

Privacy-preserving auditable token payments in a permissioned blockchain system

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Abstract. Token management systems were the first application of blockchain technology and are still the most widely used one. Early implementations such as Bitcoin or Ethereum provide virtually no privacy beyond basic pseudonymity: all transactions are written in plain to the blockchain, which makes them perfectly linkable and traceable. Several more recent blockchain systems, such as Monero or Zerocash, implement improved levels of privacy. Most of these systems target the *permissionless* setting, just like Bitcoin. Many practical scenarios, in contrast, require token systems to be *permissioned*, binding the tokens to user identities instead of pseudonymous addresses, and also requiring auditing functionality in order to satisfy regulation such as AML/KYC. We present a privacy-preserving token management system that is designed for permissioned blockchain systems and supports fine-grained auditing. The scheme is secure under computational assumptions in bilinear groups, in the random-oracle model.

Keywords: Privacy preserving payments · Hyperledger Fabric tokens · Zero Knowledge · Threshold signature schemes.

1 Introduction

Token management systems were the first application of blockchain technology and are still the most widely used one. Early implementations such as Bitcoin or Ethereum provide virtually no privacy beyond basic pseudonymity: all transactions are written in plain to the blockchain, which makes them perfectly linkable and traceable.

Several approaches exist for adding different levels of privacy to blockchain-based transactions. *Tumblers* combine several transactions of different users and obscure the relation between payers and payees. In *mix-in*-based systems, transactions reference multiple superfluous payers that are however not changed by the transaction and only serve as a cover-up for the actual payer. *Confidential Assets* [29] hide the amounts in a payment but leave the payer-payee relation in the open. Finally, several advanced systems both encrypt the amounts and fully hide the payer-payee relation.

While the privacy of transactions is important, it should not void the requirements of transparency and auditability, especially in permissioned networks that come with strong identity management and promise to ensure accountability and non-deniability. This paper introduces a solution dedicated to the permissioned setting to cover this gap: it hides the content of transactions without preventing authorized parties from auditing them.

Another goal of this paper is to move away from complex setup assumptions that underpin zkSNARK-based schemes and work with standard assumptions to build our solution. Restricting ourselves to the permissioned setting allows us to leverage a combination of signatures and standard ZK-proofs to achieve our security goals.

Results. In this paper we introduce a token management system for permissioned networks with the following properties:

- *Privacy* Transactions written on the blockchain conceal both the values that are transferred and the payer-payee relationship. The transaction leaks no information about the outputs spent in this transaction beyond the fact that they are valid and unspent.
- *Authorization* Users authorize transactions via certificates; i.e., the authorization for spending a token is bound to the user’s identity instead of a pseudonym (or address). The authorization is privacy-preserving.
- *Auditability* Each user has an assigned auditor that is allowed to see the transaction information *related to that particular user*.

Satisfying all three requirements is crucial for implementing a payment system that protects user privacy but at the same time complies with regulation.

Our system is based on the unspent transaction output (UTXO) model pioneered by Bitcoin [26] and supports multi-input-multi-output transactions. It inherits several ideas from prior work, such as the use of Pedersen commitments from Confidential Assets [29] and the use of serial numbers to prevent double-spending from Zerocash [2]. These are combined with a blind certification mechanism that guarantees the validity of tokens via threshold signatures, and with an auditing mechanism that allows flexible and fine-grained assignment of users to auditors.

We use a selection of cryptographic schemes that are based in the discrete-logarithm or pairing settings and are structure-preserving, such as Dodis-Yampolskiy VRF [14], ElGamal encryption [15], Groth signatures [20], Pedersen commitments [28], and Pointcheval-Sanders signatures [30]. This allows us to use the relatively efficient Groth-Sahai proofs [22] and achieve security under standard assumptions, in the random-oracle model.

Related work. Various solutions for improving privacy in blockchain-based token systems exist. We briefly review the most related ones.

Miers et al. [25] introduced Zerocoin, which allows users to anonymize their bitcoins by converting them into *zerocoins* that rely on hiding commitments and zero-knowledge proofs. Zerocoins can be changed back to Bitcoins without

leaking their origin. Zerocoin however does not offer any transacting or auditing capabilities.

Zerocash is a fully anonymous decentralized payment scheme introduced by Ben-Sasson et al. [2]. Zerocash uses commitments and zero-knowledge proofs to validate payments and prevent double-spending. Zerocash offers unconditional anonymity, to the extent that users can repudiate their participation in a transaction. On the downside, Zerocash requires a trusted setup and its security relies on non-falsifiable assumptions.

Extensions to Zerocash have been proposed [16] to support expressive validity rules to provide accountability: notably, the proposed solution ensures regulatory closure (i.e. allowing exchanges of assets of the same type only), enforcing spending limits and tracing tainted coins. In terms of accountability, the proposed scheme allows the tracing of certain *tainted* coins, while not really extensively and consistently allowing transactions to be audited. By building on Zerocash, the proposed scheme inherits many properties such as the computational assumptions.

Solidus [13] is a privacy-preserving protocol for asset transfer that is suitable for intermediated bilateral transactions, where banks act as mediators. Solidus conceals the transaction graph and values by using banks as proxies. The authors leverage ORAMs for banks to keep track of the transactions that took place without publicly revealing the exact type of account access that took place, and they augment ORAM with zero-knowledge proofs to enable public verifiability of the correctness of the inserted changes. Solidus only gives way to intermediated auditability.

The zkLedger protocol of Narula, Vasquez, and Virza [27] is a permissioned asset transfer scheme that hides transaction amounts as well as the payer-payee relationship and supports auditing. One main difference with our approach is the transaction model: zkLedger uses balances, whereas our system uses UTXO. Their transaction format grows linearly with the number of participants in the system, whereas our transaction size grows only with the number of inputs and outputs that are actually used in a transaction. On the flip side, the statements zkLedger has to prove in zero knowledge are simpler than ours, which results in better efficiency. Due to these different properties, the systems target different use cases and are complementary.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

We use **sans-serif** fonts to denote special values such as **true** or **false**, and **typewriter** fonts to denote string constants. All cryptographic algorithms are parametrized by a so-called *security parameter* $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ given (sometimes implicitly) to the algorithms. We generally denote the message space of algorithms by \mathcal{M} .

To succinctly represent proofs of knowledge, we use the common notation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [8], namely $\text{PK}\{(witness) : statement\}$ to denote a proof of knowledge of *witness* for *statement*.

2.2 Cryptographic schemes

The section presents cryptographic schemes that we use to build the protocol. We only present them briefly, and provide more information on concrete instantiations later in the paper.

Commitment schemes. A commitment scheme COM consists of three algorithms crsgen , commit , and open . The commit algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm that, on input of a vector (m_1, \dots, m_ℓ) of messages, outputs a pair $(cm, r_{\text{cm}}) \leftarrow^s \text{commit}(\text{crs}, (m_1, \dots, m_\ell))$ of commitment cm and an opening r_{cm} . Finally, there is a deterministic opening algorithm $\text{open}(\text{crs}, cm, (m_1, \dots, m_\ell), r_{\text{cm}})$ that outputs either **true** or **false**.

Commitments must be *hiding* in the sense that, without knowledge of r_{cm} , they do not reveal information on the committed messages, and they must be *binding* in the sense that it must be infeasible to find a different set of messages m'_1, \dots, m'_ℓ and r'_{cm} that are valid for the same commitment.

Digital signature schemes. A digital signature scheme SIG consists of three algorithms sigkeygen , sign , and verify . The key generation algorithm $(sk, pk) \leftarrow^s \text{sigkeygen}(\lambda)$ takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a pair of private (or secret) key sk and public key pk . Signing algorithm $s \leftarrow^s \text{sign}(sk, m)$ takes as input private key sk and message m , and produces a signature s . Deterministic verification algorithm $b \leftarrow \text{verify}(pk, m, s)$ takes as input public key pk , message m , and signature s , and outputs a Boolean b that signifies whether s is a valid signature on m relative to public key pk . The standard definition of signature scheme security, existential unforgeability under chosen-message attack, has been introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest [19]. It states that the probability for an efficient adversary, given an oracle for producing valid signatures, to output a valid signature on a message that has not been queried to the oracle must be negligible. The security of a signature scheme can also be described by an ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{SIG} , which we include in the appendix.

Threshold signature schemes. A non-interactive threshold signature scheme TSIG consists of four algorithms threshKeygen , sign , combine , and verify . Threshold key generation $(sk_1, \dots, sk_n, pk_1, \dots, pk_n, pk) \leftarrow^s \text{threshKeygen}(\lambda, n, t)$ gets as input security parameter λ , total number of parties n , and threshold t . Each party can sign with their own secret key sk_i as above to generate a partial signature s_i . Any t valid signatures can be combined using combine into a full signature s , which is verified as in the non-threshold case. A signature produced honestly by any t parties verifies correctly, but any signature produced by less than t parties will not verify.

Public-key encryption. A public-key encryption scheme PKE consists of three algorithms pkeKeygen , enc , and dec . Key-generation algorithm $(sk, pk) \leftarrow^s \text{pkeKeygen}(\lambda)$ takes as input security parameter λ and outputs a pair of private key sk and public key pk . Probabilistic encryption algorithm $c \leftarrow^s \text{enc}(pk, m)$ takes as input message m and public key pk and produces ciphertext c . We also write $c \leftarrow$

$\text{enc}(pk, m; r)$ where we want to emphasize that the encryption uses randomness r . Deterministic decryption $b \leftarrow \text{dec}(sk, c)$ takes as input ciphertext c and private key sk and recovers message m . Correctness requires that $\text{dec}(sk, \text{enc}(pk, m)) = m$ for all (sk, pk) generated by pkeKeygen . For our work we require semantic security as first defined by Goldwasser and Micali [18]. The scheme must additionally satisfy key privacy as defined by Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai, and Pointcheval [1], which states that, given a ciphertext c , it must be hard to determine the public key under which the ciphertext is encrypted.

Verifiable random functions. A verifiable random function VRF consists of three algorithms vrfKeygen , eval , and check . Key generation $(vsk, vpk) \leftarrow_s \text{vrfKeygen}(\lambda)$ takes as input the security parameter and outputs a pair of private key vsk and public key vpk . Deterministic evaluation $(y, \psi) \leftarrow \text{eval}(vsk, x)$ takes as input secret key vsk and input value x , and produces as output the value y with proof ψ . Deterministic verification $b \leftarrow \text{check}(vpk, x, y, \psi)$ takes as input public key vpk , input x , output y , and proof ψ , and outputs a Boolean that signifies whether the proof should be accepted.

The scheme satisfies *correctness* if honest proofs are always accepted. *Soundness* means that it is infeasible to produce a proof for a wrong output value. The scheme must satisfy *pseudorandomness* which means that, given only vpk , the output y for a fresh input x is indistinguishable from a random output.

2.3 Universal composition and MUC

In this section, we only recall basic notation and specific parts of the model that we need in this work. Details can be found in [9, 11, 10].

The UC framework follows the simulation paradigm, and the entities taking part in the protocol execution (protocol machines, functionalities, adversary, and environment) are described as *interactive Turing machines* (ITMs). The execution is an interaction of *ITM instances* (ITIs) and is initiated by the environment \mathcal{Z} that provides input to and obtains output from the protocol machines, and also communicates with adversary \mathcal{A} resp. simulator \mathcal{S} . The adversary has access to the protocols as well as functionalities used by them. Each ITI has an identity that consists of a party identifier pid and a session identifier sid . The environment and adversary have specific, constant identifiers, and ideal functionalities have party identifier \perp . The understanding here is that all ITIs that share the same code and the same sid are considered a *session* of a protocol. It is natural to use the same pid for all ITIs that are considered the same party.

ITIs can invoke other ITIs by sending them messages, new instances are created adaptively during the protocol execution when they are first invoked by another ITI. In order to use composition, some additional restrictions on protocols are necessary. In a protocol $\rho^{\phi \rightarrow \pi}$, which means that all calls within ρ to protocol ϕ are replaced by calls to protocol π , both protocols ϕ and π must be *subroutine respecting*. This means, in a nutshell, that while those protocols may have further subroutines, all inputs to and outputs from subroutines of ϕ or π must only be given and obtained through ϕ or π , never by directly interacting

with their subroutines. This requirement is natural, since a higher-level protocol should never directly access the internal structure of ϕ or π ; this would obviously hurt composition¹. Also, protocol ρ must be *compliant*. This roughly means that ρ should not be invoking instances of π with the same *sid* as instances of ϕ , as otherwise these instances of π would interact with the ones obtained by the operation $\rho^{\phi \rightarrow \pi}$.

In summary, a protocol execution involves the following types of ITIs: the environment \mathcal{Z} , the adversary \mathcal{A} , instances of the protocol machines π , and (possibly) further ITIs invoked by \mathcal{A} or any instance of π (or their subroutines). The contents of the environment’s output tape after the execution is denoted by the random variable $\text{EXEC}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}}(\lambda, z)$, where $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ is the *security parameter* and $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$ is the input to the environment \mathcal{Z} . The formal details of the execution are specified in [10]. We say that a protocol π UC-realizes a functionality \mathcal{F} if

$$\forall \mathcal{A} \exists \mathcal{S} \forall \mathcal{Z} : \text{EXEC}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}} \approx \text{EXEC}_{\phi, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{Z}},$$

where “ \approx ” denotes indistinguishability of the respective distribution ensembles, and ϕ is the dummy protocol that simply relays all inputs to and outputs from the functionality \mathcal{F} .

Multi-protocol UC The standard UC framework does not allow to modularly prove protocols in which, e.g., a zero-knowledge proof system is used to prove that a party has performed a certain evaluation of a cryptographic scheme correctly. Camenisch, Drijvers, and Tackmann [4] recently showed how this can be overcome. In a nutshell, they start from the standard $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}^R$ -functionality which is parametrized by a relation R , and show that if R is described in terms of evaluating a protocol, then the protocol can equivalently be evaluated outside of the functionality, and even used to realize another functionality \mathcal{F} . This results in a setting where $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ validates a pair (y, w) of statement y and witness w by “calling out” to the other functionality \mathcal{F} . We use this proof technique extensively in this work.

2.4 Set-up functionalities

Our protocol requires a number of set-up functionalities to be available. Most of these functionalities are widely used in the literature, which is why we only briefly describe them here and specify them in detail in the appendix.

Common reference string. Functionality \mathcal{F}_{CRS} provides a string that is sampled at random from a given distribution and accessible to all participants. All parties can simply query \mathcal{F}_{CRS} for the reference string. The functionality is generally used to generate common public parameters used in a cryptographic scheme.

Transaction ledger. We describe a simplified transaction ledger functionality as $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$ in Figure 1. In a nutshell, every party can append bit strings to a globally available ledger, and every party can retrieve the current ledger.




Fig. 1. Ledger functionality.

The functionality intentionally idealizes the guarantees achieved by a real-world ledger; transactions are immediately appended, final, and available to all parties. We also use $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$ as a local functionality. These simplifications are intended to keep the paper more digestible.

Non-interactive zero-knowledge. The guarantees provided by non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge can be formalized via the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ proposed by Groth, Ostrovsky, and Sahai [21]. In a nutshell, the (honest or dishonest) prover inputs statement and witness and obtains a proof, the adversary only learns the statement. The verification operates by inputting statement and proof, and the functionality provides the consistent response.

Secure and private message transfer. Functionality \mathcal{F}_{SMT} provides a message transfer mechanism between parties. The functionality builds on the ones described by Canetti and Krawczyk [12], but additionally hides the sender and receiver of a message, if both are honest. This is required since our protocol passes information between transacting parties, and leaking the communication pattern to the adversary would revoke the anonymity otherwise provided by our protocol.

Registration functionality. The registration functionality \mathcal{F}_{REG} models a public-key infrastructure. It allows each party P to input one value $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and makes the pair (P, x) available to all other parties. This is generally used to publish public keys, binding them to the identity of a party.

Anonymous authentication. As our protocol is in the permissioned setting but supposed to provide privacy, we need anonymous credentials to authorize transactions. Our schemes integrate well with the Identity Mixer family of protocols [7]. Yet, as these topics are not the core interest of this paper, we abstract the necessary mechanisms in the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$ as depicted in Figure 2.

In a nutshell, the functionality allows parties to first register and then “authorize” commitments; the functionality returns “proofs” ψ assuring that the party’s identity is contained in a certain position of that commitment. The exact reason for this mechanism will become clear in Section 3.1.

Our description of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$ is simplistic and tailored to an easy treatment in our proofs. For a complete composable model of anonymous authentication schemes, see e.g. the work of Camenisch, Dubovitskaya, Haralambiev, and




Fig. 2. Extended anonymous registration functionality.

Kohlweiss [5]. We chose this simplified version since this part of the mechanism is not the focus of this work.

3 Warm-up: Simplified protocol

We present in this section a simplified version of the protocol, and add complexity step by step. The goal of this section is to arrive at a still minimal but functional version, which is then extended with further functionality in the subsequent sections.

3.1 First outline

Functionality. The goal of the simplified protocol is the realization of functionality $\mathcal{F}_{S-TOKEN}$ specified in Figure 3. In a nutshell, the functionality allows for privacy-preserving single-input single-output transactions between users. The functionality has a specific *issuer* I that is allowed to issue new tokens; this can easily be generalized to a set \mathcal{I} of issuers each issuing tokens in their own name. Tokens are always bound to the (identity of the) current owner.

Each party first has to register by sending **register** to $\mathcal{F}_{S-TOKEN}$. At any later time, a party can send **read** to $\mathcal{F}_{S-TOKEN}$ to obtain a list of items $(cm, v) \in \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{N}$, where cm is an identifier for the token and v is its value. The issuer I can input **(issue, v)** to mint a new token with value v . The response of the functionality is the identifier cm of the newly minted token. A party that owns a token cm can transfer it to receiver R by inputting **(transfer, cm, R)**




Fig. 3. SISO token functionality.

to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$. The response is the new identifier cm' that can be used by R to address that token.

The adversary learns when new tokens are issued; in particular it learns the value and the issuer. Token transfers between honest users are private: only the fact that a transfer occurs is leaked. If either the sender or the receiver is corrupt, the adversary learns the full details of the transaction.

(Incomplete) protocol. The protocol represents tokens as commitments $(cm, r_{cm}) \leftarrow_s \text{commit}(crs, (v, P))$ that stored on $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$, where v is the value and P is the current owner. Issuers can create new tokens in their own name. Transferring tokens (v, P) to a party R means replacing the record with a record (v, R) . We now describe all protocol steps in more detail, but still at an informal level.

A party first registers in the system by invoking **register** at its protocol. The protocol then inputs **register** at functionality \mathcal{F}_{A-AUTH} . This step corresponds to registering at an identity provider. The protocol also retrieves the CRS crs used for the commitments from \mathcal{F}_{CRS} .

Issuer I can invoke (**issue**, v) at its protocol. The protocol then generates a new commitment $(cm, r_{cm}) \leftarrow_s \text{commit}(crs, (v, I))$, which means a token with value v is created with owner I . The protocol generates a proof

$$\psi_0 \leftarrow \text{PK}\{(r_{cm}) : \text{open}(crs, cm, r_{cm}, (v, I)) = \text{true}\},$$

which shows that the commitment contains the expected information. It also generates a proof ψ_2 by calling **prove-issue** at \mathcal{F}_{A-AUTH} , which effectively shows that I is authorized to generate this transaction. The information written to \mathcal{F}_{LEDGER} is (**issue**, v, cm, ψ_0, ψ_2).

A party can transfer a token identified by a commitment cm to a receiver R by invoking (**transfer**, v, R). The protocol generates a new commitment $(cm', r'_{cm}) \leftarrow_s \text{commit}(crs, (v, R))$. It generates a NIZK ψ_1 showing that cm' contains the correct information and a proof ψ_2 (via \mathcal{F}_{A-AUTH}) showing that P controls cm . The information written to \mathcal{F}_{LEDGER} is (**transfer**, cm', ψ_1, ψ_2). At this point, we cannot yet describe how P proves that (a) cm is a valid commitment on the ledger—we cannot include cm in the transaction as that would hurt privacy—and (b) that P is not double-spending cm . These aspects will be covered in the next sections. Party P additionally sends the message (**token**, cm', r'_{cm}, v) to R via \mathcal{F}_{SMT} .

Furthermore, a party can invoke **read** to obtain the list of tokens a party owns. Each invocation (of **issue**, **transfer**, or **read**) at a party begins with querying \mathcal{F}_{LEDGER} for new transactions and verifying them, and querying \mathcal{F}_{SMT} for incoming messages, which are also verified against the information stored on the ledger.

Security. The protocol guarantees privacy since the token data is stored on the ledger in a commitment that is only opened by the sender and the receiver of that transaction, together with zero-knowledge proofs. The proofs obtained via \mathcal{F}_{A-AUTH} bind the transaction to the owner of a token. The consistency guarantees will only become fully clear in the next subsections, but intuitively it should already be clear that the NIZK ψ_1 in **transfer** will guarantee that the commitments cm and cm' contain the same token value and issuer.

3.2 Certification via blind signatures

The problem of verification of token validity during transfer will be resolved by *certification*. We consider a specific party, called a *certifier* C , which will vouch for the validity of the token by issuing a signature. We later show in Section 4.2 how the certification task can be distributed, so that no single party has to be trusted for verification.

Moreover, we use a blind signature protocol that implements the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{BLINDSIG}$ specified in Figure 4. (We specify the threshold version directly, for




Fig. 4. Blind signature functionality, threshold version.

the setting described here one uses $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}(1)$ with a single certifier C_1 . In that case, the threshold signature scheme can be replaced by a simple signature scheme.) The functionality allows all parties to obtain the public key pk of the signature scheme through the **get-pk** call. A party P can subsequently use the call **(request, $crs, r_{\text{cm}}, (m_1, \dots, m_\ell)$)** to request a blind signature on the vector (m_1, \dots, m_ℓ) of messages. The functionality provides to the signer C the commitment $cm \leftarrow \text{commit}(crs, (m_1, \dots, m_\ell); r_{\text{cm}})$. Party C can now check whether cm indeed exists in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$, and if so, it can input **(sign, cm)**, which in turn leads to a signature s on (m_1, \dots, m_ℓ) being created and output to P . All parties can also use **(verify, $pk, s, (m_1, \dots, m_\ell)$)** to verify the signature.

We will provide more information on the protocol that realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$ and the instantiation with a concrete signature scheme later in the paper.

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$ is used by a party P during transfer: the user provides as input the contents (v, P) of the commitment cm they want to spend, along with the opening r_{cm} , which leads to C learning cm . Certifier C then checks whether cm is valid (i.e. appears on $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$), and if so C signs. Thereby, P learns a signature of C on (v, P) and can prove knowledge of this signature to other parties.

3.3 Serial numbers prevent double-spending

Double-spending prevention is achieved via a scheme that is inspired by Zerocash [2] in that it uses a VRF to compute serial numbers for tokens when they are spent. The VRF key is here, however, bound to a user identity via a signature from a certification authority. On a very high level, the protocol described in Section 3.2 is extended as follows.

1. Each user P creates a VRF key pair (vsk, vpk) . They obtain a signature s_A from certification authority A that binds vsk to their identity P .
2. Each commitment contains an additional value $\rho \in \mathcal{M}$.
3. During transfer, the value ρ is used to derive the serial number $(sn, \psi) \leftarrow \text{eval}(vsk, \rho)$. The transaction stored in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$ also contains sn .
4. We cannot store ψ in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$, as this would deanonymize P . Therefore, P proves knowledge of signature s_A , which binds vpk to its identity, and proves $\text{check}(vpk, \rho, sn, \psi)$ through a NIZK proof.

It is important to note that authority A must be trusted for preventing double-spending, since it could easily certify two different VRF keys for the same user. It is therefore suggested to implement A in a distributed fashion.

We first describe the complete protocol $\pi_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$ in the following. We then go on to prove that it realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$ if the commitment is perfectly hiding and computationally binding, and the VRF is secure. The protocol uses functionalities $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$, \mathcal{F}_{SIG} , and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$.

Complete protocol $\pi_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$. The protocol has a bit $\text{registered} \leftarrow \text{false}$ and keeps an initially empty list of commitments. We begin by describing the protocol for a regular user P of the system.

- Upon input **register**, if registered is set, then return. Else, retrieve the public keys of A and C from \mathcal{F}_{REG} . Query crs from \mathcal{F}_{CRS} . Generate a VRF key pair (vsk, vpk) and send a message $(\text{register}, vpk)$ to A via \mathcal{F}_{SMT} to obtain a signature s_A on (P, vpk) . If all steps succeeded, then set $\text{registered} \leftarrow \text{true}$ send **register** to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$.
- Process pending messages. (This is a subroutine called from functions below.)
Retrieve new data from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$.
 - For transactions $tx = (\text{issue}, v, cm, \psi_0, \psi_2)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$, validate ψ_0 by inputting $(\text{verify}, (\text{crs}, cm, v, I), \psi_0)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ and verify ψ_2 by giving $(\text{verify-issue}, cm, \psi_2)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$. If both checks succeed, record cm as a valid commitment.
 - For transactions $tx = (\text{transfer}, sn, cm, \psi_1, \psi_2)$, check the serial number sn for uniqueness, validate ψ_1 via $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ and verify ψ_2 via $(\text{verify-transfer}, cm, \psi_2, (sn, cm, \psi_1))$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$. If all checks succeed, then store cm as valid.
 - For each incoming message $(\text{token}, cm, r_{\text{cm}}, v, \rho)$ buffered from \mathcal{F}_{SMT} , test whether the commitment is correct, i.e. whether it holds that $\text{open}(\text{crs}, cm, r_{\text{cm}}, (v, P, \rho)) = \text{true}$. Check whether there is a transaction tx that appears in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$ with $tx = (\text{transfer}, sn, cm, \psi_1, \psi_2)$. If all checks are successful, store the information in the internal list.

- Upon input **read**, if \neg *registered* then abort, else first process pending messages. Then return a list of all unspent assets (cm, v) owned by the party.
- Upon input (**issue**, v), assuming that *registered*, process pending messages and proceed as follows.
 1. Choose uniformly random $\rho \leftarrow_s \mathcal{M}$. Create a commitment $(cm, r_{cm}) \leftarrow_s \text{commit}(crs, (v, P, \rho))$.
 2. Compute a proof

$$\psi_0 \leftarrow \text{PK} \{ (r_{cm}, \rho) : \text{open}(crs, cm, r_{cm}, (v, P, \rho)) = \text{true} \},$$

where P and v are publicly known. (This is achieved by sending (**prove**, y, w) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$, where the statement is $y = (crs, cm, v, P)$ and the witness is $w = (r_{cm}, \rho)$.)

3. Send (**prove-issue**, cm, r_{cm}, v, ρ) to obtain ψ_2 .
 4. Send to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$ the input (**append**, (**issue**, v, cm, ψ_0, ψ_2)).
 5. Store tuple (cm, r_{cm}, v, ρ) internally and return (**issued**, cm).
- Upon input (**transfer**, cm_0, R), assuming that *registered*, query (**lookup**, R) to \mathcal{F}_{REG} in order to make sure that R is registered. Then process pending messages and proceed as follows.
 1. If there is no record $(cm_0, r_{cm}^0, v, \rho^{\text{in}})$, then abort.
 2. Choose uniformly random $\rho^{\text{out}} \leftarrow_s \mathcal{M}$. Create a commitment $(cm_1, r_{cm}^1) \leftarrow_s \text{commit}(crs, (v, R, \rho^{\text{out}}))$.
 3. Compute the serial number as $(sn_0, \pi_0) \leftarrow \text{eval}(vsk, \rho^{\text{in}})$.
 4. Input (**request**, $r_{cm}^0, (v, P, \rho^{\text{in}})$) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$, and wait for a response s_C .
 5. Compute a proof

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_1 \leftarrow \text{PK} \{ (r_{cm}, s_A, s_C, R, P, \rho^{\text{in}}, \rho^{\text{out}}, \pi_0, v) : \\ \text{verify}(pk_C, (v, P, \rho^{\text{in}}), s_C) \wedge \text{open}(crs, cm, (v, R, \rho^{\text{out}}), r_{cm}) \\ \wedge \text{verify}(pk_A, (P, vpk), s_A) \wedge \text{check}(vpk, \rho^{\text{in}}, sn_0, \pi_0) \} \end{aligned}$$

by inputting statement $y = (pk_C, crs, cm, pk_A, sn_0)$ and witness $w = (r_{cm}, s_A, s_C, R, P, \rho^{\text{in}}, \rho^{\text{out}}, \pi_0, v)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$.

6. Send (**prove-transfer**, $cm_0, r_{cm}^0, v, \rho^{\text{in}}, (sn_0, cm_1, \psi_1)$) to obtain ψ_2 .
 7. Send (**token**, $cm_1, r_{cm}^1, v, \rho^{\text{out}}$) to R via \mathcal{F}_{SMT} and send to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$ the input (**append**, (**transfer**, $sn_0, cm_1, \psi_1, \psi_2$)).
 8. Delete cm_0 from the internal state of the protocol and return output (**transferred**, cm_1).
- Upon receiving (**sent**, S, P, m) from \mathcal{F}_{SMT} , buffer it for later processing. Respond **ok** to sender S

The protocol machines for parties C and A are easier to describe. Certifier C checks the validity of a commitment and signs if it finds the commitment in the ledger. In more detail:

1. Upon input **init** obtain crs from \mathcal{F}_{CRS} and input **init** to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$.
2. Upon receiving (**request**, P, crs', cm) from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$, check that $crs = crs'$. Query $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$ for the entire ledger. For each yet unprocessed transaction tx on $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$, validate the proofs as described in the party protocol. Check whether cm is marked as a valid commitment.

3. If the above check is successful, send (\mathbf{sign}, cm) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$.

Certification authority A signs VRF public keys of parties.

1. Upon **init**, generate a key pair $(sk_A, pk_A) \leftarrow \text{sigkeygen}(\lambda)$ for the signature scheme and input $(\mathbf{register}, pk_A)$ to \mathcal{F}_{REG} .
2. When activated, input **retrieve** to \mathcal{F}_{SMT} to obtain the next message. Let it be m from P . If no message has been signed for P yet, then $\mathbf{sign} \leftarrow \text{sign}(sk_A, (P, m))$ and send s_A via \mathcal{F}_{SMT} back to P .

We use the composition result of [4] to prove this, since we want to prove correctness of the evaluation of the verification algorithm.

Theorem 1. *Assume that $\text{COM} = (\text{crsgen}, \text{commit}, \text{open})$ is a commitment scheme that is perfectly hiding and computationally binding. Assume that $\text{VRF} = (\text{vrfKeygen}, \text{eval}, \text{check})$ is a verifiable random function. Then $\pi_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$ realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$ with static corruption. Corruption is malicious for I and users, and honest-but-curious for C . A is required to be honest, but is inactive during the main protocol phase.*

The restriction that C can only be corrupted in an honest-but-curious model is necessary: Otherwise C can issue signatures on arbitrary commitments, even ones that are not stored in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$.

Proof. We use the proof technology of Camenisch et al. [4] in instantiating the functionalities $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$, \mathcal{F}_{SIG} , and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$ in a way that $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ can call out to \mathcal{F}_{SIG} and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$ for the verification of signatures. This has the advantage that the respective clauses in the statement are ideally verified.

We then need to describe a simulator. Simulator \mathcal{S} emulates functionalities $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$, \mathcal{F}_{REG} , $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$, \mathcal{F}_{SIG} , and \mathcal{F}_{SMT} . To emulate $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$, \mathcal{S} manages an initially empty internal ledger and allows \mathcal{A} to read it via **retrieve** or append messages as described below. \mathcal{S} initially sets *initialized* \leftarrow **false**. We start by describing the behavior of \mathcal{S} upon outputs provided by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$.

- Upon receiving $(\mathbf{initialized}, P)$ for $P \in \{A, C\}$, generate a signature key pair for the respective party and simulate the public key of the respective party being registered at \mathcal{F}_{REG} . After receiving this for both A and C , set *initialized* \leftarrow **true**.
- Upon receiving $(\mathbf{registered}, P)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$, mark P as registered and generate output $(\mathbf{registered}, P)$ as a message from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$ to \mathcal{A} .
- Processing of pending messages (several occasions, see below): For every record tx marked for delayed processing, proceed as follows.
 - If I is corrupt and $tx = (\mathbf{issue}, P', v, cm_0, \psi_0, \psi_2)$, then issue $(\mathbf{verify}, y, \psi_0)$ to \mathcal{A} as an output of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$, with $y = (crs, cm_0, v, P')$, and expect as response a witness w . If $w = (r_{\text{cm}}, \rho^{\text{in}})$ is valid for cm_0 , and proof ψ_2 is valid according to the simulated instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$, then provide the input $(\mathbf{issue}, v, cm_0)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$.

- If $tx = (\mathbf{transfer}, sn, cm_1, \psi_1, \psi_2)$, then issue $(\mathbf{verify}, y, \psi_1)$ to \mathcal{A} as an output of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$, with $y = (pk_C, crs, cm_1, pk_A, sn)$. Expect as response from adversary \mathcal{A} a witness $w = (r_{\text{cm}}^1, s_A, s_C, R, P, \rho^{\text{in}}, \rho^{\text{out}}, \pi_0, v)$. If w is valid, and (ψ_2) is valid according to the simulated instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$, and a corresponding message $(\mathbf{token}, cm_1, r_{\text{cm}}^1, v, \rho^{\text{out}})$ has been sent to R , then provide a request $(\mathbf{transfer}, P, R, cm_0, cm_1)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$.
- Upon receiving $\mathbf{read?}$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$, process pending messages and return $\mathbf{read!}$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$.
- Upon receiving (\mathbf{issue}, v) from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$, first process pending messages. Then, generate a new all-zero commitment $(cm^*, r_{\text{cm}}^*) \leftarrow \text{commit}(crs, (0, 0, 0))$. Next, emulate an output (\mathbf{prove}, y) from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ for the statement $y = (crs, cm^*, v, P)$ and proceed upon an input $(\mathbf{done}, \psi_0^*)$ for the same instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$. Emulate the proof ψ_2^* as in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$, storing the respective instance as a record. Append $(\mathbf{issue}, v, cm^*, \psi_0^*, \psi_2^*)$ to the internal ledger. Input (\mathbf{issue}, cm^*) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$.
- Upon receiving $\mathbf{transfer}$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$, first process pending messages. Then generate a random serial number sn^* and a commitment $(cm^*, r_{\text{cm}}^*) \leftarrow \text{commit}(crs, (0, 0, 0))$. Next, emulate the output (\mathbf{prove}, y) from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ for instance $y = (pk_C, crs, cm^*, pk_A, sn^*)$ and record the proof ψ_1^* returned by \mathcal{A} . Emulate the proof ψ_2^* as in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$. Append transaction $(\mathbf{append}, sn^*, cm^*, \psi_1^*, \psi_2^*)$ to the internal ledger and emulate transmission of a message of the same length as $(\mathbf{token}, cm^*, r_{\text{cm}}^1, v, \rho)$ on \mathcal{F}_{SMT} (i.e., append the length to the internal queue). Respond with $(\mathbf{transfer}, cm^*)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$. Emulate a private delayed message on \mathcal{F}_{SMT} ; when \mathcal{A} delivers this message, input $(\mathbf{deliver}, cm^*)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$.
- Upon receiving $(\mathbf{transfer}, cm)$, first process pending messages. Record cm in the state of the simulated party C , and proceed as in the above case.
- Upon receiving $(\mathbf{transfer}, P, R, v, cm)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$, first process all pending messages. Generate at random a value $\rho^{\text{out}} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$ and a random serial number sn^* and compute commitment $(cm^*, r_{\text{cm}}^*) \leftarrow \text{commit}(crs, (v, R, \rho^{\text{out}}))$. Emulate output (\mathbf{prove}, y) from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ with $y = (pk_C, crs, cm^*, pk_A, sn^*)$ as above and wait for \mathcal{A} to supply the proof ψ_1^* . Emulate the proof ψ_2^* as above. Append $(\mathbf{append}, sn^*, cm^*, \psi_1^*, \psi_2^*)$ to the internal ledger. If serial number sn^* does not appear on the ledger, then respond with $(\mathbf{transfer}, cm^*)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$. Emulate a public delayed message $(P, R, (\mathbf{token}, cm^*, r_{\text{cm}}^*, v, \rho^{\text{out}}))$ on \mathcal{F}_{SMT} ; once this message is delivered by \mathcal{A} , provide input $(\mathbf{deliver}, cm^*)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$.
- Upon input (\mathbf{append}, s, P') from \mathcal{A} for a corrupt P' , append s to the ledger and mark for delayed processing. Return to \mathcal{A} .

If \mathcal{S} obtains from \mathcal{A} a query to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$ in the name of a corrupt party P that is marked as registered, then \mathcal{S} internally handles the inputs $\mathbf{prove-issue}$, $\mathbf{prove-transfer}$, $\mathbf{verify-issue}$, as well as $\mathbf{verify-transfer}$ just like $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$. If \mathcal{A} provides an input message x to \mathcal{F}_{SMT} on behalf of a corrupted party P , then the message is ignored unless it is of the format $x = (\mathbf{token}, cm, r_{\text{cm}}, v, \rho)$. If it has the right format, then \mathcal{S} checks whether the corresponding transaction tx exists on $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$; if it does, then provide input $(\mathbf{transfer}, P, R, cm_0, cm_1)$ with

the respective values from tx to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$. If such a transaction does not exist, then store the message x for later.

Our goal is now to prove that if the commitment and the VRF are secure, then the ideal and real experiments are indistinguishable. We prove this by describing a sequence of experiments, where EXEC_0 is the real experiments and we transform it step-by-step into the ideal experiment, showing for each adjacent pair of steps that they are indistinguishable. The overall statement then follows via the triangle inequality.

Experiment EXEC_1 is almost the same as EXEC_0 but commitments generated during (**issue**, v) at an honest party P as well as commitments generated during (**transfer**, cm, R) at an honest party P , where R is also honest, are replaced by commitments generated via $(cm, r_{\text{cm}}) \leftarrow_s \text{commit}(crs, (0, 0, 0))$. Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ is changed so that it does not actually check the input of honest parties.

Experiments EXEC_0 and EXEC_1 are equivalent since the commitment is perfectly hiding and therefore the distribution of the output to the adversary is unchanged. As all inputs of the honest parties' protocols to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ are correct, omitting the checks has no effect.

Experiment EXEC_2 is almost the same as EXEC_1 but serial numbers output by honest parties are replaced by uniformly random values from the same set. Experiments EXEC_2 and EXEC_1 are indistinguishable because of the pseudorandomness of VRF, which is easily proved by reduction. Note that the environment never sees honestly generated proofs.

In the following, we describe the response to environment queries in both EXEC_2 and the ideal experiment and point out the differences. We assume that the state in terms of valid commitments is the same prior to the input, and show when the output to the query is the same and when the state in terms of valid commitments remains consistent. The consistency of the input-output behavior is relatively straightforward to check for most inputs. We focus here on the ones used in **transfer**.

- On input (**transfer**, cm, R) from an honest user P , if not both of P and R are registered, then the request is ignored in both cases. Also if no transferable commitment cm exists and is associated to user P , both invocations abort. The protocol $\pi_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$ then generates a new commitment cm' and sends it for the proof to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$, which requests a proof ψ_1 from \mathcal{A} . Upon return, $\pi_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$ generates an additional proof ψ_2 via $\mathcal{F}_{\text{A-AUTH}}$, sends the transaction (**transfer**, sn, cm', ψ_1, ψ_2) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$ and the **token** message to \mathcal{F}_{SMT} . If R is corrupt, this latter invocation means that \mathcal{A} learns $(r_{\text{cm}}^1, v, \rho^{\text{out}})$ as well as the sender P via \mathcal{F}_{SMT} in addition.

The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$ provides either just **transfer**—if R is honest—or (**transfer**, P, R, v)—if R is corrupt. In the first case, \mathcal{S} generates a commitment to all-zero messages and requests the proof ψ_1 from \mathcal{A} via $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ -interaction, in the second case \mathcal{S} has all the data available to perform the same computations as the protocol.

The output distribution is the same since in both cases the commitment is an all-zero commitment and the serial number is uniformly random.

- Processing of pending transactions. For all new (possibly adversarial) transactions on $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$, the honest parties first attempt to verify the proofs via $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$. For adversarially-generated proofs, the first attempt for each such proof may lead to a message from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ requesting the witness from \mathcal{A} . The same messages are generated by \mathcal{S} , which then records the messages and issues the proper requests to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$. (Note that this processing in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$ takes place at this point in time, but the timing is indistinguishable from that in the protocol as each honest user input leads to that user processing the pending transactions in the protocol.)

For adversarial transfers sent to the party via \mathcal{F}_{SMT} , it may mean that the message sent on \mathcal{F}_{SMT} is not proper (so it is ignored by both $\pi_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$ and \mathcal{S}), or that it parses correctly does not have a corresponding transaction in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$ (in the sense that the commitment cm^* in the message does not exist there—then it is also ignored), or that both message and transaction can be found, in which case the view of the party changes when the tokens are found.

The only difference between the two above executions is when the adversary fabricates a transaction in the name of a corrupt party that makes a state transition that is different from the one that is done in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$. Let us first consider **issue** transactions, where the statement is $y = (crs, cm^*, v, P')$. When an honest party verifies the proof with $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$, then \mathcal{A} has to provide a proper witness (r_{cm}^*, ρ) such that the commitment opens to $\text{open}(crs, cm^*, (v, P, \rho^*), r_{\text{cm}}^*) = \text{true}$.

Consider a transaction $tx = (\mathbf{transfer}, sn^*, cm^*, \psi_1^*, \psi_2^*)$ input by the adversary. When this is verified by the honest party, then \mathcal{A} is given the statement $y = (pk_C, crs, cm^*, pk_A, sn^*)$ and provides a witness $w = (r_{\text{cm}}, s_A, s_C, R, P, \rho^{\text{in}}, \rho^{\text{out}}, \pi_0, v)$, which satisfies the PK-statement

$$\begin{aligned} \psi_1 \leftarrow \text{PK}\{ & (r_{\text{cm}}, s_A, s_C, R, P, \rho^{\text{in}}, \rho^{\text{out}}, \pi_0, v) : \\ & \text{verify}(pk_C, (v, P, \rho^{\text{in}}), s_C) \wedge \text{open}(crs, cm^*, (v, R, \rho^{\text{out}}), r_{\text{cm}}) \\ & \wedge \text{verify}(pk_A, (P, vpk), s_A) \wedge \text{check}(vpk, \rho^{\text{in}}, sn^*, \pi_0)\}. \end{aligned}$$

As $\text{verify}(pk_C, (v, P, \rho^{\text{in}}), s_C)$ is evaluated via $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$, and C checks the correctness of crs , we also know that s_C was generated for an input $(\mathbf{request}, crs, r_{\text{cm}}^*, (v, P, \rho^{\text{in}}))$, and the commitment $cm^* = \text{commit}(crs, (v, P, \rho^{\text{in}}); r_{\text{cm}}^*)$ indeed exists on the ledger. Then either cm^* was created during a previous transaction with the same input (v, P, ρ^{in}) or we can turn \mathcal{Z} into an adversary that breaks the binding property of COM.

As $\text{verify}(pk_A, (P, vpk), s_A)$ is evaluated via a call to \mathcal{F}_{SIG} , and the correctness of both \mathcal{F}_{SIG} and the honesty of A implies that vpk is the *unique* VRF public key associated to P . So at this point we know that vpk and ρ^{in} are correct. As $\text{check}(vpk, \rho^{\text{in}}, sn^*, \pi_0) = \text{true}$, either $(sn^*, _) \leftarrow \text{eval}(vsk, \rho^{\text{in}})$ or we can turn \mathcal{Z} into an adversary against the soundness of VRF. This means that sn^* is also correct, no double-spending occurred, and we know an opening to the new

commitment cm^* , namely $\text{open}(crs, cm^*, (v, R, \rho^{\text{out}}), r_{\text{cm}})$, which means that the state transition is consistent.

The construction has negligible correctness error due to collision of sequence numbers.

3.4 Instantiation

We describe briefly the concrete schemes that are used to instantiate the mechanisms described in the previous subsections efficiently.

Pedersen commitments. The commitment scheme is instantiated with Pedersen commitments [28] on multiple values. Consider a group \mathcal{G} and generators $g_0, g_1, \dots, g_\ell \in \mathcal{G}$ such that the relative discrete logarithms between the g_i are not known. A commitment to a vector $(x_1, \dots, x_\ell \in \{1, \dots, |\mathcal{G}|\})$ of inputs is computed by choosing a uniformly random $r \in \{1, \dots, |\mathcal{G}|\}$ and computing $(cm, r_{\text{cm}}) \leftarrow (g_0^r g_1^{x_1} \dots g_\ell^{x_\ell}, r)$. Pedersen commitments are perfectly hiding and computationally binding under the discrete-logarithm assumption in group \mathcal{G} .

Pointcheval-Sanders (PS) signatures. We use the signature scheme of Pointcheval and Sanders [30] to implement the blind signatures. We modify the signature generation slightly to make it deterministic; security still holds in the random-oracle model. We parametrize the signature algorithm by a collision-resistant function $f : \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ and allow it to take as input an auxiliary string aux . The scheme operates in an asymmetric pairing setting with groups \mathcal{G}_1 and \mathcal{G}_2 of size p , and target group \mathcal{G}_T and a bilinear map $e : \mathcal{G}_1 \times \mathcal{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathcal{G}_T$. Key generation sigkeygen chooses $\tilde{g} \in \mathcal{G}_2$ and $(x, y_1, \dots, y_\ell) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell+2}$ and sets $sk \leftarrow x, y_1, \dots, y_\ell$ and $pk \leftarrow (\tilde{g}, \tilde{g}^x, \tilde{g}^{y_1}, \dots, \tilde{g}^{y_\ell}) = (\tilde{g}, X, Y_1, \dots, Y_\ell)$. A signature $s = \text{sign}(sk, (m_1, \dots, m_\ell), aux)$ on message vector $(m_1, \dots, m_\ell) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\ell$ is computed as $a \leftarrow f(m_1, \dots, m_\ell, aux)$ and $\text{sign} \leftarrow (h, h^{x + \sum_j y_j m_j})$ with $h \leftarrow H_{\mathcal{G}_1}(a)$. Verification of signature $s = (s_1, s_2)$ is performed by checking $s \neq 1_{\mathcal{G}_1}$ and $e(s_1, X \prod_j Y_j^{m_j}) = e(s_2, \tilde{g})$.

PS signatures are CMA under an interactive computational assumption. In follow-up work, Pointcheval and Sanders [31] showed that the scheme can be modified to be secure under a non-interactive assumption, by adding another random element, which can be instantiated with $m_0 \leftarrow H_{\mathbb{Z}_p}(cm)$ in our case to keep the scheme deterministic. For simplicity, we keep the simpler version in this description.

Certification through blind signatures. The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$ is instantiated by the following protocol π_{BLINDSIG} , which operates in the $\{\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{REG}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{SMT}}\}$ -hybrid model.

- Upon input **init**, certifier C generates a new key pair (sk, pk) with $sk = (y, y_1, \dots, y_\ell)$ and $pk = (\tilde{g}, X, Y_1, \dots, Y_\ell)$, and sends (**register**, pk) to \mathcal{F}_{REG} .
- Upon input **pubkey**, P sends (**query**, C) to \mathcal{F}_{REG} and outputs the result.
- Upon input (**request**, $crs, r_{\text{cm}}, (m_1, \dots, m_\ell)$), proceed as follows.

1. Pick $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and compute $V \leftarrow g^r$. Compute $cm \leftarrow g_0^r \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} g_i^{m_i}$ and $Q \leftarrow H_G(cm)$.
2. For each $i = 1, \dots, \ell$, choose $r_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, $A_i \leftarrow V^{r_i}$, and $B_i \leftarrow Q^{m_i} g^{r_i}$.
3. Obtain the proof

$$\zeta \leftarrow \text{PK}\left\{((m_i, r_i)_{i=1}^{\ell}, r_{\text{cm}}) : \bigwedge_{i=1}^{\ell} (A_i = V^{r_i} \wedge B_i = Q^{m_i} g^{r_i}) \wedge cm = g_0^{r_{\text{cm}}} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} g_i^{m_i}\right\}$$

on input (prove, y, w) at $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ with $y = (cm, Q, V, A_1, \dots, A_{\ell}, B_1, \dots, B_{\ell})$ and $w = ((m_i, r_i)_{i=1}^{\ell}, r_{\text{cm}})$.

4. Call \mathcal{F}_{SMT} with $(\text{send}, C, (\zeta, \text{crs}, cm, V, (A_i, B_i)_{i=1}^{\ell}))$.
- Upon receiving $(\text{sent}, P, (\zeta, \text{crs}, cm, V, (A_i, B_i)_{i=1}^{\ell}))$ from \mathcal{F}_{SMT} , certifier C proceeds as follows:
 1. Verify ζ via $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ and compute $Q \leftarrow H_G(cm)$. If verification fails, input (send, P, \perp) to \mathcal{F}_{SMT} and stop.
 2. Store $(\zeta, \text{crs}, cm, V, (A_i, B_i)_{i=1}^{\ell}, Q)$ internally and output to signer C message $(\text{request}, P, \text{crs}, cm)$.
 - Upon input (sign, cm) , signer C proceeds as follows:
 1. If no record for commitment cm is stored, stop.
 2. Compute $m_0 \leftarrow H_{\mathbb{Z}_p}(cm)$, pick $\bar{r} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$.
 3. Compute $\bar{B} \leftarrow g^{\bar{r}} Q^x \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} A_i^{y_i}$ and $\bar{A} \leftarrow V^{\bar{r}} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} A_i^{y_i}$.
 4. Call \mathcal{F}_{SMT} with $(\text{send}, P, (\bar{A}, \bar{B}))$.
 - Upon receiving $(\text{sent}, C, \bar{m})$ from \mathcal{F}_{SMT} , receiver P proceeds as follows:
 1. If \bar{m} cannot be parsed as $(\bar{A}, \bar{B}) \in \mathcal{G}^2$ output (result, \perp) and stop.
 2. Compute $Q' \leftarrow \bar{B} \bar{A}^{1/r}$ and check $e(Q, \bar{X} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \bar{Y}_i^{m_i}) \stackrel{?}{=} e(Q', g)$. If the check fails, output (result, \perp) and stop. Else output $(\text{result}, (Q, Q'))$.

Lemma 1. *Protocol π_{BLINDSIG} realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$ under Assumption 2 of Pointcheval and Sanders [30], given that C is honest-but-curious and A does not have access to the secret key of C .*

A similar protocol has been provided as part of the Coconut systems by Sonnino, Al-Bassam, Bano, Meiklejohn, and Danezis [32], but the protocol there is slightly less efficient.

Groth signatures. We use Groth’s structure preserving signatures [20]. The signature scheme operates in a pairing setting with groups \mathcal{G}_1 , \mathcal{G}_2 , and \mathcal{G}_T and g_2 is a generator of \mathcal{G}_2 . Key generation $\text{sigkeygen}(\lambda, \ell)$ selects a vector $sk = (x, y_1, \dots, y_{\ell-1}) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\ell}$ and a random $\tilde{g} \leftarrow \mathcal{G}_1$, and computes $pk \leftarrow (\tilde{g}, X, Y_1, \dots, Y_{\ell}) = (\tilde{g}, g_2^x, g_2^{y_1}, \dots, g_2^{y_{\ell}})$. Signature $\text{sign}(sk, (m_1, \dots, m_{\ell}))$ selects uniformly at random $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, computes $R \leftarrow g_2^{1/r}$, $S \leftarrow (\tilde{g} g_1^x)^r$, and $T \leftarrow (\tilde{g}^x m_n \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} m_i^{y_i})^r$, and sets $s \leftarrow (R, S, T)$. Verification of signature $s = (R, S, T)$ for messages (m_1, \dots, m_{ℓ}) operates by verifying two pairing equations $e(S, R) = e(\tilde{g}, g_2)e(g, X)$ as well as

$$e(T, R) = e(\tilde{g}, X)e(m_n, g_2) \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} e(m_i, Y_i).$$

Dodis-Yampolskiy VRF We use the VRF of Dodis and Yampolskiy [14] that operates in the pairing setting. Key generation $\text{vrfKeygen}(\lambda)$ chooses a random $sk \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and sets $pk \leftarrow g_1^{sk}$. Evaluation $\text{eval}(sk, x)$ aborts if $sk + x \notin \mathbb{Z}_p^\times$. It computes output $y \leftarrow e(g_1, g_2)^{1/(sk+x)} \in \mathcal{G}_T$ and proof $\pi \leftarrow g_2^{1/(sk+x)} \in \mathcal{G}_2$. Verification $\text{check}(pk, x, y, \pi)$ checks whether $e(g_1, \pi) = y$ and $e(pk \cdot g_1^x, \pi) = 1$.

Groth-Sahai NIZK We use Groth-Sahai proofs [22] to instantiate $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ for relations in bilinear groups. Since all equations we have to verify—for the Pointcheval-Sanders signatures, the Pedersen commitment, the Groth signatures, and the Dodis Yampolskiy VRF—are defined in terms of bilinear groups,

4 Privacy-preserving auditable UTXO

In this section we describe three mechanisms in the protocol that are crucial for its use in practice, and that extend the simpler protocol presented in Section 3. We start in Section 4.1 with multi-input multi-output transactions. Section 4.2 shows how the certification mechanism described in Section 3.2 can be thresholdized to protect against misbehaving certifiers. Section 4.3 finally introduces the extension that makes the protocol auditable.

4.1 Multi-input multi-output transactions

Multi-input multi-output transaction allow a sender to transfer tokens contained in multiple commitments at once, and to split the accumulated value into multiple outputs for potentially different receivers. We therefore modify the transaction format to contain multiple inputs and multiple outputs. We also have to extend the NIZK: besides the fact that we have to prove consistency of multiple inputs and multiple outputs, we now have to show that the *sum* of the inputs equals the *sum* of the outputs.

Due to arithmetic in finite algebraic structures, we also have to prove that no wrap-arounds occur. This is achieved, as in previous work, by the use of range proofs. For a given value $\text{max} \in \{1, \dots, p\}$, the condition is that $0 \leq v \leq \text{max}$ for any value v that appears in an output commitment.

The functionality changes as described in Figure 5. The interface that a user employs to transfer tokens has become more complex: they can specify multiple commitments as input and multiple value/receiver pairs for the outputs.

MIMO protocol. The protocol π_{TOKEN} that realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{TOKEN}}$ is based on protocol $\pi_{\text{S-TOKEN}}$. Most parts of the protocol can remain unchanged, only those that deal with generating or processing **transfer** transaction must be adapted.

Upon input $(\text{transfer}, (cm_i)_{i=1}^m, (v_j^{\text{out}}, R_j)_{j=1}^n)$, assuming that *registered*, query (lookup, R_j) to \mathcal{F}_{REG} for all $j = 1, \dots, n$ in order to make sure that R_j is registered. Then process pending messages and proceed as follows.

1. If, for any $i \in \{1, \dots, m\}$, there is no recorded commitment $(cm_i, r_{\text{cm}}^i, v_i^{\text{in}}, \rho_i^{\text{in}})$, then abort.

2. If $\sum_{i=1}^m v_i^{\text{in}} \neq \sum_{j=1}^m v_j^{\text{out}}$ then abort.
3. Choose uniformly random $\rho_j^{\text{out}} \leftarrow_s \mathcal{M}$ for $j = 1, \dots, n$, and create commitments $(cm_j, r_{\text{cm}}^j) \leftarrow_s \text{commit}(crs, (v_j^{\text{out}}, R_j, \rho_j^{\text{out}}))$.
4. Compute the serial numbers as $(sn_i, \pi_i) \leftarrow \text{eval}(vsk, \rho_i^{\text{in}})$, for $i = 1, \dots, m$.
5. Input **(request, $r_{\text{cm}}^i, (v_i^{\text{in}}, P, \rho_i^{\text{in}})$)** to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$, and wait for a response s_i , for each $i = 1, \dots, m$.
6. Compute a proof

$$\begin{aligned}
\psi_1 \leftarrow & \text{PK}\left\{ (r_{\text{cm}}^1, (s_i, v_i^{\text{in}}, \rho_i^{\text{in}}, \pi_i)_{i=1}^m, R, P, (r_{\text{cm}}^j, v_j^{\text{out}}, \rho_j^{\text{out}})_{j=1}^n) : \right. \\
& \forall i \in \{1, \dots, m\} : \text{verify}(pk, (v_i^{\text{in}}, P, \rho_i^{\text{in}}), s_i) \\
& \wedge \forall j \in \{1, \dots, n\} : \text{open}(crs, cm_j, (v_j^{\text{out}}, R_j, \rho_j^{\text{out}}), r_{\text{cm}}^j) \\
& \wedge \text{verify}(pk_A, (P, vpk), s_{\text{reg}}) \\
& \wedge \forall i \in \{1, \dots, m\} : \text{check}(vpk, \rho_i^{\text{in}}, sn_i, \pi_i) \\
& \wedge \sum_{i=1}^m v_i^{\text{in}} = \sum_{j=1}^m v_j^{\text{out}} \\
& \left. \wedge \forall j \in \{1, \dots, n\} : 0 \leq v_j^{\text{out}} \leq \text{max} \right\}.
\end{aligned}$$

7. Set $tx^* \leftarrow ((sn_i)_{i=1}^m, (cm_j)_{j=1}^n, \psi_1)$ For each $i = 1, \dots, m$, send **(prove-transfer, $cm_i^{\text{in}}, r_i, v_i^{\text{in}}, \rho_i^{\text{in}}$)** to obtain $\psi_{2,i}$.
8. Send **(coin, $cm_j, r_{\text{cm}}^j, v_j^{\text{out}}, \rho_j^{\text{out}}$)** to R_j via \mathcal{F}_{SMT} (for each $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ and send to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{LEDGER}}$ the input

$$(\text{append}, (\text{transfer}, (sn_i, \psi_{2,i})_{i=1}^m, (cm_j)_{j=1}^n, \psi_1)).$$

9. Delete cm_i^{in} from the internal state and return **(transferred, $(cm_j)_{j=1}^n$)**.

The processing of the transaction is analogously modified to check this more complex NIZK. We now argue that the statement proved in the NIZK indeed guarantees the consistency of the system.

The first sub-statement (together with the honesty of C) guarantees that all commitments used as inputs indeed exist in the ledger, and the fact that the commitment is binding further implies that the values $(v_i^{\text{in}}, P, \rho_i^{\text{in}})$ indeed correspond to the expected state of the system. The second sub-statement shows that the output commitments indeed contain the expected values $(v_j^{\text{out}}, R_j, \rho_j^{\text{out}})$. The subsequent two statements prevent double-spending by showing that vpk is the user's VRF public key, and the serial numbers are computed correctly. This is all analogous to the SISO case.

The final two equations guarantee the global consistency of the system: the range proof shows that all outputs contain a value in the valid range, which avoids wrap-arounds. Finally, the summation equation then shows that no tokens have been created or destroyed in this transaction.

4.2 Distributing certification

The Pointcheval-Sanders signature scheme can be extended into a non-interactive t -out-of- n threshold signature scheme. Consider n signers C_1, \dots, C_n from which a recipient P collects at least t signature shares that can be combined into a complete signature. We describe the process with a trusted key generation, however, notices that it is straightforward to convert the key generation mechanism into a multiparty computation between the signers (see e.g. [17]). We describe the key generation algorithm `threshKeygen` and the reconstruction algorithm `combine`. The algorithm to produce a signature share is identical to original signing algorithm (taking secret key share as input instead of the overall secret key). That is, to sign a message (m_1, \dots, m_n) , signer C_i calls algorithm $(h, h') \leftarrow_s \text{sign}(sk_i, (m_1, \dots, m_n))$ with $sk_j = (x_j, y_{0j}, \dots, y_{\ell j})$. The resulting signature share is a valid Pointcheval-Sanders signature for public key $pk_j = (\tilde{X}_j, \tilde{Y}_{0j}, \dots, \tilde{Y}_{\ell j})$.

Algorithm `threshKeygen` (λ, n, t, ℓ) computes $(sk_j, pk_j)_{j=1}^n, pk$ as follows:

- Pick $\ell + 1$ random polynomials $p_x, p_{y_1}, \dots, p_{y_\ell}$ of degree $k - 1$ with coefficients from \mathbb{Z}_p .
- Compute $\tilde{X} \leftarrow g^{p_x(0)}, \tilde{Y}_0 \leftarrow g^{p_{y_0}(0)}, \dots, \tilde{Y}_\ell \leftarrow g^{p_{y_\ell}(0)}$.
- Compute all $\tilde{X}_j = g^{x_j}$ and $\tilde{Y}_{ij} \leftarrow g^{y_{ij}}$.
- Set $pk = (\tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}_0 = g^{p_{y_0}(0)}, \dots, \tilde{Y}_\ell = g^{p_{y_\ell}(0)})$, and $pk_j = (\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{Y}_{01}, \dots, \tilde{Y}_{\ell 1})$. Set $sk_j = (p_x(j), p_{y_0}(j), \dots, p_{y_\ell}(j))$ and output $(sk_1, \dots, sk_n, pk_1, \dots, pk_n, pk)$.

Algorithm `combine`, on input $\{(s_i, pk_i)\}_{i \in S}, (m_1, \dots, m_\ell)$, for a set $S \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$ with $|S| = t$, proceeds as follows.

- Output \perp if not all $\{(s_i, pk_i)\}_{i \in S}$ with $s_i = (h_i, h'_i)$ have the same h and if verify $((\tilde{X}_i, \tilde{Y}_{1i}, \dots, \tilde{Y}_{\ell i}), (m_1, \dots, m_\ell), (h, h'_i))$ does not hold for all $i \in S$.
- Compute Lagrange coefficients $\lambda_j = \prod_{i \in S \setminus j} \frac{i}{i-j}$ for all $j \in S$.
- Compute and output $(m_0, h, h' = \prod_{j \in S} h'_j{}^{\lambda_j})$.

Protocol π_{BLINDSIG} from Section 3.4 has to be modified as follows:

- Instead of generating a key locally at C , all signers C_1, \dots, C_n together use \mathcal{F}_{DKG} to generate the set of keys. Signer C_1 registers the public key pk at \mathcal{F}_{REG} .
- Requestor P sends the request message to parties C_1, \dots, C_n until it has collected t signatures that verify. It then uses `combine` to combine that into a single signature that verifies relatively to pk .

Theorem 2. *Let $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $t < n$. The above-described variant of the protocol realizes the threshold variant of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BLINDSIG}}$.*

No further adaptations to the users' protocol beyond the use of the threshold functionality are necessary, as the verification equation for the signatures remains the same.

4.3 Auditing

The auditing capability we implement associates to each user U an auditor AU . Auditor AU has the capabilities to decrypt all transaction information associated to U , such as the transaction outputs that are associated with U , as well as the full transactions issued by U . The set of auditors is denoted by \mathcal{A} . Furthermore, there is a *binder* B whose role is to set up the connection between auditors and binders.

We formalize the guarantees in a functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ATOKEN}}$ described in the following. Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ATOKEN}}$ stores a list of registered users and an initially empty map **Records**. The session identifier is of the form $sid = (A, C, I, B, \mathcal{A}, sid')$.

- Upon input **init** from $P \in \{A, B, C\} \cup \mathcal{A}$, output to \mathcal{A} (**initialized**, P). (This must happen for both before anything else.)
- Inputs **register**, **read**, and **issue** are treated as in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{TOKEN}}$.
- Upon input (**bind**, U, AU) where U is a registered user and $AU \in \mathcal{A}$ is an initialized auditor, and there is not yet a pair (U, AU') with $AU \neq AU' \in \mathcal{A}$, record the pair (U, AU) and output (**bound**, U, AU) to \mathcal{A} .
- Upon input (**transfer**, $(cm_i)_{i=1}^m, (v_j^{\text{out}}, R_j)_{j=1}^n$) from an honest party P , where P and all R_j for $j = 1, \dots, n$ are registered, proceed as follows.
 1. If, for any $i \in \{1, \dots, m\}$, **Records** $[cm_i] = \perp$ then abort, else set $(v_i^{\text{in}}, P'_i, st_i) \leftarrow \text{Records}[cm_i]$.
 2. If, for any $i \in \{1, \dots, m\}$, $st_i \neq \text{alive}$ or $P'_i \neq P$, then abort.
 3. If $\sum_{i=1}^m v_i^{\text{in}} \neq \sum_{j=1}^n v_j^{\text{out}}$ then abort.
 4. Let L be an empty list. For all $j = 1, \dots, n$, if R_j or its auditor AU_j are corrupt, then append to L the information $(P, R_j, v_j^{\text{out}})$. If the auditor AU of P is corrupt, include the information for all inputs and all outputs. Output (**transfer**, L) to \mathcal{A} .
 5. Receiving from \mathcal{A} a response (**transfer**, $(cm_j^{\text{out}})_{j=1}^n$), if **Records** $[cm_j^{\text{out}}] \neq \perp$ for any $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ then abort, else set **Records** $[cm_j^{\text{out}}] \leftarrow (v_j^{\text{out}}, R_j, \text{alive})$ for all $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ and set **Records** $[cm_i] \leftarrow (v_i^{\text{in}}, P', \text{consumed})$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, m\}$.
 6. Return (**transferred**, $(cm_j^{\text{out}})_{j=1}^n$) to P .
- Upon input (**audit**, cm) from auditor AU , if **Records** $[cm] = \perp$ then return \perp . Otherwise, set $(v^{\text{in}}, P, st) \leftarrow \text{Records}[cm]$. If P is not audited by AU , then return \perp , else return (v, P) .

The protocol is adapted as follows. First, each commitment also contains the identity of the previous owner. This is helpful for proving that the auditable information is correct. The binding between the auditor and the user is achieved through a Groth signature from A . The auditing functionality is implemented as follows: A party P that executes a transfer encrypts the following information:

- To its own auditor, for each input the value v^{in} and current owner P . For each output the value v_j^{out} , sender P , and receiver R_j .
- For each output to R_j , to the auditor of R_j the value v_j^{out} , sender P , and receiver R_j .

This is achieved by encrypting the information, including the ciphertext in the transfer, and proving that the encryption is consistent with the information in the commitment.

For concreteness, consider an input described by commitment $cm = \text{commit}(crs, (v^{\text{in}}, P, P', \rho^{\text{in}}); r_{\text{cm}})$. We encrypt current owner $c_1 = \text{enc}(pk_{AU}, P; r_1)$ and value $\wedge c_2 = \text{enc}(pk_{AU}, v, r_2)$. Then we generate a NIZK proof:

$$\text{PK}\left\{\left(v^{\text{in}}, P, P', \rho^{\text{in}}, s, pk_{AU}, r_1, r_2\right) : \begin{aligned} &\text{verify}(pk_C, (v^{\text{in}}, P, P', \rho^{\text{in}}), s) \\ &\wedge \text{verify}(pk_A, (P, pk_{AU}), s_A) \wedge c_1 = \text{enc}(pk_{AU}, P; r_1) \\ &\wedge c_2 = \text{enc}(pk_{AU}, v^{\text{in}}, r_2) \end{aligned}\right\}$$

where pk_C and pk_B are public, and c_1 and c_2 are part of the transaction.

Similarly, for a transfer from P to R and an output commitment $cm = \text{commit}(crs, (v^{\text{out}}, R, P, \rho^{\text{out}}); r_{\text{cm}})$, we encrypt to the auditor (here we use the one of P) the sender $c_1 = \text{enc}(pk_{AU}, P; r_1)$, the receiver $c_2 = \text{enc}(pk_{AU}, R; r_2)$, and the value $c_3 = \text{enc}(pk_{AU}, v^{\text{out}}; r_3)$. We then generate a NIZK proof:

$$\text{PK}\left\{\left(v^{\text{out}}, R, P, \rho^{\text{out}}, r_{\text{cm}}, pk_{AU}, s_A\right) : \begin{aligned} &\text{open}(crs, cm, (v^{\text{out}}, R, P, \rho^{\text{out}}), r_{\text{cm}}) \\ &\wedge \text{verify}(pk_A, (P, pk_{AU}), s_A) \wedge c_1 = \text{enc}(pk_{AU}, P; r_1) \\ &\wedge c_2 = \text{enc}(pk_{AU}, R, r_2) \wedge c_3 = \text{enc}(pk_{AU}, v^{\text{out}}; r_3) \end{aligned}\right\}$$

with public parameters crs and pk_A , as well as cm , c_1 , c_2 , and c_3 taken from the transaction.

4.4 Instantiation

Most of the schemes have already been introduced in Section 3.4. We provide here descriptions of the schemes for range proofs and encryption.

Range proof. The MIMO version of the protocol requires a range proof to ensure that no field wrap-arounds are used and that the number of existing coins is not changed in a transfer. The range proof we use is based on the work of Camenisch, Chaabouni, and shelat [3], instantiated with Pointcheval-Sanders signatures.

ElGamal public-key encryption We use ElGamal encryption [15] encryption. Key generation $\text{pkeKeygen}(\lambda)$ chooses a uniformly random exponent $sk \leftarrow_s \{1, \dots, |\mathcal{G}|\}$ and computes $pk \leftarrow g^{sk}$. Encryption $\text{enc}(pk, m)$ chooses a uniformly random $r \leftarrow_s \{1, \dots, |\mathcal{G}|\}$ and computes $c \leftarrow (g^r, pk^r m)$. Decryption $\text{dec}(sk, c)$ with $c = (c_1, c_2)$ computes $m \leftarrow c_2 c_1^{-sk}$. The encryption scheme is semantically secure under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.

5 Implementation and performance

We invented a slightly modified variant of the scheme where some instances of the GS protocol were replaced by instances of Schnorr’s protocol, for efficiency purposes. The transaction sizes for that protocol variant are described in Table 1. Further details can be found in Appendix B.

Setup			
<i>Param gen.</i>	$Me_1 + 7e_2 + t_c e_2$		
<i>Audit init</i>	$7e_1 + 1e_2$		
Issue	<i>Transaction generation</i>	<i>Transaction validation</i>	
		<i>Ledger</i>	<i>Certification</i>
<i>Out consist.</i>	$(9e_1 + 2p)n_o$	$3e_2 n_o$	(same as below)
Transfer	<i>Transaction generation</i>	<i>Transaction validation</i>	
		<i>Ledger</i>	<i>Certification</i>
<i>Input val.</i>	$18e_2 n_i$	$(6e_1 + 19e_2 + 2p)n_i$	(per output) C: $(48 + t_c + N_c)e_1$ $+ 6t_c e_2 + 2t_c p$
<i>Inp-out cons.</i>	$(4n_i + 3n_o + 5)e_1$	$(5n_i + 4n_o + 4)e_1$	
<i>Input own.</i>	$(20e_1 + 10e_2 + 2p)n_i$	$(28e_1 + 10e_2 + 18p)n_i$	S: $44e_1$
<i>Auditability</i>	$(136e_1 + 8e_2)n_o$	$(64e_1 + 64p)n_o$	

Table 1. This table shows the computation overhead of each phase in our system, setup, asset issue and asset transfer in terms of number of exponentiations, in $\mathcal{G}_1, \mathcal{G}_2$ denoted by e_1, e_2 , respectively and pairings in the two groups by p . Our results consider the number of request’s inputs n_i , and outputs n_o , the overall N_c and threshold t_c of certifiers, the base used for range proofs M . Finally in certification phase “C” and “S” represent the client and server computation respectively.

6 Conclusion

We described a privacy-preserving and auditable token-management scheme for permissioned blockchains, which can be instantiated without knowledge assumptions. Through the use of structure-preserving primitives, we achieve practical transaction sizes and near-practical computation times that can, however, expected to become practical through the use of optimized implementations for the underlying schemes.

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A Functionalities

We describe here in more detail some ideal functionalities that are commonly used and that we therefore omitted from the preliminaries of the paper.

Common reference string. Functionality \mathcal{F}_{CRS} is parametrized by a CRS generator crsgen , which on input security parameter λ samples a fresh string $\text{crs} \leftarrow_{\$} \text{crsgen}(\lambda)$.

Non-interactive zero-knowledge. Our functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ is adapted from the work of Groth et al. [21], with a few modifications of which most are mainly stylistic. The most relevant difference is that we store a set L_0 of false statements that have been verified; we need this to ensure that a statement that was evaluated as false by one honest party will also be evaluated as false by all other honest parties. Otherwise $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ has the two expected types of inputs **prove** and **verify**, and the adversary is allowed to delay proof generation unless $\mathcal{F}_{\text{NIZK}}$ is used in the context of responsive environments [6].

Secure message transmission. Functionality \mathcal{F}_{SMT} models a secure channel between a sender S and a receiver R . In comparison to the functionality introduced by Canetti and Krawczyk [12], however, our functionality additionally provides privacy and hides the parties that are involved in the transmission.

Digital signatures. We use the variant of the signature functionality \mathcal{F}_{SIG} that was introduced by Camenisch et al. [4]. This version of the functionality is compatible with the modular NIZK proof technique introduced in the same paper.

Distributed key generation. Functionality \mathcal{F}_{DKG} idealizes a distributed key-generation protocol such as, for discrete-log based schemes, the one of Gennaro et al. [17]. The simplified functionality given in Figure 10 is not directly realizable since it does not model that, e.g., the communication may be delayed or prevented by the adversary. We decided to still use this version to simplify the overall treatment.

B Implementation and measurements

Our token management system is currently in the process of being implemented on Hyperledger Fabric as a way of enabling token management on this platform. In this section we elaborate on the integration of the token management system in Hyperledger Fabric. We first start with a short overview of how Hyperledger Fabric operates.

Background. Hyperledger Fabric is a permissioned blockchain system. Hyperledger Fabric entities exchange messages, called *transactions*, over the Hyperledger Fabric network. A transaction can be used to introduce a new smart contract (*chaincode* in Hyperledger Fabric terms) into the system—*chaincode*

instantiation—or to introduce changes to the state (i.e., *execute*) of an already instantiated chaincode. The latter process is referred to as *chaincode invocation*. Special types of transactions, *reconfiguration transactions* are used to introduce changes to the system’s configuration.

In a Hyperledger Fabric network, we identify three types of participating entities. There are clients that submit transactions to the network in order to instantiate, invoke chaincodes, or to reconfigure the system, peers that actively participate in the chaincode execution process, and maintain a (consistent) copy of the ledger, and a set of orderers constituting the *ordering service* of the system, that jointly decide the order in which transactions appear in the ledger of the system. For the proper operation of the system, Hyperledger Fabric installations consider one or more membership service providers (in short, MSPs) that issue long-term identities to the system entities that fall under their authority. These identities would allow system entities to securely interact with each other. Essentially, MSPs provide the required abstractions to validate identities, compute and verify signatures. The configuration of each MSP considered by a Hyperledger Fabric system is included in the genesis block of its instance and is reconfigurable via reconfiguration transactions.

Hyperledger Fabric follows an *execute-order-validate* model. Here, chaincodes are speculatively *executed* on one or more peers upon a client’s request prior to adding the corresponding transaction to the ledger (*ordering*). Client requests for this purpose are called *chaincode proposals*. Execution results are signed by the peers that generated them in *chaincode endorsements* and are returned to the client who requested them. Endorsements are included in the transaction that the client constructs and is sent to the ordering service. The latter *order* the transaction among the rest of the advertised transactions to the network outputting a first version of the ledger called *raw ledger*. Raw ledger is provided to the peers of the network upon demand. Upon receiving the raw ledger, each peer *validates* each transaction that appears in it to ensure that the chaincode execution results included in the transaction have been generated correctly. After validation completes successfully, the transaction is committed, and its speculative execution results are integrated into the ledger’s state.

It is easy to see that although there is a separation in Hyperledger Fabric between clients and peers, there is a clear communication channel between the two, such that clients can acquire endorsements on the chaincodes they wish to invoke, or perform queries on the ledger state. In these requests, known as *proposals*, clients provide the chaincode execution arguments, including the name of chaincode that is to be executed. It is also important to note that Hyperledger Fabric supports pluggable transaction validation [23], such that in principle each chaincode can come with its own rules on what constitutes valid transactions that trigger its execution.

Integration architecture. For our prototype implementation we used the architecture depicted in Figure 11.

We first require that each token user, issuer and auditor operates a Hyperledger Fabric client. It is easy to separate the operations of the protocol to the ones that are used by the client side to generate the cryptographic material for requesting a token’s issue or transfer, and the ones used by a verifier to perform the cryptographic verification of the requests. In our prototype implementation on Hyperledger Fabric, we integrate all the client operations (i.e., proof generation) into a *prover chaincode*, and we require that each client is in possession of a peer that it trusts and which will run the prover chaincode. We claim that this is a reasonable requirement given that it fits the setup of multiple enterprise level clients of Hyperledger Fabric.

In our prototype we integrate the verification components into a new validation module that we plug into Hyperledger Fabric. In this way, transactions that refer to the prover chaincode go through our custom validation component that performs changes to the ledger directly. This is an example of how Hyperledger Fabric architecture can be extended to support post-ordering execution based applications.

To accommodate output certification, we leverage the communication protocol between the clients and the peers and an extension to the prover chaincode—we call it for convenience *certifier chaincode*—that is only functional on a selective set of peers. These peers are chosen by the system at setup time as trusted to jointly certify valid outputs that appear in the ledger. At setup, each such peer acquires a share of the output certification signing key; this share is passed to the certifier chaincode, whenever it processes a client request for output certification.

At the same time, we leverage the membership service infrastructure of Hyperledger Fabric to grant identities to the users, since they are also Hyperledger Fabric clients. In particular we leverage the identity mixer MSP feature of Hyperledger Fabric that allows privacy preserving user authentication, using constructions that are compatible with the ones of the token system. For our prototype implementation, we issue audit credentials and assign them to users off-band, assuming that this be accommodated by an offline service of the identity management infrastructure of the system. Audit credentials bind user-identities generated using the Hyperledger Fabric identity mixer MSP to auditors.

Performance numbers. We installed Hyperledger Fabric client and peer infrastructure with our custom validation process on a MacBook Pro (15-inch, 2016), with 2.7 GHz Intel Core i7, and 16 GB of RAM. All our chaincodes and client implementation are in golang as this is the core language used in Hyperledger Fabric, while for a token system instantiation we used EC groups on BN256 curves. We instantiated both prover and certifier chaincodes on all the peers in the network, while we disseminated shares of the output certification key only to the peers that perform output certification. We measured the time required to produce a token transfer request, and to validate it. Our measurements focused on setup and token transfer as these are the more costly operations in traditional

token management systems. We produced our results based the measurements of forty repetitions of each operation.

Our results are shown in Table 2 for a transfer with two inputs and two outputs. Although our schemes support any number of inputs, and outputs in transactions, we chose this combination as it is a common configuration of SoA schemes. In the performance evaluation of transaction generation and validation we present separately the part of theirs that refers to the auditing needs. Our results show an overall transaction construction time of a little more than 1s, whereas transaction validation takes a little less than 2s. While this can be considered poor performance for some use-cases we need to emphasise that the go libraries we use for EC operations are not optimized. An optimisation in the crypto libraries is expected to bring in a speedup of at least one order of magnitude [24]. Notice that auditability operations constitute approximately one third of this time. Output certification consumes 109.07ms on the client side and 116.65ms on the certifier side for each certifier.

	<i>Setup</i>	
<i>Param gen</i>	6.74	
<i>Auditor credential</i>	183.88	
	<i>Transaction generation</i>	<i>Transaction validation</i>
<i>Transfer data</i>	631.72	1329.86
<i>Transfer auditability</i>	467.77	400.88
<i>Output certification</i>	$[109.07 \leftrightarrow 116.65]_{t_c}$	117.14

Table 2. This table shows the actual performance of our prototype implementation on Hyperledger Fabric, for token issue and transfer in milliseconds (ms). The \leftrightarrow denotes an interactive process between the client (on the left) and the certifier (on the right), while $[\dots]_x$ denote a repetition of the interactive round x times. t_c denotes the threshold number of certifiers.




Fig. 5. MIMO token functionality.




Fig. 6. Common reference string.




Fig. 7. Non-interactive zero-knowledge functionality based on the one described by Groth et al. [21].




Fig. 8. Secure message transmission functionality.




Fig. 9. Signature functionality




Fig. 10. Distributed key generation functionality




Fig. 11. This figure shows the interactions between the entities in our system. Users and issuers are granted identities and auditor credentials via interactions with the MSPs. Upon a decision to issue a token, one or more token issuers are requested to submit an “issue” request to the transaction ledger of the system. The latter would process the request as long as it authenticates the transaction to have originated from a valid issuer. Users use their credentials to construct transactions to transfer tokens they own to other users, and validation of these transactions take place by the transaction ledger that adds it to the system’s immutable ledger. Finally, auditors assigned to a user audit that user’s transactions by reading from the ledger.