

# AuCPace: Efficient verifier-based PAKE protocol tailored for the IIoT

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## Abstract.

Increasingly connectivity becomes integrated in products and devices that previously operated in a stand-alone setting. This observation holds for many consumer applications in the so-called "Internet of Things" (IoT) as well as for corresponding industry applications (IIoT), such as industrial process sensors. Often the only practicable means for authentication of human users is a weak password. The security of password-based authentication schemes frequently form the weakest point of the security infrastructure.

In this paper we first expose, why a tailored protocol designed for the IIoT use case is considered necessary. The differences between IIoT and to the conventional Internet use-cases result in largely modified threats and require special procedures for allowing both, convenient and secure use in the highly constrained industrial setting.

Specifically the use of a verifier-based password-authenticated key-exchange (V-PAKE) protocol as a hedge against public-key-infrastructure (PKI) failures is considered important. Availability concerns for the case of failures of (part of) the communication infrastructure makes local storage of access credentials mandatory. The larger threat of physical attacks makes it important to use memory-hard password hashing.

This paper presents a corresponding tailored protocol AuCPace together with a security proof within the Universal Composability (UC) framework considering fully adaptive adversaries. We also introduce a new security notion of partially augmented PAKE that provides specific performance advantages and allows, thus, for suitability for a larger set of IIoT applications.


We also present an actual instantiation of our protocol, AuCPace25519, and present performance results on ARM Cortex-M0 and Cortex-M4 microcontrollers. Our implementation realizes new speed-records for PAKE and X25519 Diffie-Hellman for the ARM Cortex M4 architecture.

**Keywords:** Password Authenticated Key Exchange, V-PAKE, PAKE, elliptic curves, Cryptographic Protocols, Universal Composability, IEC-62443, Industrial Control, Curve25519, X25519

## 1 Introduction

Since recently, wireless and networking technology becomes integrated in products and devices that previously operated in a stand-alone setting, both in consumer applications in the so-called "Internet of Things" (IoT) as well as in the corresponding industry setting, the "Industrial IoT" (IIoT). Often communication technology and security protocols are employed that were not originally tailored and designed for the resource-constrained setting and the specific threat model.

In comparison to conventional un-connected devices, security becomes a crucial aspect to consider, specifically in the IIoT. Often the only practicable means for authentication of human users still is a weak password. In fact, the security of password-based authentication



**Figure 1:** Use-cases for conventional Internet applications and IIoT.

schemes frequently form the weakest point of the security infrastructure. Users tend to use short and easily memorable passwords. For this reason emerging industry standards, such as from the IEC-62443 family rightfully require two-factor authentication for higher security levels (SL-3, SL-4). Still then, however, suitable protection of the second factor "password" remains important.

Today, in most Internet communication and many IIoT applications protocols such as TLS based web servers are used, that were not originally designed for the IIoT use-case. Mostly, a trustworthy and failure-free Public-Key-Infrastructure (PKI) is indispensable for providing even basic protection of passwords, e.g. against phishing or man-in-the-middle attacks. However in the IIoT setting, specifically for industrial installations not fully operating according to standards such as IEC-62443, today integration of the devices in a PKI is not always available.

## 1.1 Differences between conventional web security and IIoT

One of the most remarkable difference between the conventional web server setting (here referred to as "web shop" use case) and the typical IIoT setting corresponding, e.g. to an industrial plant is illustrated in Figure 1. In the former case few servers, e.g. web servers, interface to many clients, e.g. web browsers which come with pre-installed configuration for certificate authorities trusted by the browser supplier. In the latter case, one single client, e.g. a tablet-computer based human machine interface (HMI), might be used for configuring many servers, e.g. sensors or control valves.

Unlike in the "web shop" use case, in the IIoT setting a dramatically larger number of server certificates needs to be configured and maintained. Often self-signed certificates are used for servers, leading to the significant risk that the essential corresponding configurations on the client side (e.g. browsers) are omitted. Users used to the more convenient "web shop" setting might not even be aware that such configuration is mandatory for security.

As a consequence, the threat of PKI failures should be considered very carefully for remote HMI access to (I)IoT units. This is one of the reasons, why since recently strategies for password protection as a hedge against PKI failures have regained academic and industrial interest [JKX18, PW17, HL17].

Moreover many IIoT devices, notably battery-driven devices, will not be permanently "online". Availability concerns for the case of (partial) failure of networking infrastructure often make it mandatory to locally store user credentials, typically in unprotected memory. Furthermore, IoT devices might be much more exposed to physical attacks. For all of these reasons, protection of passwords forms a crucial point of any (I)IoT security solution.

## 1.2 Strategies for protecting passwords

For the protection of passwords two complementary approaches could be distinguished. On one hand, memory-hard password hash algorithms such as scrypt [PJ] and Argon2

[BDKJ16] aim at increasing the cost of offline dictionary attacks. They do so by designing the hashing algorithm such that a large, parametrisable amount of memory, e.g. 32 Megabytes or more, is mandatory for efficiently calculating the password hash. This prevents important classes of accelerating techniques based on parallelisation on low-cost and low-power hardware such as application specific integrated circuit (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and graphic processing units (GPU).

On the other hand password-based key exchange (PAKE) protocols allow for establishing a secure, high-entropy shared session key over an insecure communication channel. This holds even if only a low-entropy secret key, the password  $pw$  is shared.

One of the important advantages of PAKE protocols published since the early works by Bellare and Merritt and Jablon [BM92, Jab96] is the fact that neither a public-key infrastructure (PKI) nor a trusted hardware component capable of securely storing high-entropy keys is required as prerequisite. PAKE protocols, thus, match very closely the needs of the IIoT use-case.

PAKE protocols essentially come in two variants. Firstly, so-called balanced or symmetric PAKE protocols, for instance [BM92, CHK<sup>+</sup>05, BFK09, Jab96, BMP00], are designed such that both, initiator and responder parties require that the same password  $pw$  is available on both sides. Secondly, so-called verifier-based PAKE protocols (also known as V-PAKE, asymmetric or augmented PAKE) protocols could be distinguished, where the server entity is given access only to a password-verifier  $W$  and the clear-text password is only available to the client party, e.g. [W<sup>+</sup>98, PW17, GMR06, Jab97]. In all known protocols V-PAKE comes with significant additional computational overhead in comparison to PAKE.

A peculiarity in the industrial IIoT setting is that we should be expecting to find the very same password in use on many small devices. Due to password re-use the compromise of one small server might affect the security of a larger infrastructure. On the other hand, availability concerns for the case of failures of (part of) the network infrastructure often make it mandatory to locally store this sensitive data and often no protected storage media, such as smart-card circuits, are available. For this reason verifier-based PAKE using memory hard password hashing should be considered to provide the best possible security strategy regarding HMI authentication for IIoT applications.

### 1.3 Why industrial instrumentation needs a specially tailored V-PAKE protocol

Unfortunately, it is not uncommon that IoT and industrial devices have only very limited energy and computational resources available, specifically regarding battery-driven wireless devices or if they have to be conformable with the constraint set that applies for intrinsically safe explosion protection (IEC60079-11) [HL17].

For important classes of devices, use of memory-hard password hashing is precluded due to the limited memory and computational capacities. Also the computational complexity of some established V-PAKE protocols that were originally developed for office information technology might prevent actual use in the IIoT. Note that all of the most efficient known augmented protocols (requiring three exponentiations) or components of the protocols, such as AugPake [SKI10] and OPAQUE [JKX18] are covered by patents. It is important to consider that also devices even smaller than typical IIoT devices need sound password protection, such as e.g. legacy fieldbus systems with bluetooth-based wireless HMI interfaces [HL17].

In all of these settings, efficiency considerations and pending patents will be a crucial factor ultimately deciding upon whether or not sound password protection could actually be implemented by manufacturers. Note that specifically for the smallest devices such as e.g. temperature sensors, a significant commercial cost constraint applies. All of, power efficiency, code size and ease-of-implementation are crucial factors that will decide for

actual roll-out of a more secure or more insecure solution. I.e. efficiency is of utmost importance.

Regarding efficiency of V-PAKE solutions, optimisations need to apply on all levels of the security implementation, protocol design, algorithmic optimisations (e.g. group operations on elliptic curves) and low-level arithmetics. Unfortunately, most protocols today were mainly designed with typical office environments in mind.

Regarding the optimisation of V-PAKE on the protocol level for both, security and efficiency, the framework used for the security analysis is of major importance. More idealised assumptions regarding the cryptographic primitives, such as specifically the random-oracle model [BR93], often allow for significantly more efficient constructions. It is also important to consider that authentication protocols are often embedded in a larger system, involving, e.g., protocols allowing for distributing password verifiers to server entities from a central management infrastructure. Note that in the IEC-62443-4-2 draft standard, centralised user account management systems are declared mandatory even at the lowest security level SL-1, providing significant challenges for all devices that are not permanently "on-line" or isolated by purpose from the main company network.

Another example for such an application is given in [KM16] where as mitigation against dishonest server units the clear-text password never leaves the client party. While it is out of the scope of this paper, we consider it highly desirable to prepare a path for formal security proofs for more complex composed solutions such as V-PAKE in conjunction with centrally distributed user credentials. One of the proof strategies simplifying analysis of inclusion of a PAKE substep in a larger system is the Universal Composability framework (UC) by Canetti [Can01], specifically because it allows for modular re-use of reduction proofs.

## 1.4 Contribution of this paper

This paper aims at contributing to the project of securing industrial IoT applications by comprehensively addressing the efficiency, implementation and patent issues that, today, often still hamper resolution of the prevalent and notorious pitfalls regarding password-based human operator authentication.

We aim at doing so by introducing an efficiency-optimised V-PAKE protocol "Augmented Composable Password Authenticated Connection Establishment" (AuCPace) and an actual instantiation AuCPace25519 that is, to the best of our knowledge, freely usable without inflicting intellectual property rights and specifically tailored for the exact subset of devices where security is most likely to be discarded: Small extremely resource-constrained and/or low-cost devices where integrating sound security is particularly difficult.

Our scheme arranges for use of memory-hard password hashes also on smallest devices with little memory, since it is deferring the costly password hashing to the client entities.

Our work builds up upon the work in [HL17] by explicitly providing formal security proofs for the specific optimised design choices therein, e.g. regarding the cheaper point verification techniques employing twist security and avoidance of costly and memory-consuming point compression. Note that such aspects were just not relevant for the conventional office IT setting for which most PAKE protocols so far have been designed.

We do so by providing a security proof for AuCPace in the UC framework with joint state [CR03]. We base our analysis on the UC-based security model of [GMR06]. We show that our protocol, unlike most Diffie-Hellman-based constructions, could be proven secure in the UC model, even when considering fully adaptive adversaries. We extend this model for allowing a new operation mode that we coined *partially augmented* PAKE. Partial augmentation allows for significant efficiency advantages in comparison to the conventional "full" verifier-based PAKE. We show, how it is possible to implement AuCPace in its partially augmented variant without any computational overhead in comparison to

conventional "balanced" PAKE for the resource-constrained server, while maintaining all of the most relevant security guarantees in the IIoT setting.

Our protocol could be clearly modularised into a balanced sub-protocol that we coined CPace (Composable Pace) since it shares important design features with the PACE protocol from [BFK09] and an augmentation layer allowing for both conventional augmentation and our newly introduced partial augmentation.

As one concrete instantiation we present a protocol AuCPace25519 which adds up further optimisations also on the group arithmetics and field arithmetics level. We present performance results for both, AuCPace and Diffie-Hellman protocols for ARM Cortex M0 and Cortex M4 microcontrollers. We hope that the new speed-records for constant-time implementation of both, PAKE and the X25519 Diffie-Hellman Protocol on the ARM Cortex M4, that we report in this paper will make it possible to enlarge the set of targets that could afford integrating state-of-the-art security technology.

## 1.5 Organisation of this paper

This paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we first review related work on PAKE protocols and review the definitions of security used for their respective security analysis. Since AuCPace may be considered a SPEKE [Jab96] variant, we will concentrate on this protocol family in more detail. We then give a short introduction to the concepts and methods used for security proofs in the framework of Universal Composability (UC) and describe our proof strategy.

Subsequently, in section 3 we will explain the full protocol AuCPace. There we will also explain the design guidelines that motivated specific choices.

We then present our modular security proof of indistinguishability, first handling the case of the balanced sub-protocol CPace without explicit authentication (section 4). In section 5 we then use the composition theorem for proving security of the verifier-based PAKE protocol in an UC hybrid model. In the subsequent section 6 we expose how to halve the computational complexity of the login process of our protocol when discarding security guarantees of only minor practical relevance in the IIoT setting. For this purpose we introduce the concept of "partial augmentation" with a corresponding ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{papwKE}}$ . In section 7 we compare our proposal AuCPace with other efficient PAKE protocols from the IIoT perspective.

Subsequently in section 8 we describe the implementation strategy on Cortex M0 and M4 microcontrollers for our reference implementation AuCPace25519. We conclude the paper by presenting actual performance benchmarks on different microcontrollers and embedded bluetooth-transceiver microcontroller platforms in section 9.

In the appendix we present an outline, how a variant of our protocol could also be implemented on conventional elliptic curves in short Weierstrass form and how the very similar balanced protocol in [HL17] could be proven secure in the UC model.

## 2 Review of PAKE protocols and their security analysis

### 2.1 Overview on PAKE protocols

Despite the clear-cut security advantages, there are a couple of reasons that hampered use of PAKE protocols in a number of applications [EKSS09]. Among the many reasons patent pitfalls did play a major role. Notably, protocols such as EKE [BM92] and SPEKE [Jab96] were patented until very recently and also some of the most efficient protocols in the IEEE 1363 standard family are patented. This resulted in protocols such as SRP[W+98] and PACE [BFK09] which did include additional complexity solely for patent circumvention.

Many protocols, including EKE and SPEKE, have been first suggested without a formal security proof. Doing so comes at the risk of accidentally including serious design-flaws. Many PAKE protocols have later been shown to be insecure. A recent example showing the need of thorough security analysis is the case of zkPAKE presented in [MRA15] that has been shown vulnerable to offline guessing attacks in [BSv17].

As a result of patent circumvention, a large number of different PAKE protocols has been presented. This did hamper thorough security analysis. Firstly proofs became more complex or impracticable because of the additional complexity of patent circumvention steps. Secondly the number of protocol variants grew significantly, reducing the amount of analysis effort spent on each individual variant.

As a general observation, protocols with a security proof that relies on random oracles are more efficient than protocols whose security is based on standard assumptions. Some of the additional complexity may be attributed to technical aspects of the proof strategy. The efficiency difference is significant. For instance, SPEKE [Jab96] requires only two exponentiations for generating the session key, while J-PAKE [HR10] requires 14 exponentiations. For a recent comprehensive overview over different PAKE protocols and proof strategies see, e.g. [SOAA15].

Many of the most efficient protocols base security on the conventional computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem or decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem. When staying in the random-oracle model, this simplifies the security analysis in comparison to other efficient constructions, such as AugPace [SKI10] whose security is based on problems that are not as well understood and studied.

For the scope of this present paper targeting resource-constrained applications, we saw the need to focus on the most-efficient constructions that are not covered by patents. For efficiency and patent reasons, we did concentrate our research on SPEKE and one of its variants, PACE [BFK09]. Since the SPEKE patent has expired recently, some of the circumvention strategies used for PACE became obsolete. The protocol CPace, as presented in this paper, has been developed in the process of removing some of the patent circumvention steps. We did observe that the resulting protocol changes allowed for a natural way of agreeing on a session id before entering the protocol, and opened a path for a proof strategy within the UC framework. We will elaborate on the specific design objectives and corresponding advantages of AuCPace in the section presenting the protocol.

It is worth noting that a very interesting recent and highly efficient construction for PAKE augmentation using oblivious pseudo-random functions OPAQUE has been presented in [JKX18]. OPAQUE is particularly interesting for elliptic curves having an efficient integrated mapping available. We will come back to the respective advantages and disadvantages in of this construction in actual applications in the discussion sections.

## 2.2 Security models

Probably one of the most widely used security models used for analysing PAKE protocols is the game-based approach introduced in the early work of Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway (BPR) [BPR00]. This model later has been extended to the so-called "find-then-guess" (FTG) model [AFP05]. Other groups have used simulation-based proof techniques, such as introduced by Boyko, MacKenzie and Patel (BMP) in [BPR00].

In 2005 Canetti, Katz, Lindell and MacKenzie [CHK<sup>+</sup>05] have introduced an alternative approach, based on the framework of Universal Composability (UC) [Can01], specifically in its joint-state version [CR03]. Unfortunately, it has been proven that PAKE constructions being secure in in the UC model could not be realised without either, idealised assumptions, such as random oracles or a common reference string [CHK<sup>+</sup>05]. One of the advantages of analysing PAKE protocols in the UC framework is that no assumptions regarding the password distribution apply. Related passwords or mistyped related passwords and

forward secrecy are inherently also considered. For this reason, the UC-based approach is considered to be providing particularly strong security guarantees.

### 2.3 Review of SPEKE and SPEKE variants

SPEKE [Jab96] is one of the earliest published protocols. Over time it has been analysed in a number of papers. The first security analysis of SPEKE has been given by MacKenzie within the BMP simulation based model [Mac01]. As a result of the analysis at most two passwords may be guessed for one on-line impersonation attack. Later it has been shown that in fact multiple password guessing with one impersonation is feasible [Zha04] when instantiating SPEKE on large-characteristic prime fields (as in the original 1996 SPEKE paper).

SPEKE variants inherit the property from Diffie-Hellman key exchange, that a man-in-the-middle attacker has the possibility to modify both honest party's resulting DH key unless the whole transcript of the communication is used for generating the session key (or authenticator messages respectively) [HS14]. If the attacker replaces both intermediate exponentiations  $B^a$  and  $B^b$  of the honest participants by a fixed power  $(B^a)^c$  and  $(B^b)^c$  both parties will calculate the same session key. Note that this "attack" does not actually affect security in practice [HS14]. In fact, preventing it might result in some overhead with respect to storage for the transcript and computation.

SPEKE variants operating on large characteristic prime fields suffer from exponential equivalence of passwords and also hashing of the password as suggested in [Jab97] does not fully resolve this issue [LW15]. Note that the length of the bit stream generated by commonly used hash functions is way shorter than the length of the prime.

In principle, SPEKE could also be implemented using groups on (hyper)-Elliptic curves. However, until very recently [PW17] we are not aware of any security analysis where SPEKE derivatives (except for PACE [BFK09]) have been proven to be secure in this setting.

It was long conjectured that SPEKE and its variants inherit the property of forward secrecy from Diffie-Hellman. However we are only aware of one protocol, VTBPEKE, for which this has been analysed in detail [PW17].

One notable advantage of SPEKE and some SPEKE variants such as PACE [BFK09] when implemented on elliptic curves with integrated mapping [CGIP12] is that no full group operations are required, e.g. allowing also for so-called x-coordinate-only implementations. This feature provides some advantages of SPEKE and SPEKE variants in comparison with, e.g., SPAKE [AP] and its variants and PAK[BMP00]. I.e. this way no full group operations are required for implementations but only a less-strict notion of a group modulo negation, that allows for scalar multiplication and differential addition but not for arbitrary point additions.

Verifier-based variants of SPEKE have been suggested already in 1997 [Jab97]. However the first verifier-based SPEKE variant VTBPEKE that came with a formal security proof dates to our best knowledge from 2017 [PW17].

### 2.4 Review of the UC framework

In this paper we assume some familiarity with the framework of Universal Composability (UC). As a short introduction, we will give a summary of the essence here. The reader interested in more details is referred to the updated version of [Can01] in [Can00].

The general idea of UC is to define security in terms of idealised functionalities  $\mathcal{F}$  which provide services to a set of players  $P_i$ . Moreover the framework considers an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  and an environment  $\mathcal{Z}$  and a real-world protocol  $\pi$  whose security is to be analysed. In the context of UC all of the algorithmic strategy of  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\mathcal{Z}$  and  $\pi$  are provided in form of code for an interactive Turing machine (ITM). In an actual real-world execution, a

plurality of interactive Turing machine instances (ITI) is generated upon request of the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ . For instance several ITI may execute the ITM algorithm  $\pi$  for the parties  $P_i$ . Also the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$  and the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  are given their respective ITI instance.

In the UC framework this "real-world" case is compared with an "ideal-world" case where the protocol  $\pi$  is replaced with the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}$  and the real-world adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  with an ideal-world adversary  $\mathcal{S}$ . The security model is based on the observation that if any (polynomially bounded) environment algorithm  $\mathcal{Z}$  cannot distinguish between the "real" and "ideal" world executions with any significant advantage, then using instances of protocol  $\pi$  is just as secure as using the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}$ .

From the perspective of the players  $P_i$ ,  $\mathcal{F}$  provides a set of subroutine calls that calculate a given function. For instance the subroutine call of the ideal functionality of a PAKE protocol  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  returns a session key.

The definition of the algorithm of the ITM  $\mathcal{F}$  makes sure that sensitive information is hidden from the adversary as long as no "corruption" of parties occurs. Thus, the security targets are inherently guaranteed. With corruptions, we model the case that the adversary gets control over some of the protocol partners and, e.g., is able to retrieve data from its internal memory. In the literature different types of corruption could be distinguished. Unlike in so-called static corruption models where corruptions are only allowed before starting with an actual protocol execution, the so-called adaptive or Byzantine corruption models give the attacker more power by allowing him to corrupt parties at any time during protocol execution. In this paper we consider the stronger Byzantine corruption model.

In the UC framework there may be many copies of the ideal functionality running in parallel, each one being uniquely characterised by a session id *sid*. Every time a message has to be sent to a specific copy of  $\mathcal{F}$ , such a message should contain the *sid* of the copy it is intended for. We follow here the approach of [CHK<sup>+</sup>05] and assume that each protocol that implements  $\mathcal{F}$  expects to have the session id included in each message.

The original UC theorem from [Can01] allows to analyse the security of a system viewed as a single unit, but it does not guarantee anything if different protocols share some amount of state and randomness, such as a hash function functionality for instance. For this reason, for our application in mind, the UC theorem cannot be used as-is. Our analysis, just as the strongly related work in [ACCP08] is thus implemented in the framework of universal composition with joint state [CR03]. Unfortunately the alternative approach of [CJS14] for modelling a global random oracle  $\mathcal{F}_{gRO}$  functionality could not be used, because we need to program the random oracle to chosen values in our proof.

It is worth noting, that the integration of a Diffie-Hellman substep typically provides significant technical difficulties in the UC framework [KR17]. Specifically, when considering adaptive adversary models allowing for corruptions at any time, it is often infeasible for the simulator to provide the adversary secret scalars that are consistent with the previously published group elements. For this reason, many security proofs previously were forced to restrict the analysis to the weaker static adversary model, for instance, in [GMR06].

## 2.5 Overall proof strategy

In this paper we follow a modular approach and try to avoid the introduction of new security notions and new ideal functionalities where possible.

For this reason, we first prove that the balanced sub-protocol CPace securely implements the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  from [CHK<sup>+</sup>05] which we repeat for reference in figure 4.

We finally show by using the UC composition theorem that the combination of the sub-protocols securely implements  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$  from [GMR06] and thus provides conventional "full" augmentation.

We then show that when the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman secret scalar  $x$  within the AuCPace augmentation layer is replaced by a static scalar value  $\tilde{x}$  that is re-used over several protocol instances, the computational complexity for the server is essentially halved,

while preserving most of the security guarantees. We will present the corresponding idealised functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{papwKE}}$  together with the security proof for partially augmented AuCPace.

## 3 The AuCPace protocol

### 3.1 Design rationales for the AuCPace protocol

One major guideline for the protocol choices beside the security targets already introduced above has been server-side efficiency. In a typical use case of a remote human-machine-interface for a resource-constrained target, we could assume the client-side units to have much more powerful computing capabilities.

There is no simple means for performance assessment of cryptographic protocols. A large number of competing objectives are involved. The assessment needs, e.g., to consider computational resources, RAM memory requirements, ROM memory requirements, message transport latency, maximum transport-layer packet size and power consumption. For different target hardware the relative importance varies.

Often, PAKE protocols were assessed with respect to performance in a simplified way by counting the number of required exponentiations (sometimes also distinguishing fixed-based and variable base cases) and by counting the number of communication rounds.

With AuCPace, we target the industrial IoT use-case, where a large set of servers is assumed to be operating with the same passwords. For integrating these servers into a larger user-credential distribution framework, it is mandatory to meet the computational constraints also of the smallest devices. Therefore, the design should focus on this specific subset, assuming that larger devices could then implement the corresponding mechanisms without any difficulty.

We assessed power consumption to be one major issue in line with the results of [HL17]. We observed that not only minimising the number of required group exponentiations is important. Beside the choice of a high-speed elliptic curve, a number of further parameters influence the efficiency. Also point compression and point verification sub-steps should be considered. We observed, e.g., that x-coordinate-only Diffie-Hellman implementations could provide significant advantages, both, regarding speed, ease-of-implementation and memory-consumption. We therefore searched for protocols compatible with implementations not requiring full group operations. One possible advantage of using x-coordinate-only implementations of an elliptic curve is, that the complexity of point compression/decompression and verification could be drastically reduced, specifically on curves offering twist security (allowing for efficient strategies for fending off small-subgroup attacks [LL97]). Otherwise point decompression typically requires one costly field exponentiation for implementing a square root.

We also tried to minimise the number of required primitives in the protocols. E.g. we aimed at avoiding the digital signature scheme needed within some constructions, such as the  $\Omega$ -Method from Genry, MacKenzie and Ramzan [GMR06].

For AuCPace, we also aimed at minimising memory requirements. E.g., it was considered desirable, not to require that a full transcript of all communication is to be kept in memory until the termination of the protocol. Throughout the calculation, we aimed also at minimising the memory requirement for temporary variables. E.g. for calculating scalar multiplications on elliptic curves we searched for efficient strategies not requiring large pre-computed tables, such as are typically required for window-based algorithms. Also storage in Flash memory, e.g. for password database entries was considered important. As one example the  $\Omega$ -Method from [GMR06] needs to store a full public-private key pair in addition to the hashed password and the salt. We aimed to improve on this in our solution. For constrained servers, we assumed also that the ROM limitation might not allow for easy

integration of tables typically needed for fixed-base point scalar multiplication speedups.

On the other hand, we assessed that in comparison to memory and power consumption, the number of message rounds might not be of primary importance, specifically if content of messages from different protocol levels (protocol handshake, authentication protocol, secured channel protocol) could be combined. Typically the main objective of reducing communication rounds is reduction of the impact of networking latency. However, for constrained servers, the main issue for the user-experienced delay might not be packet transmission latency but lacking power or lacking computational resources respectively [HL17].

### 3.2 Parameters of the AuCPace protocol

The AuCPace protocol is depicted in figures 2 and 3. The protocol is parametrised by

- A password based key derivation function  $\text{PBKDF}_\sigma$  that is itself parametrised by algorithm settings  $\sigma$ , specifying e.g. the memory consumption for the password hash or an iteration count.  $\text{PBKDF}_\sigma$  calculates a random string from the password  $pw$ , a username and a so-called "salt" value. For reasons to detail in the following paragraphs, AuCPace alternatively also considers use of a server-specific so-called "pepper" that never changes for a specific server instead of ephemeral "salt" values that are chosen randomly upon each password change. For our reference implementation of AuCPace, we use the memory-hard script [PJ] password hash parametrised for a memory consumption of 32 MByte.
- A (hyper-)elliptic curve  $\mathcal{C}$  with a group  $\mathcal{J}$  and a Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol (written here by using an exponentiation notation) operating on both,  $\mathcal{J}$  and its quadratic twist  $\mathcal{J}'$ . We denote the DH base point with  $B$ . We don't require full group structure but could also instantiate AuCPace if only group operations modulo negation are available. This might result in more efficient implementations. (For more details regarding this efficiency aspect see the corresponding discussion for the qDSA/EdDSA signature schemes in [RS17].). For our reference implementation, we use the Curve25519 [Ber06] and the x-coordinate-only Diffie-Hellman protocol X25519. In this paper we follow the recommendation in [Ber14] and reserve the name Curve25519 for the curve and X25519 for the protocol.
- An encoding that represents either an element  $Y$  in  $\mathcal{J}$  or on its quadratic twist  $\mathcal{J}'$  in a fixed-size bit stream. In our reference implementation we make use of a little-endian encoding of the  $x$ -Coordinate of the point on Curve25519 or its quadratic twist.
- A verification algorithm that checks whether the order of a point  $Y$  within  $\mathcal{J}$  or  $\mathcal{J}'$  is large enough for the security target specified by the complexity of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) for security parameter  $k$ . In our reference implementation we make use of Curve25519's twist security and the integrated co-factor of 8 for X25519 scalars. I.e. we just verify that  $X25519(x, Y) \neq 0$ .
- A  $\text{Map2Point}$  operation and its inverse map  $\text{Map2Point}^{-1}$ .  $\text{Map2Point}(s)$  is required to map a string  $s$  on a point from a cryptographically large subgroup  $\mathcal{J}_m$  of  $\mathcal{J}$ , such that the discrete logarithm of the point is unknown. The inverse map  $s = \text{Map2Point}^{-1}(X, l)$  is required to map a point  $X \in \mathcal{J}_m$  on a bit string  $s$  of length  $l$  bits such that for any randomly sampled  $X \in \mathcal{J}_m$  the string  $s$  is indistinguishable from a random bit string of length  $l$ . For our reference implementation we use Elligator2 introduced by Hamburg, Bernstein, Krasnova and Lange in [BHKL13] on Curve25519, where the sign of the inverse map result is chosen at random and the Elligator2 inverse map's result is padded with random bits to yield the required total length  $l$ .

- Hash functions  $H_0 \dots H_4$ . For our reference implementation we use SHA512 where the hash function index is prepended as four-byte word.

We will refer to our reference implementation of AuCPace using the actual choices above as AuCPace25519. While denying any legal responsibility, the authors declare that they are not aware of any intellectual property right or patent limiting the use of AuCPace25519.

### 3.3 Configuring the password verifier on the server

Two basic sub-protocols could be distinguished. In a first sub-protocol the server is given a password-verifier  $W = B^w$  for storage in its database. This protocol is depicted in figure 2. The second sub-protocol is shown in figure 3 uses the available password verifier for establishing a session key.

The configuration of password verifiers requires one message. We assume, that the specific group  $\mathcal{J}$  and the permissible set of PBKDF parametrisations  $\sigma$  of the server are known to the client. The client chooses a fresh "salt" value and hashes the password  $pw$  to yield a secret scalar  $w$ . Then a password verifier  $W = B^w$  is calculated and sent to the server for storage in the database. Possibly authorisation information is also transmitted. The server then checks whether the parametrisation  $\sigma$  and the authorisation setting to attribute to the user are acceptable and stores the verifier  $W$  in the database together with the salt and the authorisation settings.


While all of the protocols in this paper allow for choosing ephemeral fresh "salt" values upon password changes, in some settings we see reasons for using a fixed "pepper" that is chosen once for each server and otherwise fixed. Firstly, when using an ephemeral salt value, we could not avoid some leakage of information. Specifically, we could not hide whether or not a specific username entry is available in the server's database or whether a user has changed his password. For some applications, this information might provide real-world attackers more advantage than a facilitated offline attack. Note also that an additional or alternative "pepper" could serve as kind of common reference string for honest parties. Specifically, if the "pepper" value required for the password hash is not openly communicated over the vulnerable channel, some attackers might not be able to mount an online attack.

In this paper we concentrate on the security proof for the session establishment only. I.e. for this first sub-protocol we assume that communication is using a confidential channel. We also assume that the client is properly authenticated and that the authorisation for writing password file entries has been verified (as well as the authorisations to be attributed to the user). More formally, we do not consider adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$  that read or modify messages of this sub-protocol or impersonate parties.

Within the protocol, the password is never given in clear-text to the server. This also implies that the computationally complex PBKDF function is only calculated on the client entity. Note also that by letting the client choose the "salt" value, we provide a path for distributing password verifiers from a centralised user credential server by use of an offline ticket mechanism.

Note that with respect to the generation of the password verifier  $W$  our protocol shares some similarities with the AugPake scheme by Shin and Kobara [SKI10] and VTBPEKE by Pointcheval and Wang [PW17]. In all of these constructions a group element  $W = B^\xi$  is used as verifier where password-derived key  $\xi$  is used as secret exponent for a known base point.

## Store password operation for AuCPace



**Figure 2:** Protocol for password configuration.

### 3.4 Establishing session keys based on the password $pw$ and the password verifier $W$

Establishment of the session key  $sk$  is realised by a sequence of several steps shown in figure 3. First a session id  $ssid$  is established. This is done by hashing together client and server-side generated random values  $s, t$  with a so-called "channel identifier" CI. In the context of a TCP/IP based communication, the channel identifier might be constructed by concatenating unique representations of the server's and client's IP address and TCP port numbers. Incorporating the channel identifier into the  $ssid$ , allows us to fend off certain types of relay attacks.

Secondly, a password related string  $PRS$  is established. We refer to this sub-protocol as the AuCPace Augmentation layer. Establishing  $PRS$  involves one message round. After learning the user name, the server transmits its "salt" string together with the value  $\sigma$  required for parametrising the password hash  $\text{PBKDF}_{\sigma}$  and an ephemeral public key  $P$  and the group representation  $\mathcal{J}$  to use for the Diffie-Hellman protocol. Both, server and client entity then calculate a password-derived string  $PRS$ . While the server uses the password verifier  $W$  from its database, the client party has to calculate  $\text{PBKDF}_{\sigma}$ . If no entry is available for  $W$  in the server's password file, or if the point verification on the client fails, the protocol is continued with a randomly sampled  $PRS$  string. Doing so somewhat mitigates the fact that the openly communicated "salt" value leaks some information on the server's password file contents. (At the same time we have to accept more workload when facing some types of denial-of-service attacks.)

Then client and server enter the balanced sub-protocol CPace with the password-derived string  $PRS$ . There, first an ephemeral generator  $G$  is calculated by use of the Map2Point algorithm.

Then the two parties implement a Diffie-Hellman protocol by exchanging two messages  $Y_a$  and  $Y_b$  and derive a shared Diffie-Hellmann secret point  $K$ . Note that it is essential for the receiving party to verify the points  $Y_a$  and  $Y_b$  to be on a large prime-order subgroup of  $\mathcal{J}$  or its twist. Then a first session key  $sk1$  is derived from the shared Diffie-Hellman secret  $K$ .

As last sub-protocol, optionally explicit authentication is added by exchange of two authenticator messages  $T_a$  and  $T_b$ . Finally the session key  $sk1$  is refreshed to yield the final session key  $sk$ .

With respect to the mandatory point verification, we do not impose the conventional requirement that the implementation has to verify that the points  $X, Y_a$  and  $Y_b$  are  $\in \mathcal{J}$ . Instead we impose a less strict requirement that could be implemented more efficiently on some curves, notably if they have secure twists: We require that it has to be verified that

the order of the respective points is large with respect the required complexity assumption for the CDH problem for the security parameter  $k$ , such as to prevent collisions in the result points  $K$  and  $X^w$  due to small subgroup attacks.

## 4 Proof of indistinguishability for the balanced sub-protocol CPace

In this section we will deal with the balanced PAKE protocol CPace corresponding to the middle part of figure 3.

In this proof we show that this sub-protocol emulates the functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  from [CHK<sup>+</sup>05].  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  (repeated in figure 4) receives the passwords  $pw$  from the environment-controlled parties  $P_i$  and  $P_j$  and returns upon a **NewKey** request the same random session key  $sk$  if and only if the passwords match. In case that any party gets corrupted or messages were modified by the adversary, the adversary is given control over the party's session key  $sk$ .

In [CHK<sup>+</sup>05]  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  has been used in the context of static adversaries only. Here, in the context of adaptive adversaries we observed the need to more clearly specify the behaviour of  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  in case of adaptive corruptions. As in the static corruption model used in [CHK<sup>+</sup>05], we let  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  give party  $P_i$ 's password to  $\mathcal{S}$  upon corruption. In addition, we need to handle the case that  $\mathcal{S}$  corrupts a party  $P_j$  after a session key  $sk$  has been already sent to party  $P_i$ . If  $P_i$  and  $P_j$  use the same password  $pw$ , we send  $\mathcal{S}$  the honest party's session key  $sk$ , otherwise (in case of different passwords) we send  $\mathcal{S}$  a randomly sampled key  $sk'$ . This is required for giving  $\mathcal{S}$  the possibility to continue behaving just as a honest party.

The sub-protocol CPace from figure 3 receives password-related strings  $PRS$  as input and returns session keys  $sk1$  as result. Note that  $PRS$  is formed as the concatenation of the session id (that has been generated involving also the server and client identifiers via the channel identifier CI) and a password-related component ( $W^x$  and  $X^w$  respectively).

For the security analysis in this section we need to map the inputs and outputs of the protocol from figure 3 to the notation used for defining the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  in figure 4. The password related components ( $W^x$  and  $X^w$  respectively) correspond to the passwords  $pw$  and the resulting session key  $sk$  from figure 4 corresponds to the intermediate session key  $sk1$  from figure 3. (Note that when using CPace as a stand-alone protocol, it is important to make sure that the names of server and client contribute to the calculation of the generator  $G$ , i.e. that they enter the  $PRS$  that is passed to the hash function  $H_1$ .)

### 4.1 Proof strategy

Our proof closely follows the strategy from [ACCP08]. Here we also use a sequence of games  $G_0$  to  $G_4$  where the simulator algorithms  $\mathcal{S}_0$  to  $\mathcal{S}_4$  are executed. We organise these algorithms  $\mathcal{S}_n$  as a combination of independent ITI that only interact through their well-defined APIs and have internal state (tape) that is not accessible from the outside. Initially we have one such ITI for each simulated honest party  $P_i$ , the hash functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{RO}}$  and one ITI executing the algorithm of the real-world adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ . We let  $\mathcal{S}_n$  invoke the other ITI during the course of the execution. I.e. we treat the real-world adversary algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  as a black box subroutine library for  $\mathcal{S}_n$ .

When  $\mathcal{A}$  decides to corrupt a party  $P_i$ , we need to provide it all of the corrupted ITI's internal accessible state. The subsequent behaviour of this party is then controlled by  $\mathcal{A}$ . The adversary is also given the secret scalars used in the real-world protocol. Finally, we give  $\mathcal{S}_n$  also access to an ITM  $\mathcal{F}_n$  in each game, where  $\mathcal{F}_0$  is initially not providing any service. In each game we extend the functionality of  $\mathcal{F}_n$  until it implements  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$ .




Figure 3: Protocol AuCPace.

In the games in our proof we re-factor the algorithms  $\mathcal{S}_n$  such that each change is indistinguishable for the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ .

At the end of the game sequence, we end up with an algorithm  $\mathcal{S}_4$  that makes only calls to  $\mathcal{F}_4$  which itself implements exactly the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$ .

## 4.2 Game-based proof

### 4.2.1 Game $G_0$ : Real Game

$G_0$  is the real game in the random-oracle model using the functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{RO}}$  from figure 5. The parties  $P_i$  receive `NewSession` queries from all simulated honest parties. These queries contain the passwords provided by the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ .  $P_i$  then executes the actions of initially honest parties in the protocol. In the event of corruptions, the internal state of the parties is passed to the real-world adversary algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ . The subroutine library  $\mathcal{F}_0$  is empty.

### 4.2.2 Game $G_1$ : Simulation of the random oracle

Here we modify the previous game by replacing the calls  $H_n(q)$  to the original  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{RO}}$  hash ITI by an own implementation. We let  $\mathcal{S}_1$  maintain an initially empty list  $\Lambda$  of value pairs  $(n, q, g, r)$ . For any hash query  $H_n(q)$  such that  $(n, q, *, r)$  appears in  $\Lambda$  from any of the ITI libraries, the returned answer is  $r$ . In case that no query  $q$  has yet occurred, we handle separately the cases of  $n = 1$  and  $n \neq 1$ . In case of  $n \neq 1$  we implement the conventional random-oracle model by choosing a new random  $r$  of length  $k$ , by storing  $(n, q, 0, r)$  in  $\Lambda$  and by returning  $r$  to the calling ITI.

For  $n = 1$  instead, we aim at generating a random string  $r$  such that the discrete logarithm of the point  $\text{Map2Point}(r)$  is known. For this purpose we first generate a random point  $G$  whose discrete logarithm is known and use the inverse map  $\text{Map2Point}^{-1}(G, k)$  for converting it into a bit string of length  $k$ . We use the guarantee, that for any random point  $G$  the string  $r = \text{Map2Point}^{-1}(G, k)$  is indistinguishable from a random value.

For calculating the random point  $G$ , we first choose a random nonzero value  $g$  being smaller than the order of the group. We calculate the point on  $\mathcal{J}$ ,  $G = B^g$ . We then test whether  $G$  is in the image of  $\text{Map2Point}$ ,  $\mathcal{J}_m$ . If  $G$  is not in the image, we restart with a new random value  $g$  until  $G \in \mathcal{J}_m$ . This is guaranteed to succeed in probabilistic polynomial time because  $\mathcal{J}_m$  is required to be a large subset of  $\mathcal{J}$ .

Then we calculate  $r = \text{Map2Point}^{-1}(G, k)$ , record  $(1, q, g, r)$  in  $\Lambda$  and return  $r$ .

Since the inverse map returns a string indistinguishable from a random string by the guarantees of  $\text{Map2Point}$  and due to the birthday paradox,  $G_0$  and  $G_1$  are indistinguishable for the environment.

### 4.2.3 Game $G_2$ : Handle the case that an impersonating adversary wins by chance

Here we handle the case that an impersonating adversary succeeds in calculating the session key  $sk$  without querying the hash oracle  $H_2$ . In this case we let  $\mathcal{S}_2$  abort. This case occurs with negligible probability.  $G_2$  is, thus, indistinguishable from  $G_1$ .

### 4.2.4 Game $G_3$ : Restrict the access to the password.

Here, when receiving the passwords for party  $P_i$  from the environment, we let  $P_i$  pass them directly to the subroutine library  $\mathcal{F}_3$  and allow the rest of the program  $\mathcal{S}_3$  no longer access the password unless the simulated party  $P_i$  get's corrupted. We let  $\mathcal{S}_3$  inform  $\mathcal{F}_3$  in case that a party got corrupted such that  $\mathcal{F}_3$  returns the password in this case. We add also an implementation of the `TestPwd` query to  $\mathcal{F}_3$  and implement it according to the

spec. of  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$ . In this game, we preliminarily also add a `SamePwd` query to  $\mathcal{F}_3$  that returns true if the passwords match.

As a result, the password-derived generator  $G$  from figure 3 is no longer known to the ITI  $P_i$ . We therefore cannot start the original protocol from the beginning and need to refactor the ITM for the parties as well.

Instead we let the ITI  $P_i$  calculate the protocol messages  $Y_a$  and  $Y_b$  to be random multiples of the group's base point  $B$ ,  $Y_a = B^{z_a}$  and  $Y_b = B^{z_b}$ . We also let  $P_i$  maintain an initially empty list  $\Gamma$  and store the secret scalars of simulated honest parties  $(sid, ssid, P_i, y \text{ unknown}, z_a)$  and  $(sid, ssid, P_j, y \text{ unknown}, z_b)$  in this list together with the respective session id.

Since  $G$  from game  $\mathsf{G}_2$  was a generator of the whole cryptographic group  $\mathcal{J}$ , the resulting points  $Y_a, Y_b$  take any value on  $\mathcal{J}$  with equal probability (except for the neutral element) for honest parties. So do the points generated in  $\mathsf{G}_3$ . The public messages in  $\mathsf{G}_2$  and  $\mathsf{G}_3$  are, thus, indistinguishable for the environment.

As soon as both messages  $Y_a$  and  $Y_b$  have been delivered by  $\mathcal{A}$  we calculate the Diffie-Hellman results using the received points and the local exponents  $z_a$  and  $z_b$ . If the respective result points differ, we know that  $\mathcal{A}$  has modified the messages in a destructive way and record for this session a flag `DHFAILS`.

In case that a party  $P_i$  gets corrupted before calculating  $K$ , we need to hand over  $\mathcal{A}$  something being consistent with the internal state from  $P_i$  in  $\mathsf{G}_2$ , notably the values  $y$  ( $y_a$  or  $y_b$  respectively for client and server).

In the case of corruption,  $\mathcal{F}_3$  grants us access to the secretly stored  $pw$  from its internal state.  $\mathcal{S}_3$  may then take the password and the session id and make a corresponding hash query to  $\mathsf{H}_1$ . We then retrieve the secret scalar value  $g$  from  $\Lambda$ . We fetch the party  $P_i$ 's secret scalar  $z$  from  $\Gamma$  and calculate  $y = z/g$ . We add the party's secret scalar  $z$  to the record in  $\Gamma$  with  $y$  and hand over  $y, pw$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

In case that any party gets corrupted after calculating  $K$  but before calculating the final  $\mathsf{H}_2$ , we perform the secret scalar correction above and recalculate a new  $K = Y_r^y$  by using the received point value  $Y_r$  and pass  $K$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

The code for the verification handling for the received points  $Y_r$  can remain unchanged in comparison to Game  $\mathsf{G}_2$ .

In case that the point verification fails for any party, we do not generate a session key and do not need to calculate the final hash  $\mathsf{H}_2(ssid||K)$ . In case that the final hash  $\mathsf{H}_2$  needs to be calculated for the first of the parties  $P_i$  and  $P_i$  is still honest, we need to provide a session key to  $P_i$ . (Note that in case that this could be either server or client.) We distinguish three cases.

- If the other party was corrupted earlier, we know the other party's password  $pw'$ . We then may issue a `TestPwd` query to  $\mathcal{F}_3$ . If the guess was correct, we learn the local secret scalar value  $y$  by the method described above and calculate  $K = Y_r^y$  with the received remote point  $Y_r$ . We query  $\mathsf{H}_2(sid||K)$  for the corrected value of  $K$  and return the result to  $P_i$ . If the guess was wrong, we sample a new random key  $sk$  and return it to  $P_i$ .
- If the other party is still honest, we sample a new random key  $sk$  and send it to  $P_i$  and record this session key together with the session id and the party identifier  $(sid, P_i, P_j, sk)$ .
- If the other party is impersonated by  $\mathcal{A}$  we also sample a new random key  $sk$  and send it to  $P_i$  and record this session key together with the session id and the party identifier  $(sid, P_i, P_j, sk)$ . Note that (according to the previous game), we will be returning a distinguishable key  $sk$  iff  $\mathcal{A}$  somehow managed to guess the value  $K = Y_r^y$ . We will calculate the corresponding probability `GuessK` in section 4.3.

The remaining task is to calculate the session key  $sk$  for a second party  $P_j$  if it is not corrupted until the very end or corrupted before calculating  $sk$ . In any of these two cases, we know that two messages  $Y_a$  and  $Y_b$  must have been delivered by  $\mathcal{A}$ , and we, thus, have access to the DHFails marker and that the received points are not from a low order sub-group (or the neutral element). Also, because we know that we have to simulate session key generation for the second time, we know that the first party was honest until the end of the protocol.

If the second party is also honest until the very end, we make a SamePwd query introduced temporarily to  $\mathcal{F}_3$ . If the passwords match and if the session is not marked as DHFails, we return the same  $sk$  value to  $P_j$  as for the first party, otherwise we sample a new random key  $sk'$  and return this one to  $P_j$ .

In case that the second party  $P_j$  gets corrupted after calculating  $K$  we first correct  $K$  using the secret exponent  $g$  retrieved from  $\Lambda$ . In case that we recognised destructive modification of the Diffie-Hellman points by the DHFails marker for the session, we just sample a new value for  $sk'$  by the interface of the random oracle  $sk' = H_2(sid||K)$  and pass  $sk'$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . There is only a negligible chance of collision with the key  $sk$  sent to the first party, since both  $sk$  and  $sk'$  have been randomly sampled. There is also only a negligible chance that  $\mathcal{A}$  managed to make both parties issue the same session key despite different passwords by modification of the transmitted points. For this reason  $G_3$  and  $G_2$  are indistinguishable for this case.

If the Diffie-Hellman points have not been modified in a destructive way (DHFails not recognised), the session key issued in  $G_2$  depends on the password. We learn the party's password  $pw$  from  $\mathcal{F}_3$ . We then may issue a TestPwd query to  $\mathcal{F}_3$ . If the guess was correct, we have to provide the same session key to  $\mathcal{A}$  as for the first party if DHFails is not recognised. For this purpose, we program the value  $H_2(sid||K) := sk$  to the session key returned to the first party. This could fail only, if the oracle  $H_2$  already has been queried for  $(sid||K)$ , again corresponding to the probability GuessK that we deal with in section 4.3. (Note that it is for this re-programming operation that we will later need to be granted access to the session key issued to the client by the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{pwKE}$ . Otherwise we could not give  $\mathcal{S}$  access to the session key that would have been calculated by honest parties for corruptions occurring just after executing the hash function.)

The messages  $Y_a, Y_b$  generated in Game  $G_2$  and  $G_3$  are indistinguishable for the environment because they come from the same distribution. Also the session keys are sampled from an un-distinguishable uniform distribution in both cases. Session keys delivered to parties  $P_i$  and  $P_j$  match under the same conditions as in  $G_2$ . Inserting points on the group's twist by the adversary always leads to different session keys for both parties, just as in  $G_2$ .  $G_2$  and  $G_3$  are, thus, indistinguishable for the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ .

#### 4.2.5 Game $G_4$ : Merge the key generation procedures to the functionality $\mathcal{F}_4$ .

In this game we essentially only do code-refactoring and move the code responsible for session key generation to the ITM  $\mathcal{F}_4$ . We make  $\mathcal{F}_4$  implement exactly the functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{pwKE}$ . Note that we need maintain the queries within  $\mathcal{F}_4$  that give access to the passwords  $pw$  in case of corruptions. We also need to add a query returning the session key delivered to the client in case of late adaptive corruptions of the second party (server), as discussed above. We remove the SamePwd query from the list of queries for  $\mathcal{F}_4$  because now,  $\mathcal{F}_4$  could easily check itself for password identity in its internal storage. Within  $\mathcal{S}_4$  we finally replace the sampling of the session keys by calls to the NewKey query of the ideal functionality.

Since between  $G_3$  and  $G_4$  no functionality change is present,  $G_3$  and  $G_4$  are indistinguishable for the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ .

### 4.3 Proof that probability $\text{GuessK}$ in $\mathbf{G}_3$ is negligible

For the proof we did use the conjecture that an impersonating adversary that has no access to the password of a honest party  $pw$  is not able to predict the honest party's calculated point  $K$ .

The reasoning is identical for both, server and client, so we consider the case of the server here.  $\mathbf{G}_3$  can be distinguished by  $\mathcal{Z}$  from  $\mathbf{G}_2$  iff the impersonating adversary succeeds in obtaining the real-world protocol's honest party point  $K = Y_a^{y_b}$  in  $\mathbf{G}_2$  without knowing the honest player's password. Note that  $Y_a$  is publicly known and may be either on  $J$  or on it's twist  $J'$ . We know, however, that the order of the point  $Y_a$  is large, thus DLP and CDH could be conjectured to be difficult.

In  $\mathbf{G}_2$  and under the assumption of the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem DLP,  $\mathcal{A}$  can derive  $K$  iff he knows  $y_b$ . The only information that he disposes of is the remote side's sent point  $Y_b = G^{y_b}$ . If we assume that the password-derived generator  $G = B^g$  used by the honest party is unknown because the password is unknown, the problem of calculating the honest party's secret ephemeral scalar  $y_b$  from the known  $Y_b = B^{g \times y_b}$  is simply undefined, since one equation cannot be used for two unknowns ( $g$  and  $y_b$ ). Note that the secret scalar  $g$  is known to exist, but known to no party according to the security guarantees required for the `Map2Point` primitive. I.e. even an attacker being able to solve the discrete log problem could not solve it. If one more conservatively assumes that the adversary managed to control the generator  $G$ , possibly by biasing the `sid` and by exploiting two simultaneous flaws in both, the hash and the `Map2Point` primitive, we obtain the PACE-DH problem from [BFK09]. In the very same paper this one is shown to be as hard as the DH problem in the generic model of Shoup [Sho97] and conjectured to be as hard as the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.

In any case the probability  $\text{GuessK}$  is, thus, negligible.

### 4.4 Remarks regarding the ordering of the messages and efficiency

Note that in this proof we have assumed that the server party starts with the communication round. In fact, since the services provided to the two parties by the ideal functionality are identical and since the protocol is perfectly symmetric, we could interchange the server and client roles for the balanced PAKE sub-protocol `CPace`. The ordering of the message exchange of  $Y_a$  and  $Y_b$  is, thus, irrelevant for the security. Note that this could be used for speedups for actual implementations, specifically in case that the scalar multiplication takes comparable time as message delivery.

## 5 Proof for the augmented protocol AuCPace

### 5.1 Technical details

For implementing the actual proofs we need to consider a number of technical details. We aim at re-using functionalities from previous papers wherever possible, specifically the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$  from [GMR06].

However, for our protocol we could not use it as-is because firstly,  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$  aborts in case that the server does not find a password entry in its file. In our protocol, we aim at keeping the information which users have a database entry somewhat more confidential by continuing the protocol with a random password. (This confidentiality could be fully realised only when using a server-specific "pepper". If a random "salt" is used for the password hashing, we could, e.g., not hide the information that a user has changed the password.) Secondly, AuCPace supports password changes, while  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$  only allows for configuring passwords once. We first considered re-phrasing the functionality to our needs, but observed that we would have had to carefully consider the "salt" vs. "pepper" issue,

The functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  is parametrised by a security parameter  $k$ . It interacts with an adversary  $\mathcal{S}$  and a set of parties via the following queries:

**Upon receiving a query (NewSession , $sid, P_i, P_j, pw, \text{role}$ ) from party  $P_i$  :**

Send (NewSession , $sid, P_i, P_j, \text{role}$ ) to  $\mathcal{S}$  . In addition, if this is the first NewSession query, or if this is the second NewSession query and there is a record  $(P_j, P_i, pw')$ , then record  $(P_i, P_j, pw)$  and mark this record fresh .

**Upon receiving a query (TestPwd , $sid, P_i, pw'$ ) from the adversary  $\mathcal{S}$  :**

If there is a record of the form  $(P_i, P_j, pw)$  which is fresh , then do: If  $pw = pw'$ , mark the record compromised and reply to  $\mathcal{S}$  with "correct guess". If  $pw \neq pw'$ , mark the record interrupted and reply with "wrong guess".

**Upon receiving a query (NewKey , $sid, P_i, sk$ ) from  $\mathcal{S}$  where  $|sk| = k$ :**

If there is a record of the form  $(P_i, P_j, pw)$ , and this is the first NewKey query for  $P_i$ , then:

- If this record is compromised , or either  $P_i$  or  $P_j$  is corrupted, then output  $(sid, sk)$  to player  $P_i$ .
- If this record is fresh , and there is a record  $(P_j, P_i, pw')$  with  $pw' = pw$ , and a key  $sk'$  was sent to  $P_j$  and  $(P_j, P_i, pw)$  was fresh at the time, then output  $(sid, sk')$  to  $P_i$ .
- In any other case, pick a new random key  $sk'$  of length  $k$  and send  $(sid, sk')$  to  $P_i$ .

Either way, mark the record  $(P_i, P_j, pw)$  as completed .

**Figure 4:** Ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  from [CHK<sup>+</sup>05] re-presenting balanced PAKE without explicit authentication.

The functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{RO}}$  proceeds as follows, running on security parameter  $k$  with parties  $P_1, \dots, P_n$  and an adversary  $\mathcal{S}$  :

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{RO}}$  keeps a list  $L$  (which is initially empty) of pairs of bit strings.

Upon receiving a value  $(sid, m)$  with  $(m \in \{0, 1\}^*)$  from some party  $P_i$  or from  $\mathcal{S}$  , do:

- If there is a pair  $(m, (\tilde{h}))$  for some  $\tilde{h} \in \{0, 1\}^k$  in the list  $L$ , set  $h := \tilde{h}$ .
- If there is no such pair, choose uniformly  $h \in \{0, 1\}^k$  and store the pair  $(m, h) \in L$ .

Once  $h$  is set, reply to the activating machine (i.e., either  $P_i$  or  $\mathcal{S}$  ) with  $(sid, h)$ .

**Figure 5:** Ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{RO}}$  .

The functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$  is parametrised by a security parameter  $k$ . It interacts with an adversary  $\mathcal{S}$  and a set of parties via the following queries:

### Password storage and authentication sessions

**Upon receiving a query** (StorePWfile , $sid, P_i, P_j, pw$ ) **from party**  $P_i$  :

If this is the first StorePWfile query, store password data record (file ,  $P_i, P_j, pw$ ) and mark it uncompromised .

**Upon receiving a query** (CltSession , $sid, ssid, P_i, pw$ ) **from party**  $P_i$  :

Send (CltSession ,  $sid, ssid, P_j, P_j$ ) to  $\mathcal{S}$  , and if this is the first CltSession query for  $ssid$ , store session record ( $ssid, P_i, P_j, pw$ ) and mark it fresh .

**Upon receiving a query** (SvrSession , $sid, ssid$ ) **from party**  $P_j$  :

If there is a password data record (file , $P_i, P_j, pw$ ) then send (SvrSession , $sid, ssid, P_i, P_j$ ) to  $\mathcal{S}$  , and if this is the first SvrSession query for  $ssid$ , store session record ( $ssid, P_j, P_i, pw'$ ) and mark it fresh .

### Stealing password data

**Upon receiving a query** (StealPWfile , $sid$ ) **from adversary**  $\mathcal{S}$  :

If there is no password data record, reply to  $\mathcal{S}$  with "no password file". Otherwise do the following. If the password data record (file , $P_i, P_j, pw$ ) is marked uncompromised , mark it as compromised . if there is a tuple (offline , $pw'$ ) stored with  $pw = pw'$ , send  $pw$  to  $\mathcal{S}$  , otherwise reply to  $\mathcal{S}$  with "password file stolen".

**Upon receiving a query** (OfflineTestPwd , $sid, pw'$ ) **from adversary**  $\mathcal{S}$  :

If there is no password data record, or if there is a password record (file , $P_i, P_j, pw$ ) that is marked uncompromised , then store (offline , $pw'$ ). Otherwise, do: If  $pw = pw'$ , reply to  $\mathcal{S}$  with "correct guess". If  $pw \neq pw'$ , reply with "wrong guess".

### Active session attacks

**Upon receiving a query** (TestPwd , $sid, ssid, P, pw'$ ) **from adversary**  $\mathcal{S}$  :

If there is a session record of the form ( $ssid, P, P', pw$ ) which is fresh , then do: If  $pw = pw'$ , mark the record compromised and reply to  $\mathcal{S}$  with "correct guess". Otherwise, mark the session record interrupted and reply with "wrong guess".

**Upon receiving a query** (SvrImpersonate , $sid, ssid$ ) **from adversary**  $\mathcal{S}$  :

If there is a session record of the form ( $ssid, P_i, P_j, pw$ ) which is fresh , then do: If there is a password data record (file ,  $P_i, P_j, pw$ ) that is marked compromised , mark the session record compromised and reply to  $\mathcal{S}$  with "correct guess", else mark the the session record interrupted and reply with "wrong guess".

### Key Generation and Authentication

**Upon receiving a query** (NewKey , $sid, ssid, P, key$ ) **from adversary**  $\mathcal{S}$  , where  $|key| = k$ :

If there is a record of the form ( $ssid, P, P', pw$ ) that is not marked completed , then:

- If this record is compromised , or either  $P$  or  $P'$  is corrupted, then output ( $sid, ssid, key$ ) to  $P$ .
- If this record is fresh , there is a session record ( $ssid, P', P, pw'$ ),  $pw' = pw$ , a key  $key'$  was sent to  $P'$ , and ( $ssid, P', P, pw$ ) was fresh at the time, then let  $key'' = key'$ , else pick a random key  $key''$  of length  $k$ . Output ( $sid, ssid, key''$ ) to  $P$ .
- In any other case, pick a random key  $key''$  of length  $k$  and output ( $sid, ssid, key''$ ) to  $P$ .

Finally, mark the record ( $ssid, P, P', pw$ ) as completed .

**Upon receiving a query** (TestAbort , $sid, ssid, P$ ) **from adversary**  $\mathcal{S}$  :

If there is a session record of the form ( $ssid, P, P', pw$ ) that is not marked completed , then:

- If this record is fresh , there is a record ( $ssid, P', P, pw'$ ), and  $pw' = pw$ , let  $b' = \text{succ}$  .
- In any other case let  $b' = \text{fail}$

Send  $b'$  to  $\mathcal{S}$  . If  $b' = \text{fail}$ , send (abort , $sid, ssid$ ) to  $P$ , and mark record ( $ssid, P, P', pw$ ) completed .

**Figure 6:** Ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$  for verifier-based PAKE with explicit authentication from [GMR06]. Note that we applied a single wording change (underlined) by replacing Impersonate with SvrImpersonate for making it more explicit that this message models impersonation of the *server*.

resulting in two separate functionalities and two proofs. We came to the conclusion that it is best to try to avoid this complexity by rather slightly modifying our protocol for the purpose of the security proof. Specifically, for the purpose of the proof we don't continue the protocol if no password database entry is available for the given username by a random password related string  $PRS$ , but abort instead and only allow for setting the password once and forever. This change in the protocol allows for carrying out the proof with an un-modified functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$ .

The second technical aspect to consider is the handling of the  $\text{PBKDF}_\sigma(pw, \text{username}, \text{salt})$  function. For the purpose of the UC proof, we treat  $\text{PBKDF}$  as a separate hash function  $\text{H}_6$  and model it as a random oracle  $\text{PBKDF}_\sigma(pw, \text{username}, \text{salt}) = \text{H}_6(pw || \sigma || \text{username} || \text{salt})$ .

The third technical aspect stems from the fact, that the UC simulation model based on Turing machines does not naturally allow for the concept of human users with "user names" and authorisations. Instead we assume that the client's identifier  $P_i$  takes over the role of the user name and ignore the concept of authorisation here. The full protocol used for the proof is shown in figure 7.

We adhere to the convention from [GMR06] where we use the terminology "server compromise" for the event of stealing the server's persisted state, while we use the terminology denote "corruption" for events where the adversary gains full control over a party during session establishment.

## 5.2 Proof strategy for the augmented protocol

With respect to simulation, we need to distinguish password storage and session establishment. During password storage we don't actually give the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  any power. We allow  $\mathcal{A}$  for compromising the server after configuration of the password. For this reason, the simulation of this sub-step does not provide any difficulty. We let  $\mathcal{S}$  just forward the  $\text{StorePWfile}$  query to the  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$  functionality and send an empty  $\text{StorePWfileSvr}$  message to the server.

With respect to the session establishment, we again consider fully-adaptive adversaries. The most complex part of the proof will be handling of compromise of the server database. Just as for the proof of the balanced sub-protocol  $\text{CPace}$ , we proceed by using a sequence of games where  $\text{G}_0$  corresponds to the real world and  $\text{G}_4$  corresponds to the ideal world. In each of these games, we consider simulators  $\mathcal{S}_0$  to  $\mathcal{S}_4$  which implement part of their functionality in a subroutine library  $\mathcal{F}_0$  to  $\mathcal{F}_4$ , where  $\mathcal{F}_4$  exactly implements the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$ . Throughout this proof, we show that all of the individual games are indistinguishable for  $\mathcal{Z}$ .

## 5.3 Game-based proof

### 5.3.1 Game $\text{G}_0$ : Real Game

$\text{G}_0$  is the real game in the random-oracle model using the functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{RO}}$  from figure 5 for calculating the password hash  $\text{PBKDF}$ . Honest parties  $P_i$  execute the actions of the real-world protocol until eventually getting corrupted. Specifically client entities  $P_i$  receive  $\text{StorePWfile}$  and  $\text{CltSession}$  queries from the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$  and return session keys upon success. Server entities  $P_j$  receive  $\text{SvrSession}$  queries. On the event of corruptions, all the internal state of the parties is passed to the real-world adversary algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ , specifically for server corruptions, the password verifier  $W$  is returned. The subroutine library  $\mathcal{F}_0$  is empty.

### The Asymmetric AuCPace protocol

**Setup:** This protocol uses a random oracle functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{RO}}$  for all of the hash functions  $H_3, H_4, H_5$  and the password hash  $\text{PBKDF}_\sigma (H_6)$  with a parametrisation  $\sigma$  and salt size of  $m$  bits. The protocol also uses a balanced PAKE functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  as well as a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (written in exponentiation notation  $X^y$ ) operating on base point  $B$  and group order  $m$  working on a cryptographic sub-group  $\mathcal{J}$  of an elliptic curve and its quadratic twist  $\mathcal{J}'$ .

#### Password storage protocol:

When  $P_i$  (who is a client) is activated using  $\text{StorePWfile} (sid, P_j, pw)$  for the first time, he does the following. He samples a fresh value  $\text{salt} \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}^m$ , calculates the password hash  $w = H(\text{salt} || \sigma || pw || P_i)$  by using  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{RO}}$ . He then calculates a Diffie-Hellman point  $W = B^w$ .

He sends a message  $(\text{StorePWfileSvr}, sid, P_i, \text{salt}, \sigma, W)$  to  $P_j$ . When  $P_j$  which is a server receives  $(\text{StorePWfileSvr}, sid, P_i, \text{salt}, \sigma, W)$  from  $P_i$  for the first time, he sets file  $[sid] = (sid, \text{salt}, \sigma, W, P_i)$ .

#### Protocol steps for session establishment:

1. When  $P_j$  receives input  $(\text{SvrSession}, sid, ssid, P_i)$ , he sets up a session record  $(sid, ssid, P_i)$  and marks it as **fresh**. He then waits for a  $(\text{username}, sid, ssid, P_i)$  message.
2. When  $P_i$  receives input  $(\text{CltSession}, sid, ssid, P_j, pw)$  he sets up a session record  $(sid, ssid, P_j)$  and marks it as **fresh**. He then sends message  $(\text{username}, sid, ssid, P_i)$  to  $P_j$  and awaits a response.
3. When  $P_j$  receives input  $(\text{username}, sid, ssid, P_i)$ , he obtains the tuple stored in file  $[sid]$  (aborting and marking the session record as **completed** if this value is not properly defined). He then samples a fresh nonzero exponent  $x$  with  $0 < x < m$  and calculates  $X = B^x$ .  $P_j$  then sends  $(\text{hashingParams}, sid, ssid, \sigma, \text{salt}, X)$  to  $P_i$ .  $P_j$  then calculates  $W^x$ . He then sends  $(\text{NewSession}, (sid, ssid), P_j, P_i, (sid, ssid, W^x))$  to  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  and awaits a response.
4. When  $P_i$  receives input  $(\text{hashingParams}, sid, ssid, \sigma, \text{salt}, X)$  he calculates  $w = H_6(\text{salt} || \sigma || pw || P_i)$ . He then calculates  $X^w$ . He then sends  $(\text{NewSession}, (sid, ssid), P_i, P_j, (sid, ssid, X^w))$  to  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  and awaits a response.
5. When  $P_j$  receives input  $((sid, ssid), sk1)$  he calculates  $T_a = H_3(sk1), T'_b = H_4(sk1)$  and  $sk = H_5(sk1)$  and adds  $T_a, T'_b, sk$  to the session record. He then sends  $(\text{Authenticator}, sid, ssid, T_a)$  to  $P_i$  and awaits a response.
6. When  $P_i$  receives input  $((sid, ssid), sk1)$  he calculates  $T'_a = H_3(sk1), T_b = H_4(sk1)$  and  $sk = H_5(sk1)$  and adds  $T'_a, T_b, sk$  to the session record. Then he sends  $(\text{Authenticator}, sid, ssid, T_b)$  to  $P_j$  and outputs  $(sid, ssid, sk)$ . He then waits for a response.
7. When  $P_i$  receives a message  $(\text{Authenticator}, sid, ssid, T_a)$  he compares  $T'_a$  with  $T_a$  and aborts in case of differences. Else  $P_i$  outputs  $(sid, ssid, sk)$ .
8. When  $P_j$  receives a message  $(\text{Authenticator}, sid, ssid, T_b)$  he compares  $T'_b$  with  $T_b$  and aborts in case of differences. Else  $P_j$  outputs  $(sid, ssid, sk)$ .

**Stealing the password file:** When  $P_j$  (who is a server) receives a message  $(\text{StealPWfile}, sid, P_j, P_i)$  from the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , if file  $[sid]$  is defined,  $P_j$  sends it to  $\mathcal{A}$ .

**Figure 7:** AuCPace Protocol definition for the proof of indistinguishability.

### 5.3.2 Game $G_1$ : Modeling the random oracle for the hash

In  $G_1$  we replace calls to  $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$  by an own implementation of the random oracle for PBKDF and the hash functions in a straight-forward way. Again we maintain an initially empty list  $\Lambda$  of value pairs  $(n, q, r)$ . For any hash query  $H_n(q)$  such that  $(n, q, r)$  appears in  $\Lambda$  from any of the ITI, the returned answer is  $r$ . In case that no query  $q$  has yet occurred we implement the conventional random-oracle model by choosing a new random  $r$  of length  $k$ , by storing  $(n, q, 0, r)$  in  $\Lambda$  and by returning  $r$  to the calling ITI.

This game is indistinguishable from game  $G_0$  due to the birthday paradox.

### 5.3.3 Game $G_2$ : Getting rid of the case where the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ wins by chance.

This game is almost as the previous, only we allow the simulator to abort in case that the adversary manages to guess one of the authenticator messages  $T_a$  or  $T_b$  or the final session key  $sk$  without querying the random oracles for  $sk$ . This happens with negligible probability, so Game  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  are indistinguishable for the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ .

### 5.3.4 Game $G_3$ : Handle mutual authentication.

In this game we deal with mutual authentication but still allow the simulator access to the clear-text password  $pw$  upon server compromise events. I.e., in this game, we don't give the simulator access to the password but instead pass the password from a StorePWfile and CltSession query to code within  $\mathcal{F}_3$  with an implementation according to  $\mathcal{F}_{apwKE}$ . Temporarily, we allow  $\mathcal{F}_3$  to return the clear-text password upon the StealPWfile query.

This way, the simulator may no longer access the password for the message StorePWfile sent from the client to the server. Since we assume that neither impersonation nor eavesdropping or message modification is feasible for  $\mathcal{A}$  in this sub-step, simulation of the message provides no difficulties. We just sample a new random salt value and let the client send a message (StorePWfile,  $sid, salt, \sigma, P_j$ ) with only the hashing parameter but without password verifier  $W$ . Since  $\mathcal{A}$  is not allowed to eavesdrop this is indistinguishable from game  $G_2$  for the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ .

Simulation of the (username,  $sid, ssid, P_i$ ), does only include publicly known information and is simulated as in the real world protocol. The same holds for the server's reply (hashingParams,  $sid, ssid, \sigma, salt, X$ ) we sample a fresh random secret scalar  $x$  and salt value and calculate the public key in the message as  $X = B^x$ . Point verification for  $X$  may be implemented just as in  $G_2$ .

In case of compromising the server's password file, we have to return password verifiers  $W$  in order to maintain indistinguishability with game  $G_2$ . In game  $G_3$  we do so, by retrieving the clear-text password  $pw$  from  $\mathcal{F}_3$  and by calculating the password verifier as in the original protocol.

For simulating the authenticator messages  $T_a$  and  $T_b$  we sample two random values and transmit these. Since also in game  $G_2$  these values came from a uniform distribution, the authenticator messages from game  $G_3$  are indistinguishable from  $G_2$  for the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ .

After sending the authenticator messages, we call the TestAbort queries of  $\mathcal{F}_3$  for both parties and call a NewKey query upon success. In case that the adversary did destructively modify the hashingParams or the authenticator messages, we let protocol parties abort.

Games  $G_2$  and  $G_3$  are indistinguishable for the environment. In both games, the client aborts, if the group order of the point  $X$  is small. The Diffie-Hellman points  $W^x$  and  $X^w$  match, thus, iff  $W$  has been calculated from  $B^w$  and  $X$  has been calculated from  $B^x$ . Therefore any modification of  $X$  by  $\mathcal{A}$  leads to different PRS strings. I.e. the input to  $\mathcal{F}_{pwKE}$  matches iff the passwords used for the StorePWfile request for the client match the one from the CltSession request. As a consequence the session keys returned by

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  match only if the very same passwords match. Verification of the authenticators in  $\mathcal{G}_2$  succeeds iff  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$  returned the same session key to both parties. Upon any modification of the authenticator messages by  $\mathcal{A}$  the parties abort in both games.

### 5.3.5 Game $\mathcal{G}_4$ : Keeping the password secret

In this game we disallow the simulator to access the clear-text password upon server compromise events. In this game, we add a re-program-offline-query list  $\Lambda_1$  to the implementation of the random oracle in addition to its list  $\Lambda$ . We change the implementation as follows. Upon a query  $q$  to the hash oracle, if no corresponding entry is found in  $\Lambda$ , we first parse salt value  $P_i, pw$  and  $\sigma$  from the query  $q$ 's encoding. For all entries  $(sid, P_j, w)$  contained in  $\Lambda_1$  we execute a `OfflineTestPwd` query on  $\mathcal{F}_4$  for all  $P_j$  in case of a "correct guess" result, we program the record in  $\Lambda$  for the query to the value  $w$  from  $\Lambda_1$ , remove the entry  $(sid, P_j, w)$  from  $\Lambda_1$  and return  $w$ . If after parsing the full list  $\Lambda_1$  no "correct guess" result is returned, we sample a fresh random value  $r'$ , program it to  $\Lambda$  and return  $r'$ .

Upon server compromise, we proceed as follows. We first make a `StealPWfile` query to  $\mathcal{F}_4$ . Subsequently, we iterate through the PBKDF's random oracle list entries in  $\Lambda$ , parse the stored queries for the client id, salt,  $\sigma$  and the password and execute `OfflineTestPwd` queries to  $\mathcal{F}_4$ . In case of a "correct guess" reply, we learned the password  $pw$  and can, thus, calculate the password verifier  $W$  and send it to the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ . Otherwise, the password hash oracle has not yet been queried. In this case, we sample a new random hash result  $w$ , setup a new re-program-offline-query entry  $(sid, P_j, w)$  for the hash oracle  $\Lambda_1$ . In this case we calculate the password verifier as  $W = B^w$  and send it to the adversary.

This procedure allows us to later on arrange for matching password verifiers  $W$  and password hashes  $w$ .

We also have to handle the case of impersonation. If  $\mathcal{A}$  uses the stolen password verifier in his attack strategy for impersonating a server, we let the simulator make calls to `SvrImpersonate`.

The only difference to game  $\mathcal{G}_3$  shows up with respect to the way that the password verifier  $W$  is calculated. Irrespectively, whether the adversary had queried the hash oracle before the server compromise operation or after, the simulator always returns  $(w, W)$  pairs matching to the respective passwords. Also in both games the distribution of password hashes and verifiers  $w$  and  $W$  is the same. Game  $\mathcal{G}_3$  and  $\mathcal{G}_4$  are, thus, indistinguishable for the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$ .

The real-world protocol AuCPace, thus emulates the ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$  in the  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{RO}}$  hybrid model.

## 6 Partial augmentation

### 6.1 The ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{papwKE}}$ for modeling *partial* augmentation.

In order to allow for the proof we introduce a new concept for *partial* augmentation of a PAKE protocol. The corresponding functionality is depicted in figure 8. In comparison to  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$  partial augmentation ( $\mathcal{F}_{\text{papwKE}}$ ) gives the attacker the possibility to also impersonate the *client* after having succeeded in compromising the server.

In the partially augmented variant of our protocol, we replace the server-chosen ephemeral key-pair  $(x, X)$  by a long-term key pair that is re-used over several login sessions (same *sid*, different *ssid*). We would have liked to choose the key-pair only once at the point, where the server's Turing machine is first instantiated and not upon each password configuration. Unfortunately this is technically not possible in the UC framework, since this would correspond to a shared state over several *sid*, which is not possible. For this reason, we need to let the server choose  $(x, X)$  upon password configuration and store  $W^x$  together with  $X$  in the password file. I.e., just as the password verifier, the public key  $X$

becomes part of the shared state for session  $sid$ . Note that using a long-term public key essentially halves the computational complexity of AuCPace for the server for the case of the login sessions.

At first glance, since after a server  $P_j$ 's compromise, none of the security guarantees with respect to the adversary are maintained, it might be argued that  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{papwKE}}$  does not actually provide any meaningful advantage in comparison to  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$ .

The advantage, however, becomes obvious when considering the IIoT setting with many servers sharing the same user credentials and passwords. In fact after executing a `StealPWfile` query on server  $P_j$  the adversary has full control over  $P_j$ . Note, however that the adversary is *not* given the clear-text password  $pw$  from  $P_j$  upon server compromise. He is only granted the capability to execute `OfflineTestPwd` queries.

In settings where the adversary may expect other server entities  $P_k$  to operate with the same password  $pw$  as  $P_j$ , client impersonation for connections with  $P_k$  is still precluded.

Note that this is occurring exactly in the use-case of industrial control plants. There user credentials (password verifiers) may be shared by many small server entities, which may be comparably easily stolen/compromised. In this setting, server compromise might most likely be implemented by invasive attacks on the hardware, e.g. by stealing a first server, un-soldering microcontroller or memory chips and by side-channel attacks that re-open debug ports. In this setting  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{papwKE}}$  provides very meaningful protection to the honest subset of servers. It might be likely to detect theft of the device and the partial augmentation feature might provide a sufficiently large time-window allowing for changing user credentials on the plant.

Also undetected re-insertion of a compromised server in a plant might not be a relevant attack scenario, such that the additional capability of the adversary to impersonate the client on this specific server might not actually degrade the security in practice. Moreover, as we will show, the AuCPace scheme allows for a server-specific configuration for partial and full augmentation. A server entity where non-invasive attacks allowing for a re-insertion of a server should be considered feasible might choose to implement  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$  using AuCPace with ephemeral key pair  $(x, X)$  while a server where a more invasive attack is presumed necessary in order to compromise the database (leading to device destruction) might choose to use a long-term secret  $x$  and as a consequence  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{papwKE}}$ .

Similar security guarantees of  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{papwKE}}$  could also be realised if any server uses a different "salt" value for each client, e.g. by letting the server provide a random salt value upon password configuration. This, however precludes mechanisms offering an off-line user credential distribution. In such a setting a central user credential database server is storing password verifiers for all users. (We refer to this other type of server as "the database" in order to avoid confusion with the V-PAKE server entities that receive password verifiers from the database). Note, however that this way upon password changes, the complex  $\text{PBKDF}_\sigma$  password hash would have to be calculated once for each server, significantly reducing the feasible strength of the workload parametrisation  $\sigma$ .

Finally, we would like to mention that it might be possible to relax the requirement that a new key pair has to be chosen upon each password configuration within the server's file. In fact it would be desirable to choose a key pair only once and forever for one specific server. In the UC model, however, we presently see the need for new key pairs upon each password configuration in order to avoid common state in concurrent executions. This aspect might be worth to be further analysed, specifically regarding the real-world case of a server implementation being restricted to one single concurrent login instance by resource-constraints.

## 6.2 Proof

We implement the proof for the partially augmented protocol in the UC hybrid model, just as for the fully augmented variant. However, here leave the black-box model for  $\mathcal{A}$  for

The functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{papwKE}}$  is an extension to the functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$  from figure 6. It implements all of the  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$  queries and extends the capabilities of the adversaries by the following query:

**Upon receiving a query** ( $\text{CltImpersonate}, sid, ssid$ ) **from adversary**  $\mathcal{S}$  :

If there is a session record of the form  $(ssid, P_i, P_j, pw)$  which is **fresh** , then do: If there is a password data record  $(file, P_i, P_j, pw)$  that is marked **compromised** , mark the session record **compromised** and reply to  $\mathcal{S}$  with "correct guess", else mark the the session record **interrupted** and reply with "wrong guess".

**Figure 8:** Ideal functionality  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{papwKE}}$  for partial verifier-based PAKE with explicit authentication.

simplicity.

Since we assume that the key pair  $(x, X)$  is used for several protocol runs, we give the adversary access to the secret exponent  $x$  upon server compromise. For this reason, we also have to consider adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$  which base their attack strategy on this knowledge. In this case, the adversary is able to calculate the password related string  $PRS$  and, thus, impersonate the client. In case of such an attack strategy, we let the simulator use the  $\text{CltImpersonate}$  query of  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{papwKE}}$  in order to make the ideal and real world indistinguishable for the environment  $\mathcal{Z}$  .

## 7 Performance assessment of the AuCPace protocol

In the literature a large number of V-PAKE protocols have been suggested. For a recent comparison regarding efficiency and proven security guarantees see e.g. [PW17]. In this section, we will concentrate on verifier-based protocols offering explicitly proven forward secrecy. According to [PW17] and in line with our own analysis, the most efficient known verifier-based PAKE protocol that allows for forward-secrecy within the analysis [PW17] is VTBPEKE, requiring four exponentiations in total, just as the fully augmented variant of AuCPace.

Since the work of [PW17] one new interesting construction, OPAQUE, has been presented in [JKX18]. OPAQUE is a construction involving the HQMV [Kra05] protocol (for which unfortunately according to the author's knowledge patents apply). With respect to the fully augmented setting we come to the conclusion that OPAQUE allows for the lowest computational complexity on the server by needing only three scalar multiplications. Moreover OPAQUE with its HQMV construction only needs two messages for securely establishing a session key. Unfortunately we believe that for patent reasons, some applications might not be considering use of OPAQUE.

Most of the previously suggested protocols have in contrast to AuCPace not specifically been optimised for small embedded devices. For instance, VTBPEKE requires additional costly operations. E.g., an inversion modulo the group order is used in the construction for the sake of avoiding one communication round. AuCPace in comparison does not need this. AuCPace in comparison to VTBPEKE also provides slightly stronger security guarantees (with respect to assumptions regarding the password distribution) and also requires a total of four scalar multiplications. However unlike VTBPEKE, one of these four  $(X = B^x)$  could be pre-calculated before the login starts. The perceived delay on the HMI interface due to the complex scalar multiplications will correspond, thus, to only three scalar multiplications in the case of AuCPace in contrast to four in the case of VTBPEKE. Also VTBPEKE, just as OPAQUE and augmented variants of PAK [GMR06] requires the full group structure for actual implementation and, thus has to deal with the conventional point compression and point verification issues.

At a first glance, AuCPace requires a comparably large number of communication rounds, specifically regarding the initial establishment of the session ID by exchange of the messages  $t$  and  $s$ . Note, however, that any reasonable communication protocol needs a mandatory protocol handshake phase and that these message exchanges could be integrated in this phase for optimisation. Also the typical use-case of a PAKE protocol is establishment of a secure channel using the session key. In this case, the final authenticator messages are optional. Note, that the two authenticator messages are not mandatory for securely implementing the  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{apwKE}}$  functionality. If using explicit mutual authentication,  $T_a$  and  $T_b$  messages may alternatively be prepended to the first encrypted payload data or "change cipher spec." packet respectively. Also note, that in case that the optional mutual authentication is desired, no specific ordering requirement is imposed on the  $T_a$  and  $T_b$  messages.

AuCPace allows for pipelining message transfer and cryptographic calculation, improving upon user-experienced latency. For instance, the server may interleave transmission of the last message from the augmentation layer  $(X, \sigma, \text{salt})$  and calculation of the public point  $Y_a$ , such that  $Y_a$  is transmitted later in a separate message. In settings where message delivery latency is significant and computation is fast, however, the server may choose to include  $Y_a$  in the earlier message.

With respect to the user-perceived login delay however, AuCPace might still be faster than OPAQUE since, e.g. x-coordinate-only operations are possible and point compression/decompression is not necessary, specifically if one considers that the fourth scalar multiplication of AuCPace could be pre-calculated.

Regarding OPAQUE, it is worth to draw attention to a side-effect of the security property of pre-computation attack resistance. This desirable feature is realised by executing the complex password hash after finishing the protocol step of the oblivious pseudo-random function (OPRF). This requires as a consequence to maintain an online connection to the server entity upon password changes. First an interaction is required between client and server for calculating the OPRF which is required as pre-requisite for calculating the computationally complex PBKDF password hash. As a consequence, if the server is not capable of calculating the PBKDF this effectively precludes user credential distribution protocols based on offline ticket generation.

For this reason, we conclude that V-PAKE constructions finishing the PBKDF operation only after the asymmetric cryptographic primitives are probably not best-suited for applications, where online connections to the server are not guaranteed to be permanently available. We assess, that then offline password database update protocols become helpful, notably for battery-driven devices and devices operating in separated industrial sub-networks that have been intentionally isolated for security reasons from the office IT network maintaining a user credential database.

For important applications in the IIoT setting, we conjecture that conventional full augmentation is not essential and that equivalent security could be obtained when implementing partial augmentation. Specifically here we consider settings where server compromise involves stealing of hardware and highly invasive physical attacks likely to destroy hardware. In the partially augmented setting, AuCPace has a computational complexity of two exponentiations and provides the most efficient solution among known verifier-based PAKE protocols. Attacks on un-compromised servers are prevented even if these are working with the same password verifier  $W$  as, e.g. distributed by a centralised database server.

## 8 Implementation on ARM Cortex M0 and M4 microcontrollers

One important target platform for resource-constrained (I)IoT devices are 32 bit microcontrollers, such as from the ARM Cortex M0 and Cortex M4 series. We have implemented AuCPace25519 in its partially augmented variant on nRF51 and nRF52 microcontrollers from the company Nordic Semiconductors and three different microcontrollers from the manufacturer ST Microelectronics.

In this section we first describe the high-level strategy for implementing the X25519 Diffie-Hellman protocol and Elligator2. Then we will elaborate on our strategy for implementing the field arithmetics.

### 8.1 Implementation of X25519

AuCPace uses X25519 for generating the password verifier and the session key  $sk1$ . We make use of the constant-time Montgomery ladder algorithm from [DHH<sup>+</sup>15]. Both fixed-point and variable-point scalar multiplication require 1287 field multiplications and 1274 field squarings. We did implement two variants. Firstly for the sake of comparison with related work, we implemented a synchronous version of the X25519 function. Secondly, we implemented a second, asynchronous version of X25519. For this second implementation, we defined an asynchronous cryptographic engine (ACE) object that stores the intermediate state of the scalar multiplication. This allows our implementation to suspend and resume calculations after each ladder step in case that the power budget requires the microcontroller to enter a sleep mode.

We came to the conclusion, in line with findings from [Ham12], that the constant-time Montgomery ladder is, most probably the most efficient known algorithmic choice available for Diffie-Hellman on Curve25519, if we aim at avoiding at the same time memory consuming pre-computed tables.

### 8.2 Implementation of Elligator2

In order to remain consistent with the notation used in [BHKL13] we denote the Legendre symbol that records quadratic residuosity of  $a \bmod q$  (with  $q$  being an odd prime number) with  $\chi$ :

$$\chi(a) \triangleq \left(\frac{a}{q}\right) \equiv a^{\frac{q-1}{2}} \quad (1)$$

Remember that the Elligator2's decoding function for a Weierstrass curve  $E : y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + Bx$  is the function  $\psi : R \rightarrow E(\mathbb{F}_q)$  defined as follows:  $\psi(0) = (0, 0)$ ; if  $r \neq 0$  then  $\psi(r) = (x, y)$  (see [BHKL13]). For a set  $R$  defined as

$$R \triangleq \{r \in \mathbb{F}_q : 1 + ur^2 \neq 0, A^2ur^2 \neq B(1 + ur^2)^2\} \quad (2)$$

the following elements of  $\mathbb{F}_q$  are defined (we use only  $X$  coordinates):

$$v = \frac{-A}{1 + ur^2} \quad (3)$$

$$\varepsilon = \chi(v^3 + Av^2 + Bv) \quad (4)$$

$$x = \varepsilon v - (1 - \varepsilon) \frac{A}{2} \quad (5)$$

In case of Curve25519,  $q = 2^{255} - 19$ ,  $A = 486662$  and  $B = 1$ . We take  $u = 2$ . If we would calculate  $x$  directly, we would need two exponentiations, one for the inversion (3) and one

for the Legendre symbol  $\chi(4)$ . We will show that computing a single exponentiation is enough, using the inverse square root algorithm. Let us substitute  $v$  in  $v^3 + Av^2 + Bv$ . We obtain, in a projective representation, the fraction

$$\frac{a}{b} \triangleq \frac{A^3ur^2 + AB(1 + ur^2)^2}{(1 + ur^2)^3} \quad (6)$$

As a property of the Legendre symbol we have:

$$\chi\left(\frac{a}{b}\right) = \chi(ab) \quad (7)$$

since  $\chi\left(\frac{a}{b}\right) \equiv a^{\frac{q-1}{2}} b^{-\frac{(q-1)}{2}} \equiv a^{\frac{q-1}{2}} b^{\frac{q-1}{2}} \equiv \chi(ab)$  with  $1 \equiv a^{q-1} \pmod{q}$  (Fermat's little theorem). Now let's define

$$c \triangleq ab \quad (8)$$

$$d \triangleq 1 + ur^2 \quad (9)$$

$$s \triangleq (cd^2)^{\frac{q-3}{2}} \quad (10)$$

We have  $s^2cd^2 = (cd^2)^{q-2} = \frac{1}{cd^2}$  using Fermat's little theorem again. So the inverse is given by:

$$\frac{1}{d} = s^2cd^2cd \quad (11)$$

iff  $c \neq 0$  and  $d \neq 0$ . If  $c = 0$  then the point is  $(0, 0)$  or  $\infty$ . If  $d = 0$  the point is  $\infty$  and we return 0 in whatever case. On the other hand we can write  $scd^2 = (cd^2)^{\frac{q-1}{2}} \equiv \chi(cd^2)$ . Furthermore it holds that by definition of the Legendre symbol:

$$\chi(ab) = \chi(a)\chi(b) \quad (12)$$

and

$$\chi(d^2) = 1 \quad (13)$$

unless  $d = 0$ . So

$$scd^2 \equiv \chi(cd^2) = \chi(c) = \chi(ab) = \chi\left(\frac{a}{b}\right) \quad (14)$$

By placing (14) into (11) we get

$$\frac{1}{d} = \chi\left(\frac{a}{b}\right)scd \quad (15)$$

This means that we have calculated the Legendre symbol and the inverse (and finally Elligator2) by means of a single exponentiation (10). In case of Elligator2 for Curve25519 our algorithm requires a total of 254 field squarings and 23 field multiplications.

### 8.3 Implementation of the field arithmetics

The implementations for Cortex M0 and M4 share all of the group arithmetics and high-level algorithms but rely on separate field arithmetics for addition, subtraction, negation, multiplication and squaring.

Our implementation for the Cortex M0 uses the same highly optimised field arithmetics as in [DHH<sup>+</sup>15, HL17]. Here register pressure and the limited capability of the multiplier

engine providing only 32 bits of a result make it beneficial to employ three cascaded Karatsuba stages.

The implementation for the Cortex M4 makes use of a new, yet unpublished optimised implementation. Just as for the M0, we use a packed radix 32 representation. Throughout the implementation we reduce field elements modulo  $2^{256} - 38$ .

Our implementation on the M4 uses the much more powerful `MULAL` and `MLAAL` instructions allowing for simultaneously multiplying two 32 bit words and accumulating up to two 32 bit words. Due to the significant advantage of using several stages of Karatsuba multiplication for the M0, we have implemented several variants of Karatsuba multiplication also for the Cortex M4. Experiments, however, have shown that here the reduced register pressure (the "upper" registers R8 . . . R12 and R14 may be used without restrictions) in addition to the fact that accumulation comes essentially for free made schoolbook multiplication faster when register-allocation is carefully tuned. Based on our experiments, we presume that for carefully optimised code on the M4, Karatsuba techniques might become beneficial again for integer sizes above 512 bits.

In order to optimise the register allocation, we have generated the assembly sources by a code generator handling register allocation and spill register storage on the stack. For the accumulation of intermediate results during the multiplication we also make use of the `MULAL` and `MLAAL` instructions. Note that when one register with the value 1 is available, `MLAAL` allows for implementing three 32 bit additions in one single cycle ( $r := a + b + 1 * c$ ) yielding a 64 bit result. For subtraction (and for squaring), we made use of a specific architectural property of the M4 architecture. There two distinct ways of handling addition carries are possible. In addition to the `MLAAL`-based method above, flag-based add and add-with-carry (`ADDS ,ADCS`) and subtract-with-borrow (`SUBS ,SBCS`) instructions are available. The multiplication instructions are specified not to modify the addition/subtraction carry flag. We did use this for merging reduction with subtraction of field elements. We first do accumulate both the value to subtract and a multiple of the prime (that stems from reduction) by using multiply-accumulate instructions. Then we use subtract with borrow to simultaneously subtract both results. Note that this will result in different execution times. Addition could be implemented very efficiently by using the powerful multiplication engine. Subtraction is somewhat slower because `SUBS` and `SBCS` have to be used.

For addition and subtraction, we did use the powerful inline assembly capabilities of both, `GCC` and `CLANG`, that allowed us to avoid a significant amount of call overhead. In order to avoid operand fetches and stores wherever possible, we also made use of an inline assembly function that merges addition of a first operand with the curve-constant's multiple of a second operand ( $r := a + b * 121666$ ). Addition and subtraction of field elements follows the strategy from [DHH<sup>+</sup>15] by first processing the most significant word and then merging reduction of the two most significant bits and addition(subtraction) operation for the remaining seven words. I.e. we make use of the available carry bit 255 to obtain an implementation with only one single carry chain.

One additional optimisation strategy was to bundle load and store operations together as much as possible in blocks. This way the pipeline latency on the M4 could be reduced. Isolated load and store operations account for two clock cycles each, while a sequence of  $n$  such operations only accounts for  $n + 1$  cycles.

### 8.3.1 Field multiplication for ARM Cortex M4

Table 1 depicts the sequence (0 . . . 63) in which each of the 64 partial products of the schoolbook multiplication of the input operand words A0 . . . A7 and B0 . . . B7 is executed. Our optimisation of the multiplication strategy does not seem to follow a regular pattern at first sight.

We use this sequence several reasons. Firstly, we observed that keeping as many input

**Table 1:** Sequence of executing the 64 partial products of words  $A_i \times B_j$  used for schoolbook multiplication of 256 bit operands.

	A0	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7
B0	1	5	10	15	20	25	28	48
B1	0	6	11	16	21	26	29	31
B2	2	7	12	17	22	27	30	32
B3	3	8	13	18	23	49	50	51
B4	4	9	14	19	24	52	53	54
B5	33	36	39	42	45	55	56	57
B6	34	37	40	43	46	58	59	60
B7	35	38	41	44	47	61	62	63

operands in registers as possible is equally important as avoiding stack spills of intermediate multiplication results. Secondly, it is worth noting that a multiplication actually costs *less* instructions if two intermediate results are to be accumulated at the same time. If only one intermediate result is to be accumulated, a MULAL instruction has to be used, which typically requires clearing of a scratch register (+1 instruction).

Basically four subblocks may be distinguished. Initially input operands B0 to B4 are cached in registers and multiplied one after the other with input operands A0 to A4. In the process of multiplication increasingly more registers were required for holding intermediate multiplication results. Completed result words that had been fully accumulated were spilled on the stack in order to free registers for more temporary results. Still starting with the multiplication with input A5, the input operand registers B3 and B4 were required as scratch registers for storing temporaries (multiplication steps 25 to 32). Ultimately also B0 had to be discarded. Then, in order to complete words 5 to 6 of the multiplication results (for freeing completed result words by writes to the stack), multiplication of input operands B5 to B7 with A0 to A4 is performed (33 to 47). Subsequently the multiplication result word 7 could be completed after the multiplication of A7 and B0 (Step 48). Finally the multiplications of input words A6 to A7 with B3 to B7 is calculated. Here the values A5 to A7 were cached in registers.

During the multiplication only 8 register spills were necessary for storing the lower-most result words temporarily on the stack. After multiplication the upper 8 result words of the 512 bit multiplication result were reduced within the register set before storing the reduced result back to memory.

### 8.3.2 Field squaring for ARM Cortex M4

For squarings we again make use of a special property of the Cortex-M4 instruction set which allows for two different types of carry chain. Either the ADDS and ADCS instructions may be employed (storing the carry bit in the status register) or MULAL and MLAAL instructions (which do not modify the carry bit). The latter instructions store carries in full registers. We make use of this by using addition instructions for doubling the off-diagonal parts (with the exception of the product term  $A1 \cdot A0$ ), while we make use of integrated multiply-accumulate operations everywhere else.

In comparison to multiplication, we were able to hold more input operands in registers. The following table depicts the sequence (0..36) in which the partial products were calculated.

Throughout the calculation we distinguish between off-diagonal multiplication results (which require subsequent doubling) and diagonal multiplication results which were accumulated by use of multiplication instructions. Just as for multiplication, squaring is

**Table 2:** Sequence of executing the partial product words  $A_i \times A_j$  used for schoolbook squaring of 256 bit operands .

	A0	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	A7
A0	1	2						
A1	0	3						
A2	5	6	15					
A3	4	11	12	19				
A4	8	9	16	23	32			
A5	7	13	20	24	27	34		
A6	10	17	21	25	28	30	35	
A7	14	18	22	26	29	31	33	36

merged with reduction. This way only 5 register spills to the stack were required for storing intermediate multiplication results.

## 8.4 Implementation of the hash functions

For the calculation of SHA512 we use the optimised assembly code for the Cortex M0 architecture on both targets. This code fully unrolls the inner loop of the add-rotate-xor algorithm. We also make use of the special instructions for endianness-change. For the Cortex M4, a further speedup would be possible, when exploiting the availability of the "upper" registers.

## 9 Experimental results

In the following sections we will report on experimental results obtained from several different microcontroller targets, nRF51822, nRF52832, STM32F407, STM32F411 and STM32L476. We decided to include figures for all of these instead of selecting one particular chipset since in the course of our analysis, we observed that for the Cortex M4 architecture a major difficulty arises regarding speed benchmarking. Unlike for smaller architectures we observed that the highly target-specific performance of the flash memory subsystem plays a major role for the actual speed.

We did observe the most remarkable effect for the microcontroller STM32L476 targeting specifically ultra-low-power applications. Note that for ultra-low-power operation a suitable compromise between increased microcontroller speed and increased power consumption due to speculative flash accesses has to be found. We attribute our finding that the cycle counts for the analysed primitives (depending on the power-consumption configuration) could increase by almost 40% when increasing the clock frequency from 16 MHz to 80 MHz mainly to such type of optimisation. Obviously this makes fair speed benchmarking very difficult.

For the high-performance-family devices STM32F411 and STM32F407 from the same manufacturer, we observed that the influence of the clock frequency on performance is still present, but much smaller. Specifically for the STM32F411 almost no speed reduction was observed also at its highest clock frequency. In addition to flash timing issues, it is worth noting that for the STM32F407 device we observed some further dependence on the RAM memory configuration. This device disposes of so-called core-coupled memory (CCM). The timings reported here were obtained when placing the execution stack to CCM. Speed figures were observed to be somewhat faster than when placing the stack in conventional RAM region.

**Table 3:** Field arithmetics on different targets at different frequencies  $f$  (/MHz). Columns  $*A_0$  ( $+ * A_0$ ) contain clock cycles for multiplication with the field constant  $A_0 = 121666$  and merged addition and multiplication  $x + y * A_0$ . Cycle count for the nRF51 target was obtained with the CLANG compiler with compile switch `-O2` while for the ST Microelectronics microcontroller we did use GCC 4.9.2 with optimisation setting `-O2`.

Target	$f$	$x + y$	$x - y$	$*A_0$	$+ * A_0$	$x^2$	$x * y$	
nRF51822	16	120	147	193	-	998	1478	$\mathbb{F}_{(2^{255}-19)}$ , this work
STM32F411	?	73	77	129	-	563	631	$\mathbb{F}_{(2^{255}-19)}$ , [DSS16]
MK20DX	72	86	86	76	-	252	276	$\mathbb{F}_{(2^{255}-19)}$ , [FA17]
STM32F411	16	55	72	-	58	153	222	$\mathbb{F}_{(2^{255}-19)}$ , this work
STM32L476	16	52	65	-	55	153	220	$\mathbb{F}_{(2^{255}-19)}$ , this work
STM32L476	80	95	124	-	95	168	237	$\mathbb{F}_{(2^{255}-19)}$ , this work
STM32F407	84	86	-	-	-	215	358	$\mathbb{F}_{(2^{127}-1)^2}$ [LLP <sup>+</sup> 18]

As a result, we conclude that for speed benchmarking for cryptography implementations it is best to compare results obtained at lower clock frequencies. According to our results then some variations between different microcontroller suppliers still do exist, however the resulting values are at least of the same order of magnitude. We suggest, that the STM32F411 as a typical medium-size implementation for IIoT applications might be well suited as kind of reference platform for speed benchmarking.

## 9.1 Field arithmetics

In table 3 the speed results for the field arithmetics are summarised. Despite the mentioned difficulties regarding benchmarking, we come to the conclusion that our field arithmetics is significantly more efficient than the previously best published results on the Cortex M4 microcontroller in [FA17], specifically regarding multiplication and squaring of field elements.

The speedup obtained for the field arithmetics in comparison to reports from D. Aranha and H. Fujii in [FA17] in our opinion might stem from the following differences. Firstly for multiplication and squaring we did merge multiplication and squaring functions with reductions. This allowed us to hold more operands in registers. Secondly with the realised level of optimisation regarding multiplication and squaring, the performance of addition and subtraction within the X25519 calculations starts becoming important as well. For these simpler operations call overhead becomes significant and use of inline assembly functions highly beneficial.

For the purpose of comparison, we also did add timings for the field  $\mathbb{F}_{(2^{127}-1)^2}$  as used in the construction Four $\mathbb{Q}$  in [LLP<sup>+</sup>18]. Note that our timings for  $\mathbb{F}_{(2^{255}-19)}$  are significantly faster despite the fact that the group order is comparable. As a result, we expect that a large fraction of the algorithmic speedup that is made possible by the endomorphisms of Four $\mathbb{Q}$  is lost by less efficient field arithmetics. Note, that the most relevant figure for the speed of Diffie-Hellman on Four $\mathbb{Q}$  is field multiplication, where the difference to our results is particularly large.

## 9.2 X25519 Diffie-Hellman

In table 4 we summarise the results for the X25519 function for different microcontrollers and different clock frequencies. Our fastest result for X25519 on the M4 executes in as little as 609.779 cycles and is, thus, roughly 3 and 2.5 times faster than the reports in [dG15] (1816351) and [DSS16] (1563852) respectively and also significantly faster than the

**Table 4:** Speed of X25519 scalar multiplication (FourQ) (on different targets, clock and memory configurations. The timings marked with (p) were obtained with enabled flash pre-fetch engines which increase current consumption.

Target	f / MHz	X25519	
nRF51822	16	3.474.201	this work
STM32F411	?	1.816.351	[dG15]
STM32F411	?	1.563.852	[DSS16]
MK20DX	72	907.240	[FA17]
STM32L476	16, 80 <sup>(p)</sup> , 80	609.779, 857.002, 971.272	this work
nRF52832	64	634.567	this work
STM32F411	16, 100 <sup>(p)</sup> , 100	625.347, 625.449, 734.554	this work
STM32F407	16, 168 <sup>(p)</sup> , 168	625.358, 655.891, 847.048	this work
STM32F407	84 <sup>(p)</sup>	560.500 (FourQ)	[LLP <sup>+</sup> 18]

**Table 5:** Cycle counts for the nRF51822 Cortex M0 (STM32F411 Cortex M4) microcontrollers running at 16 MHz for SHA512, Elligator2, a X25519 Montgomery ladder step (LS), Inversion ( $1/x$ ) and a complete partially augmented AuCPace protocol run.

Target	SHA512	Elligator2	LS	$1/x$	AuCPace
nRF51822	21.564	289.276	13.521	258.291	7.345.820
STM32F411	21.130	46.032	3.163	42.590	1.351.381

previously fastest result (907.240 cycles) from [FA17]. It is worth noting that in contrast to [FA17] we did use (in line with [HL17]) constant-time swaps of pointers instead of swapping full field elements. Note that for internal memories of Cortex M4 and M0 access timing is deterministic. When swapping pointers we expect both, more speed and less side-channel leakage. Note however, that our implementation requires (unlike [FA17]) to be run with using internal RAM memory with constant access times. Our implementation optionally also allows for swapping field elements instead of pointers. According to our own measurements the penalty of doing so accounts roughly for additional 50.000 clock cycles.

Again we also have added speed benchmarks for FourQ from [LLP<sup>+</sup>18] for reference. Note that comparing of the fundamentally different algorithms X25519 and Diffie-Hellman on FourQ is difficult. For instance, when using the endomorphisms in FourQ quite large tables in RAM are required (required stack size is unfortunately not reported in [LLP<sup>+</sup>18]). Also note that the code size is about a factor of three larger than for our X25519 implementation. Despite the fact that our X25519 implementation (ca. 625.500 cycles) is much more adapted to small targets, our observed speed is very competitive in comparison to the reported result for Diffie-Hellman on FourQ (560.500 cycles including point decompression).

### 9.3 Partially augmented AuCPace25519

We have implemented AuCPace by using an asynchronous execution engine as suggested in [HL17]. Table 5 summarises the speed results for individual substeps for the Cortex M0 (nRF51822) and different Cortex M4 microcontrollers.

We observed a speedup of roughly a factor of two in comparison to the results of [HL17] regarding the Elligator2 substep. In [HL17] the Elligator2 mapping algorithm was calculated by use of two separate exponentiations for inversion and calculation of

**Table 6:** Memory consumption in bytes for asynchronised implementation of AuCPace (ACE) and X25519 for Cortex M0 and M4 microcontrollers. Results were obtained with `arm-none-eabi-gcc -O2` (gcc version 4.9.3). RAM consumption is separated in static memory (stack memory) respectively.

Target	RAM	ROM	RAM	ROM	
Target	ACE	ACE	X25519	X25519	
Cortex-M0	264 (396)	11252	0 (572)	6108	this work
Cortex-M4	264 (268)	8896	0 (444)	3324	this work
Cortex-M4				4152	[FA17]
Cortex-M4				3786	[DSS16]

the Legendre symbol  $\chi$ . In our work, we make use of the inverse square root algorithm for calculating Elligator2 with one single field exponentiation. In total this accounts for roughly 4 percent of a speedup regarding the balanced PACE (CPace) protocol runs on the Cortex M0.

Our results for the Cortex-M4 microcontroller family are faster by a factor of 5.4 in comparison to the Cortex M0, showing that this microcontroller architecture with its signal-processing instructions is by far better suited and likely also much more power-efficient for implementing complex asymmetric cryptography.

In table 6 the memory consumptions for the asynchronous execution object ACE from [HL17] and the stand-alone algorithm X25519 are summarised. The figures for the ACE object also include a salsa20-20 based pseudo-random-number generator and the implementation for SHA512. For the Cortex M4 version, the total RAM requirement amounts to 532 bytes including static memory and stack. The stand-alone synchronous X25519 implementation (no state in static memory) for the Cortex M4 needs 444 bytes of stack memory and 3.324 bytes of flash and improves, thus upon previous work [DSS16, FA17].

All of our code avoids secret-dependent branches and is, thus, executing in constant time on target-platforms with deterministic RAM memory access timings, such as typically found in ARM Cortex M0 and M4 microcontrollers.

## 10 Discussion and conclusion

In this paper we have presented a comprehensive analysis regarding possible optimisations for verifier-based password-authenticated key exchange for the setting of resource-constrained servers. Our analysis did cover all of, protocol design, protocol security proof, algorithmic optimisation regarding group operations and field arithmetics and assembly-level fine-tunings.

Our construction allows for particular advantages in IIoT settings where a large number of small server nodes should be expected to operate with the same passwords, such as e.g. the case in industrial plants. In addition to the conventional notion of verifier-based PAKE, our construction also allows for a partial augmentation operation mode that essentially halves the computational complexity of the password verification step.

Our construction with full augmentation imposes a complexity of four exponentiations in total on the server, one of which could be pre-computed prior to each login. The user-perceived login delay, thus is governed by the time consumed for calculating three scalar multiplications.

Our construction, is one exponentiation faster for the server than all previously known verifier-based PAKE constructions when instantiated in its partially augmented variant. In

the setting of [HL17] where one scalar multiplication accounts for about two seconds this results in a clearly perceivable usability gain in comparison to previously known protocols requiring at least three scalar multiplications.

Moreover our construction inherently allows for using strong memory-hard password hashing also on small servers since the costly memory-consuming operations are deferred to the clients.

The composability of the AuCPace security guarantees facilitates security analysis for use of AuCPace, e.g. as a building block in larger constructions, such as a centralised ticket-based user-credential distribution framework for industrial plants.

In contrast to most previous Diffie-Hellman based V-PAKE constructions with analysis in the UC framework, our security proof provides guarantees also in the stronger fully adaptive adversary model which allows for corruptions at any time during session establishment.

Finally, we have presented performance benchmarks of an instantiation targeting common microcontroller platforms coined AuCPace25519 which instantiates our protocol with using the primitives X25519, Elligator2 and SHA512.

The protocol runs in only 1.351.381 (7.345.820) cycles for a partially augmented protocol run on an ARM Cortex-M4 (M0) microcontroller respectively. On the M4 AuCPace requires only 8896 (532) bytes of flash (RAM) memory. There the X25519 Diffie-Hellman protocol sub-step executes in as little as 609.779 cycles. Our implementation, thus, sets up new speed records for both, (V)-PAKE protocols and X25519 Diffie-Hellman key exchange on this important embedded CPU architecture platform. This illustrates also that on the Cortex M4 X25519 could be implemented very competitively, even in comparison to constructions that exploit additional structure in elliptic curves, such as endomorphisms.

Summing up, we believe that all of the individual components presented in this paper in combination might yield a solution particularly tailored for the needs of real-world resource-constrained IIoT environments, such as notably explosion protected industrial instrumentation.

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## A Notes regarding short Weierstrass curves

Our construction shares with [JKX18] the requirement that an efficient hashing to group elements must be available for the elliptic curve's point group. Unfortunately, this is not always the case for important established curves, namely regarding standards using the short Weierstrass form. In order to circumvent this problem, as an alternative in [PW17] a construction TBPEKE based on two base points and an additional scalar multiplication has been suggested by Pointcheval and Wang. Note that this construction is very similar to the balanced sub-protocol CPace presented in this paper.

In this appendix we deal with the question, whether the TBPEKE construction could also be used instead of CPace as a balanced sub-protocol component for AuCPace. I.e. the question is whether the TBPEKE construction could also be proven secure in the UC model. In our opinion, this answer could be given affirmatively. However, unfortunately, our UC security proof technique that allowed for *fully adaptive* adversaries could probably not be carried out for TBPEKE because of a technical commitment problem within the Diffie-Hellman step. However, we come to the conclusion, that the balanced sub-step of TBPEKE could be proven secure also in the UC framework, when considering a weaker *static* adversary model as used for most other security proofs of efficient constructions in the UC framework such as [GMR06].

I.e. for implementations forced to use older short Weierstrass curves, we suggest to replace our technique for the calculation of the ephemeral generator  $G$  as  $G = \text{Map2Point}(H_1(PRS))$  by the TBPEKE equivalent of  $G = A + C^{H_1(PRS)}$ . The essential property (as pointed out also in [BFK09]) is that the discrete logarithm of  $G$  must be unknown for both, honest parties and the adversaries.

Note that for any TBPEKE-based construction we see as important pre-requisite that the "nothing-upon-my-sleeve" problem related to the secrecy of the discrete log of the points  $C$  and  $A$  needs to be resolved in a trustworthy way.

Here we make the following suggestion. For any of the older short Weierstrass form elliptic curves we suggest to determine the curve points  $A$  and  $C$  by the following algorithm. For the point  $A$  ( $C$ ) we suggest to first take the packed little-endian encoding of the standardised curve's base point  $x$  ( $y$ ) coordinate and calculate  $\tilde{x}_A = \text{SHA512}(x)$  ( $\tilde{x}_C = \text{SHA512}(y)$ ). When doing so, there is a non-negligible probability that the  $x$ -coordinates  $\tilde{x}_A$  and  $\tilde{x}_C$  actually correspond to the  $x$ -coordinate of a point on the twist or possibly on a small subgroup. In this case we suggest to increment the coordinates step by step by one until a point on the cryptographic group is returned. We then suggest to choose the one out of two  $y$ -coordinate candidates  $y_A$  and  $y_C$  such that the least-significant bit 0 of the  $y$ -coordinate is zero.

Based on the assumption that no common mathematical structure is shared between the respective short Weierstrass curve and the Add-Rotate-XOR (ARX) algorithm SHA512, we conclude that it is justified to conjecture the secrecy of the discrete logarithms of  $A$  and  $C$ .

## B Notes regarding UC security of the PACE protocol variant from [HL17]

The protocol in [HL17] is closely related to the protocol CPace presented in this paper. This protocol and the specific optimisation steps were yet not analysed within the UC framework. The main difference to CPace stems from the strategy used for circumventing the patents on SPEKE.

While we do not detail a full UC security proof for this protocol, we never the less would like to sketch the necessary steps for executing it. The difference of [HL17] to CPace essentially is that the calculation of the password related string  $PRS$  involves an additional symmetric encryption, not actually needed for securely implementing the protocol. In order to cover the patent circumvention protocol, we suggest to proceed as follows:

- Firstly we use the encrypted version of the messages  $s$  together with the nonce value and the message  $t$  that are exchanged at the beginning of the protocol for deriving the session id needed for the UC framework.
- We then use the symmetric salsa20-20 primitive on the password in order to generate the XOR pad used in [HL17] and modify the definition of the password-related string  $PRS$  according to the patent circumvention construction.
- We then prove that the password related string  $PRS$  generated this way matches iff the same password  $pw$  was used by both, server and client. For this step, we essentially need the property that the entropy of the password is preserved when extracting a random stream from  $pw$  and nonce value by using salsa20-20.
- The rest of the proof could then be executed by the same procedures as used in this paper. (Note that the explicit authentication step involving generation of several authenticators by one single run of SHA512 is not mandatory for securely implementing  $\mathcal{F}_{\text{pwKE}}$ .)