, r^{\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x}+\mathbf{w}})$, then $\sigma(z) = (\sigma(r), \mathbf{A}, \sigma(r^{\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x}+\mathbf{w}}))$.

Definition 1. Let \mathcal{E} be a family of probability distributions over the metric space $(\mathcal{M}, \text{dis})$. A pair of procedures $(\text{Gen} : \mathcal{M} \to \{0,1\}^{\kappa} \times \{0,1\}^*, \text{Rep} : \mathcal{M} \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^{\kappa})$ is an $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{E}, \kappa, t)$ -fuzzy extractor that is (ϵ_{sec}, m) -hard with error δ if Gen and Rep satisfy the following properties:

• Correctness: if dis $(\psi, \psi') \leq t$ and (key, pub) $\leftarrow \text{Gen}(\psi)$, then

$$\Pr[\operatorname{\mathsf{Rep}}(\psi', \operatorname{\mathsf{pub}}) = \operatorname{\mathsf{key}}] \ge 1 - \delta.$$

Security: for any distribution e ∈ E, the string key is close to random conditioned on pub for all A making at most m queries to the group oracle O_G, that is

$$\Pr_{\substack{\sigma \stackrel{\otimes}{\leftarrow} \Sigma, \\ (\mathsf{Key}, \mathsf{Pub}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(\mathbf{e})}} \left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\sigma(\mathsf{Key}, \mathsf{Pub})) = 1 \right] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\sigma(U, \mathsf{Pub})) = 1] \right| \leq \epsilon_{sec}$$

We also assume that the adversary receives $\sigma(1)$. The errors are chosen before Pub: if the error pattern between ψ and ψ' depends on the output of Gen, then there is no guarantee about the probability of correctness.

2.2 The MIPURS condition

In this section, we introduce the *Maximum Inner Product Unpredictable over Random Subspace* (MIPURS) condition.

Definition 2. Let \mathbf{e} be a random variable taking values in \mathbb{F}_q^n and let \mathbf{A} be uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{F}_q^{n \times k}$ and independent of \mathbf{e} . We say that \mathbf{e} is a $(k, \beta) - \mathsf{MIPURS}$ distribution if for all random variables $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n, \mathbf{g} \in \mathbb{F}_q$ independent of \mathbf{e} (but depending arbitrarily on \mathbf{A} and each other)

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{A}}\left[\Pr\left[\langle \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{e} \rangle = \mathbf{g} \text{ and } \mathbf{b} \in \mathtt{null}(\mathbf{A}) \setminus \vec{0}\right]\right] \leq \beta$$

To see the equivalence between this definition and the game presented in the introduction, the random variables \mathbf{b} and \mathbf{g} can be seen as encoding the "adversary" and quantifying over all (\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{g}) is equivalent to considering all information-theoretic adversaries.

Theorem 2. Let γ be a security parameter. Let q be a prime and $n, k \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ with $k \leq n \leq q$. Let $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times k}$ and $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$ be uniformly distributed. Let \mathbf{e} be a (k, β) – MIPURS distribution. Let $\mathbf{u} \in (\mathbb{F}_q)^n$ be uniformly distributed. Let Σ be the set of random functions with domain of size q and range of size q^3 . Then for all adversaries \mathcal{D} making at most m queries

$$\left| \Pr_{\sigma \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \Sigma} [\mathcal{D}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\mathbf{A}, \sigma(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e})) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\mathbf{A}, \sigma(\mathbf{u})) = 1] \right| < \mu \left(\frac{3}{q} + \beta \right)$$

for $\mu = ((m+n+2)(m+n+1))^2/2$. If $1/q = \operatorname{ngl}(\gamma), n, m = \operatorname{poly}(\gamma)$, and $\beta = \operatorname{ngl}(\gamma)$ then the statistical distance between the two cases is $\operatorname{ngl}(\gamma)$.

In the above, the adversary is provided the code directly in the group, not its image in the handle space. The proof of Theorem 2 is relatively straightforward and appears in Appendix A. Our proof uses the simultaneous oracle game introduced by Bishop et al. [BKM⁺18, Section 4].

3 A Fuzzy Extractor from Hardness of Code Offset in the Exponent

One can directly build a fuzzy extractor out of any \mathbf{e} that satisfies the MIPURS condition. To do so, one instantiates the code-offset "in the exponent" and then uses hardcore elements of \mathbf{x} as the key.

Construction 1. Let γ be a security parameter, t be a distance, $k = \omega(\log \gamma)$, $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}^+$, $\ell \in \mathbb{Z}^+$, let q be a prime and let \mathbb{G}_q be a cyclic group of order q. Let \mathbb{F}_q be the field with q elements. Suppose that **e** and $\mathbf{e}' \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$, and let dis be the Hamming metric. Define (Gen, Rep) as follows:

 $\mathsf{Rep} \ (\mathbf{e}', \mathsf{pub} = (r, \mathbf{A}, r^{\mathsf{c}_1} \dots r^{\mathsf{c}_n}))$ Gen ($e = e_1, ..., e_n$) 1. For i = 1, ..., n, set $r^{c_i} = r^{c_i} / r^{e'_i}$. 1. Sample generator r of \mathbb{G}_q . 2. Sample $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow (\mathbb{F}_q)^{n \times (k+\alpha)}, \mathbf{x} \leftarrow (\mathbb{F}_q)^{k+\alpha}.$ 2. For $i = 1, ..., \ell$: 3. For i = 1, ..., n: set $r^{c_i} = r^{\mathbf{A}_i \cdot \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}_i}$. (i) Sample $J_i \subseteq \{1, ..., n\}$ where $|J| = k + \alpha$. 4. Set key = $r^{\mathbf{x}_0}, ..., r^{\mathbf{x}_{\alpha-1}}$. (ii) If $\mathbf{A}_{J_i}^{-1}$ does not exist go to 2. 5. Set $pub = (r, \mathbf{A}, \{r^{c_i}\}_{i=1}^n)$. (iii) Compute $r^{\vec{s}} = r^{\mathbf{A}_{J_i}^{-1}\mathbf{c}_{J_i}}$. 6. Output (key, pub). (iv) Compute $r^{c'} = r^{\mathbf{A}\vec{s}}$. (v) If $\operatorname{dis}(r^{\mathsf{c}}, r^{\mathsf{c}'}) \leq t$, output $r^{\vec{s}_0}, ..., r^{\vec{s}_{\alpha}}$. 3. Output \perp .

Theorem 3. Let c be a constant. Let all parameters be as in Construction 1. Let \mathcal{E} be the set of all (k,β) -MIPURS distributions. Suppose that

- $k' \stackrel{def}{=} k + \alpha = o(n) \text{ and } k' = \omega(\log n),$
- t is such that $tk' \leq cn \log n$ for some constant c, which with the above implies t = o(n),
- Let $\delta' > 0$ be some value,

- Let $\eta > 0$ be some constant and let $\ell = n^{2(1+\eta)c} \log \frac{1}{\delta'}$, and
- Let δ be some value such that $\delta \leq \delta' + exp(-\Omega(n))$.

Then (Gen, Rep) is a $(\mathbb{F}_q^n, \mathcal{E}, |\mathbb{F}_q^\alpha|, t)$ -fuzzy extractor that is (ϵ_{sec}, m) -hard that is correct with probability $1 - \delta$ for all adversaries in the generic group model (making at most m queries) where

$$\epsilon_{sec} = \left(\frac{((m+n+2)(m+n+1))^2}{2}\right) \left(\frac{3}{q} + \beta\right).$$

Proof. The security portion of Theorem 3 follows by combining Theorem 2 with a lemma that generalizes Akavia, Goldwasser, and Vaikuntanathan's result on hardcore elements of LWE [AGV09, Lemma 2]. Their result is that if the decision version of LWE is hard for k dimensions than any additional α dimensions are hardcore. The core idea of the proof is that if one distinguishes these "hardcore" dimensions then an outer adversary could augment their LWE instance by just sampling these α new coordinates of \mathbf{x} and extending \mathbf{A} accordingly. Note that this can all be done linearly. We restate this lemma for the generic group setting here (the proof is identical to that of Akavia, Goldwasser, and Vaikuntanathan):

Lemma 4. For any integer n > 0, prime $q \ge 2$, and let \mathbb{G}_q be a group of order q, error-distribution **e** over \mathbb{Z}_q^n , if for random $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times k}, \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k, \mathbf{U} \in \mathbb{F}^n$ uniformly distributed one has for all PPT \mathcal{A} :

$$\left| \Pr_{\sigma \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \Sigma} \left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\mathbf{A}, \sigma(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e})) = 1 \right] - \Pr_{\sigma \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \Sigma} \left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\mathbf{A}, \sigma(\mathbf{U})) = 1 \right] \right| < \epsilon.$$

Then for $\mathbf{A}' \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times (k+\alpha)}, \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{k+\alpha}, \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{\alpha}$ uniformly distributed one has that

$$\left| \Pr_{\sigma \leftarrow \Sigma} \left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\sigma(\mathbf{x}_{0...\alpha-1}), \mathbf{A}', \sigma(\mathbf{A}'\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e})) = 1 \right] - \Pr_{\sigma \leftarrow \Sigma} \left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\sigma(\mathbf{v}), \mathbf{A}', \sigma(\mathbf{A}'\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e})) = 1 \right] \right| < \epsilon.$$
(1)

ī

We note that to apply this Lemma, the distribution **e** must be (k, β) – MIPURS while **x** is of length $k + \alpha$.

To show that Rep has a high probability of outputting the correct key we consider two cases 1) when Rep outputs an incorrect key and 2) when Rep terminates without finding a candidate key. We call these properties **Correctness** and **Efficiency** respectively.

Correctness We consider two separate properties. First the probability that the algorithm finds some codeword $\mathbf{x}' \neq \mathbf{x}$ and uses this to find $\mathbf{s}'_0, ..., \mathbf{s}'_\alpha$. Second, we compute the probability that no value is found after ℓ iterations and Rep outputs \perp . For correctness it suffices to observe that the minimum distance of the code exceeds the number of possible errors between \mathbf{e} and \mathbf{e}' . For this we use the following standard theorem (which applies since k', t = o(n)).

Lemma 5 ([Gur10, Theorem 8]). For prime $q, \delta \in [0, 1 - 1/q), 0 < \epsilon < 1 - H_q(\delta)$ and sufficiently large n, the following holds for $k' = \lceil (1 - H_q(\delta) - \epsilon)n \rceil$. If $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times k'}$ is drawn uniformly at random, then the linear code with \mathbf{A} as a generator matrix has rate at least $(1 - H_q(\delta) - \epsilon)$ and relative distance at least δ with probability at least $1 - e^{-\Omega(n)}$.

Efficiency We now turn to analyzing the probability that Rep outputs \perp after completing ℓ iterations.

Lemma 6. Let all parameters be as in Construction 1. Suppose that $k + \alpha = o(n)$ and t is such that $tk' \leq cn \ln n$ for some constant c. Let $\delta' > 0$ and $\eta > 0$ be a constant, then for $\ell \geq n^{2(1+\eta)c} \log \frac{1}{\delta'}$, Rep when run for ℓ iterations outputs \perp with probability at most δ' .

Proof of Lemma 6. For any two ψ, ψ' used as inputs to Gen and Rep respectively, we assume that $\operatorname{dis}(\psi, \psi') \leq t$ Our analysis of running time is similar in spirit to that of Canetti et al. [CFP⁺16]. We first consider the probability that an individual subset is correct. For any given *i*, the probability that $\psi'_{J_i} = \psi_{J_i}$ is at least

$$\left(1 - \frac{t}{n - k'}\right)^{k'} \ge \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{k't/(n - k')} \ge \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{cn\log n/(n - k')} \ge \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{(1 + \eta)c\log n} = n^{-2(1 + \eta)c},$$

where we have applied the inequality $n - k' \ge n/(1 + \eta)$ for any constant η since k' = o(n) and the fact that $(1 - \alpha)^{\ell} = [(1 - \alpha)^{1/\alpha}]^{\alpha \ell} \ge (1/4)^{\alpha \ell}$ for any $0 \le \alpha \le 1/2$ (with equality at $\alpha = 1/2$) and $\ell \ge 1$. We bound the probability of an error for each sample (without replacement) by the probability of the last sample which is at most $\frac{t}{n-k'}$. The probability that no iteration matches is at most

$$\left(1 - \left(1 - \frac{t}{n - k'}\right)^{k'}\right)^{\ell}$$

Using the inequality $1 + x \leq \exp(x)$ we conclude

$$\left(1 - \left(1 - \frac{t}{n - k'}\right)^{k'}\right)^{\ell} \le \left(1 - 1/n^{2(1+\eta)c}\right)^{\ell} \le \exp(-\ell/n^{2(1+\eta)c}).$$

As $\ell \ge n^{2(1+\eta)c} \log 1/\delta'$ the result follows. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.

This completes the proof of Theorem 3.

3.1 Handling binary e

In this section we show one way to transform binary values to a good MIPURS distribution and consider the associated impact on correctness. Assume that the input value \mathbf{e} is binary and all subsets of \mathbf{e} are hard to predict, one can form a MIPURS distribution by multiplying by an auxiliary random and uniform random variable $\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$. This has the effect of placing random errors in the locations where $\mathbf{e}_i = 1$. Since decoding finds a subset without errors (it does not rely on the magnitude of errors) we can augment errors into random errors. We prove that this augmented vector is MIPURS in Section 4.

However, this transform creates a problem with decoding. When bits of \mathbf{e} are 1, denoted $\mathbf{e}_j = 1$ we cannot use location j for decoding as it is a random value (even if $\mathbf{e}'_j = 1$ as well). When one amplifies a binary \mathbf{e} , we recommending using another uniform random variable $\mathbf{y} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and check when $\mathbf{y}_i \neq \mathbf{e}_i$ to indicate when to include a random error. Then in reproduction the algorithm should restrict to locations where $\mathbf{y}_i = \mathbf{e}_i$. Using Chernoff bounds one can show this subset is big enough and the error rate in this subset is not much higher than the overall error rate (except with negligible probability). If $k + \alpha$ is just barely $\omega(\log n)$ one can support error rates that are just barely o(n).

 Construction 2. Let γ be a security parameter, t be a distance, $k = \omega(\log \gamma)$, $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}^+$, q be a prime and let \mathbb{G}_q be some cycle group of order q. Let \mathbb{F}_q be the field with q elements. Let $\mathcal{E} \in \{0,1\}^n$ and let dis be the Hamming metric. Let $\tau = \max(0.01, t/n)$. Define (Gen, Rep) as follows:

 $\begin{aligned} & \mathsf{Gen}(\mathbf{e} = \mathbf{e}_1, ..., \mathbf{e}_n) \\ & 1. \ Sample \ random \ generator \ r \ of \ \mathbb{G}_q. \\ & 2. \ Sample \ \mathbf{A} \leftarrow (\mathbb{F}_q)^{n \times (k+\alpha)}, \\ & 3. \ Sample \ \mathbf{x} \leftarrow (\mathbb{F}_q)^{k+\alpha}. \\ & 4. \ Sample \ \mathbf{y} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^n. \\ & 5. \ For \ i = 1, ..., n: \\ & (i) \ If \ \mathbf{e}_i = \mathbf{y}_i, \ set \ r^{\mathbf{c}_i} = r^{\mathbf{A}_i \cdot x}. \\ & (ii) \ Else \ set \ r^{\mathbf{c}_i} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{G}_q. \\ & 6. \ Set \ \mathsf{key} = r^{\mathbf{x}_{0...\alpha-1}}. \\ & 7. \ Set \ \mathsf{pub} = (r, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{A}, \{r^{\mathbf{c}_i}\}_{i=1}^n). \\ & 8. \ Output \ (\mathsf{key}, \mathsf{pub}). \end{aligned}$

Rep $(e', pub = (r, y, A, r^{c_1} \dots r^{c_\ell}))$ 1. Let $\mathcal{I} = \{i | e'_i = y_i\}.$ 2. For $i = 1, ..., \ell$:

(i) Choose random $J_i \subseteq \mathcal{I}$, with $|J_i| = k$.

(ii) If $\mathbf{A}_{J_i}^{-1}$ does not exist, output \perp .

- (iii) Compute $r^{\vec{s}} = r^{\mathbf{A}_{J_i}^{-1} \mathbf{c}_{J_i}}$.
- (iv) Compute $r^{\mathbf{c}'} = r^{\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{A}_{J_i}^{-1}\mathbf{c}_{J_i})}$.
- (v) If dis($c_{\mathcal{I}}, c'_{\mathcal{I}}$) $\leq 2|c_{\mathcal{I}}|\tau$, output $r^{\vec{s}_0}, ..., r^{\vec{s}_{\alpha-1}}$.

3. Output \perp .

Theorem 7. Let all parameters be as in Construction 2. Let $\gamma \in \mathbb{N}$ and let \mathcal{E} be the set of all sources where all $(k - \gamma)$ -subsets have entropy β (Definition 3) over $\{0,1\}^n$. Then (Gen, Rep) is a $(\{0,1\}^n, \mathcal{E}, |\mathbb{F}_q^{\alpha}|, t)$ fuzzy extractor that is (ϵ_{sec}, m) -hard for all adversaries in the generic group model (making at most m queries) where

$$\epsilon_{sec} = \left(\frac{((m+n+2)(m+n+1))^2}{2}\right) \left(\frac{4}{q} + 2^{-\beta} + \left(\frac{(k-\gamma)\binom{n}{k-\gamma-1}}{q^{\gamma+1}}\right)\right).$$

Furthermore, suppose that

- $k' \stackrel{def}{=} k + \alpha = o(n)$ and $k' = \omega(\log n)$,
- t is such that $tk' \leq cn \log n$ for some constant c, which with the above implies t = o(n),
- Let $\delta' > 0$ be some value.
- Let $\eta > 0$ be some constant.
- Let $\ell = n^{2(1+\eta)c} \log \frac{1}{\delta'}$, (if $tk' = o(n \log n)$ setting $\ell = n \log 1/\delta'$ suffices)

Then there is some function negligible ngl(n) such that the Rep is correct with probability $1 - \delta' - ngl(n)$.

We prove Theorem 7 by combining lemmata that argue the security (Lemma 8), correctness (Lemma 9), and efficiency (Lemma 10) properties.

To show security we first need to formalize the required property of the distribution \mathbf{e} . We introduce a notion called *all subsets have entropy*:

Definition 3. Let a source $\mathbf{e} = \mathbf{e}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{e}_n$ consist of n-bit binary strings. For some parameters k, β we say that the source \mathbf{e} is a source where all k-subsets have entropy β if $H_{\infty}(\mathbf{e}_{j_1}, \ldots, \mathbf{e}_{j_k}) \geq \beta$ for any $1 \leq j_1, \ldots, j_k \leq n, j_a \neq j_b$ for $a \neq b$.

We consider \mathbf{e}' given by the coordinatewise product of a uniform vector $\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ and a "selection vector" $\mathbf{e} \in \{0,1\}^n$: that is, $\mathbf{e}'_i = \mathbf{r}_i \cdot_c \mathbf{e}_i$ where all large enough subsets of \mathbf{e} are unpredictable (\cdot_c is component-wise multiplication). We call such a source a *location source*. Lemma 14 shows that location sources are MIPURS.

Lemma 8. Let all parameters be as in Construction 2. Let $\gamma \in \mathbb{N}$, then for any distribution **e** where all $k - \gamma$ subsets have entropy β over $\{0, 1\}^n$, (Gen, Rep) is is (ϵ_{sec}, m) -hard for all adversaries in the generic group model (making at most m queries) where

$$\epsilon_{sec} = \left(\frac{((m+n+2)(m+n+1))^2}{2}\right) \left(\frac{4}{q} + 2^{-\beta} + \left(\frac{(k-\gamma)\binom{n}{k-\gamma-1}}{q^{\gamma+1}}\right)\right).$$

Proof of Lemma 8. Define the auxiliary indicator random variable $1_{e=y}$ over $\{0,1\}^n$ as follows:

$$1_{\mathbf{e}=\mathbf{y},i} = \begin{cases} 1 & \mathbf{e}_i = \mathbf{y}_i \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Consider some fixed subset \mathcal{I} of size $k - \gamma$. Conditioned on y,

$$\max_{x \in \{0,1\}^k} \Pr\left[1_{\mathbf{e}=\mathbf{y},\mathcal{I}} = x | y, \mathcal{I}\right] = \max_{x \in \{0,1\}^k} \Pr\left[\mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{I}} = x\right] \le 2^{-\beta}.$$

That is, for every value y it is true that $1_{\mathbf{e}=\mathbf{y}}|y$ all k subsets have entropy β . Thus, defining $\mathbf{e}'|y$ as a random value when $1_{\mathbf{e}=\mathbf{y},i} = 1$ and 0 otherwise, we have that $\mathbf{e}'|y$ is a location source. Thus, applying Lemma 14 one has that \mathbf{e}' is a $(k, \beta') - \mathsf{MIPURS}$ distribution for

$$\beta' = \frac{1}{q} + 2^{-\beta} + \left(\frac{(k-\gamma)\binom{n}{k-\gamma-1}}{q^{\gamma+1}}\right).$$

Application of Lemma 4 completes the proof of Lemma 8.

We now show this construction is correct and efficient. Our correctness argument considers $k' \stackrel{def}{=} k + \alpha = \Theta(n)$ and $t = \Theta(n)$. For the fuzzy extractor application, one would consider a smaller k' and t. In particular, for t = o(n) the theorem applies with overwhelming probability as long as $k' \leq ((1-c)/3) \cdot n$ for a constant 0 < c < 1. We use the q-ary entropy function which is a generalization of the binary entropy function to larger alphabets. $H_q(x)$ is the q-ary entropy function defined as

$$H_q(x) = x \log_q(q-1) - x \log_q(x) - (1-x) \log_q(1-x).$$

Lemma 9. Let parameters be as in Construction 2. Define $\tau = \max(t/n, 0.01)$. Let $0 < \delta < 1 - H_q(4\tau)$ and suppose that $k' \leq (1/3) \cdot [1 - H_q(4\tau) - \delta]n$. If Rep outputs a value other than \perp it is correct with probability at least $1 - e^{-\Theta(n)}$.

Proof of Lemma 9. We assume a fixed number of iterations in Rep denoted by ℓ . For any two ψ, ψ' used as inputs to Gen and Rep respectively, we assume that $dis(\psi, \psi') \leq t$ and that the value **y** is independent of both values (by Def 1, any distribution over ψ' does not depend on the public value).

We first show that with high probability the final check of $\operatorname{dis}(\mathbf{c}_{\mathcal{I}}, \mathbf{c}'_{\mathcal{I}}) \leq 2|\mathbf{c}_{\mathcal{I}}|\tau$ to return correctly if and only $r^{\mathbf{x}} = r^{\mathbf{A}_{J_i}^{-1}\mathbf{c}_{J_i}}$. We stress that this guarantee is independent of the chosen subset and only

depends on **A** and **y**. We refer to the values in the exponent, but our argument directly applies to the generated group elements. Define the matrix $\mathbf{A}_{\mathcal{I}}$ defined by the set \mathcal{I} . By Chernoff bound,

$$\Pr\left[|\mathcal{I}| \le \left(1 - \frac{1}{3}\right) \mathbb{E} |\mathcal{I}|\right] = \Pr\left[|\mathcal{I}| \le \left(\frac{2}{3}\right) \frac{n}{2}\right] \le e^{-\frac{n}{36}} \le e^{-\Theta(n)}$$

Without loss of generality we assume that the size of $\mathcal{I} = n/3$. Consider any fixed ψ, ψ' such that $\operatorname{dis}(\psi, \psi') \leq t$. Note that the only way a random value is included in $r^{c_{\mathcal{I}}}$ is if $\psi'_i = \mathbf{y}_i$ but $\psi_i \neq \mathbf{y}_i$, that is position *i* is erroneously thought to be without error. Define the random variable *Z* of length *n* where a bit *i* of *Z* that indicates $\psi_i \neq \psi'_i$, noting that $|Z| = \operatorname{dis}(\psi, \psi') \leq t$. Thus, the number of random values included in $r^{c_{\mathcal{I}}}$ is at most $|\mathcal{I} \cap Z|$. Let $S \stackrel{def}{=} |\mathcal{I} \cap Z|$. Recall that \mathcal{I} and *Z* are independent. Thus, we can upper bound the CMF *S* by the CMF of the binomial distribution with n/3 flips and probability $p \leq \tau$. Thus, $\mathbb{E}[S] \leq \tau * n/3$.

We now turn to measuring the probability that S is larger than its expectation. For the correctness argument it suffices to consider $t = \Theta(n)$, if t = o(n) then $\tau \stackrel{def}{=} t/n \leq .01$ as this case creates the highest likelihood of recovering some wrong codeword.

By an additive Chernoff bound,

$$\Pr\left[S - \mathbb{E}[S] \ge \tau n/3\right] \le 2e^{-2\tau^2/9n} \le e^{-\Theta(n)}.$$

To show correctness it remains to show that \mathbf{x} is unique even when the code is restricted to \mathcal{I} . We again assume that $\mathcal{I} = n/3$, all arguments proceed similarly when $\mathcal{I} > n/3$. To show uniqueness of \mathbf{x} suppose that there exists two $\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2$ such that $\mathsf{dis}(\mathbf{A}_{\mathcal{I}}\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{c}_{\mathcal{I}}) \leq 2|\mathbf{c}_{\mathcal{I}}|\tau$ and $\mathsf{dis}(\mathbf{A}_{\mathcal{I}}\mathbf{x}_2, \mathbf{c}_{\mathcal{I}}) \leq 2|\mathbf{c}_{\mathcal{I}}|\tau$. This means that $\mathbf{A}_{\mathcal{I}}(\mathbf{x}_1 - \mathbf{x}_2)$ contains at most 4t/3 nonzero components. To complete the proof we use Lemma 5 which bounds the minimum distance of a random code. Noting that by independence of \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{y} , and ψ' that $\mathbf{A}_{\mathcal{I}}$ is uniform.

Lemma 10. Let all parameters be as in Construction 2. Suppose that $k + \alpha = o(n)$ and t is such that $tk' \leq cn \ln n$ for some constant c. Let $\eta > 0$ be some constant and let $\delta' > 0$ be some value, then for $\ell = n^{2(1+\eta)c} \log \frac{1}{\delta'}$, Rep when run for ℓ iterations outputs \perp with probability at most δ' . If $tk' = o(n \log n)$ setting $\ell = n \log 1/\delta'$ suffices.

Proof of Lemma 10. Our analysis of running time is similar to Lemma 6 restricted to only positions in \mathcal{I} . It is more complicated because it must account for the chance that the error rate in \mathcal{I} increases. accounting for the smaller set S with a potentially higher error rate. For this analysis we consider the setting of $|\mathcal{I}| = n/3$. We use the notation from Lemma 9. We separate out two cases when $tk' = o(n \log n)$ and when $tk' = \Omega(n \log n)$.

Case 1: $tk' = o(\log n)$: In this case we assume that all t errors are included in \mathcal{I} . Then for any given i, the probability that $\psi'_{J_i} = \psi_{J_i}$ is at least

$$\left(1 - \frac{3t}{n - 3k'}\right)^{k'} \ge \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{k't/(n - k')} \ge \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{3k'\log n/(n - k')} \ge \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{6k'/n\log n} = n^{-12k'/n},$$

where we have applied the inequality $n - 3k' \ge n/2$ (since k' = o(n)). The probability that no iteration matches is at most

$$\left(1-\left(1-\frac{3t}{n-3k'}\right)^{k'}\right)^{\ell}.$$

Using the inequality $1 + x \leq \exp(x)$ we conclude

$$\left(1 - \left(1 - \frac{3t}{n - 3k'}\right)^{k'}\right)^{\ell} \le \left(1 - 1/n^{12(k'/n)}\right)^{\ell} \le \exp(-\ell/n^{12k'/n})^{\ell}$$

When $\ell \geq n \log 1/\delta'$ the result follows.

Case 2: $tk' = \Omega(n \log n)$ Let $\eta > 0$ be a constant and define $\eta' = \eta/3$. In this case we bound the fraction of errors included in \mathcal{I} . As in Lemma 9 we S denote the number of included errors. Note that in this case since k' = o(n) it must be true that $t = \omega(\log n)$. By a multiplicative Chernoff bound:

$$\Pr\left[S - \mathbb{E}[S] \ge \eta' \,\mathbb{E}[S]\right] \le e^{-\eta'^2 \,\mathbb{E}[S]/(2+\gamma)} = \mathtt{ngl}(n).$$

Thus, with high probability we know that $S \leq (1 + \eta')t/3$. Conditioned on this event, we consider the probability that an individual subset is correct. For any given *i*, the probability that $\psi'_{J_i} = \psi_{J_i}$ is at least

$$\left(1 - \frac{(1+\eta_1)t}{n-3k'}\right)^{k'} \ge \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{(1+\eta_1)k't/(n-k')} \ge \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{(1+\eta')cn\log n/(n-k')} \\ \ge \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)^{(1+\eta_2)(1+\eta')c\log n} \\ = n^{-2(1+\eta')(1+\eta')c} \\ \ge n^{-2(1+\eta)c},$$

where we have applied the inequality $n - 3k' \ge n/(1 + \eta')$ for any constant η' (since k' = o(n)) and used the fact that $(1 + \eta')(1 + \eta') < 1 + \eta$. The probability that no iteration matches is at most

$$\left(1 - \left(1 - \frac{2t}{n - 3k'}\right)^{k'}\right)^{\ell}$$

Using the inequality $1 + x \leq \exp(x)$ we conclude

$$\left(1 - \left(1 - \frac{(1+\eta')t}{n-3k'}\right)^{k'}\right)^{\ell} \le \left(1 - 1/n^{2(1+\eta)c}\right)^{\ell} \le \exp(-\ell/n^{2(1+\eta)c}).$$

As $\ell \ge n^{2(1+\eta)c} \log 1/\delta'$ the result follows. This completes the proof of Lemma 10.

3.2 The power of confidence information

Most PUFs and biometrics demonstrate a constant error rate $\tau = t/n$. This is higher than the correction capacity of our construction and Canetti et al.'s digital locker construction [CFP⁺16]. However, existing fuzzy extractors that support constant τ do not support the low entropy distributions found in practice.

While code offset in the exponent is not designed for constant error rates it is efficient for small constant τ . As described in the Introduction for the case of PUFs and biometrics, using confidence information can lead to a multiplicative decrease in the effective error rate of bits chosen for information set decoding. The important tradeoff is between the fractional error rate $\tau = t/n$ and the number of required iterations.




Figure 2: Expected number of iterations ℓ to have Rep output a value with .95 probability across error rate. Three lines represent original error rate t and two reduced error rates of t/2 and t/10 that may be achievable by using confidence information. Note that the y-axis is in log scale.

We observe, for practical parameters, multiplicative changes in τ lead to exponential changes in the required iterations ℓ . To demonstrate we consider the following parameters: a source of length n = 1024 (common for the iris), a subset size of k = 128, and an output key of a single group element ($\alpha = 1$). Figure 2 shows how log ℓ increases for different τ . Three lines represent the original error rate and two potential reduced error rates (multiplicative decreases of 2 and 10 respectively). Figure 2 considers τ steps of .001. Between 0 and .06, each step of .001 increases log ℓ by .667 (r^2 value of .999).

As mentioned in the introduction, Canetti et al. $[CFP^+16]$ digital locker ⁹ condition for security is that *average* subsets have entropy. A distribution satisfying MIPURS implies that average subsets have entropy (see Section 4.3). Since code offset in the exponent allows the adversary to test any subset, average subsets having entropy does not suffice (see Section 1.5). Section 3.1 showed how to handle distributions where *all* subsets have entropy by multiplying by a random error vector. Unfortunately, as we show in Section 4.4, MIPURS and all subsets have entropy are incomparable notions creating a barrier to removing this random vector in Construction 2.

3.3 Reusability

Reusability is the ability to support multiple independent enrollments of the same value, allowing users to reuse the same biometric or PUF, for example, with multiple noncooperating providers. More precisely, the algorithm Gen may be run multiple times on correlated readings $e^1, ..., e^{\rho}$ of a given source. Each time, Gen will produce a different pair of values $(\text{key}^1, \text{pub}^1), ..., (\text{key}^{\rho}, \text{pub}^{\rho})$. Security for each extracted string keyⁱ should hold even in the presence of all the helper strings $\text{pub}^1, ..., \text{pub}^{\rho}$ (the reproduction procedure Rep at the *i*th provider still obtains only a single e' close to e^i and uses a single helper string pub_i). Because providers may not trust each other key_i should be secure even when all key_j for $j \neq i$ are also given to the adversary.

⁹Intuitively, a digital locker is a symmetric encryption that is semantically secure even when instantiated with keys that are correlated and only have entropy [CKVW10].

Definition 4 (Reusable Fuzzy Extractor [CFP⁺16]). Let \mathcal{E} be a family of distributions over \mathcal{M} . Let (Gen, Rep) be a $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{E}, \kappa, t)$ -fuzzy extractor that is (ϵ_{sec}, m) -hard with error δ in the generic group model. Let $(\mathbf{e}^1, \mathbf{e}^2, \ldots, \mathbf{e}^{\rho})$ be ρ correlated random variables such that each $\mathbf{e}^j \in \mathcal{E}$. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary. Define the following game for all $j = 1, ..., \rho$:

- Sampling The challenger samples $u \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_q^{\alpha}$ and $\sigma \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \Sigma$.
- Generation For all $1 \le i \le \rho$, the challenger computes $(\text{key}^i, \text{pub}^i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\mathbf{e}^j)$.
- **Distinguishing** The advantage of A is

$$\begin{split} Adv(\mathcal{A}) \stackrel{dej}{=} \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\sigma(\mathsf{key}^{1},...,\mathsf{key}^{j-1},\mathsf{key}^{j},\mathsf{key}^{j+1},...,\mathsf{key}^{\rho},\mathsf{pub}^{1},...,\mathsf{pub}^{\rho})) = 1] \\ &- \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\sigma(\mathsf{key}^{1},...,\mathsf{key}^{j-1},u,\mathsf{key}^{j+1},...,\mathsf{key}^{\rho},\mathsf{pub}^{1},...,\mathsf{pub}^{\rho})) = 1]. \end{split}$$

(Gen, Rep) is $(\rho, \epsilon_{sec}, m)$ -reusable if for all \mathcal{A} making at most m queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}$ and all $j = 1, ..., \rho$, the advantage is at most ϵ_{sec} .

Theorem 11. Let c be a constant. Let all parameters be as in Construction 1. Let \mathcal{E} be the set of all (k, β) -MIPURS distributions. Then (Gen, Rep) is a $(\mathbb{F}_q^n, \mathcal{E}, |\mathbb{F}_q^\alpha|, t)$ -fuzzy extractor for any t such that $t \leq (cn \ln n)/(k + \alpha)$; moreover, (Gen, Rep) is $(\rho, \epsilon_{sec}, m)$ -reusable for all adversaries in the generic group model making at most m queries where

$$\epsilon_{sec} = 3\rho\left(\frac{((m+n+2)(m+n+1))^2}{2}\right)\left(\frac{3}{q} + \beta\right).$$

Proof. Unfortunately, the proof of Theorem 11 needs to work directly with the generic group model. This is because we have to first show that we can provide separate oracles for the different values of key^i , pub^i without any loss. From there the proof proceeds akin to Theorem 3. Without loss of generality, we assume that the adversary is trying to learn information about the first key. Since we sample generators $r^1, ..., r^{\rho}$ we can define $s^1, ..., s^{\rho}$ where $s^i = \log_{r^1} r^i$. For the construction to be reusable for all distinguishers, it must be true that for uniform $\mathbf{V} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{\alpha}$:

$$\left| \Pr_{\sigma \stackrel{\mathfrak{S}}{\leftarrow} \Sigma} [\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\sigma(s_{1}(\mathbf{x}_{0\ldots\alpha-1}^{1})), \mathbf{A}^{1}, \sigma(s_{1}(\mathbf{A}^{1}\mathbf{x}^{1} + \mathbf{e}^{1})), \{\sigma(\mathsf{key}^{i}, \mathsf{pub}^{i})\}_{i=2}^{\rho})) = 1] - \Pr_{\sigma \stackrel{\mathfrak{S}}{\leftarrow} \Sigma} [\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\sigma(\mathbf{V}), \mathbf{A}^{1}, \sigma(s_{1}(\mathbf{A}^{1}\mathbf{x}^{1} + \mathbf{e}^{1})), \{\sigma(\mathsf{key}^{i}, \mathsf{pub}^{i})\}_{i=2}^{\rho})) = 1] \right| \leq \epsilon_{sec}.$$

where \mathbf{x}^1 , \mathbf{A}^1 are values sampled in the invocation of $\mathsf{Gen}(\mathbf{e}^1)$.

As shown in Theorem 2, for a single oracle \mathcal{A} has negligible probability of seeing a 0 response for any nontrivial linear combination.

All dependence between the values \mathbf{x}^1 and key^i is contained in $\sigma(\mathsf{pub}^1, \mathsf{pub}^i)$. We calculate the probability of an adversary making a query with nonzero elements from multiple generic group instances that results in a zero value response. As long as this probability is small, one can provide separate oracles for each σ . We now calculate this probability. The values contained in $\mathsf{key}^i, \mathsf{pub}^i$ are multiplied by s^i . So finding some 0 response requires finding some $\sum_{j=1} \sum_k \alpha_{j,k} s^j \mathsf{pub}^j_k = \sum_k \alpha_k s^i \mathsf{pub}^i_k$. Since the value s^i

starts as uniformly random from the adversary's perspective this occurs with probability (see Lemma 30) at most

$$\frac{((m+n+2)(m+n+1))^2}{4a}$$

Thus, we can replace these coupled oracles in a hybrid fashion paying cost at most

$$\rho \frac{((m+n+2)(m+n+1))^2}{4q}$$

To show hardness in this separate oracle setting we follow a three step process. First we replace all handles for pub^i with uniform values. This again requires using the proof of Theorem 2 which argues that with high probability no response from $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{G}}$ is useful and thus even when correlated values are in independent oracle, the adversary never learns anything useful from any individual oracle. For this step, we need a lemma similar to Lemma 4 that is proved analogously:

Lemma 12. For any integer n > 0, prime $q \ge 2$, and let \mathbb{G}_q be a group of order q, error-distribution **e** over \mathbb{F}_q^n , if for random $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times k}, \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$, and $\mathbf{U} \in \mathbb{F}^n$ it is true for all PPT \mathcal{A} that

$$\left| \Pr_{\substack{\sigma \in \Sigma}} \left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\mathbf{A}, \sigma(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e})) = 1 \right] - \Pr_{\substack{\sigma \in \Sigma}} \left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\mathbf{A}, \sigma(\mathbf{U})) = 1 \right] \right| < \epsilon$$

then for uniformly distributed $\mathbf{A}' \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times (k+\alpha)}, \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{k+\alpha}$, and $\mathbf{U} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ it is true that

$$\left| \Pr_{\substack{\sigma \in \Sigma \\ \sigma \in \Sigma}} \left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\sigma(\mathbf{x}_{0...\alpha-1}), \mathbf{A}', \sigma(\mathbf{A}'\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e})) = 1 \right] - \Pr_{\substack{\sigma \in \Sigma \\ \sigma \in \Sigma}} \left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{G}}}(\sigma(\mathbf{x}_{0...\alpha-1}), \mathbf{A}', \sigma(\mathbf{U})) = 1 \right] \right| < \epsilon.$$

Second, we replace the key for $\sigma(x_{0,\dots,\alpha-1}^1)$ with a uniform value (using Theorem 2 and Lemma 4). Finally, we repeat the first step now that the relevant key has been replaced with uniform. Together this results in $2\rho + 1$ hybrids with distance between each one of at most

$$\left(\frac{((m+n+2)(m+n+1))^2}{2}\right)\left(\frac{3}{q}+\beta\right).$$

Together with the cost of $\rho\left(((m+n+2)(m+n+1))^2/4\right)(1/q+\beta)$, for replacing the oracles with separate oracles yields an overall cost of at most

$$\epsilon_{sec} = 3\rho \left(\frac{((m+n+2)(m+n+1))^2}{2} \right) \left(\frac{3}{q} + \beta \right).$$

4 Characterizing MIPURS

Definition 2 of MIPURS is admittedly unwieldy. It considers a property of a distribution $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ with respect to a random matrix. We turn to characterizing distributions that satisfy MIPURS. We begin with easier distributions and conclude with the general entropy case is in Section 4.5. Throughout, we consider a prime order group \mathbb{G} of prime size q, a random linear code $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times k}$ and the null space $\mathbf{B} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \operatorname{null}(\mathbf{A})$.

4.1 Independent Sources \subset MIPURS

In most versions of LWE, each error coordinate is independently distributed and contributes entropy. Examples include the discretized Gaussian introduced by Regev [Reg05, Reg10], and a uniform interval introduced by Döttling and Müller-Quade [DMQ13]. We show that these distributions fit within our MIPURS characterization.

Lemma 13. Let $\mathbf{e} = \mathbf{e}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{e}_n \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ be a distribution where each \mathbf{e}_i is independently sampled. Let $\alpha = \min_{1 \leq i \leq n} H_{\infty}(\mathbf{e}_i)$. For any $k \leq n$, \mathbf{e} is a (k, β) – MIPURS distribution for $\beta = 2^{-\alpha}$.

Proof. Consider a fixed element $b \neq 0$ in **B**. Since the components of **e** are independent, predicting $\langle b, \mathbf{e} \rangle$ is at least as hard as predicting \mathbf{e}_i for each i such that $\mathbf{b}_i \neq 0$. This can be seen by fixing b and \mathbf{e}_j for $j \neq i$ and noting that the value of \mathbf{e}_i then uniquely determines $\langle b, \mathbf{e} \rangle$. Since $b \neq 0$ there exists at least one such i. Thus,

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{B}}\left[\max_{g}\max_{b\in\mathbf{B}\setminus\mathbf{0}}\Pr[\langle b,\mathbf{e}\rangle=g]\right] \leq 2^{-\alpha} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \beta.$$

4.2 Location Sources \subset MIPURS

Next, we consider \mathbf{e}' given by the coordinatewise product of a uniform vector $\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ and a "selection vector" $\mathbf{e} \in \{0,1\}^n$: that is, $\mathbf{e}'_i = \mathbf{r}_i \cdot_c \mathbf{e}_i$ where all large enough subsets of \mathbf{e} are unpredictable (\cdot_c is component-wise multiplication). Location sources are important for applications (see Section 2.1 and Section 5).

Lemma 14. Let $\gamma \in \mathbb{N}$ and $k \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. Let $\mathbf{e} \in \{0,1\}^n$ be a distribution where all $(k - \gamma)$ -subsets have entropy α . Define the distribution \mathbf{e}' as the coordinatewise product of a uniform vector $\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ and \mathbf{e} : that is, $\mathbf{e}'_i = \mathbf{e}_i \cdot_c \mathbf{r}_i$. Then the distribution \mathbf{e}' is a (k,β) -MIPURS distribution for

$$\beta = \frac{1}{q} + 2^{-\alpha} + \left(\frac{(k-\gamma)\binom{n}{k-\gamma-1}}{q^{\gamma+1}}\right).$$

Proof of Lemma 14. We use $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times k}$ to represent the random matrix from the definition of a MIPURS distribution and let $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times n-k}$ represent its null space. We start by bounding the "minimum distance" of \mathbf{B} , that is, the minimum weight of a non-zero element of $\mathbf{B} = \operatorname{null}(\mathbf{A})$. Observe that the number of vectors in \mathbb{F}_q^n of weight less than $k - \gamma$ is

$$\sum_{j=0}^{k-\gamma-1} \binom{n}{j} q^j \le (k-\gamma) \binom{n}{k-\gamma-1} q^{k-\gamma-1}$$

The probability that any fixed, nonzero vector lies x in **B** is q^{-k} , as it must annihilate k independent, uniform linear equations. (That is, $\sum_{i} x_i \mathbf{A}_{is} = 0$ for each $1 \le s \le k$.) Thus

$$\mathbb{E}[|\{w \in \mathtt{null}(\mathbf{A}) \setminus 0 \mid \mathsf{wt}(w) < k - \gamma\}|] \le (k - \gamma) \binom{n}{k - \gamma - 1} q^{-\gamma - 1}.$$
(2)

By Markov's inequality, the probability that there is at least one such small weight vector in null(A) is no more than the expected number of such vectors. Hence

$$\Pr[\exists w \in \mathtt{null}(\mathbf{A}) \setminus 0, \mathsf{wt}(w) < k - \gamma] \le (k - \gamma) \binom{n}{k - \gamma - 1} q^{-\gamma - 1}.$$

For some **b** in the span of **B** with weight at least $k - \gamma$, consider the product $\langle \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{e}' \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathbf{b}_i \cdot \mathbf{e}_i \cdot \mathbf{r}_i$. Define \mathcal{I} as the set of nonzero coordinates in **b**. With probability at least $1 - 2^{-\alpha}$ there is some nonzero coordinate in $\mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{I}}$. Conditioned on this fact this means that at least one value \mathbf{r}_i is included in the inner product. Thus, the entropy of the inner product is bounded below by the entropy of $\mathbf{e}_i \cdot \mathbf{r}_i$ which since $\mathbf{e}_i \neq 0$ is bounded by the entropy of \mathbf{r}_i . In this case, the prediction probability of an inner product (and therefore a single element of \mathbb{F}) is 1/q. The argument concludes by assuming perfect predictability when there exists **b** in **B** with weight of at most $k - \gamma - 1$.

4.3 MIPURS \subset Average Subsets Have Entropy

As mentioned in the Introduction, Canetti et al. $[CFP^+16]$ showed a fuzzy extractor construction for all sources where an average subset has entropy:¹⁰

Definition 5 ([CFP⁺16] average subset have entropy). Let the source $\mathbf{e} = \mathbf{e}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{e}_n$ consist of strings of length n over some arbitrary alphabet \mathcal{Z} . We say that the source \mathbf{e} is a source with a k-average subsets have entropy β if

$$\mathbb{E}_{j_1,\ldots,j_k \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} [1,\ldots,n], j_\alpha \neq j_\gamma} \left(\max_z \left\{ \Pr[(\mathbf{e}_{j_1},\ldots,\mathbf{e}_{j_k}) = z \mid j_1,\ldots,j_k] \right\} \right) \le \beta.$$

We now show that all MIPURS distributions implies that average subsets have entropy.

Lemma 15. Let $\mathbf{e} = \mathbf{e}_1, \dots, \mathbf{e}_n$ be a source over alphabet \mathcal{Z} such that \mathbf{e} is $(k, \beta) - \mathsf{MIPURS}$. Then \mathbf{e} has (k', β') -entropy samples for any k' and

$$\beta' = \frac{\beta}{\left(1 - \frac{\left(q^{k'-(k+1)}\right)}{\left(2^{k'}\binom{n}{k'}\right)}\right)}.$$

Proof. We proceed by contradiction, that is suppose that **e** does not have k', β' entropy samples. That is,

$$\mathbb{E}_{j_1,\ldots,j'_k \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} [1,\ldots,n], j_\alpha \neq j_\gamma} \left(\max_{z} \left\{ \Pr[(\mathbf{e}_{j_1},\ldots,\mathbf{e}_{j_k}) = z \mid j_1,\ldots,j'_k] \right\} \right) > \beta'.$$

We consider the following definition of \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{g} in the MIPURS game:

- 1. Receive input \mathbf{A} , compute $\mathbf{B} = \operatorname{null}(\mathbf{A})$.
- 2. Select random $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbf{B}$ such that $wt(\mathbf{b}) \leq k', \mathbf{b} \neq \mathbf{0}$. If no such \mathbf{b} exists output $\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{0}, \mathbf{g} = 0$.
- 3. Define \mathcal{I} as the set of nonzero locations in **b**. If $|\mathcal{I}| < k'$ insert random distinct locations until $|\mathcal{I}| = k'$.
- 4. Compute $z = \arg \max_z \{ \Pr[\mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{I}} = z \mid \mathcal{I}] \}.$
- 5. Output $\mathbf{g} = \langle \mathbf{b}, z \rangle$.

¹⁰We make a small modification to their definition changing to sampling without replacement.

If z is the correct prediction for $\mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{I}}$ then $\mathbf{g} = \langle \mathbf{b}, z \rangle = \langle \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{e} \rangle$. As noted above, the probability of any particular value nonzero **b** being in **B** is q^{-k} . Thus, conditioned on finding a good **b**, the distribution of the random variable **b** is exactly that of a uniform weight k' value. This implies that $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{b}} [\max_{z} \{\Pr[(\mathbf{e}_{\mathcal{I}}) = z \mid \mathcal{I}\}] > \beta'$. It remains to analyze the probability that **B** contains no vectors of weight k'. Here we derive an elementary bound, asymptotic formulations exist in the information theory literature [HHLT20, Theorem 1.1].

Lemma 16. Let V denote a random subspace of \mathbb{F}_q^n of dimension κ . Let W_ℓ denote the subset of \mathbb{F}_q^n consisting of all vectors with weight ℓ , then

$$\Pr[V \cap W_{\ell} = 0] \le \frac{(q^n - 1)}{\left(\binom{n}{\ell}(q - 1)^{\ell - 1}(q^{\kappa} - 1)\right)}$$

Proof of Lemma 16. We begin by noting that $|W_{\ell}| = \binom{n}{\ell}(q-1)^{\ell}$ For a vector $\vec{v} \in W_{\ell}$, let

$$X_{\vec{v}} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \vec{v} \in V, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Then

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{\vec{v}\in W_{\ell}} X_{\vec{v}}\right] = \binom{n}{\ell} (q-1)^{\ell} \frac{q^{\kappa}-1}{q^n-1}$$

We wish to compute the second moment of the sum $\sum X_{\vec{v}}$. We have

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{\vec{v},\vec{w}\in W_{\ell}} X_{\vec{v}} X_{\vec{w}}\right] = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{\substack{\vec{v},\vec{w}\in W_{\ell} \\ \vec{v},\vec{w} \text{ independent}}} X_{\vec{v}} X_{\vec{w}}\right] + \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{\substack{\vec{v},\vec{w}\in W_{\ell} \\ \vec{v},\vec{w} \text{ dependent}}} X_{\vec{v}} X_{\vec{w}}\right]$$

$$\leq \binom{n}{\ell} (q-1)^{\ell} \left(\binom{n}{\ell} (q-1)^{\ell} - (q-1)\right) \max_{\text{indep. } \vec{v},\vec{w}} \Pr[\vec{v},\vec{w}\in V] + \binom{n}{\ell} (q-1)^{\ell+1} \max_{\text{dependent } \vec{v},\vec{w}} \Pr[\vec{v},\vec{w}\in V]$$

$$\leq \underbrace{\left(\binom{n}{\ell} (q-1)^{\ell}\right)^{2} \frac{(q^{\kappa}-1)(q^{\kappa-1}-1)}{(q^{n}-1)(q^{n-1}-1)}}_{(\ddagger)} + \binom{n}{\ell} (q-1)^{\ell+1} \frac{q^{\kappa}-1}{q^{n}-1}.$$

Note that (m-t)/(n-t) < m/n assuming that $t \le m < n$ and hence that that

$$\begin{aligned} (\ddagger) &= \left(\binom{n}{\ell} (q-1)^{\ell} \right)^2 \frac{(q^{\kappa}-1)(q^{\kappa}-q)}{(q^n-1)(q^n-q)} \\ &\leq \left(\binom{n}{\ell} (q-1)^{\ell} \right)^2 \frac{(q^{\kappa}-1)^2}{(q^n-1)^2} \leq \mathbb{E} \left[\sum X_{\vec{v}} \right]^2. \end{aligned}$$

It follows that

$$\operatorname{Var}\left[\sum X_{\vec{v}}\right] = \mathbb{E}\left[\left(\sum X_{\vec{v}}\right)^2\right] - \mathbb{E}\left[\sum X_{\vec{v}}\right]^2 \le \binom{n}{\ell}(q-1)^{\ell+1}\frac{q^{\kappa}-1}{q^n-1}.$$

Then using Chebyshev's inequality with a constant of

$$\alpha = \sqrt{\left(\binom{n}{\ell}(q-1)^{\ell}\frac{q^{\kappa}-1}{q^{n}-1}\right)^{2}} / \left(\binom{n}{\ell}(q-1)^{\ell+1}\frac{q^{\kappa}-1}{q^{n}-1}\right)$$

one finds:

$$\Pr\left[\sum X_{\vec{v}} = 0\right] \leq \frac{\operatorname{Var}\left[\sum X_{\vec{v}}\right]}{\mathbb{E}\left[\sum X_{\vec{v}}\right]^2} \\ \leq \left(\binom{n}{\ell}(q-1)^{\ell+1}\frac{q^{\kappa}-1}{q^n-1}\right) / \left(\binom{n}{\ell}(q-1)^{\ell}\frac{q^{\kappa}-1}{q^n-1}\right)^2 \\ \leq (q^n-1) / \left(\binom{n}{\ell}(q-1)^{\ell-1}(q^{\kappa}-1)\right).$$

This completes the proof of Lemma 16.

Thus, for dim(**B**) $\geq n - k$ it is true that for any k':

$$\Pr[\mathbf{B} \cap W_{k'} = 0] \le (q^n - 1) \Big/ \left(\binom{n}{k'} (q - 1)^{k' - 1} (q^{n-k} - 1) \right)$$
$$\le \frac{q^n}{2^{k'} \binom{n}{k'} q^{n-k+k'-1}} = \frac{q^{k' - (k+1)}}{2^{k'} \binom{n}{k'}}.$$

We note that the overall success of prediction of \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{g} in the MIPURS game is bounded below by $\Pr[\mathbf{B} \cap W_{k'} = 0] * 0 + (1 - \Pr[\mathbf{B} \cap W_{k'} = 0]) * \beta' = \beta$. This completes the proof of Lemma 15.

4.4 MIPURS and all subsets have entropy

We now consider the relationship between MIPURS and all subsets have entropy. Recall, that we showed that for a distribution **e** where all subsets have entropy multiplying by a random vector produced a MIPURS distribution. With two simple examples, we show that MIPURS is not contained by all subsets have entropy and all subsets have entropy is not contained by MIPURS.

Proposition 17 (MIPURS $\not\rightarrow$ all subsets have entropy). Define $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ as the distribution that is fixed in the first k positions and uniform in all other positions. Clearly for any $\beta > 0$ it does not hold that all k-subsets have entropy. Furthermore, \mathbf{e} is $(k, \beta) - \mathsf{MIPURS}$ for $\beta \ge (1 - \frac{1}{a^k} - \frac{k}{a^{n-k}}) \log q$.

To show the above proposition, assume perfect predictability in the MIPURS game in the case when **A** is not full rank or when $1^k || 0^{n-k}$ is in null(**A**). Otherwise, full entropy results from the same argument as Lemma 13.

For the second direction we assume that **e** is a Reed-Solomon [RS60] code (the counterexample is similar to the one presented in Section 1.3). For the field \mathbb{F}_q of size q, a message length k, and code length n, such that $k \leq n \leq q$, define the Vandermonde matrix **V** where the *i*th row, $\mathbf{V}_i = [i^0, i^1, \dots, i^k]$. The Reed Solomon Code $\mathbb{RS}(n, k, q)$ is the set of all points \mathbf{Vx} where $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$.

Proposition 18 (all subsets have entropy $\not \rightarrow \mathsf{MIPURS}$). Let k < n/2 and let \mathbf{e} be the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{RS}(n, n-k-1, q)$ then all k subsets of \mathbf{e} have entropy $k \log q$. Furthermore, \mathbf{e} is **not** $(k, \beta) - \mathsf{MIPURS}$ for any $\beta < 1$.

Note dim(null(A)) $\geq n - k$ and thus null(A) and null($\mathbb{RS}(n, n - k - 1, q)$) are guaranteed to a have a nontrivial intersection. The result follows by picking some **b** in this intersection and setting g = 0.

4.5 High entropy \subset MIPURS

We now turn to the general entropy condition: MIPURS is hard for all distribution where the min-entropy exceeds log q^{n-k} (by a super logarithmic amount). For conciseness, we introduce $\kappa \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} n - k$.

The adversary is given a generating matrix of the code, \mathbf{A} ; this determines $\mathbf{B} = \operatorname{null}(\mathbf{A})$. Our proof is divided into three parts. Denote by E a set of possible error vectors.

- 1. Theorem 19: We show that the number of vectors $\psi \in E$ that are likely to have 0 inner product with an adversarially chosen vector in **B** is small. Intuitively, we show that this set is "not much larger than a κ -dimensional subspace."
- 2. Theorem 24: We then show it is difficult to predict the value of the inner product: even if the adversary may select arbitrarily coupled **b** and **g**, it is difficult to achieve $\langle \mathbf{b}, \psi \rangle = \mathbf{g}$.
- 3. Lemma 26: We show that any distribution \mathbf{e} with sufficient entropy cannot lie in the set of *predictable* error vectors E with high probability.

We codify the set of possible adversarial strategies by introducing a notion of κ -induced random variables. For the moment, we assume that **B** is a uniformly selected subspace of dimension exactly κ ; at the end of the proof we remove this restriction to apply these results when **B** has the distribution given by $\text{null}(\mathbf{A})$ (Corollary 27).

Definition 6. Let **b** be a random variable taking values in \mathbb{F}_q^n . We say that **b** is κ -induced if there exists a (typically dependent) random variable **B**, uniform on the collection of κ -dimensional subspaces of \mathbb{F}_q^n , so that $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbf{B}$ and $\mathbf{b} \neq \vec{0}$ with certainty: $\Pr[\mathbf{b} \in \mathbf{B} \land \mathbf{b} \neq \vec{0}] = 1$. Note, in fact, that the random variables **B** and **b** are necessarily dependent unless $n = \kappa$.

It suffices to consider the maximum probability in Definition 2 with respect to κ -induced random variables. This is because for any **b** that is not κ -induced we can find another **b** that is κ induced that does no worse in the game in Definition 2. For example when **b** is not in **B** or is the zero vector, one can replace **b** with a random element in the span of **B**.

We now show that if the set E is large enough there is no strategy for **b** that guarantees $\langle \mathbf{b}, \psi \rangle = 0$ with significant probability. The next theorem (Thm. 24) will, more generally, consider prediction of the inner product itself. For a κ induced random variable **b**, define

$$E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},0)} = \left\{ f \in \mathbb{F}_p^n \mid \Pr_{\mathbf{b}}[\langle \mathbf{b}, f \rangle = 0] \ge \epsilon \right\} \,.$$

When **b** can be inferred from context, we simply refer to this set as E_{ϵ} . Then define $P_{\kappa,\epsilon} = \max_{\mathbf{b}} |E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},0)}|$ where the maximum is over all κ -induced random variables in \mathbb{F}_q^n .

Theorem 19. Let q be a prime and let d > 1, $\kappa, m, \eta \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ be parameters for which $\kappa \leq n$. Then assuming $P_{\kappa,\epsilon} > d \cdot q^{\kappa}$ we must have

$$\epsilon \leq \left(\frac{\kappa + \eta}{m}\right) + \binom{m}{\kappa} \left(\binom{m}{\eta} \left(\frac{1}{d}\right)^{\eta} + \left(\frac{2}{q}\right)\right).$$

Before proving Theorem 19, we introduce and prove two combinatorial lemmas (20 and 22). We then proceed with the proof of Theorem 19. The major challenge is that the set E_{ϵ} (for a particular **b**) is typically not a linear subspace; these results show that is has reasonable "approximate linear" structure. We begin with the notion of *linear density* to measure, intuitively, how close the set is to linear. **Definition 7.** The ℓ -linear density of a sequence of vectors $F = (f^1, \ldots, f^m)$, with each $f^i \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$, is the maximum number of entries that are covered by a subspace of dimension ℓ . Formally,

$$\Delta^{\ell}(F) = \max_{V, \dim(V) = \ell} |\{i \mid f^i \in V\}|.$$

Lemma 20. Let q be a prime and let $n, \ell \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ satisfy $\ell \leq n$. Let $E \subset \mathbb{F}_q^n$ satisfy $|E| \geq q^\ell$ and let $\mathbf{F} = (\mathbf{f}^1, \ldots, \mathbf{f}^m)$ be a sequence of uniformly and independently chosen elements of E. Define d so that $|E| = dq^\ell$; then for any $\eta \geq 0$,

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{F}}[\Delta^{\ell}(\mathbf{F}) \ge \ell + \eta] \le \binom{m}{\ell} \binom{m-\ell}{\eta} \left(\frac{1}{d}\right)^{\eta}.$$

Proof. By the definition of linear density, if $\Delta^{\ell}(\mathbf{F}) \geq \ell + \eta$ there must be at least one subset of $\ell + \eta$ indices $I \subset [m]$ so that $\{\mathbf{f}^i \mid i \in I\}$ is contained in a subspace of dimension ℓ . In order for a subset I to have this property, there must be a partition of I into a disjoint union $S \cup L$, where S has cardinality ℓ and T indexes the remaining η "lucky" vectors that lie in the span of the vectors given by S. Formally, $\forall t \in T, \mathbf{f}^t \in \operatorname{span}(\{\mathbf{f}^s \mid s \in S\})$.

Fix, for the moment, ℓ indices of **F** to identify a candidate subset of vectors to play the role of *S* and η indices of **F** to identify a candidate set *T*. The probability that each of the η vectors indexed by *T* lie in the space spanned by *S* is clearly no more than $(q^{\ell}/|E|)^{\eta} \leq (1/d)^{\eta}$. Taking the union bound over these choices of indices completes the argument: the probability of a sequence is no more than

$$\binom{m}{\ell}\binom{m-\ell}{\eta}d^{-\eta},$$

as desired.

Before introducing our second combinatorial lemma (Lem 22), we need a Lemma bounding the probability of a fixed subspace having a nontrivial intersection with a random subspace.

Lemma 21. Let q be a prime and $\kappa, n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $\kappa \leq n$. Let \mathbf{V} be a random variable uniform on the set of all κ -dimensional subspaces of \mathbb{F}_q^n . Let W be a fixed subspace of dimension ℓ . Then

$$\Pr[\mathbf{V} \cap W \neq \{0\}] \le q^{\kappa + \ell - (n+1)} \cdot \left(\frac{q}{q-1}\right)$$

Proof. Let \mathcal{L} denote the set of all 1-dimensional subspaces in W. Each 1-dimensional subspace is described by an equivalence class of q-1 vectors under the relation $x \sim y \Leftrightarrow \exists \lambda \in \mathbb{F}_q^*, \lambda x = y$. Thus $|\mathcal{L}| = (q^{\ell} - 1)/(q - 1) \leq q^{\ell-1}(q/(q - 1))$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathbf{V} \cap W \neq \{\vec{0}\}] &= \Pr[\exists L \in \mathcal{L}, L \subset \mathbf{V}] \leq \sum_{L \in \mathcal{L}} \Pr[L \subset \mathbf{V}] \\ &\leq |\mathcal{L}| \max_{v \in \mathbb{F}_q^n \setminus \{\vec{0}\}} \Pr[v \in \mathbf{V}] \leq q^{\kappa + \ell - (n+1)} \left(\frac{q}{q-1}\right) \,, \end{aligned}$$

where we recall the fact that for any particular fixed nonzero vector v,

$$\Pr[v \in \mathbf{V}] = \frac{q^{\kappa} - 1}{q^n - 1} \le q^{\kappa - n}$$

Lemma 22. Let q be a prime, let $\ell, \kappa, n \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ satisfy $\ell, \kappa \leq n$. Let $F = (f^1, \ldots, f^m)$ be a sequence of elements of \mathbb{F}_q^n with dim $(\text{span}(F)) \geq \ell$. Then, for any κ -induced random variable **b** taking values in \mathbb{F}_q^n ,

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{b}}\left[|\{i \mid \langle \mathbf{b}, f^i \rangle = 0\}| \ge \Delta^{\ell}(F)\right] \le \binom{m}{\ell} q^{\kappa-\ell-1} \left(\frac{q}{q-1}\right) \le 2\binom{m}{\ell} q^{\kappa-\ell-1}$$

Proof. Let \mathcal{V}_F denote the collection of all ℓ -dimensional subspaces of \mathbb{F}_q^n spanned by subsets of elements in the sequence F. That is,

$$\mathcal{V}_F = \{ V \mid V = \operatorname{span}(\{f^i \mid i \in I\}), I \subset [m], \dim(V) = \ell \}$$

Then $|\mathcal{V}_F| \leq \binom{m}{\ell}$, as each such subspace is spanned by at least one subset of F of size ℓ . As dim $(\text{span}(F)) \geq \ell$, the set \mathcal{V}_F is nonempty.

Observe that if $I \subset [m]$ has cardinality at least $\Delta^{\ell}(F)$ then, by definition, dim $(\text{span}(\{f^i \mid i \in I\})) \geq \ell$; otherwise, an additional element of F could be added to the set indexed by I to yield a set of size exceeding $\Delta^{\ell}(F)$ which still lies in a subspace of dimension ℓ (contradicting the definition of Δ^{ℓ}). Note in the case that $m = \ell$ (and there is no element to add) then $\Delta^{\ell}(F) = \ell = \dim(\text{span}(\{f^i \mid i \in I\}))$. Thus, if $I \subset [m]$ has cardinality at least $\Delta^{\ell}(F)$, there must be some $V \in \mathcal{V}_F$ for which $V \subset \text{span}(\{f^i \mid i \in I\})$. In particular

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr_{\mathbf{b}} \left[|\{f^{i} \in F \mid \langle \mathbf{b}, f^{i} \rangle = 0\}| \geq \Delta^{\ell}(F) \right] \leq \Pr_{\mathbf{b}} \left[\exists V \in \mathcal{V}_{F}, \forall v \in V, \langle v, \mathbf{b} \rangle = 0 \right] \\ &\leq \sum_{V \in \mathcal{V}_{F}} \Pr_{\mathbf{b}} \left[\forall v \in V, \langle v, \mathbf{b} \rangle = 0 \right] = \sum_{V \in \mathcal{V}_{F}} \Pr_{\mathbf{b}} \left[\mathbf{b} \in V^{\perp} \right], \end{aligned}$$

where we have adopted the notation $V^{\perp} = \{w \mid \forall v \in V, \langle v, w \rangle = 0\}$. Recall that when V is a subspace of dimension ℓ , V^{\perp} is a subspace of dimension $n - \ell$. To complete the proof, we recall that **b** is κ -induced, so that there is an associated random variable **B**, uniform on dimension κ subspaces, for which $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbf{B}$ with certainty; applying Lemma 21 we may then conclude

$$\sum_{V \in \mathcal{V}_F} \Pr_{\mathbf{b}} \left[\mathbf{b} \in V^{\perp} \right] \le \sum_{V \in \mathcal{V}_F} \Pr_{\mathbf{B}} \left[\mathbf{B} \cap V^{\perp} \neq \{\vec{0}\} \right] \le \binom{m}{\ell} q^{\kappa + (n-\ell) - (n+1)} \frac{q}{q-1}$$
$$= \binom{m}{\ell} q^{\kappa - \ell - 1} \left(\frac{q}{q-1}\right) \,.$$

Proof of Theorem 19. Now we analyze the relationship between our two parameters of interest: ϵ and d. Fix some $\epsilon > 0$. Let **b** be a κ -induced random variable for which $|E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},0)}| = P_{\kappa,\epsilon}$ and let **B** be the coupled variable, uniform on subspaces, for which $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbf{B}$.

For the purposes of analysis we consider a sequence of m vectors chosen independently and uniformly from $E_{\epsilon} = E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},0)}$ with replacement; we let $\mathbf{F} = (\mathbf{f}^1, \dots, \mathbf{f}^m)$ denote the set of vectors so chosen. We study the expectation of the number of vectors in \mathbf{F} that are orthogonal to \mathbf{b} . We first give an immediate lower bound by linearity of expectation and the definition of E_{ϵ} :

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{b},\mathbf{F}}[|\{\mathbf{f}^i \in F \mid \langle \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{f}^i \rangle = 0\}|] \ge \epsilon \cdot m \,.$$

We now infer an upper bound on this expectation using Lemmas 20 and 22. We say that the samples **F** from E_{ϵ} are bad if $\Delta^{\kappa}(\mathbf{F}) \geq \kappa + \eta$. The probability of this bad event is no more than

$$\binom{m}{\kappa}\binom{m-\kappa}{\eta}\left(\frac{1}{d}\right)^{\eta}$$

by Lemma 20. For *bad* selections, we crudely upper bound the expectation by *m*; for *good* selections we further split the expectation based on the random variable **B**. We say that **B** is *terrible* (for a fixed $F = (f^1, ..., f^m)$) if there exists some $b \in \mathbf{B}$ such that $|\{f^i \in F \mid \langle b, f^i \rangle = 0\}| \ge \Delta^{\kappa}(F)$. Otherwise, **B** is *great*. The probability of a *terrible* selection of **B** is bounded above by $(2/q) \binom{m}{\kappa}$ in light of Lemma 22 (applied with $\ell = \kappa$). In this pessimistic case (that **B** is *terrible*), we again upper bound the expectation by *m*. Then if the experiment is neither *bad* nor *terrible*, we may clearly upper bound the expectation by $\kappa + \eta$. So, for any $\eta > 0$ we conclude that

$$\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\mathbf{b},\mathbf{B},F}[|\{f_i \in F \mid \langle \mathbf{b}, f_i \rangle = 0\}|] \le (\kappa + \eta) + m\left(\binom{m}{\kappa}\binom{m - \kappa}{\eta}\left(\frac{1}{d}\right)^{\eta} + \frac{2}{q}\binom{m}{\kappa}\right)$$

and hence that

$$\epsilon \leq \left(\frac{\kappa + \eta}{m}\right) + \binom{m}{\kappa} \left(\binom{m}{\eta} \left(\frac{1}{d}\right)^{\eta} + \frac{2}{q}\right).$$

Corollary 23. Let κ and n be parameters satisfying $1 \leq \kappa < n$ and let q be a prime such that $q \geq 2^{4\kappa}$. Then for $\epsilon \geq 5eq^{-1/(2(\kappa+1))}$ we have $P_{\kappa,\epsilon} \leq 5eq^{\kappa}/\epsilon$. In particular, for such ϵ and any κ -induced \mathbf{b} , the set $|E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},0)}| \leq 5eq^{\kappa}/\epsilon$.

Proof. Consider parameters for Theorem 19 that satisfy the following:

$$1 < d \le q^{1/(2(\kappa+1))}, \qquad m = \frac{d\eta}{2e}, \qquad \text{and} \qquad \eta = \log q \,.$$

First note that $\kappa < 4\kappa \leq \log q = \eta$ (as $q \geq 2^{4\kappa}$). Then, consider a set $E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},0)}$ for some **b**. We have

$$\begin{aligned} \epsilon &\leq \left(\frac{\kappa+\eta}{m}\right) + \binom{m}{\kappa} \left(\left(\frac{me}{\eta d}\right)^{\eta} + \frac{2}{q}\right) \\ &\leq \left(\frac{2\eta}{m}\right) + 3\binom{m}{\kappa} q^{-1} \\ &\leq \left(\frac{4e}{d}\right) + 3\binom{d\eta/2e}{\kappa} q^{-1} \leq \underbrace{\left(\frac{4e}{d}\right) + 3\left(\frac{d\eta}{2\kappa}\right)^{\kappa} q^{-1}}_{(\dagger)}. \end{aligned}$$

Since $q \ge 2^{4\kappa}$, we may write $q = 2^{2\alpha\kappa}$ for some $\alpha \ge 2$ and it follows that

$$\left(\frac{\log q}{\kappa}\right)^{\kappa} = (2\alpha)^{\kappa} \le (2^{\alpha})^{\kappa} = \sqrt{q}$$

because $2\alpha \leq 2^{\alpha}$ for all $\alpha \geq 2$. In light of this, consider the second term in the expression (†) above:

$$3\left(\frac{d\eta}{2\kappa}\right)^{\kappa}q^{-1} \le \frac{3}{2}\left(\frac{d\eta}{\kappa}\right)^{\kappa}q^{-1} \le \frac{3}{2}\left(\frac{d^{\kappa}}{\sqrt{q}}\right) \cdot \left(\left(\frac{\log q}{\kappa}\right)^{\kappa}\frac{1}{\sqrt{q}}\right) \le \frac{3}{2d} \le \frac{e}{d}.$$

We conclude that for any $1 < d \leq q^{1/(2(\kappa+1))}$, $P_{\kappa,\epsilon} \geq dq^k \implies \epsilon \leq 5e/d$. Observe then that for any $\epsilon > 5e/q^{1/(2(\kappa+1))}$ we may apply the argument above to $P_{\kappa,\epsilon}$ with $d = 5e/\epsilon$ and conclude that $P_{\kappa,\epsilon} \leq 5eq^{\kappa}/\epsilon$.

Predicting Arbitrary Values. We now show that the adversary cannot due much better than Theorem 19 even if the task is predicting the value $\langle \mathbf{b}, \cdot \rangle$.

Theorem 24. Let **b** be a κ -induced random variable in \mathbb{F}_q^n and let **g** be a random variable over \mathbb{F}_q (arbitrarily dependent on **b**). For $\epsilon > 0$ we generalize the notation above so that

$$E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})} = \left\{ f \in \mathbb{F}_{q}^{n} \mid \Pr[\langle \mathbf{b}, f \rangle = \mathbf{g}] \ge \epsilon \right\} \,.$$

Then $|E_{\epsilon^2/8}^{(\mathbf{b},0)}| \geq \frac{\epsilon^2}{8} |E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}|.$

Proof. For an element $\psi \in E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}$, define $F_{\psi} = \{(x, \langle x, \psi \rangle) \mid x \in \mathbb{F}_p^n\}$. Note that $\Pr_{\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g}}[(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g}) \in F_{\psi}] \ge \epsilon$ by assumption. For any $\delta < \epsilon$, there is a subset $F^* \subset E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}$ for which (i.) $|F^*| \le 1/\delta$, and (ii.) for any $\psi \in E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}$,

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g}}\left[(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})\in\left(F_{\psi}\cap\left(\bigcup_{f'\in F^*}F_{f'}\right)\right)\right]\geq\epsilon-\delta.$$

To see this, consider incrementally adding elements of $E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}$ into F^* so as to greedily increase

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g}}\left[(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})\in\bigcup_{f'\in F^*}F_{f'}\right].$$

If this is process is carried out until no $\psi \in E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}$ increases the total probability by more than δ , then it follows that every F_{ψ} intersects with the set with probability mass at least $\epsilon - \delta$, as desired. Note also that this termination condition is achieved after including no more than $1/\delta$ sets. It follows that for any $\psi \in E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}$,

$$\mathbb{E}_{f' \in F^*} \Pr_{\mathbf{b}}[\langle \mathbf{b}, \psi \rangle = \langle \mathbf{b}, f' \rangle] \ge (\epsilon - \delta)\delta$$

and hence

$$\mathbb{E}_{f'\in F^*} \mathbb{E}_{\psi\in E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}} \Pr[\langle \mathbf{b}, \psi \rangle = \langle \mathbf{b}, f' \rangle] \ge (\epsilon - \delta)\delta$$

Then there exists an f^* for which

$$\mathbb{E}_{\psi \in E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}} \Pr[\langle \mathbf{b}, \psi \rangle = \langle \mathbf{b}, f^* \rangle] \ge (\epsilon - \delta) \delta.$$

Setting $\delta = \epsilon/2$ and we see that

$$\mathbb{E}_{\psi \in E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}} \Pr[\langle \mathbf{b}, \psi \rangle = \langle \mathbf{b}, f^* \rangle] = \Pr_{\mathbf{b}, \psi \in E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}}[\langle \mathbf{b}, \psi \rangle = \langle \mathbf{b}, f^* \rangle] \geq \frac{\epsilon^2}{4} \,.$$

Using this expectation (of a probability), we bound the probability it is greater than 1/2 its mean. As the inner product is bi-linear,

$$\Pr_{\psi \in E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}} \left[\Pr_{\mathbf{b}}[\langle \mathbf{b}, \psi - f^* \rangle = 0] \ge \frac{\epsilon^2}{8} \right] \ge \frac{\epsilon^2}{8} \,.$$

Thus, an $\epsilon^2/8$ fraction of the set $\{\psi - f^* \mid \psi \in E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}\}$ must be a subset of $E_{\epsilon^2/8}^{(\mathbf{b},0)}$: the claim of the theorem follows, that $|E_{\epsilon^2/8}^{(\mathbf{b},0)}| \ge (\epsilon^2/8)|E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}|$.

With the language and settings of this last Theorem, applying Corollary 23 to appropriately control $|E_{\epsilon^2/8}^{(\mathbf{b},0)}|$ yields the following bound on $|E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}|$.

Corollary 25. Let κ and n be parameters satisfying $1 \leq \kappa < n$ and let q be a prime such that $q \geq 2^{4\kappa}$. Let **b** be any κ -induced random variable in \mathbb{F}_q^n and **g** any random variable in \mathbb{F}_q . Then for any $\epsilon \geq 11q^{-1/(4(\kappa+1))}$ it holds that

$$|E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}| \leq \frac{8}{\epsilon^2} \frac{5eq^{\kappa}}{\epsilon^2/8} = \frac{320eq^{\kappa}}{\epsilon^4}.$$

This implies all high min-entropy distributions are not predictable in the above game.

Lemma 26. Let **b** be a κ -induced random variable in \mathbb{F}_q^n . Let **g** be an arbitrary random variable in \mathbb{F}_q . Let **e** be a random variable with $\mathcal{H}_{\infty}(\mathbf{e}) = s$. Let $E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}$ be as defined in Theorem 24. Then for $\epsilon > 0$,

$$\Pr_{\psi \leftarrow \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{g}} \left[\langle \mathbf{b}, \psi \rangle = \mathbf{g} \right] \le 2^{-s} |E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{g})}| + \epsilon$$

Proof. Our predictable set $E_{\epsilon} = E_{\epsilon}^{(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g})}$ gives us no guarantee on the instability of the inner product. If $\psi \in E_{\epsilon}$ then we upper bound the probability by 1. Because **e** has min-entropy *s*, we know that no element is selected with probability greater than 2^{-s} , thus the probability of a lying inside a set of size $|E_{\epsilon}|$ is at most $|E_{\epsilon}|/2^s$. Outside of our predictable set, we know that the probability of a stable inner product cannot be greater than ϵ by definition of E_{ϵ} . Therefore if ψ does not fall in the predictable set we bound the probability by ϵ (for simplicity, we ignore the multiplicative term less than 1).

Corollary 27. Let k and n be parameters with n > k and let q be a prime such that $q \ge 2^{4(n-k)}$. Let $\epsilon \ge 11q^{-1/(4(n-k+1))}$ be a parameter. Then for all distributions $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ such that

$$\mathrm{H}_{\infty}(\mathbf{e}) \ge \log\left(\frac{320eq^{n-k}}{\epsilon^5}\right),$$

it holds that (for any **b** and **g** above) $\Pr_{\mathbf{b},\mathbf{g},\mathbf{e}}[\langle \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{e} \rangle = \mathbf{g}] \leq 2\epsilon + k/q^{n-k}$ and thus **e** is $(k, 2\epsilon + k/q^{n-k}) - MIPURS$.

The additional k/q^{n-k} term is due to the probability that **A** may not be full rank, all of the above analysis was conditioned on **A** being full rank. The corollary then follows by replacing $\kappa = n - k$.

5 Pattern Matching Obfuscation from Code Offset in the Exponent

In this section we introduce a second application for our main theorem. This application is known as pattern matching obfuscation. The goal is to obfuscate a string v of length n which consists of $(0, 1, \bot)$ where \bot is a wildcard. The obfuscated program on input $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ should output 1 if and only if $\forall i, x_i = v_i \lor v_i = \bot$. Roughly, the wildcard positions are matched automatically. We directly use definitions and the construction from the recent work of Bishop et al. [BKM⁺18]. Our improvement is in analysis, showing security for more distributions V. We start by introducing a definition of security:

Definition 8. Let C_n be a family of circuits that take inputs of length n and let \mathcal{O} be a PPT algorithm taking $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $C \in C_n$ outputting a new circuit C'. Let \mathcal{D}_n be an ensemble of distribution families where each $D \in \mathcal{D}_n$ is a distribution over circuits in C_n . \mathcal{O} is a distributional VBB obfuscator for \mathcal{D}_n over C_n if:

- 1. Functionality: For each $n, C \in \mathcal{C}_n$ and $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, $\Pr_{\mathcal{O}, C'}[C'(x) = C(x)] \ge 1 \operatorname{ngl}(n)$.
- 2. Slowdown: For each $n, C \in \mathcal{C}_n$, the resulting C' can be evaluated in time poly(|C|, n).
- 3. Security: For each generic adversary \mathcal{A} making at most m queries, there is a polynomial time simulator S such that $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}$, and each $D \in \mathcal{D}_n$ and each predicate P

$$\left| \Pr_{\substack{C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_n, \\ \mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{G}}, \mathcal{A}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{G}}(\mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{G}}(C, 1^n)) = P(C)] - \Pr_{C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_n, \mathcal{S}}[S^C(1^{|C|}, 1^n) = P(C)] \right| \le \operatorname{ngl}(n)$$

Construction 3. We now reiterate the construction from Bishop et al. adapted to use a random linear code for some prime q = q(n).

 $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{v} \in \{0, 1, \bot\}^n, q, g):$ where g is a generator of a group \mathbb{G}_q . 1. Sample $\mathbf{A} \in (\mathbb{F}_q)^{2n \times n}$, $\mathbf{x}_0 = 0, \mathbf{x}_{1,...,n-1} \leftarrow (\mathbb{F}_q)^{n-1}$. 2. Sample $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{2n}$ uniformly. 3. For i = 0 to n - 1: (a) If $v_i = 1$ set $e_{2i} = 0$. (b) If $v_i = 0$ set $e_{2i+1} = 0$. (c) If $v_i = \perp$ set $e_{2i} = 0, e_{2i+1} = 0$. 4. Compute $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}$.

I

5. Output $g^{\mathbf{y}}, \mathbf{A}$.

 $Eval(g^{y}, \mathbf{A}, \psi \in \{0, 1\}^{n}):$ $\begin{array}{ll} \text{1. Define \mathcal{I} as}\\ \{i \in [1...2n] \mid \psi_{\lfloor i/2 \rfloor} = (i \mod 2)\}. \end{array}$ 2. Compute $\mathbf{A}_{\mathcal{I}}^{-1}$. If none exists output \perp .

3. Output
$$g^{\mathbf{A}_{\mathcal{I},1}^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{y}} \stackrel{?}{=} g$$
.

To state our security theorem we need to map strings v over $\{0, 1, \bot\}$ to binary strings.

 $\mathsf{Bin}(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{s} \text{ where } \begin{cases} s_i = 10 & \text{if } v_i = 1, \\ s_i = 01 & \text{if } v_i = 0, \\ s_i = 00 & \text{if } v_i = \bot. \end{cases}$

Lastly, define the distribution $\mathbf{e}' = \mathbf{r} \cdot_c \mathsf{Bin}(\mathbf{v})_i$ for uniform distributed $\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{2n}$.

Theorem 28. Let $\ell \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ be a free parameter. Define \mathcal{V} as the set of all distributions V such that $E' = U_{\mathbb{F}_a}^n \cdot c \operatorname{Bin}(V)$ is a distribution that is $(n,\beta) - \operatorname{MIPURS}$. Then Construction 3 is VBB secure for generic $\hat{\mathcal{D}}$ making at most m queries with distinguishing probability at most

$$\frac{\left((m+n+2)(m+n+1)\right)^2}{2}\left(\frac{3}{q}+\beta\right).$$

Proof. Like the work of Bishop et al. [BKM⁺18, Theorem 16] the VBB security of the theorem follows by noting for any adversary \mathcal{A} there exists a simulator S that initializes \mathcal{A} , provides them with 2n random handles (and simulates the interaction with \mathcal{O}_r) and outputs their output. By Theorem 2, the output of this simulator differs from the adversary in the real game by at most the above probability.

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A Generic Group Formalism and Analysis

A.1 The Generic Group Model and the Simultaneous Oracle Game

The focus of this section is on proving Theorem 2. Our proof uses the simultaneous oracle game introduced by Bishop et al. [BKM⁺18, Section 4]. In this game, the adversary is given two oracles \mathcal{O}_1 and a second oracle \mathcal{O}^* that is either \mathcal{O}_1 or \mathcal{O}_2 with probability 1/2. If $\mathcal{O}^* = \mathcal{O}_1$ it is sampled with independent randomness from the first copy. Bishop et al. show that if an adversary cannot distinguish in this game, they cannot distinguish the two oracles \mathcal{O}_1 and \mathcal{O}_2 . Since the adversary has access to two oracles simultaneously it is easier to formalize when the adversary can distinguish: The adversary's distinguishing ability arises directly from repeated responses. The adversary can only notice inconsistency when (i.) one oracle returns a new response and the other does not or (ii.) if both responses are repeated but not consistent with the same prior query.

Definition 9 (Generic Group Model (GGM) [Sho97]). An application in the generic group model is defined as an interaction between a m-attacker \mathcal{A} and a challenger \mathcal{C} . For a cyclic group \mathbb{G}_N of order Nwith fixed generator g, a uniformly random function $\sigma : [N] \to [M]$ is sampled, mapping group exponents in \mathbb{Z}_N to a set of labels \mathcal{L} . Label $\sigma(x)$ for $x \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ corresponds to the group element g^x . We consider Mlarge enough that the probability of a collision between group elements under σ is negligible so we assume that σ is injective.

Based on internal randomness, C initializes A with some set of labels $\mathcal{L} = \{\sigma(x_i)\}_{i=0}^n$. It then implements the group operation oracle $\mathcal{O}_G(\cdot, \cdot)$, which on inputs $\sigma_1, \sigma_2 \in [M]$ does the following:

1. if either σ_1 or σ_2 are not in \mathcal{L} , return \perp .

2. Otherwise, set $x = \sigma^{-1}(\sigma_1)$ and $y = \sigma^{-1}(\sigma_2)$ compute $x + y \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ and return $\sigma(x+y)$, add $\sigma(x+y)$ to \mathcal{L} .

 \mathcal{A} is allowed at most m queries to the oracle, after \mathcal{A} outputs a bit which is sent to C which outputs a bit indicating whether \mathcal{A} was successful.

The above structure captures distinguishing games. Search games can be defined similarly. Bishop et. al. formalized the simultaneous oracle game [BKM⁺18]. The formal structure is as follows.

Definition 10 (Simultaneous Oracle Game [BKM⁺18] definition 6). An adversary is given access to a pair of oracles $(\mathcal{O}_M, \mathcal{O}_*)$ where \mathcal{O}_* is drawn from the same distribution as \mathcal{O}_M with probability 1/2 (with independent internal randomness) and is \mathcal{O}_S with probability 1/2. In each round, the adversary asks the same query to both oracles. The adversary wins the game if they guess correctly the identity of \mathcal{O}_* .

We note that even if the oracles are drawn from the same distribution their handle mapping functions σ , using their independent internal randomness, will respond with distinct handles with overwhelming probability even if their responses represent the same underlying group element. The distributions that the oracles are drawn from represent any internal randomness used to implement the oracle by the challenger in the definition of the generic group model.

In [BKM⁺18], Bishop et. al. also define two sets \mathcal{H}_S^t and \mathcal{H}_M^t which are the sets of handles returned by the two oracles after t query rounds. They use these sets to define a function $\Phi : \mathcal{H}_S^t \to \mathcal{H}_M^t$. Initially the adversary sets $\Phi(h_S^{t,i}) = h_M^{t,i}$ for each element indexed by *i* in the initial sets given by the oracles. The adversary can only distinguish if (i.) one oracle returns a new handle, while the other is repeated or (ii.) the two oracles both return old handles that are not consistent under Φ . Hardness of the simultaneous oracle game is sufficient to show that the two games cannot be distinguished. We state a lemma from Bishop et al.:

Lemma 29 ([BKM⁺18] Lemma 7). Suppose there exists an algorithm \mathcal{A} such that

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{M}}}(\mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{M}}})=1]-\Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{S}}}(\mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{S}}})=1]| \geq \delta.$$

Then an adversary can win the simultaneous oracle game with probability at least $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\delta}{2}$ for any pair of oracles $(\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{O}_* = \mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{M}}/\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{S}})$.

In the above $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{M}}}(\mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{M}}})$ corresponds to an adversary being initialized with handles from $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{M}}$ and having an oracle to $\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{M}}$. $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{S}}}(\mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{S}}})$ is defined similarly.

Remark 1. It is convenient for us to change the query capability of the adversary in the simultaneous oracle game. Rather than single group operation queries we allow the adversary to make queries in the form of a vector representing a linear combination of the initial set of handles given by the pair of oracles. Specifically, a query $\mathcal{X} = (c_0, \ldots, c_n)$ is given to both \mathcal{O}_M and \mathcal{O}_* where they compute and return their responses. Each query to this interface can be simulated using a polynomial number of queries to the traditional group oracle.

Proof of Theorem 2. We begin by noting that since the output range of σ is q^3 the probability of $\sigma(x) = \sigma(y)$ when $x \neq y$ is at most $1/q^2$ so taking a union bound over all q elements, the probability of some collision existing is at most 1/q. Thus, for the remainder of the proof we restrict to the case when σ is a 1-1 function.

We begin the proof by describing the two oracles we use in the simultaneous oracle game called the **Code** and **Random** Oracles.

Code Oracle. We define a code oracle that responds to queries faithfully. We denote this oracle \mathcal{O}_c (and particular sampled function as σ_c). This oracle picks a message \mathbf{x} , uses the generating matrix \mathbf{A} and the error vector \mathbf{e} which is a $(k, \beta) - \mathsf{MIPURS}$ distribution.

The oracle begins by calculating the noisy codeword $\mathbf{b}_1, ..., \mathbf{b}_n$ as $\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}$. The oracle prepends $b_0 = 1$ (to allow the adversary constant calculations) and sends $(\sigma_c(b_0), \ldots, \sigma_c(b_n))$ to \mathcal{D} . When queried with a vector $\vec{\chi} = (\chi_0, \chi_1, \ldots, \chi_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$ the oracle answers with an encoded group element $\sigma_c(\sum_{i=0}^n \chi_i \cdot b_i)$.

Random Oracle. We also define an oracle \mathcal{O}_r that creates n + 1 random initial encodings and responds to all distinct requests for linear combinations with distinct random elements. For a sequence of indeterminates $\mathbf{y} = (y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_n)$, this oracle can be described as a table where the left side is a vector representing a linear combination of the indeterminates and the right side is a handle associated with each vector.

When presented a query, if the vector is in the oracle's table, it responds with the handle on the right side of the table. When the query is a new linear combination, it generates a distinct, random handle. The adversary then stores the vector and the handle in the table and sends the handle to \mathcal{D} . We denote the handles τ_i to distinguish them from the encoded group elements of the code oracle.

Lemma 30. In a simultaneous oracle game, the probability that any adversary \mathcal{D} , when interacting with group oracles $(\mathcal{O}_c, \mathcal{O}_* = \mathcal{O}_c/\mathcal{O}_r)$ succeeds after *m* queries is at most

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{O}_c) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{O}^*) = 1]| \le \gamma \left(\frac{1}{q} + \beta\right)$$

for $\gamma = ((m+n+2)(m+n+1))^2/4$.

Proof. We examine the simultaneous oracle game that the adversary plays between \mathcal{O}_c and \mathcal{O}^* . The adversary maintains its function Φ as it makes queries. We also analyze the underlying structure of \mathcal{O}_c . Denote the adversary's linear combination as $\gamma || \chi_1, ..., \chi_n$. We distinguish the first element as it is multiplied by 1 leading to an offset in the resulting product. We do this by noticing that for $i \geq 1$, the group element b_i is $\mathbf{A}_i \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}_i$ (we use \mathbf{A}_i to denote the *i*th row of a matrix \mathbf{A}):

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \chi_i b_i + \gamma = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \chi_i (\mathbf{A}_i \cdot \mathbf{x}) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \chi_i (\mathbf{e}_i) + \gamma = \langle \chi, \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} \rangle + \langle \chi, \mathbf{e} \rangle + \gamma.$$

Again, \mathcal{O}_r responds to each distinct query with a new handle. This means that there is exactly one occasion to distinguish when $\mathcal{O}_* = \mathcal{O}_c$ or \mathcal{O}_r . This is when the handle returned by \mathcal{O}_c is known and \mathcal{O}_r is new. We divide our cases with respect to the linear combination query χ . If χ is not in the null space of the code **A**, we call this case 1. If χ is in the null space of **A** we call this case 2.

Case 1. Initially, **x** is both uniform and private. We can write the product of χ and our noisy code word **b** as $\chi(\mathbf{b}) = \chi(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}) = (\chi \mathbf{A})\mathbf{x} + \chi(\mathbf{e})$. Since $\chi \notin \mathsf{null}(\mathbf{A})$ then for at least one index *i* there is a $\chi_i \cdot \mathbf{A}_i \neq 0$. Since *x* has full entropy, then $(\chi_i \mathbf{A}_i)\mathbf{x}_i$ also has full entropy and the sum of the terms has full entropy. After the first query, **x** is no longer uniform. With each query, the adversary learns a predicate about the difference of all previous queries, simply that they do not produce the same element. After *m* queries (and n + 1 starting handles) there are $\eta = (m + n + 1)(m + n + 2)/2$ query differences, giving the same number of these equality predicates. Note that the adversary wins if a single of these predicates is 1 meaning we can consider η total values for the random variable, denoted EQ representing the equality predicate pattern. Then, using a standard conditional min-entropy argument [DORS08, Lemma 2.2b]. Thus,

$$\forall i, \mathbf{H}_{\infty}(\mathbf{x}_i \mid \mathsf{EQ}, \mathbf{A}) \ge \log q - \log \eta.$$

Thus, it follows that after m queries,

$$\widetilde{\mathrm{H}}_{\infty}(\chi(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x}) \mid \mathtt{EQ}, \mathbf{A}) \ge \log q - \log \eta.$$

Thus, the probability that this linear combination represents a known value (on average across \mathbf{a}) is:

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{A}, \mathtt{EQ}} \left[\max_{z} \Pr[(\chi(\mathbf{Ax}) = z \mid \mathbf{A}, \mathtt{EQ}] \right] \leq \frac{\eta}{q}$$

Case 2. Decomposing the linear combination of the codeword into $\chi(\mathbf{Ax} + \mathbf{e})$ since χ is in the null space of A then the linear combination is just $\vec{0} + \langle \chi, \mathbf{e} \rangle$. Since \mathbf{e} is a $(k, \beta) - \mathsf{MIPURS}$ distribution, then an upper bound for the power of the adversary to predict the outcome of the linear combination (and thus the outcome of $\langle \chi, e \rangle + \gamma$) is β . In this case we also lose entropy due to the linear predicates. After mqueries, we pay the same $\log \eta$ bits so the probability is increased to $\eta\beta$.

These two cases are mutually exclusive. Thus, to calculate the probability of either of these cases occurring after m queries (and n + 1 starting handles) we take the sum. There are only q distinct group elements, and therefore handles. Even a handle with full entropy will collide with a known handle with probability equal to the number of known handles over the size of the group. Since each query can only produce one handle, we have η distinct pairs of handles after m queries. So taking a union bound over each query, we upper bound the distinguishing probability for the adversary by

$$\eta\left(\frac{\eta}{q} + \eta\beta\right) = \eta^2\left(\frac{1}{q} + \beta\right)$$

This completes the proof of Lemma 30 by setting $\gamma = \eta^2$.

This lemma gives us the distinguishing power of an adversary interacting with our code oracle and our random oracle. Our random oracle never has collisions because it creates fresh handles every time. We now create an oracle that represents a distribution over uniform elements as claimed in Theorem 2. Note that this oracle is different than \mathcal{O}_r which responded to all distinct queries with distinct handles. This third handle initializes n random elements and faithfully represents the group operation. For a fresh query this oracle has probability 1/q of returning a previously seen handle. We call this last oracle the uniform oracle. In this case the adversary only distinguishes by seeing a repeated query handle. This probability is at most η/q . To simplify the final result we know this value is at most γ/q since $\gamma = \eta^2$.

Taking the result of this Lemma 30, we can prove Theorem 2 using Lemma 29 (and the modification to the uniform oracle) where

$$\delta/2 \stackrel{def}{=} \gamma\left(\frac{2}{q} + \beta\right).$$

Since the probability of an adversary winning the simultaneous oracle game is bounded above by

$$1/2 + \delta/2 = 1/2 + \gamma \left(\frac{2}{q} + \beta\right)$$

then

$$\Pr[A(\mathcal{O}_c) = 1] - \Pr[A(\mathcal{O}_r) = 1] < 2\gamma \left(\frac{2}{q} + \beta\right),$$

for $\gamma = ((m + n + 1)(m + n + 2)/2)^2$. Because \mathcal{O}_r represents the oracle for uniform randomness and \mathcal{O}_c is the oracle for $A\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}$, this gives us the result for generic adversaries.

B Hardness of Decoding in the Standard Model

In this section we ask, "for which \mathbf{e} is code offset in the exponent secure assuming only assuming the hardness of discrete log?" We use this as a comparison to the distributions that are secure in the generic group model. In this section, we consider hardness of random linear codes in the exponent. We first consider random linear codes and then Reed-Solomon codes. Both results follow a three part outline:

- 1. A theorem of Brands [Bra93] which says that if an adversary \mathcal{A} given a uniformly distributed $g^{\mathbf{y}}$ can find \mathbf{z} such that $g^{\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z} \rangle} = 1$ or equivalently that a vector \mathbf{z} such that $\langle \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z} \rangle = 0$ then one can solve discrete log with the same probability. For a vector of length n and prime q, this problem is known as the FIND REP(n, q) problem.
- 2. A combinatorial lemma which shows conditions for a random $g^{\mathbf{y}}$ to be within some distance parameter c of a codeword with noticeable probability. That is, $\exists \mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{C}$ such that $\operatorname{dis}(g^{\mathbf{y}}, g^{\mathbf{z}}) \leq c$ (for the codeword space \mathbb{C}).
- 3. Let \mathcal{O} be an oracle for bounded distance decoding. That is, given $g^{\mathbf{y}}$, \mathcal{O} returns some $g^{\mathbf{z}}$ where $\operatorname{dis}(g^{\mathbf{z}}, g^{\mathbf{y}}) \leq c$ and $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{C}$. Recall that linear codes have known null spaces. Thus, if two vectors $g^{\mathbf{z}}$ and $g^{\mathbf{y}}$ match in more positions than the dimension of the code it is possible to compute a vector $\vec{\gamma}$ that is only nonzero in positions where $g^{\mathbf{z}_i} = g^{\mathbf{y}_i}$ and $\langle \vec{\gamma}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = \langle \vec{\gamma}, \mathbf{y} \rangle = 0$. If \mathcal{O} works on a random point $g^{\mathbf{y}}$ it is possible to compute a vector $\vec{\gamma}$ in the null space of \mathbf{y} . This serves as an algorithm to solve the FIND REP and completes the connection to hardness of discrete log.

Notation and Definitions. We will consider noise vectors $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}_q$ where the Hamming weight of \mathbf{e} denoted $wt(\mathbf{e}) = t$ and the nonzero entries of \mathbf{e} are uniformly distributed. That is, we consider $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}$. Usually in coding theory the goal is *unique decoding*. That is, given some \mathbf{y} , if there exists some $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{C}$ such that $dis(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) \leq t$, the algorithm is guaranteed to return \mathbf{y} and \mathbf{z} is uniquely defined. Our results consider algorithms that perform bounded distance decoding. Bounded distance decoding is a relaxation of unique decoding. For a distance c and a point $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ a bounded distance decoding algorithm returns some $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{C}$ such that $dis(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) \leq c$. There is no guarantee that \mathbf{z} is unique or is the point in the code closest to \mathbf{y} .

Problem BDDE – RL(n, k, q, c, g), or Bounded Distance Decoding (exponent) of Random Linear Codes.

Instance Known generator g of \mathbb{F}_q . Define \mathbf{e} as a random vector of weight c in \mathbb{F}_q . Define $g^{\mathbf{y}} = g^{\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x}+\mathbf{e}}$ where \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{x} are uniformly distributed. Input is $g^{\mathbf{y}}, \mathbf{A}$.

Output Any codeword $g^{\mathbf{z}}$ where $\exists \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^k$ such that $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x}$ and $\mathsf{dis}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}) \leq c$.

For a code **C** we define the distance between a point **y** and the code as the minimum distance between **y** and any codeword **c** in **C**. Formally, $dis(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{C}) = \min_{\mathbf{c} \in \mathbf{C}} dis(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{c})$. Consider some point **y** in the codespace

and a radius r. The *thickness* of a point is the number of Hamming balls (of radius r) inflated around all codewords that cover \mathbf{y} . Specifically, define the set of points contained in a Hamming ball of radius r as $\Phi(r, \mathbf{z})$ for each codeword \mathbf{z} in the code \mathbf{C} . Then define random variable $\varphi(r, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{y})$ for each $\Phi(r, \mathbf{z})$ where $\varphi(r, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{y}) = 1$ if $\mathbf{y} \in \Phi(r, i)$ and 0 otherwise. Then the thickness of \mathbf{y} is

$$\mathsf{Thick}(r,\mathbf{C},\mathbf{y}) = \sum_{\mathbf{z}\in\mathbf{C}} \varphi(r,\mathbf{z},\mathbf{y}).$$

B.1 Random Linear Codes

In this section we focus on a combinatorial lemma how frequently a random point will be close to some codeword of a random linear code. In the next subsection (Appendix B.2), we present a similar result for Reed-Solomon codes improving prior work of Peikert [Pei06]. We now present the theorem of this section and our key technical lemma (Lemma 32), then prove the lemma and finally the theorem.

Theorem 31. For positive integers n, k, c and prime q where $k < n \leq q$ and let g be a generator of \mathbb{G}_q . If an efficient algorithm exists to solve BDDE - RL(n, k, q, n - k - c, g) with probability ϵ , then an efficient randomized algorithm exists to solve the discrete log problem in the same group with probability at least

$$\epsilon' = \epsilon \left(1 - \left(\frac{q^{n-k}}{\operatorname{Vol}(n, n-k-c, q)} + \frac{k}{q^{n-k}} \right) \right).$$

In particular, using a volume bound $\operatorname{Vol}(n,r,q) \geq {n \choose k} q^r (1-n/q)$,

$$\epsilon' = \epsilon \left(1 - \left(\frac{q^c}{\binom{n}{k+c}(1-\frac{n}{q})} + \frac{k}{q^{n-k}} \right) \right).$$

Lemma 32. Let a random code be defined by matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{n \times k}$, then

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{y}\in\mathbb{F}_q^n,\mathbf{A}}[\mathsf{dis}(\mathbf{y},\mathbf{A})>n-k-c]\leq \frac{q^{n-k}}{\mathsf{Vol}(n,n-k-c,q)}+\frac{k}{q^{n-k}}.$$

Proof of Lemma 32. A has q^k codewords in a q^n sized codespace as long as A is full rank. The probability of A being full rank is at least $1 - k/q^{n-k}$ [FMR13, Lemma A.3]. The expected thickness of a code or $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{y}}$ Thick $(r, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{y})$ is the average thickness over all points in the space. Expected thickness is the ratio of the sum of the volume of the balls and the size of the space itself. Note that this value can be greater than 1. A Hamming ball in this space can only be defined up to radius n. We give denote the expected thickness of the code as follows:

$$\begin{split} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{y}}(\mathsf{Thick}(r,\mathbf{A},\mathbf{y})) &= \frac{\mathsf{Vol}(n,r,q) \cdot q^{k}}{q^{n}} = \mathsf{Vol}(n,r,q) \cdot q^{k-n} \\ \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{y}}(\mathsf{Thick}(n-k-c,\mathbf{A},\mathbf{y})) &\geq \mathsf{Vol}(n,n-k-c,q) \cdot q^{k-n} \end{split}$$

Where the last equation follows by setting For r = n - k - c. For a point to have Hamming distance from our code greater than n - k - c, its thickness must be 0. For the thickness of a point to be 0, it must deviate from the expected thickness by the expected thickness. We use this fact to bound the probability that a point is distance at least n - k - c. We require that each codeword is pairwise independent (that is, $\Pr_{\mathbf{A}}[c \in \mathbf{A} | c' \in \mathbf{A}] = \Pr_{\mathbf{A}}[c \in \mathbf{A}]$). In random linear codes, only generating matrices with dimension 1 are not pairwise independent. We have already restricted our discussion to full rank **A**. Define an indicator random variable that is 1 when a point c is in the code. The pairwise independence of the code implies pairwise independence of these indicator random variables. With pairwise independent codewords, we use Chebyshev's Inequality to bound the probability of a random point being remote from a random code. We upper bound the variance of Thick by its expectation (since the random variable is nonnegative). In the below equations we only consider **A** where $\text{Rank}(\mathbf{A}) = k$ but do not write this to simplify notation. Let t = n - k - c, then

$$\begin{split} & \mathbb{E} \Pr[\mathsf{dis}(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{A}) > t] = \mathbb{E} \Pr[\mathsf{Thick}(t, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{y}) = 0] \\ & \leq \mathbb{E} \left(\Pr[|\mathsf{Thick}(t, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{y}) - \mathbb{E}(\mathsf{Thick}(t, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{y}))| > \mathbb{E}(\mathsf{Thick}(t, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{y}))] \right) \\ & \leq \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{\operatorname{Var}_{\mathbf{y}}(\mathsf{Thick}(t, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{y}))}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{y}}(\mathsf{Thick}(t, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{y}))^{2}} \right) \leq \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{1}{\mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{y}}(\mathsf{Thick}(t, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{y}))} \right) \\ & = \frac{q^{n-k}}{\operatorname{Vol}(n, n-k-c, q)}. \end{split}$$

Proof of Theorem 31. Suppose an algorithm \mathcal{F} solves BDDE - RL(n, k, q, n - k - c, g) with probability ϵ . \mathcal{F} can be used to construct an \mathcal{O} that solves FIND – REP.

 ${\mathcal O}$ works as follows:

- 1. Input $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ (where \mathbf{y} is uniform over \mathbb{Z}_q^n).
- 2. Generate $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times k}$.
- 3. Run $\mathbf{z} \leftarrow \mathcal{F}(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{A})$.
- 4. If $dis(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) > n k c$ output \perp .
- 5. Let $\mathcal{I} = \{i | \mathbf{y}_i = \mathbf{z}_i\}.$
- 6. Construct parity check matrix of $\mathbf{A}_{\mathcal{I}}$, denoted $H_{\mathcal{I}}$.
- 7. Find some nonzero row of H_I , denoted $\mathbf{B} = (b_1, \ldots, b_{k+c})$ with associated indices I.
- 8. Output $\vec{\gamma}$ where $\vec{\gamma}_i = \mathbf{B}_{i'}$ for $i \in \mathcal{I}$ where i' represents the location of i in a sorted list with the same elements as \mathcal{I} and 0 otherwise.

By Lemma 32, (\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{A}) is a uniform instance of BDDE - RL(n, k, q, n - k - c, g) with probability at least $1 - (q^{n-k}/Vol(n, n - k - c, q) + k \cdot q^{-(n-k)})$. This means that $\mathcal{I} \ge k + c$. Note for \mathbf{z} to be a codeword it must be that there exists some \mathbf{x} such that $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x}$ and thus, the parity check matrix restricted to \mathcal{I} is defined and there is some nonzero row.

B.2 Decoding Reed Solomon Codes in the Exponent

The Reed-Solomon family of error correcting codes [RS60] have extensive applications in cryptography. Recall, that the Reed Solomon Code $\mathbb{RS}(n, k, q)$ is the set of all points \mathbf{Vx} where $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$ where where the *i*th row of $\mathbf{V}_i = [i^0, i^1, ..., i^k]$. Reed-Solomon Codes have known efficient algorithms for correcting errors. We note that for a particular vector \mathbf{x} the generated vector \mathbf{Vx} is a degree *k* polynomial with coefficients \mathbf{x} evaluated at points 1, ..., n. The Berlekamp-Welch algorithm [WB86] corrects up to (n - k + 1)/2 errors in any codeword in the code. List decoding provides a weaker guarantee. The algorithm instead vectors a list containing codewords within a given distance to a point, the algorithm may return 0, 1 or many codewords [Eli57]. The list decoding algorithm of Guruswami and Sudan [GS98] can find all codewords within Hamming distance $n - \sqrt{nk}$ of a given word. Importantly, algorithms to correct errors in Reed-Solomon codes rely on nonlinear operations. Like with Random Linear Codes we consider hardness of constructing an oracle that performs bounded distance decoding.

Problem BDDE – RS(n, k, q, c, g), or Bounded Distance Decoding in the exponent of Reed Solomon codes. **Instance** A known generator g of \mathbb{Z}_q^* . Define **e** as a random vector of weight c in \mathbb{Z}_q^* . Define $g^{\mathbf{y}} = g^{\mathbf{Vx}+\mathbf{e}}$

where \mathbf{x} is uniformly distributed. Input is $q^{\mathbf{y}}$.

Output Any codeword $g^{\mathbf{z}}$ where $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{RS}(n, k, q)$ such that $dis(g^{\mathbf{y}}, g^{\mathbf{z}}) \leq c$.

Theorem 33. For any positive integers n, k, c, and q such that $q \ge n^2/4$, $c \le n + k$, $k \le n$ and a generator g of the group \mathbb{G}_q , if an efficient algorithm exists to solve BDDE - RS(n, q, k, n - k - c, g) with probability ϵ (over a uniform instance and the randomness of the algorithm), then an efficient randomized algorithm exists to solve the discrete log problem in \mathbb{G}_q with probability

$$\epsilon' \ge \begin{cases} \epsilon \left(1 - \frac{2q^c}{\binom{n}{k+c}}\right) & \frac{n^2}{2} \le q\\ \epsilon \left(1 - \frac{cq^c}{\binom{n}{k+c}}\right) & \frac{n^2}{4} \le q < \frac{n^2}{2} \end{cases}.$$

Proof. Like Theorem 31 the core of our theorem is a bound on the probability that a random point is close to a Reed-Solomon code.

Lemma 34. For any positive integer $c \leq n-k$, define $\alpha = \frac{4q}{n^2}$, and any Reed-Solomon Code $\mathbb{RS}(n,k,q)$,

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{y}}[\mathsf{dis}(\mathbf{y}, \mathbb{RS}(n, k, q)) > n - k - c] \le \frac{q^c}{\binom{n}{k+c}} \alpha^{-c} \sum_{c'=0}^c \alpha^{c'}$$

where the probability is taken over the uniform choice of \mathbf{y} from \mathcal{G}^n .

Proof of Lemma 34. A vector \mathbf{y} has distance at most n - k - c from a Reed-Solomon code if there is some subset of indices of size k + c whose distance from a polynomial is at most k - 1. To codify this notion we define a predicate which we call *low degree*. A set S consisting of ordered pairs $\{\alpha_i, x_i\}_i$ is low degree if the points $\{(\alpha_i, \log_g x_i)\}_{i \in S}$ lie on a polynomial of degree at most k - 1. Define $S = \{S \subseteq [n] : |S| = k + c\}$. For every $S \in S$, define Y_S to be the indicator random variable for if S satisfies the low degree condition taken over the random choice of \mathbf{y} . Let $Y = \sum_{S \in S} Y_S$.

For all $S \in \mathcal{S}$, $\Pr[Y_S = 1] = q^{-c}$, because any k points of $\{(\alpha_i, \log_g x_i)\}_{i \in S}$ define a unique polynomial of degree at most k. The remaining c points independently lie on that polynomial with probability 1/q. The size of \mathcal{S} is $|\mathcal{S}| = \binom{n}{k+c}$. Then by linearity of expectation, $\mathbb{E}[Y] = \binom{n}{k+c}/q^c$. Now we use Chebyshev's inequality,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{\mathbf{y}}[\mathsf{dis}(\mathbf{y}, \mathbb{RS}(n, k, q)) > n - k - c] &= \Pr[Y = 0] \\ &\leq \Pr\left[|Y - \mathbb{E}[Y]| \ge \mathbb{E}[Y]\right] \\ &\leq \frac{\operatorname{Var}(Y)}{\mathbb{E}[Y]^2}. \end{aligned}$$

It remains to analyze $\operatorname{Var}(Y) = \mathbb{E}[Y^2] - \mathbb{E}[Y]^2$. To analyze this variance we split into cases where the intersection of Y_S and $Y_{S'}$ is small and large. Consider two sets S and S' and the corresponding indicator random variables Y_S and $Y_{S'}$. If $|S \cap S'| < k$ then $\mathbb{E}[Y_S|Y_{S'}] = \mathbb{E}[Y_S]$ and $\mathbb{E}[Y_SY_{S'}] = \mathbb{E}[Y_S] \mathbb{E}[Y_{S'}]$. This observation is crucial for security of Shamir's secret sharing [Sha79]. For pairs S, S' where $|S \cap S'| \ge k$, we introduce a variable c' between 0 and c to denote $c' = |S \cap S'| - k$. For such S, S' instead of computing $\mathbb{E}[Y^2] - \mathbb{E}[Y]^2$ we just compute $\mathbb{E}[Y^2]$ and use this as a bound. For each c' we calculate $\mathbb{E}[Y_SY_{S'}]$ where $|S \cap S| = k + c'$. The number of pairs can be counted as follows: $\binom{n}{k+c}$ choices for S, then $\binom{k+c}{c-c'}$ choices for the elements of S not in S' which determines the k + c' elements that are in both S and S', and finally $\binom{n-k-c}{c-c'}$ to pick the remaining elements of S' that are not in S. So the total number of pairs is

$$\binom{n}{k+c}\binom{k+c}{c-c'}\binom{n-k-c}{c-c'}.$$

Using these observations, we can upper bound the variance Var(Y) for our random variable Y:

$$\operatorname{Var}(Y) = \sum_{S,S'\in\mathcal{S}} (\mathbb{E}[Y_S Y_{S'}] - \mathbb{E}[Y_S] \mathbb{E}[Y_{S'}])$$
$$= \sum_{c'=0}^{c} \sum_{\substack{S,S'\in\mathcal{S} \\ |S\cap S'|=k+c'}} (\mathbb{E}[Y_S Y_{S'}] - \mathbb{E}[Y_S] \mathbb{E}[Y_{S'}])$$
$$\leq \sum_{c'=0}^{c} \sum_{\substack{S,S'\in\mathcal{S} \\ |S\cap S'|=k+c'}} (\mathbb{E}[Y_S Y_{S'}]) = \sum_{c'=0}^{c} \sum_{\substack{S,S'\in\mathcal{S} \\ |S\cap S'|=k+c'}} (\frac{1}{q^{2c-c'}})$$

Here the last line follows by observing that for both Y_S and $Y_{S'}$ to be 1 they must both define the same polynomial. Since S and S' share k + c' points, there are (k + c) + (k + c) - (k + c') = k + 2c - c' points that must lie on the at most k - 1 degree polynomial, and any k points determine the polynomial, and the remaining 2c - c' points independently lie on the polynomial with probability 1/q then the probability that this occurs is $1/q^{2c-c'}$. Continuing one has that,

$$\begin{aligned} \operatorname{Var}(Y) &\leq \frac{1}{q^{2c}} \sum_{c'=0}^{c} \sum_{\substack{S,S' \in S \\ |S \cap S'| = k + c'}} (q^{c'}) \\ &= \frac{1}{q^{2c}} \sum_{c'=0}^{c} \left(q^{c'} \binom{n}{k+c} \binom{k+c}{c-c'} \binom{n-k-c}{c-c'} \right) \\ &= \left[\binom{n}{k+c} \frac{1}{q^c} \right] \frac{1}{q^c} \sum_{c'=0}^{c} \left(q^{c'} \binom{n}{k+c} \binom{k+c}{c-c'} \binom{n-k-c}{c-c'} \right) \\ &= \frac{\mathbb{E}[Y]}{q^c} \sum_{c'=0}^{c} \left(q^{c'} \binom{k+c}{c-c'} \binom{n-k-c}{c-c'} \right) \end{aligned}$$

We bound the size of $\binom{k+c}{c-c'}\binom{n-k-c}{c-c'}$ by observing that the sum of the top terms of the choose functions is n and the product of two values with a known sum is bounded by the product of their average, in this

case n/2. We also use the upper bound of the choose function where $\binom{a}{b} \leq a^b$ to arrive at the bound that

$$q^{-c} \sum_{c'=0}^{c} \left(q^{c'} \binom{k+c}{c-c'} \binom{n-k-c}{c-c'} \right) \le \frac{1}{q^c} \sum_{c'=0}^{c} (q^{c'} (n/2)^{2c-2c'}) = \left(\frac{(n/2)^2}{q} \right)^c \sum_{c'=0}^{c} \left(\frac{q}{(n/2)^2} \right)^c$$

The proof then follows using our bound for variance by defining $\alpha = 4q/n^2$. This completes the proof of Lemma 34.

The remainder of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 31. \mathcal{A} works as follows: on input uniform **y** run $\mathcal{D}(g, \mathbf{y})$ which is a good list decoder for Reed Solomon (note the code no longer needs to be provided). By Lemma 34, (g, \mathbf{v}) is an instance of BDDE – $\text{RS}_{q,\mathcal{E},k,n-k-c}$ with probability at least

$$1 - \frac{q^c}{\binom{n}{k+c}} \alpha^{-c} \sum_{c'=0}^c \alpha^{c'}.$$

Then conditioned on this event, the instance is uniform, and \mathcal{D} (with probability ϵ) outputs some \mathbf{z} where $\operatorname{dis}(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{y}) \leq n-k-c$. Define the set $E \subseteq [n]$ as the set of indices i such that $\mathbf{y}_i = \mathbf{z}_i$. Note that $|E| \geq k+1$. From any subset E of size k it is possible given $\{\mathbf{y}_i\}_{i\in\mathcal{I}}$ it is possible to linearly interpolate any \mathbf{y}_j for $1 \leq j \leq n$. Thus for any k+1 positions, it is possible to find $\gamma_{i_1}, ..., \gamma_{i_{k+1}}$ such that for any codeword \mathbf{z} , $\sum_{i_i} \mathbf{z}_{i_i} \gamma_{i_j} = 0$. Define $\gamma_i = 0$ when $i \notin E$. Then one has that

$$\prod_{i_j \in E} v_i^{\gamma_{i_j}} = g^{\sum_{i_j \in E} \mathbf{y}_{i_j} \gamma_{i_j}} = g^{\sum_{i_j \in E} \mathbf{z}_{i_j} \gamma_{i_j}} = 1.$$

That is, $(\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_n)$ is a solution to FIND – REP. The parameters in the Theorem follow when $1 \le \alpha < 2$ by noting that

$$\alpha^{-c} \sum_{c'=0}^{c} \alpha^{c'} \le \alpha^{-c} (c \cdot \alpha^{c}) = c$$

Parameters in Theorem 33 follow in the case when $\alpha = 4q/n^2 \ge 2$ by noting that:

$$\alpha^{-c} \sum_{c'=0}^{c} \alpha^{c'} = \alpha^{-c} \left(\frac{\alpha^{c+1} - 1}{\alpha - 1} \right) = \left(\frac{\alpha - \alpha^{-c}}{\alpha - 1} \right) \le 2.$$