

Alibi: A Flaw in Cuckoo-Hashing based Hierarchical ORAM Schemes and a Solution

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Abstract

*There once was a table of hashes
That held extra items in stashes
It all seemed like bliss
But things went amiss
When the stashes were stored in the caches*

The first Oblivious RAM protocols introduced the “hierarchical solution,” (STOC ’90) where the servers store a series of hash tables of geometrically increasing capacities. Each ORAM query would read a small number of locations from each level of the hierarchy, and each level of the hierarchy would be reshuffled and rebuilt at geometrically increasing intervals to ensure that no single query was ever repeated twice at the same level. This yielded an ORAM protocol with polylogarithmic (amortized) overhead.

Future works extended and improved the hierarchical solution, replacing traditional hashing with cuckoo hashing (ICALP ’11) and cuckoo hashing with a combined stash (Goodrich et al. SODA ’12). In this work, we identify a subtle flaw in the protocol of Goodrich et al. (SODA ’12) that uses cuckoo hashing with a stash in the hierarchical ORAM solution.

We give a concrete distinguishing attack against this type of hierarchical ORAM that uses cuckoo hashing with a *combined* stash. This security flaw has propagated to at least 5 subsequent hierarchical ORAM protocols, including the recent optimal ORAM scheme, OptORAMa (Eurocrypt ’20).

In addition to our attack, we identify a simple fix that does not increase the asymptotic complexity.

We note, however, that our attack only affects more recent *hierarchical ORAMs*, but does not affect the early protocols that predate the use of cuckoo hashing, or other types of ORAM solutions (e.g. Path ORAM or Circuit ORAM).

1 Introduction

In this work, we describe an attack on a wide variety of *hierarchical Oblivious RAM (ORAM)* protocols in the literature. Oblivious RAM is a cryptographic primitive designed to allow a client to securely execute RAM programs using an *untrusted* memory. ORAM provides a method for simulating a virtual memory array, such that for any two sequences of reads and writes into the virtual array, the sequences of accesses to the underlying *physical memory* are indistinguishable.

Typically, encryption protects the data *content*, however, even when the underlying data are encrypted simply observing the *data access pattern* can leak significant information.

ORAM is applicable in several different types of scenarios, including:

1. **Outsourced storage:** If a client makes use of an outsourced (cloud) storage provider, even if the content is encrypted, the storage provider can observe the client’s access pattern. This type of leakage can be serious. For example several works have shown that access pattern leakage severely undermines the security of searchable symmetric encryption schemes [IKK12, LZWT14, NKW15, GMN⁺16, CGPR15, AAG17, BGC⁺18].

2. **Secure hardware:** If a small, trusted hardware component makes use of a (cheaper) untrusted memory, observing the memory access pattern can compromise the security of the processes running within the trusted component. This was the original proposed application [Ost90] and is a concern where memory side-channel attacks exist. A secure enclave, such as Intel SGX, is a recent real-world computing environment in which computation is performed on secure hardware, but the application needs the memory resources of an untrusted operating system. A series of works have shown that revealing memory access patterns is indeed a problem for SGX [BMD⁺17, GESM17, MIE17, JHOVD17], and this leakage can be mitigated using ORAM and other oblivious data structures to allow enclaves to use untrusted memory without leaking access patterns [SGF17].
3. **Secure multiparty computation (MPC):** ORAM is also useful in secure multiparty computation (MPC), where a group of parties engage in a distributed protocol to compute a joint function of their private data. Most MPC protocols use cryptographic secret sharing to protect the *content* of the data, and execute computations in the *circuit model* to ensure that the computation’s control flow remains independent of the private data. Efficient ORAM protocols have the potential for allowing efficient, secure multiparty computation in the RAM model [LHS⁺14, Ds17, WHC⁺14].

The first ORAM construction [Ost90], introduced the *hierarchical solution*, and many subsequent works have expanded and built on this paradigm [Ost92, GO96, GMOT12, KLO12, LO13, PPRY18, AKL⁺20]. We review the hierarchical solution in Section 2.4.

The original Hierarchical ORAM has $O(\log(n))$ levels in the hierarchy, each containing a hash table with buckets of size $O(\log(n))$, leading to an amortized overhead of $O(\log^2(n))$. Pinkas and Reinman realized that the traditional hash tables could be replaced with cuckoo hashing, which reduced the cost of accessing each hash table to $\mathcal{O}(1)$ per virtual access. The initial solution allowed cuckoo hashing to fail with some non-negligible probability, and in the case that it did, the hash table would be reconstructed. The failure (and rebuilding) of a cuckoo hash led to security problems, however, since the ORAM protocol would rebuild the hash table until there were no collisions, an adversary who observed a collision in the *physical access pattern*, would learn that the client had made queries for elements not stored in that level [GM11].

This problem was resolved by reducing the cuckoo hash failure probability by including a stash [PR04]. If each cuckoo hash table in the hierarchy included a $O(\log(n))$ -sized stash, the probability of a build failure becomes negligible, and no rehashing was needed [GM11].¹ At query time, every element of the stash at each level needed to be accessed, so although this eliminated the security problem created by cuckoo hashing failures, it did not improve the asymptotic overhead, which remained $O(\log^2(n))$.

Scanning separate cuckoo stashes at every level of the hierarchy significantly adds to the query complexity, and Goodrich et al. [GMOT12] then observed that even though the size of the stash for *each* level needs to be $O(\log(n))$ in order to ensure a negligible probability of failure, the same failure probability could be maintained by combining the stashes at all levels into a single $O(\log(n))$ -sized stash. Similarly, Kushilevitz et al. [KLO12] proposed that elements that would otherwise be placed in a cuckoo stash could instead be re-inserted directly into the ORAM data structure. Both these techniques improved the asymptotic complexity of accesses in the hierarchical solution to $O(\log(n))$ physical accesses per virtual access.

In this work, we show that the techniques of combining cuckoo stashes across different levels of the hierarchy (introduced by Goodrich et al. and Kushilevitz et al.) creates a subtle security flaw which gives an adversary non-negligible advantage in distinguishing access patterns. The problem is similar to the problem in [PR10], where rehashing in the event of a build failure leaked information about the elements being stored at that level. Removing the elements from the stash on each level, like performing a rehashing, causes the elements that would have been in the stash to no longer be in the stash. Therefore, if these elements are searched for they will be found before this level is reached, so instead of searching for these elements, random locations will be accessed. (For instance most schemes will search for a ‘dummy’ element once the item being searched for is found.) This means that, if all elements from a level are accessed, the access pattern on that level is unlikely to contain any collisions in the *physical access pattern*. In contrast, if no elements from that

¹Even though a logarithmic-sized sash provides a negligible failure probability, for the smaller levels, a failure probability that is negligible in the size of the *level* may be non-negligible in the overall size of the ORAM. To avoid this problem, [GM11] suggested using traditional hash tables (rather than cuckoo hashing) for the smaller levels of the hierarchy, *i.e.*, until the level size reached $O(\log^7(n))$.

level are accessed, all accessed locations will be random. The expected number of collisions will therefore be higher in the second case, and we will show that this difference is non-negligible.

This flaw affects a large number of papers [GMOT12, KLO12, LO13, PPRY18, KM19, AKL⁺20] which combine stashes in order to eliminate super-constant sized stashes at each level. This does not affect earlier hierarchical solutions that did not combine the stash e.g. [Ost90, Ost92, GO96] or non-hierarchical ORAMs such as PathORAM [SVDS⁺13] or Circuit ORAM [WCS15]. In addition to finding this flaw, we present a simple solution. Our solution applies directly to almost all schemes which suffer from the flaw without affecting their asymptotic complexity.

In Section 2.2, we review cuckoo hashing, and in Section 2.4 we review the basic hierarchical ORAM construction.

In Section 3, we present our concrete attack that allows an adversary to distinguish two different access patterns with non-negligible probability in hierarchical ORAM solutions that use Cuckoo-Hashing with a *combined stash*. In Section 4 we present our solution and prove that it is correct. The attack and fix described in Sections 3 and 4 do not apply directly to PanORAMa and OptORAMa so in the appendices we present a general version of the attack (Appendix A) and a general version of the fix (Appendix B) which apply to these protocols. We defer presenting the protocols that have been affected by this flaw to Section 5. Lastly, in Section 6 we make some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Oblivious Hash tables

The hierarchical ORAM scheme builds on oblivious hash tables which we formalize and abstract in Definition 2.1. We view a hash table as a method for storing (v, w) pairs, where $v \in \mathcal{V} = [N]$ is a (virtual) index, and $w \in \mathcal{W}$ is a payload. Let $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{W}$.

Definition 2.1 (Oblivious hash tables). An oblivious hash table $T = (\text{Gen}, \text{Build}, \text{Lookup}, \text{Delete}, \text{Extract})$ is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms

- **Setup:** $k \leftarrow \text{Gen}(N, m)$ generates a key for a hash table of capacity m , storing (virtual) indices from $[N]$. In most cases, the key is simply the description of the hash functions.
- **Building:** The function $T \leftarrow \text{Build}(k, X)$ takes a set, $X \subset \mathcal{X}$, $|X| \leq m$ and builds a table, T , containing the elements in X . For any X , the probability $\text{Build}(k, X)$ fails is negligible in N , *i.e.*, is bounded by $N^{-\omega(1)}$.
- **Lookup:** The deterministic function $Q \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k, v)$ takes a (virtual) index $v \in \mathcal{V}$, and returns a set of query locations $Q \subset [|T|]$.
- **Delete:** The deterministic function $\text{Delete}(k, v, T)$ removes items (v, w) if they exist in any location $T[i]$ where $i \in Q \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k, v)$. Delete accesses exactly the indexes of T in Q and does not access any other memory.
- **Extract:** The function $\bar{X} \leftarrow \text{Extract}(k, T)$, takes a key k and a table T and returns a set of elements \bar{X} .

These algorithms satisfy the following correctness properties. Suppose $k \leftarrow \text{Gen}(N, m)$ and $X \subset \mathcal{X}$ with $|X| \leq m$.

- **Building:** If $T \leftarrow \text{Build}(k, X)$, then $T \in \mathcal{X}^{|T|}$. For every $(v, w) \in X$, we say that the payload w was stored in virtual location v and that (v, x) is stored in T .
- **Lookup:** If $T \leftarrow \text{Build}(k, X)$, then for any $(v, w) \in X$, if v has not been deleted from T , the lookup $Q \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k, v)$ produces a set of indices, $Q \subset [|T|]$ such that $(v, w) \in T[i]$ for some $i \in Q$ with probability at least $1 - N^{-\omega(1)}$.
- **Extraction:** If k, T are constructed as above, and D is the set of items deleted from table T , and $\bar{X} \leftarrow \text{Extract}(k, T)$ then $x = (v, w) \in \bar{X}$ iff $\exists w$ such that $(v, w) \in X$, $v \notin D$,

Additionally, these algorithms will need to allow the above functions to be executed obliviously. We define two notions of obliviousness: access obliviousness and full obliviousness. Full obliviousness includes access obliviousness. In our attack, we show that “combined-stash” cuckoo hashing schemes are not *access oblivious*, and hence cannot be fully oblivious. Since the techniques used to obliviously perform builds and extractions are complex and varied, focusing on access obliviousness will simplify exposition.

• **Obliviousness:**

- **Access obliviousness:** For any two *distinct* sequences of virtual indices (v_1, \dots, v_t) and (v'_1, \dots, v'_t) where a sequence w is distinct if $\forall i \neq j, w_i \neq w_j$, the sequence of outputs of $\text{Lookup}(k, \cdot)$ on \vec{v} and \vec{v}' are computationally indistinguishable (in N). In other words

$$\Delta((Q_1, \dots, Q_t), (Q'_1, \dots, Q'_t)) < N^{\omega(1)}$$

where the sequence of queries (Q_1, \dots, Q_t) and (Q'_1, \dots, Q'_t) are generated according to the following experiments:

$$\left\{ (Q_1, \dots, Q_t) \left| \begin{array}{l} T \leftarrow \text{Build}(k, X) \\ Q_1 \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k, v_1) \\ \vdots \\ Q_t \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k, v_t) \end{array} \right. \right\}$$

and

$$\left\{ (Q'_1, \dots, Q'_t) \left| \begin{array}{l} T' \leftarrow \text{Build}(k', X') \\ Q'_1 \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k', v'_1) \\ \vdots \\ Q'_t \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k', v'_t) \end{array} \right. \right\}.$$

- **Full obliviousness:** The complete sequence of accesses from building, lookups, deletions and extractions are oblivious, provided that the lookup and deletion sequences are the same, and that each item in these sequences is distinct. Concretely, for any two sets $X, X' \subset \mathcal{X}$ with $|X|, |X'| \leq m$ and any distinct sequences $v, v' \in \mathcal{V}^t$ and

$$A \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ \text{Acc} \left(\begin{array}{l} T \leftarrow \text{Build}(k, X) \\ \text{Delete}(k, v_1, T) \\ \dots \\ \text{Delete}(k, v_t, T) \\ \bar{X} \leftarrow \text{Extract}(k, T) \end{array} \right) \left| k \leftarrow \text{Gen}(N, m) \right. \right\}$$

and

$$A' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ \text{Acc} \left(\begin{array}{l} T' \leftarrow \text{Build}(k', X') \\ \text{Delete}(k', v'_1, T') \\ \dots \\ \text{Delete}(k', v'_t, T') \\ \bar{X}' \leftarrow \text{Extract}(k', T') \end{array} \right) \left| k' \leftarrow \text{Gen}(N, m) \right. \right\}$$

where $\text{Acc}(f(\cdot))$ are the set of physical memory accesses when executing function f and Q_i, Q'_i are defined as above using the same v, v', X, X', k, k' , then

$$\Delta((A, Q_1, \dots, Q_t), (A', Q'_1, \dots, Q'_t)) < N^{\omega(1)}$$

Remark 1 (Full Obliviousness). In a single-party ORAM setting, the hash-table must provide full obliviousness. It is possible in a multi-party setting to have the construction, accessing and extraction of the hash table be performed by different parties (*e.g.*, [LO13]). In this case, the set of functions executed by each individual party must be oblivious, but the combined set of all functions need not be.

Remark 2 (Insertions). Although most hash tables support *insertion*, this is not a necessary functionality for use in a hierarchical ORAM protocol, so we omit it in the formal definition of a hash table.

Remark 3 (Deletions and Extraction). Some ORAM schemes do not delete items as they are accessed, but rather extract data from all levels and then perform deduplication. However, the definition presented here simplifies proofs.

Figure 1: Single-table Cuckoo hashing [PR04]

- **Key generation:** Generate $d \geq 2$ hash functions $h_i : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow [cn]$ for $i \in [d]$.
- **Building:** The build algorithm must place each element $(v, w) \in X$ in either $T[h_i(v)]$ for some $1 \leq i \leq d$ or in $T[cn + j]$ for some $1 \leq j \leq s$. Building can be accomplished by repeated insertions, or an “offline” algorithm. We do not specify how the build is accomplished obviously as this varies significantly between protocols.
- **Lookups:** Return $Q = \{h_1(v), \dots, h_d(v), cn + 1, \dots, cn + s\}$. To read an element from a virtual index, v , read $T[h_i(v)]$ for $i = 1, \dots, d$, and check if any of the elements retrieved are of the form (v, x) for some x .
- **Deletions:** Find $Q \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k, v)$ and for any $i \in Q$ if $T[i] = (v, x)$ set $T[i] = \perp$.
- **Extractions:** Again, the method for performing extractions obviously varies significantly between protocols, so we do not outline it here.

2.2 Cuckoo hashing

Cuckoo hashing was introduced in [PR04] as a method of multiple-choice hashing with expected constant-time lookups. Since its introduction, many variants of cuckoo hashing have been proposed and analyzed (see [Mit09] for a review). In this section, we review a basic common form of cuckoo hashing, but we emphasize that our attack works for almost all types of hashing with a stash.

We view a hash table as an array, T , with $cn + s$ locations, each having capacity one. Each element, x , can be placed in one of d locations given by $h_i(x)$ for $i = 1, \dots, d$ where $h_i(x) \in [cn]$. If an element cannot be placed in one of its d locations, it is placed in a logarithmic-sized “stash,” *i.e.*, a location in $cn + 1, \dots, cn + s$.

With appropriate choices of constants c and d , and a stash of size s , cuckoo hashing will succeed except with probability in n .

Lemma 1. Cuckoo hashing, as presented in Figure 1 is *access oblivious*.

Proof. As is standard practice, we model the hash functions as truly random functions (see [Mit09] for a discussion of this assumption). Since each hash function is truly random, the first time an item is queried to a hash function, the result is chosen uniformly at random and independent of all previous choices. Therefore, within the scope of the access obliviousness experiment, the values Q_i and Q'_i will all be chosen uniformly at random and independently, since each access sequence is distinct, and the keys are different in the two experiments. Therefore, (Q_1, \dots, Q_t) and (Q'_1, \dots, Q'_t) will actually be perfectly indistinguishable in this model, and so will also be computationally indistinguishable in N . \square

If Cuckoo hashing is combined with an appropriate Build and Extract construction, it can be fully oblivious. Note that this not *only* requires that the Build and Extract functions are oblivious in themselves, but that when Build, Lookup and Extract are all performed by a single entity, that the *combined* sequence of accesses is still oblivious.

Remark 4 (1-table vs d-table cuckoo hashing). We describe a single-table cuckoo hashing scheme, where all d hash functions hash into the same table. Alternatively, some cuckoo hashing constructions use d tables, and hash function i hashes into table i . Setting d to 2 is a common choice, resulting in 2-table cuckoo hashing. Using 1- vs d -table cuckoo hashing does not change the asymptotic performance of the hashing scheme, although it does change some details in the analysis.

A single-table cuckoo hash table corresponds naturally to bipartite multigraph with n left-hand nodes (corresponding to $[n]$) and cn right-hand nodes corresponding to the hash buckets (*i.e.*, first cn locations in the array T). Then a left hand node, v , is connected to d right hand neighbors given by $\{h_i(v)\}_{i=1}^d$. It

is straightforward to see that the build procedure can succeed if there is a bipartite matching that includes $|X| - s$ left-hand vertices. Since these elements can be placed in their right-hand neighbors (given by the matching) and the remaining s elements can be placed in the stash.

This also shows that the build procedure can be implemented by building this bipartite multigraph and calculating a maximum matching. We assume that whatever build procedure is used does find such a maximum matching. In practice, analyses of build processes generally assume that a maximum matching is found, even if they use an algorithm which is not known to provide a maximum matching. For example [KMW09] notes “Of course, the most natural insertion algorithm is to impose an a-priori bound of $\alpha \log n$ on the number of evictions, and if after $\alpha \log n$ evictions an empty slot had not been found, put the current element in the stash. Unfortunately, this insertion algorithm does not guarantee that the element put in the stash corresponds to a cycle edge, a property essential for the analysis. Nevertheless, simulations given in Section 5 suggest that the same qualitative results hold for both cases.”

If the stash is chosen by finding a maximum matching, the probability of failure is $\mathcal{O}(n^{-\Theta(s)})$. This holds for constant s with a constant of 1 in the Θ -notation [KMW09]. It also holds for $s \leq \mathcal{O}(n)$ with a constant of $\frac{1}{2}$ in the Θ -notation [ADW14]. Therefore, if $s = \Theta(\log(n))$ the failure probability is $\mathcal{O}(n^{-\Theta(\log n)})$, which is negligible in n . Note that for ORAMs, the failure probability may need to be negligible not in the capacity of the cuckoo hash table, n , but in the capacity of the ORAM, N . If n is polynomial in terms of N this will hold. Goodrich and Mitzenmacher show that it also holds if the stash size is $\Theta(\log(N))$ and $n = \Omega(\log^7(N))$ and propose using another type of oblivious hash table for $n = o(\log^7(N))$ [GM11].

We have shown here that the Cuckoo hash table presented here, with appropriate **Build** and **Extract** functions, is an example of an oblivious hash table. We next show how oblivious hash tables can be used to construct a Hierarchical ORAM. This is secure, but we will later show that if the stashes are combined this breaks obliviousness.

2.3 ORAM

An Oblivious RAM (ORAM) provides access to a virtual memory such that all equal-length sequences of virtual memory accesses have computationally indistinguishable physical access sequences. We define an ORAM formally below.

Definition 2.2 (ORAM). An ORAM $O = (\text{Init}, \text{Query})$ is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms:

- **Init:** $O \leftarrow \text{Init}(A, N)$, where N is an integer, and A is an array of length N of elements from some space \mathcal{W} . This initializes the value of index $i \in \mathcal{V} = [N]$ to $A[i] \in \mathcal{W}$.
- **Query:** $w' \leftarrow \text{Query}(O, v, w)$ where O is an ORAM object, $v \in \mathcal{V}$ is an index and $w \in \mathcal{W} \cup \{\perp\}$. If $w = \perp$ this is a read query and it returns the value at index v . If $w \neq \perp$ this is a write query and it returns \perp and sets the value at index v to w .

The ORAM must satisfy the following correctness guarantee.

- **Consistency:** When a read is performed on index v , the result equals the value that was last written to index v , or if a write has never been performed on index v , it returns the initial value of index v , $A[v]$.

The ORAM must additionally satisfy the following security property.

- **Obliviousness:**

Regardless of the data, or the sequence of queries, the access pattern to the physical memory is computationally indistinguishable. Formally, for any initial arrays A, A' of length N and any sequence of queries $(v_1, w_1), \dots, (v_t, w_t), (v'_1, w'_1), \dots, (v'_t, w'_t)$, where $v_i, v'_i \in \mathcal{V}$, $w_i, w'_i \in \mathcal{W} \cup \{\perp\}$, given

$$C \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ \text{Acc} \left(\begin{array}{c} O \leftarrow \text{Init}(A, N) \\ \text{Query}(O, v_1, w_1) \\ \dots \\ \text{Query}(O, v_t, w_t) \end{array} \right) \right\}$$

and

$$C' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ \text{Acc} \left(\begin{array}{l} O' \leftarrow \text{Init}(A', N) \\ \text{Query}(O', v'_1, w'_1) \\ \dots \\ \text{Query}(O', v'_t, w'_t) \end{array} \right) \right\}$$

then


$$\Delta(C, C') < N^{\omega(1)}$$

Note that the basic ORAM security definition only gives the adversary the ability to see the *access pattern*, but not the underlying data itself. To hide the data, each record can be encrypted under the client's key using a symmetric-key cryptosystem, or, in multi-server ORAMs, each record can be secret-shared among the servers (e.g. [KM19]).

2.4 Hierarchical ORAM

In this section, we review the hierarchical ORAM construction, originally put forward in [Ost90, Ost92, GO96]. The hierarchical scheme has been used as a basis for many future ORAM protocols including [GMOT12, LO13, PPRY18, AKL⁺20]. We will now lay out the basic scheme and show it to be secure. In Section 3, we show how modifications to this basic scheme caused a subtle security problem that caused future schemes (using this modification) to be insecure.

A hierarchical ORAM consists of a number of levels, each consisting of an oblivious hash table of increasing capacities.



Tables in a hierarchical ORAM.

The cache is an oblivious object similar to an Oblivious Hash Table but that additionally supports insertions and repeated queries in the access sequence. We also refer to it as level 0, L_0 , when performing actions on multiple levels. The cache can be implemented easily by performing a linear scan of its contents on each access.

We present the Hierarchical ORAM formally in Figure 2.4. We will now show why such ORAMs are secure, provided that the hash tables are fully oblivious. First, we need the following lemma.

Lemma 2. The ORAM of Figure 2.4 satisfies an invariant that all possible indexes $v \in \mathcal{V}$ are stored in exactly one level in the ORAM. This invariant holds after initialization, after each cache insertion and after each rebuild, though need not hold between these points.

Proof. By induction. The ORAM is initialized to store all indexes $v \in \mathcal{V}$ in level L_ℓ . Each query is to some $v \in \mathcal{V}$. When a lookup to some index v is made, by induction this index will exist at some level. Since each level is searched, this index will be found and deleted from this level. It will then be placed in the cache. Therefore, once the item has been inserted into the cache, each index $v \in \mathcal{V}$ will be stored in exactly one location. If a rebuild occurs, certain levels will be emptied and merged into a larger level. However, this merge preserves the set of indexes in the ORAM, since all indexes from levels $i = 0, \dots, i^*$ are extracted and placed in level i^* . \square

Figure 2: Hierarchical ORAM

- **Input:** A virtual memory size N . An array of initial values A .
- **Init:** Set $t = 0$
 Set $X = (v, A[v])$ for all $1 \leq v \leq N$.
 For $i = 0, \dots, \ell - 1$, set $k_i \leftarrow \text{Gen}(N, c2^i)$, $T_i \leftarrow \text{Build}(k_i, \emptyset)$.
 Set $k_\ell \leftarrow \text{Gen}(N, c2^\ell)$, $T_\ell \leftarrow \text{Build}(k_\ell, X)$.

Hierarchical ORAM Initialization

- **Input:** A virtual memory address, v . A payload, x . (For read queries $x = \perp$)
- **State:** A counter t , hash keys k_1, \dots, k_ℓ . Local memory, m .
- **Scan the cache:** Initialize $\text{found} = \text{false}$. Read every element in the cache L_0 . If a pair (v, w) is found, set $m = w$, $\text{found} = \text{true}$, and delete the old item from the cache.
- **Search each level:** For i in $1, \dots, \ell$
 - If $\text{found} = \text{false}$ set $Q_i \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k_i, v)$, otherwise set $Q_i \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k_i, \text{dummy} \circ t)$.
 - If there is a $j \in Q_i$, and a w such that $T_i[j] = (v, w)$, then set $m = w$ and $\text{found} = \text{true}$.
 - $\text{Delete}(k_i, v, T_i)$
- **Insert into the cache:** If $x \neq \perp$ (*i.e.*, it was a write query), insert (v, x) into the cache, otherwise insert (v, m) into the cache.
- **Rebuilding:** Increment t . Let $\tau = 2c$ be the rebuild period. If t is a multiple of τ initiate a rebuild (as described below).

Hierarchical ORAM queries.

- **State:** A counter, t . Hash tables $\{T_i\}_{i \in [\ell]}$. Hash keys $\{k_i\}_{i \in [\ell]}$.
- **Identify level:** Let \bar{i} be the largest value such such that $\frac{t}{\tau} = 0 \pmod{2^{\bar{i}}}$. Let $i^* = \min(\bar{i} + 1, \ell)$. We will merge levels $0, \dots, i^*$ into level i^* .
- **Merge levels:** Initialize $X = \emptyset$. For $i = 0, \dots, i^*$, and obviously evaluate $X = X \cup \text{Extract}(k_i, T_i)$. Set $k_{i^*} \leftarrow \text{Gen}(N, c2^{i^*})$, and $T_{i^*} = \text{Build}(k_{i^*}, X)$.
- **Clear lower levels:** For $i = 0, \dots, i^* - 1$, set $k_i \leftarrow \text{Gen}(N, c2^i)$, $T_i \leftarrow \text{Build}(k_i, \emptyset)$.

Hierarchical ORAM rebuilds.

Lemma 3. An index is queried at most once at each (non-cache) level between rebuilds of that level, or equivalently, an index is queried at most once to any oblivious hash table.

Proof. If an index, $v \in \mathcal{V}$ is queried at a level L_i , it will be found at some level, (since by Lemma 2 it must exist at *some* level) It will then be placed in the cache. Until L_i is rebuilt, it will not exist in L_i , since the tables only support deletions, not insertions. Since the sizes of the tables are exponentially increasing, if L_j is rebuilt for some $j > i$, L_i will also be rebuilt (possibly to an empty table) so conversely, if L_i has *not* been rebuilt, L_j will also have not been rebuilt for all $j > i$. Therefore, the index will not be stored at L_j for any $j > i$. Therefore, since the index must be stored somewhere, it is stored at some level L_k , where $k < i$. Since the Hierarchical ORAM searches levels sequentially, it will find the item before L_i is reached, will set $found = true$ and will therefore search for $dummy \circ t$. Therefore each $v \in \mathcal{V}$ will only be searched for once in L_i between rebuilds of L_i . The values of t increment with each ORAM query, so each query of form $dummy \circ t$ will also be queried at most once at any level. \square

We now show that the oblivious property of the ORAM follows easily from this lemma and the properties of oblivious hash tables:

Theorem 1. The Hierarchical ORAM protocol in Figure 2.4, when using an Oblivious Hash Table at each level, is oblivious as per Definition 2.2.

Proof. The security of the ORAM protocol rests on two key facts: (1) *No repeated accesses*: An index is queried once in each level between rebuilds, or equivalently, the set of queries to each hash table is distinct. This was demonstrated in Lemma 3. (2) *Oblivious accesses*: Our definition of an oblivious hash table (Definition 2.1) produces indistinguishable physical access patterns provided that any two sequences of *distinct* virtual indices. This is satisfied as per fact (1), so the combined access patterns of builds, lookups, deletions and extractions at each level are indistinguishable. Furthermore, builds, lookups, deletions and extractions of each hash table do not depend on those of other hash tables.

For the cache, there may indeed be multiple queries to the same index. However, we required that the cache also provides obliviousness given repeated accesses and insertions. Therefore accesses to the cache are also independent, and since each level is constructed independently of the cache and of each other, the combined access patterns of the entire data structure are oblivious. \square

Remark 5 (Efficiency). While rebuilding the hash tables is expensive,² these rebuilds occur at a frequency proportional to the capacity of the table, thus the *amortized* cost can remain low. The exact communication cost depends on how the hash tables are implemented, and how the oblivious functions **Build** and **Extract** are implemented. We do not focus on these details here, as they do not bear directly on our attack.

3 The Attack

In this section, we describe a novel attack on hierarchical ORAM protocols that use cuckoo hashing with a combined stash. This attack applies directly to [GMOT12, KLO12, LO13] and Instantiation 2 of [KM19]. The recent works of PanORAMa [PPRY18] and OptORAMa [AKL⁺20] use a modified hierarchical solution with multiple cuckoo tables at each level, so the attack described in this section does not apply directly. In Appendix A we present a modified attack that also applies to PanORAMa [PPRY18] and OptORAMa [AKL⁺20].

3.1 Simplified attack

First, we describe an attack in a simplified setting, which we later show is equivalent to the ORAM setting.

Imagine the following construction of a hash table. A cuckoo hash table, as defined in Figure 1, is modified in the following way. When querying some item $v \in \mathcal{V}$, the stash will be searched first. If the item is found in the stash, then some new unique index $v' \notin \mathcal{V}$ will be searched for in the remainder of the table, *i.e.*, $h_i(v')$ will be accessed for $1 \leq i \leq d$. This construction is presented in Figure 3. We will show that this object is no longer an oblivious hash table.

²In the client-server setting expense is measured by communication between the client and the server. In the MPC setting, expense is measured as the communication between multiple ORAM servers, and possibly also a client.

Figure 3: Stash-Resampling Cuckoo Table

Build, Delete and Extract are defined identical to Cuckoo Hash Table (Figure 1)

- **Lookups:** `Lookup` takes the key k , an index v and the table object T , and returns a set of indexes, Q . If v is not in the stash, (i.e., $T[j] \neq (v, w)$ for any $cm + 1 \leq j \leq cm + s$) return $Q = \{cm + 1, \dots, cm + s, h_1(v), \dots, h_d(v)\}$. However, if v is in the stash pick a new $v' \notin \mathcal{V}$, using an internal counter to ensure that the same v' is never selected twice, and return $Q = \{cm + 1, \dots, cm + s, h_1(v'), \dots, h_d(v')\}$.

Observe that previously, `Lookup` only took k and v as parameters, whereas in this definition, its behavior depends on an additional parameter T . The fact that the access pattern changes depending on how the table is constructed breaks the abstraction of an oblivious hash table. We will next show that this break leads to a concrete vulnerability in the oblivious hash table.

Remark 6. We describe our attack in terms of cuckoo hashing, but essentially the same argument goes through with other hashing schemes that use a stash.

The remainder of this subsection will go to prove that the Stash-Resampling Cuckoo Hash table is not access oblivious. We will do this by showing how accesses to a (Stash-Resampling) Cuckoo Hash Table induce a graph and by showing that the induced graphs of different access sequences to a Stash-Resampling Cuckoo Hash Table can be distinguished.

As with the Cuckoo hash table, the Stash-Resampling Cuckoo Hash Table has a constant number $d \geq 2$ hash functions and holds non-stash elements in an array of length cm for some $c > 1$. A cuckoo hash table with d hash functions induces a bipartite multigraph with m left-hand vertices (corresponding to the virtual accesses $1, \dots, m$) and cm right-hand vertices (corresponding to the cm locations in the table). Each left-hand vertex will be connected to the d locations given by the d hash functions.

First we will formalize the correspondence between accesses to a (Stash-Resampling) Cuckoo Hash Table and bipartite graphs by defining a function that generates a graph from a sequence of responses to `Lookup`.

Definition 3.1 (Access-Pattern Graph Representation). The Graph Representation of an Access Pattern, $B(m, c, Q)$, is a function that generates a graph for a sequence of accesses Q . $B(m, c, Q)$ takes as inputs integers m and c and a sequence of integer sets Q_1, \dots, Q_m and returns a bipartite multigraph with left vertices a_1, \dots, a_m , right vertices b_1, \dots, b_{cm} and edges (a_i, b_j) for $j \in Q_i \cap [cm]$.

We will now review some elementary material regarding maximum matting's on bipartite graphs.

Definition 3.2 (Left-regular bipartite multigraph). We define a left-regular bipartite directed multigraph to be a graph $G = (L \cup R, E)$ with the following properties.

- It is bipartite, with vertex sets L and R , and each edge being directed from L to R , i.e., $\forall (u, v) \in E, u \in L, v \in R$.
- Every vertex in L has a constant number of edges, denoted d .
- E is a multiset, i.e., the edge (u, v) may occur multiple times.

Definition 3.3 (Random left-regular bipartite multigraph). We define $H_0(m, c, d)$ to be a function that produces a random left-regular bipartite multigraph, where $|L| = m$, $|R| = c \cdot m$, $d \geq 1$ is the degree of each vertex in L and where each outgoing edge from a vertex $u \in L$ has an end-point, $v \in R$, that is chosen uniformly at random from R (and independent of all other choices).

It is easy to see that if $Q = [Q_1, \dots, Q_m]$ is the result of outputs of `Lookup` to a sequence of queries in a (Stash-Resampling) Cuckoo Hash Table with capacity m and degree d , then $G \leftarrow B(m, c, Q)$ will be a

left-regular bipartite multigraph, since every Q_i will contain d vertices in $[cm]$. We will soon show that for an Oblivious Cuckoo Hash Table, this will be sampled as a *random* left-regular bipartite multigraph, but for a Stash-Resampling Cuckoo Table the left-regular bipartite multigraph will *not* be sampled from this random distribution.

Definition 3.4 (Matching of a bipartite multigraph). For a bipartite multigraph $G = (L \cup R, E)$, a matching is a set of edges $E' \subseteq E$ such that

$$(u, v), (u', v') \in E' \Rightarrow u \neq u', v \neq v'.$$

A maximum matching is a matching of maximum size. There may be multiple such matchings, but they will all be the same size; we use $M(G)$ to denote some such matching and $|M(G)|$ to be this size, which is independent of which matching is chosen. $S(G) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} m - |M(G)|$ is the number of unmatched elements on the left-hand side.

Note that for any graph, $0 \leq S(G) \leq m - 1$ since at most all elements may be matched and at least one element will be matched.

Lemma 4 (Lower bound on unmatched elements). For $G \leftarrow H_0(m, c, d)$, where d, c are constants,

$$\Pr[S(G) \geq s] \geq \left(\frac{1}{cm}\right)^{ds+1}$$

which is non-negligible in m .

Proof. Pick $s + 1$ elements of L . The probability that *all* $d \cdot (s + 1)$ edges of these elements will have the same endpoint $v \in R$ is $\left(\frac{1}{cm}\right)^{d(s+1)-1} \geq \left(\frac{1}{cm}\right)^{ds+1}$. If this occurs, any matching can contain at most 1 of these elements, which means that at least s of these elements will be unmatched. Thus $S(G) \geq s$. Note that for any constant d and s , this probability is non-negligible. \square

Next, we describe two distributions on the integers $[m - 1]$.

Definition 3.5. Fix constants $d, m \in \mathbb{N}$, and $c > 1$. Let $M(\cdot)$ be an algorithm that takes a bipartite multigraph G , and returns a maximum matching $M(G)$.

- **Distribution 0:** Let s_0 be the random variable denoting the number of unmatched elements in a random bipartite multigraph. $s_0 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} S(H_0(m, c, d))$.
- **Distribution 1:** Define a distribution of graphs according to the following process. First construct a graph $G' \leftarrow H_0(m, c, d)$. Let $G' = (L \cup R, E')$. Let $M(G')$ be a maximum matching in G' . Initialize $E = E'$. For every $u \in L$ s.t. $\nexists (u, v) \in M(G')$, remove every edge $(u, v) \in E'$, and replace it with a new edge (u, v') where v' is chosen uniformly at random from R . Let $G = (L_1 \cup R_1, E)$ be the modified graph. Let $H_1(m, c, d, M(\cdot))$ denote the function that samples a graph from this distribution. Define s_1 to be the number of unmatched elements in this experiment, *i.e.*, $s_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} S(H_1(m, c, d, M(\cdot)))$.

Although the distributions s_0 and s_1 depend on parameters, we generally suppress these dependencies for notational convenience.

Intuitively, the expected value of s_1 should be smaller than the expected value of s_0 , since the vertices which were not matched get another chance to be matched when new end-points are chosen for them.

In Lemma 5 we show that this is indeed the case, and that the distributions of s_0 and s_1 are statistically different (*i.e.*, non-negligibly different).

Lemma 5. If s_0 and s_1 are the random variables described above, then the statistical distance between s_0 and s_1 is at least $\frac{1}{m} \left(1 - \left(\frac{1}{c}\right)^d\right) \left(\frac{1}{cm}\right)^{ds+1}$ which is non-negligible in m .

Proof. Consider the graph $G' = (L \cup R, E')$ $\leftarrow H_0(m, c, d)$ generated as the first step in generating distribution s_1 , where $|R| = c \cdot m$. Let $M = M(G')$. Since $|M| \leq m$, at most a $\frac{1}{c}$ -fraction of the vertices in R have edges in $M(G')$. Thus, when G is constructed (as the second step of distribution s_1), for each $u \in L$ that was not in M , there is at most a $(\frac{1}{c})^d$ chance that *all* d right-hand neighbors of u are already matched. Thus by linearity of expectation

$$E[s_1] \leq \left(\frac{1}{c}\right)^d E[s_0].$$

By Lemma 4, $E[s_0] \geq \left(\frac{1}{cm}\right)^{ds+1}$ so

$$|E[s_0] - E[s_1]| \geq \left(1 - \left(\frac{1}{c}\right)^d\right) \left(\frac{1}{cm}\right)^{ds+1}.$$

In particular, this means that the expected values, $E[s_0]$ and $E[s_1]$ are non-negligibly different.

Finally, notice that $0 \leq s_0, s_1 \leq m$, so

$$\Delta(s_0, s_1) \geq \frac{1}{m} |E[s_0] - E[s_1]| \geq \frac{1}{m} \left(1 - \left(\frac{1}{c}\right)^d\right) \left(\frac{1}{cm}\right)^{ds+1}$$

which means that $\Delta(s_0, s_1)$ is also non-negligible. □

Now we show that the Stash-Resampling Cuckoo Hash table is not access oblivious.

Theorem 2. The Stash-Resampling Cuckoo table presented in Figure 3 is not access oblivious.

Proof. Let $X = X' = \{1, \dots, m\}$ for some $m \leq \frac{N}{2}$. Let $v_i = i + m$ and let $v'_i = i$ for $1 \leq i \leq m$. The adversary will generate a table with the input data, lookup the sequence of virtual indices and construct a bipartite graph based on these lookup results.

Let there be two experiments:

$$k \leftarrow \text{Gen}(N, m); T \leftarrow \text{Build}(k, X); Q_i \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k, v_i, T); G \leftarrow B(m, c, Q); s = S(G)$$

and

$$k' \leftarrow \text{Gen}(N, m); T' \leftarrow \text{Build}(k, X'); Q'_i \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k', v'_i, T'); G' \leftarrow B(m, c, Q'); s' = S(G')$$

where i ranges over $1 \leq i \leq m$.

In the first experiment, none of the queries are in X , therefore none will be in the stash. Therefore $Q = \{cm + 1, \dots, cm + s, h_1(v_i), \dots, h_d(v_i)\}$. Since the v_i were never queried by the random oracle before their results will be uniform at random. Therefore, each left-vertex in G will have d neighbors, chosen uniformly at random from b_j . Therefore G is chosen exactly according to the distribution H_0 .

In the second experiment, all of the queries are in X' . If we were to search according to the oblivious Cuckoo Hashing algorithm of Figure 1 then the corresponding graph would be distributed according to $H_0(m, c, d)$. However, for any element that was not in the maximum matching, (*i.e.*, the elements in the stash) the Stash-Resampling Cuckoo hash table will instead pick new indices to query, \bar{v}'_j and return locations $h_i(\bar{v}'_j)$ which will not have been queried to the random oracle before so will be new random location. Therefore, for these elements that were not in the maximum matching, the corresponding edges will be re-chosen uniformly at random. The graph from the second experiment will therefore be constructed according to distribution $H_1(m, c, d, M(\cdot))$, assuming the stash was chosen by some maximum matching algorithm $M(\cdot)$.

We have already shown that distributions $H_0(m, c, d)$ and $H_1(m, c, d, M(\cdot))$ are distinguishable. Therefore an adversary can distinguish the two experiments, so Stash-Resampling Cuckoo Hashing is not access oblivious. □

Remark 7. Note that the attack described above is immediately applicable in cases where the stash is accesses *before* the associated cuckoo hash table, and if the target is found in the stash, the protocol searches for dummy elements in the table. For instance, our attack would apply to a hierarchical ORAM that stored a stash at the same level, but accessed the stash *first*, and searches for a dummy in the rest of the table if the element is found in the stash.

Figure 4: Hierarchical ORAM with a Combined Stash

A Stash-Reinserting ORAM is an ORAM equivalent to that of Figure 2.4 with the following modifications:

- **Rebuild:** Rather than table T_{i^*} storing all elements in X , at most c of these elements can be stored in a stash. The stash is not stored at this level, but is padded to size c and inserted into the cache.
- **Rebuild frequency:** Since the cache is of size c after a rebuild, the rebuild period is now $\tau = c$.

3.2 Hierarchical ORAM with a combined stash

We now present how Hierarchical ORAMs were constructed using a combined stash. We will show that this breaks the abstraction of an oblivious hash table, and results in access patterns identical to those of the Stash-Resampling Cuckoo Table, which breaks obliviousness.

Beginning with the protocol of Goodrich et al. [GMOT12], a number of hierarchical ORAM schemes stored stashed items from a table construction in a shared stash or re-inserted them into the cache. Since most schemes re-insert stash items into the cache, we will present this version. We now present in Figure 4 the changes between the stash-reinserting hierarchical ORAM and the original Hierarchical ORAM protocol from Section 2.4. All other parts of the protocol remain the same.

Theorem 3. The Stash-Reinserting ORAM of Figure 4 is insecure; *i.e.*, it does not satisfy the oblivious property in Definition 2.2.

Proof. Let $A = A' = 0^N$. Let the Hierarchical ORAM be such that there will be some level L_i of capacity $m \leq \frac{N}{2}$ that is implemented using a cuckoo hash table.³

Let $U = (1, \perp), \dots, (m, \perp), (m+1, \perp), \dots, (2m, \perp)$ and $U' = (1, \perp), \dots, (m, \perp), (1, \perp), \dots, (m, \perp)$ be two sequences of ORAM queries. Recall that $w = \perp$ indicates a read query.

After m queries, L_i will be constructed.⁴ In both experiments L_i will be constructed using the elements $(1, 0), \dots, (m, 0)$. A cuckoo hash table will be constructed in both cases, with these contents.⁵

The stash will be re-inserted in both cases. We have from Lemma 2 that each of these stashed elements will exist at a single location at the start of each access. Since levels L_j for all $j \geq i$ will only be rebuilt when L_i is also rebuilt, we know that these elements must remain in some level L_k with $k < i$ until L_i is rebuilt. This means that, until this point in time, they will always be found *before* L_i is accessed. Thus, by the ORAM query algorithm, a dummy query will be performed in L_i .

Therefore, the access pattern in the cuckoo table at L_i will be the same as that of the stash-resampling cuckoo table in Figure 3, where elements were searched in the stash first, and if found in the stash a dummy was searched in the remainder of the table. The only difference is that in the stash-resampling cuckoo table, the algorithm also accessed a pre-assigned stash, but this is not an issue since the attack to the stash-resampling algorithm does not use the access pattern to the stash (as this access pattern is always the same). Observe that, exactly like in the attack of Theorem 2, one sequence of accesses (U) will only access

³Some schemes use a mixture of hash table types at different levels. We do not require that all levels use a cuckoo hash table, only that there is at least one such level of size $\leq \frac{N}{2}$ that has its stash re-inserted into the ORAM data structure.

⁴This is not quite true. We would like to construct L_i such that it contains indices $1, \dots, m$ (although some may of these may be stashed). However, due to reinsertions of the stash this will actually need to occur in a level with capacity roughly $2m$. If additional accesses are needed to trigger the rebuild, then the same element, *e.g.*, $(1, \perp)$ can be looked up multiple times. The exact details of what sequence of accesses is needed in order to cause elements $1, \dots, m$ to be inserted into a particular level also varies depending on how exactly the ORAM is constructed. More generally, the sequence $(1, \perp), \dots, (m, \perp)$ at the beginning of both U and U' should be replaced with whatever sequence in the given ORAM is needed in order to instantiate a level to contain exactly the indices $1, \dots, m$.

⁵It is possible that when the ORAM is initialized, elements from the L_ℓ are stashed and stored in the cache. These elements would inadvertently also be stored in L_i . The affect of this on the cuckoo hash table is small.

elements that were *not* in the data table, and the other sequence (U') will only access elements that *were* in the data table (including the stash). Therefore, by the same argument as Theorem 2 an adversary is able to distinguish access patterns in the ORAM with non-negligible probability. Therefore, the ORAM protocol is insecure. \square

4 Alibi: Secure Hierarchical ORAM with Reinserted Stashes

The basic problem arises when a stashed element is found *before* the appropriate level of the ORAM hierarchy is searched. As a successful criminal needs not only to be hidden in the location where they committed a crime, but also needs an alibi who claims to have seen them enacting their everyday life, likewise the stashed elements need not only hide their presence in the levels to which they are reinserted, but also need to hide their absence from the levels from which they came. To fix this problem, we need to ensure that even when an element cannot be *stored* at a certain level of the ORAM hierarchy (*i.e.*, because it falls in the cuckoo stash), it must still be *searched for* at this level. This way, the set of physical accesses at a level will always be chosen uniformly at random and be fully independent. Each element therefore needs to store a record of the locations where it would have been, and needs to be searched for in these locations if accessed.

There are some small subtleties here. First, an element needs to store the fact that it was ejected from a level not only when it is in the cache, but at least until this level is rebuilt or the item is searched for, since if it is looked up at *any* point before this level is rebuilt it needs to be searched for in this level. Second, it is entirely possible that the same element that had been stashed at some level L_i could be stashed again at some level L_k with $k < i$, *before* L_i is rebuilt or the element queried. Therefore each element needs to store the location of all levels from which it was ejected due to having fallen in the stash. Since there are $\ell \leq \log N$ levels in the hierarchical ORAM, it is possible to store which levels the item was ejected from using $O(\log N)$ bits.

The flaw can be fixed using the following simple modification. For each element (v, x) the algorithm will additionally store a bit array ϵ of length ℓ , which records at which levels the item was “stashed.”

Our solution makes the following modifications to the generic hierarchical ORAM protocol.

Lemma 6. In the Alibi protocol above, there is an invariant that given a tuple (v, w, ϵ) stored at some level, $\epsilon[i] = 1$ if and only if v was stashed at level L_i during the last rebuild and v has not been queried by the ORAM since this rebuild. This invariant holds initially, after each query and after each rebuild.

Proof. By induction. This is initially true, as no items have been stashed and $\epsilon[i] = 0$ for all items.

If a level L_i is rebuilt, all levels L_j for $j < i$ will be rebuilt as empty levels. Therefore following the rebuild $\epsilon[j] = 0$ for all such levels, satisfying the invariant for these levels. For level L_i , some elements may be stashed after the rebuild, $\epsilon[i] = 1$ for exactly these elements, so the invariant is satisfied for level i . For any level L_j with $j > i$, the level has not been rebuilt and $\epsilon[j]$ is not modified, so the invariant will hold if it held before.

After a query $\epsilon[j]$ is set to 0 for all j , so $\epsilon[i]$ will only be 1 if there has not been a query since the last rebuild.

Therefore, by induction, this invariant always holds. \square

Theorem 4. Let v_1, \dots, v_m be the sequence of indices that are looked up at level L_i with $i > 0$, between two subsequent rebuilds of that level. Then the Alibi protocol satisfies the following property. If $v_k = v'_k$ for some $k' < k$, then $Q_k = \text{Lookup}(k_i, \text{dummy} \circ t)$ else $Q_k = \text{Lookup}(k_i, v_k)$.

Proof. Immediately after L_i is rebuilt, all levels L_j for $0 < j < i$ are empty. Furthermore, the cache L_0 contains only elements from the stash of T_j . Therefore, by Lemma 6 every element (v, w, ϵ) either exists in level L_j for $j > i$ or has $\epsilon[i] = 1$. This will remain true until L_i is rebuilt or v is queried. If $v_k = v$ is queried and v is stored at some level $j > i$, then it will be looked up at level i , *i.e.*, $Q_k = \text{Lookup}(k_i, v_k)$. Similarly, if $v_k = v$ is queried, and $\epsilon[i] = 1$ then when v is found, it will still be looked up at level L_i , so $Q_k = \text{Lookup}(k_i, v_k)$. In both cases $\epsilon[i]$ will be set to 0 (if it wasn't already) and it will be moved to a level $j < i$ (if it wasn't already). Only a rebuild on level L_i could change either of these facts. Therefore, until L_i is rebuilt, for any subsequent queries $v'_k = v$, a dummy item will be looked for in L_i , *i.e.*, $Q'_k = \text{Lookup}(k_i, \text{dummy} \circ t)$. \square

- **Initializing records:** When initializing the ORAM, for each input tuple (v, x) store the tuple $(v, x, 0^\ell)$ in the ORAM.
- **On rebuilds:** When a hash table, T_i , is constructed at level i , suppose $(T_i, S_i) \leftarrow \text{Build}(k_i, X)$.
 - **Stashed records:** For each record $(v, x, \epsilon) \in S_i$, set $\epsilon[i] = 1$, and $\epsilon[j] = 0$ for $j = 1, \dots, i-1$. Finally, insert (v, x, ϵ) into the cache (or combined stash) as usual.
 - **Regular records:** For each record $(v, x, \epsilon) \in T_i$, set $\epsilon[i] = 0$, and $\epsilon[j] = 0$ for $j = 1, \dots, i-1$.
- **On queries:** On input (v, x) , initialize $\text{found} = \text{false}$, $\mathbf{f} = 0^\ell$.
 - **Scan the cache:** If a record (v, w, ϵ) is found in the cache, set $m = w$, $\text{found} = \text{true}$ and $\mathbf{f} = \epsilon$ and delete the item from the cache.
 - **Search each level:** For i in $1, \dots, \ell$
 - * If $\text{found} = \text{true}$, and $\mathbf{f}[i] = 0$ then set $Q_i \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k_i, \text{dummy} \circ t)$. otherwise set $Q_i \leftarrow \text{Lookup}(k_i, v)$,
 - * Probe locations $T_i[j]$ for $j \in Q_i$.
 - * If there is a $j \in Q_i$, such that $T_i[j] = (v, w, \epsilon)$, then set $m = w$, $\text{found} = \text{true}$ and $\mathbf{f} = \epsilon$.
 - * Execute $\text{Delete}(k_i, v, T_i)$
 - **Rewrite the cache:** If $x \neq \perp$ (*i.e.*, it was a write query), insert $(v, x, 0^\ell)$ into the cache. Otherwise insert $(v, m, 0^\ell)$ into the cache.

Alibi Hierarchical ORAM protocol (delta to standard protocol of Figure 2.4)

Theorem 5. The Alibi Stash-Reinserting ORAM protocol, when instantiated with an Oblivious Hash Table with a stash, is secure, *i.e.*, it satisfies the security property of Definition 2.2.

Proof. This follows similarly to the proof of Theorem 1. The ORAM satisfies two properties: (1) *No repeated accesses:* Each query is queried at most once to each level between rebuilds. This follows directly from Theorem 4. Any query in the form $v \in \mathcal{V}$ is queried at most once, since the theorem implies that any future accesses will be to dummy items. Any query in the form $\text{dummy} \circ t$ is queried at most once, because t is incremented after each query. Therefore the lookups to the Oblivious Hash table are *distinct*. (2) *Oblivious accesses:* The Oblivious Hash Table satisfies a property that the result of Lookup are computationally indistinguishable over all distinct access patterns. Even though the ORAM only accesses the non-stash part of the Oblivious Hash Table, the accesses are still computationally indistinguishable, since the access pattern to the stash is deterministic. Since we know from (1) that the accesses to each Oblivious Hash Table are indeed distinct, this means that the accesses at that level are computationally indistinguishable.

The cache has the property that it is oblivious despite repeated accesses. All levels are built independently and so, the access patterns of all levels combined are also oblivious. The Oblivious Hash Tables are such that builds, deletions, accesses and extractions are oblivious, even when combined. Therefore the full ORAM is oblivious. \square

Remark 8. It may initially seem that the proof of security above would apply to the flawed schemes as well. However, because the schemes *resample* the queries based on whether they were stored in the stash, the access pattern of the remaining table changes, and changes specifically in a way that depends on the structure of the table. We showed that in the case of Cuckoo Hashing this change causes a change in the combined set of accesses that is distinguishable.

Complexity: Since each element only needs to store one bit for each level, and there are $O(\log n)$ levels, then the additional size of each element is increased by $O(\log n)$. Since the index is at least $\log n$ bits and the payload is $\Omega(\log n)$ the items still have the same asymptotic sizes so this does not change the asymptotic communication complexity. All of the modifications above only involve modifying or reading ϵ

when v and/or x would also be read or modified. We have that ϵ is no larger than v or x (up to constant factors, but usually in exact terms as well.) Therefore the modification only increases communication costs up to constant factors.

Correctness: The modifications do not change the output of the program, only the access patterns. The only operation that does not involve only modifications of ϵ is that during an access, if the item has already been found, the real item may be searched for in subsequent levels rather than a random item. This does not change the output of the program, since the value that was already found is the one that will be used.

5 Summary of Affected Papers

Goodrich et al. [GMOT12] introduced the idea of using Cuckoo tables with combined stashes for Hierarchical ORAM. This introduced the flaw described in this paper. Kushilevitz et al. [KLO12] introduced the alternative approach of reinserting elements from the stash into the ORAM (“cache the stash”). While there are differences between these approaches, in either case an element that was stashed will be found prior to the level from which it was ejected and random locations accessed at this level instead. Therefore both approaches are vulnerable to our attack.

Lu and Ostrovsky [LO13] then used the stash-reinsertion of [KLO12] in their 2-party ORAM protocol, inheriting this vulnerability. Similarly Kushilevitz and Moore [KM19] created a Three-server ORAM that also uses cuckoo hashing (Instantiation 2) based on [KLO12], but using a shared stash [GMOT12] rather than reinserting the stash. This ORAM protocol is therefore vulnerable to the attack from this paper; Kushilevitz and Moore also present other multi-party ORAM protocols based on other techniques which are not subject to this attack.

Two alternative Hierarchical ORAM protocols were also published that avoided the flaw described in this paper. The Hierarchical ORAM protocol [MZ14] of Mitchell and Zimmerman uses a different model where the client can keep track of which level each item should be stored at. Knowing before-hand that an element does not exist at a certain level allows the algorithm to search for *pre-inserted dummy elements* at these levels. The data-structure therefore no longer needs to hide where data is stored, but only whether an element is real or a dummy, so standard chained hash tables can be used instead of Cuckoo hashing. The two-tiered Hierarchical ORAM protocol of Chan et al. [CGLS17] then presented an alternative to cuckoo hashing with a stash. Instead, two hash tables existed, each with bins of size $\log^\epsilon(\lambda)$ for some constant $\epsilon \in (0.5, 1)$ and security parameter λ . They presented an oblivious construction in which elements would be placed in the first hash table if possible and in the second if not. They showed that the probability that an element could not be placed was negligible. Since this protocol used two-tier hashing rather than Cuckoo hashing with a combined stash it is immune to the attack we have presented.⁶

However, the flaw resurfaced again in the recent asymptotic breakthroughs of PanORAMa [PPRY18] and OptORAMa [AKL⁺20]. These achieved efficiency by storing most of the data in small bins, which are small enough to be sorted without increasing the asymptotic performance, while remaining items are placed in an overflow pile. Each of these bins is implemented as a cuckoo table and stashes are shared, but the combined stash for the bins is kept at the same level as the bins. Therefore it is possible to search the bins for the stashed elements and then to access the single-level combined stash, so the bin objects are not vulnerable to this attack. However, in both papers, the overflow and single-level combined stash cuckoo tables both have stashes that are re-inserted into the ORAM data structure. They are therefore vulnerable to the variant of our attack in Appendix A.

Our attack *does not* affect the tree-based ORAM protocols, such as Binary Tree ORAM [SCSL11], Path ORAM [SVDS⁺13] and Circuit ORAM [WCS15], as these do not use cuckoo hashing.

In summary, this flaw has existed in the the ORAM literature for almost a decade and has affected a number of significant protocols, including the most recent asymptotic breakthroughs.

⁶Chan et al. also presented a concrete instantiation of Goodrich and Mitzenmacher’s ORAM protocol in an appendix of the full version of their paper. The protocol they present uses a Cuckoo hash table at each level and a shared stash, so is vulnerable to the attack described in this paper. However, they recommend, somewhat clairvoyantly, that since Cuckoo hashing is complex and hard to prove correct, that their two-tier hash-table protocol should be used rather than the Cuckoo-hashing protocol.

6 Conclusion

In this paper we presented an attack that affects all hierarchical ORAM protocols that use cuckoo hashing with a combined stash. This vulnerability appeared in at least six prominent papers in the field. The attack is subtle, but has a simple fix which we have presented.

This attack motivates research into *simplification* of ORAM protocols. While the community has obtained very significant performance improvements over the past decade, ORAM protocols are now often very complex. Cuckoo hashing, for instance, although it has appealing performances, is tricky to implement obliviously. It would be worthwhile to find alternative oblivious hashing techniques that are simple to implement and prove secure. Creating simpler ORAM protocols in general that have the same asymptotic bounds as the latest hierarchical breakthroughs of PanORAMa and OptORAMa is an important area for future ORAM research.

This attack also motivates *improved formalization* of cryptographic components. This attack is a use case for how breaking an abstraction of a cryptographic component can break the component’s security properties in counter-intuitive ways. While a Cuckoo Hash Table with a stash is, indeed, an oblivious hash table, and a hierarchical ORAM based on oblivious hash tables is secure, combining/reinserting the stashes broke both the hash table abstraction and the security of the ORAM protocol. If an abstraction is broken, security must be re-proven from the ground up, or alternatively new abstractions need to be created and proven secure. It would therefore be helpful for the community to continue to formalize and achieve consensus on new abstractions that will form useful cryptographic components of more complex protocols.

In short the following questions are good avenues for future research:

- How can ORAM protocols be simplified while retaining the same performance?
- What other (simpler) Oblivious Hash Tables exist?
- What new functionalities would be useful cryptographic components in the ORAM space and how can these be formalized and implemented?

Simpler, more modular ORAM protocols will also aid in exposition to those outside of the field and—combined with improved constants—pave the way for real-world ORAM implementations.

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Appendix

A PanORAMa/OptORAMa attack

The attack described in Section 3 does not directly apply to PanORAMa [PPRY18] and OptORAMa [AKL⁺20]. These protocols *do* use cuckoo hash tables and combined stashes, but rather than each ORAM level containing a *single* cuckoo table, each ORAM level contains *many* cuckoo tables. Nevertheless, we show that as long as there is a table with capacity $\Theta(m/\log^q \lambda)$ for some constant $q > 0$, where m is the size of the ORAM level, then there is still an adversary that is able to distinguish access patterns with non-negligible probability.

In both PanORAMa and OptORAMa, the cuckoo table for the overflow items is of size $\Theta(m/\log^q \lambda)$. In PanORAMa, each level of the ORAM contains an overflow set, namely the value of \tilde{D} when $ctr = d - 1$. (See the construction of OblivHT.BuildLevel [PPRY18]). From this, a cuckoo hash table $(\tilde{H}^{d-1}, \tilde{S}^{d-1})$ is constructed, where \tilde{H}^{d-1} is the table and \tilde{S}^{d-1} is the stash. The overflow set \tilde{D} is of size $\Theta(m/\log \lambda)$ where m is the capacity of the ORAM level.⁷ In OptORAMa, each level contains an overflow pile, which has capacity exactly $\frac{m}{\log^2 \lambda}$. A cuckoo hash table (OF_T, OF_S) is constructed from this table, where OF_T is the table and OF_S is the stash.

In both cases, the stash of the overflow table is re-inserted into the ORAM data-structure. This means that instead of searching for stashed items in their assigned locations in the overflow table, the algorithm will access random locations in the overflow table. Similar to the attack described in 3 this causes the set of accesses to the overflow table to not be uniformly random and independent for some access patterns, and this change in the distribution of accesses is non-negligible.

First we introduce some notation and prove some helpful lemmas.

PanORAMa and OptORAMa both use the original two-table Cuckoo Hashing scheme of Pagh and Rodler [PR01].⁸ We will represent access patterns to a Cuckoo table as a bipartite multi-graph $(U \cup V, E)$ with edges, (u_j, v_k) representing an element x_i being searched for at location $u_j \in U$ in the first table and $v_k \in V$ in the second table.

We can therefore count in any graph the number of “three-way collisions”, that is the number of triplets (e_i, e_j, e_k) such that $i \neq j, j \neq k, i \neq k$ but $e_i = e_j = e_k$.

Definition A.1. A *three-way collision* occurs in a graph between distinct edges e_i, e_j and e_k if they have the same values, i.e. $\exists u \in U, v \in V$ such that $e_w = (u, v)$ for all $w \in \{i, j, k\}$.

Given a bipartite multi-graph $(U \cup V, E)$, we say an edge is randomly chosen $e \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} U \times V$. if $e = (u, v)$ and $u \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} U$ and $v \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} V$.

Lemma 7. If $e_i, e_j, e_k \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} U \times V$, then the probability that e_i, e_j and e_k have a three-way collision is $\frac{1}{(|U||V|)^2}$.

Proof. Let e_i be chosen before-hand, $e_i = (u, v)$ where $u \in U, v \in V$. The probability that $e_j = (u, v)$ is $\frac{1}{|U||V|}$ and likewise for e_k . These events are independent. Therefore the probability that $e_i = e_j = e_k$ is $\frac{1}{(|U||V|)^2}$. \square

Observe that we did not need the fact that e_i was chosen uniformly at random from $U \times V$. So this proof also demonstrates the following more general fact:

⁷This fact is not stated explicitly, but is evident from other information in the paper. \tilde{D} initially has size $2m$, where m is the capacity of the ORAM level. In each iteration $|\tilde{D}_{ctr}| = \delta |\tilde{D}_{ctr-1}|$ for some constant $0 < \delta < 1$. The iteration stops, and \tilde{H}^{d-1} is constructed once $|\tilde{D}| + |\tilde{S}| \leq w \left(\frac{m}{\log \lambda}\right)$ for some constant w (line 1 of OblivHT.BuildLevel). \tilde{S} is a set that increases in each iteration, but is much smaller than \tilde{D} , since $|\tilde{S}| = \mathcal{O}(\log(m)m/\log^c \lambda)$ where $c \geq 7$ and $\lambda = \text{poly}(m)$ i.e., $|\tilde{S}| = \mathcal{O}(m/\log^6 \lambda)$. Therefore it must be that \tilde{D} in iteration $d - 1$ is of size $\Theta\left(\frac{m}{\log \lambda}\right)$.

⁸PanORAMa states they use the cuckoo table construction of Goodrich and Mitzenmacher [GM11] which uses two-table cuckoo hashing.

Lemma 8. If e_i is an edge in bipartite multi-graph G with vertices partitioned into U and V , then if $e_j, e_k \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} U \times V$, then e_i, e_j, e_k have a three-way collision with probability $\frac{1}{(|U||V|)^2}$.

Now we can describe the attack concretely.

Let L_i be a level of the ORAM hierarchy. Let m be the capacity of this level. In both access patterns, we first access $[1, \dots, m]$. This causes level L_i to be constructed and contain elements $1, \dots, m$. After this the access patterns will differ. Our first sequence will access $A_0 = [m + 1, \dots, 2m]$ and our second sequence will access $A_1 = [1, \dots, m]$.

Let T be the two-table cuckoo hash table we will examine. In both PanORAMa and OptORAMa this is the hash table for the overflow elements. The algorithm will attempt to insert $n' = \Theta(\frac{m}{\log^d \lambda})$ elements into T . However some of these elements may be placed in a stash, S of size $|S| = s$. We know that, except with negligible probability $s \leq c \log(n')$ for some constant c . These stashed elements are re-inserted into the ORAM data-structure. They will be found prior to level L_i being accessed, and so rather than querying items from S and accessing their locations in the overflow cuckoo hash table, the algorithm will instead access random locations in the overflow cuckoo table.

From the $m + 1^{th}$ to $2m^{th}$ accesses we create a graph as follows. Let U be the set of all locations in the first table of the cuckoo table of T . Let V be the set of all locations in the second table. If access j results in accessing locations $u \in U$ and $v \in V$, add edge $e_j = (u, v)$. Let G_0 and G_1 be the graphs resulting from access pattern A_0 and A_1 respectively.

We can observe that in A_0 every element is stored in L_j , for some $j > i$. Therefore, $e_k \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} U \times V$ for each access k . Therefore, from Lemma 7, in G_0 each triplet of distinct edges has a three-way collision with probability $\frac{1}{(|U||V|)^2}$.

Now let us examine G_1 . For elements which the algorithm did not try to store in the overflow table, the accesses in T will be chosen uniformly at random. Similarly, elements that were placed in S will have been found already, so random locations will be accessed in the T cuckoo table as well. For elements that were successfully stored in T , the access pattern will not be entirely random. Let O be the set of edges corresponding to the elements that were successfully stored in T . Let B be the set of edges corresponding to all other elements. $|O| = n' - s$ and $|B| = m - n' + s$.

We will now consider the probability of a collision between different types of triplets.

- All three edges are from B . Since each edge is chosen uniformly at random, the probability of a collision is $\frac{1}{(|U||V|)^2}$ from Lemma 7.
- Two edges are from B , one is from O . Since the edges in B are chosen independently at random from $U \times V$, we have from Lemma 8 that the probability of a collision is also $\frac{1}{(|U||V|)^2}$.
- One edge is from B , two are from O . In order for there to be a three-way collision, the two edges from O first need to have a two-way collision, *i.e.*, they need to connect the same vertices. When the cuckoo hash table was first constructed, each edge was chosen uniformly at random, but the edges corresponding to the stash were removed. If the stash were to not remove any two-way collisions,⁹ then the number of two-way collisions would remain the same but the total number of elements would decrease from n' to $n' - s$. Therefore the probability of a two-way collision is at most $\frac{1}{|U||V|} \frac{n'}{n' - s}$.
- All three edges are from O . In this case the probability of a three-way collision is 0, since such a collision would imply that the overflow Cuckoo hash table were able to store 3 values in only 2 locations.

Let E_0 be the expected number of three-way collisions in G_0 and E_1 the expected number in G_1 .

In E_0 each triplet has a collision with probability $\frac{1}{(|U||V|)^2}$. While these are not independent, their expectations still sum, so the expected number of three-way collisions is $\sum_{\{i,j,k\} \in [1..m]} \frac{1}{(|U||V|)^2} = \frac{m(m-1)(m-2)}{6(|U||V|)^2}$.

Let $Q(i)$ be the number of distinct triples (ignoring order) of $O \cup B$ such that i of these are in O . Observe $Q(0) + Q(1) + Q(2) + Q(3) = \frac{m(m-1)(m-2)}{6}$

⁹Many stash-choosing algorithms are likely to remove edges that have two-way collisions since they produce cycles in the corresponding bipartite graph. However we just need to upper-bound the probability of two-way collisions between edges in O and this generalization allows us to avoid making assumptions about how the stash is chosen.

$$\begin{aligned}
E_1 &\leq \frac{Q(0) + Q(1)}{(|U||V|)^2} + \frac{Q(2)n'}{(|U||V|)^2(n' - s)} \\
E_0 &= \frac{Q(0) + Q(1) + Q(2) + Q(3)}{(|U||V|)^2} \\
E_1 - E_0 &\leq \frac{Q(2)n'}{(|U||V|)^2(n' - s)} - \frac{Q(2)}{(|U||V|)^2} - \frac{Q(3)}{(|U||V|)^2} \\
E_1 - E_0 &\leq \frac{1}{(|U||V|)^2} \left(\frac{Q(2)s}{n' - s} - Q(3) \right)
\end{aligned}$$

Now

$$\begin{aligned}
Q(2) &= \frac{(n' - s)(n' - s - 1)(m - n' + s)}{2} \\
Q(3) &= \frac{(n' - s)(n' - s - 1)(n' - s - 2)}{6}
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore:

$$\frac{Q(2)}{Q(3)} = \frac{3(m - n' + s)}{n' - s - 2}$$

We know that $s \leq c \log(n')$ so $s < n'$ and $n' - s - 2 > \frac{n'}{2}$ for sufficiently large n' .

Therefore $\frac{Q(2)}{Q(3)} \leq \frac{6m}{n'}$. We have $n' \geq k \frac{m}{\log^q \lambda}$, for some constants $q > 0$ and $k > 0$, so $Q(2) \leq \frac{6}{k} Q(3) \log^q \lambda$.

$$E_1 - E_0 \leq \frac{Q(3)}{(|U||V|^2)} \left(\frac{6s \log^q \lambda}{kn'} - 1 \right)$$

Since $s \leq c \log(n') \leq c \log(m)$, and $n' \geq k \frac{m}{\log^q \lambda}$

$$E_1 - E_0 \leq \frac{Q(3)}{(|U||V|^2)} \left(\frac{6c \log(m) \log^{2q} \lambda}{k^2 m} - 1 \right)$$

For sufficiently large m ,

$$\frac{6c \log(m) \log^{2q} \lambda}{k^2 m} < \frac{1}{2}$$

Therefore, for sufficiently large m ,

$$E_1 - E_0 \leq -\frac{Q(3)}{2(|U||V|)^2}$$

This is non-negligible in n' .

Therefore, the expected number of three-way collisions is non-negligibly lower in A_1 than in A_0 . This allows an adversary to distinguish the access patterns A_0 and A_1 .

B PanORAMa/OptORAMa solution

Our fix also applies to PanORAMa and OptORAMa. While we chose to analyze the overflow table at each level, because it is the largest cuckoo hash table and it has a clear size, the combined bin stash that exists at each level *also* has a stash that is re-inserted into the ORAM. Therefore, these stashed elements also need to be searched for in the combined stash table at that level so as to ensure the access pattern of the combined stash cuckoo table remains the same.

In addition, the bins of PanORAMa and OptORAMa are also cuckoo hash tables, which have have a combined stash that is stored at each ORAM level. Care must be taken to ensure that the access patterns

in the bins is not subject to our attack. In OptORAMa it appears that, in each level, the bins are accessed first, and then the combined stash for the bins. This means that the access pattern within the bins is the same regardless of whether an item is stored in the bin or the combined stash. It is important to realize that this is important for security, and that searching in random bins would likely lead to a vulnerability like the one described in this paper. In PanORAMa, the combined stash is accessed *before* the bins are accessed and a random bin is chosen in the case that the data is found in the combined stash. Therefore, the access patterns in the individual bins are probably also vulnerable to a distinguishing attack based on the fact that stashed elements will not be searched for. This can simply be solved by searching the bins before searching the combined stash. Similarly, elements of the combined stash that were re-inserted into the ORAM need to be searched for in their corresponding bins, so the ORAM needs to remember to still search in the bins for these items at the level from which this item was removed.

C Distinguishing distributions

In this section, review a basic fact that if two distributions are statistically different, and supported on polynomial-sized sets, then they are polynomial-time distinguishable.

Lemma 9. Let $\{X_n\}, \{Y_n\}$ denote two sequences of distributions supported on polynomial-sized sets, *i.e.*, there is a constant c , such that $\max(|X_n|, |Y_n|) < n^c$. In addition, assume that X_n and Y_n are efficiently samplable.

Then if $\Delta(X_n, Y_n)$ is non-negligible, the distributions $\{X_n\}$ and $\{Y_n\}$ are polynomial-time distinguishable.

Proof. Consider the following maximum likelihood distinguisher, D . Let $W = \text{supp}(X_n) \cup \text{supp}(Y_n)$, and $m = |W|$. Define

$$p_z \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[X_n = z]$$

$$q_z \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr[Y_n = z]$$

Fix $t = \text{poly}(n)$.

Recall that if $W = X_n \cup Y_n$,

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{w \in W} \max(p_w, q_w) &= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{w \in W} [[\max(p_w, q_w) + \min(p_w, q_w)] + [\max(p_w, q_w) - \min(p_w, q_w)]] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \left[2 + \sum_{w \in W} [\max(p_w, q_w) - \min(p_w, q_w)] \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} [2 + 2\Delta(X_n, Y_n)] \\ &= 1 + \Delta(X_n, Y_n) \end{aligned}$$

First, D will estimate the frequency of elements in both X_n and Y_n by sampling. First D will draw tm samples from X_n , let X_{sampled} denote the multiset corresponding to these samples. Similarly D will draw tm samples from Y_n . Let Y_{sampled} be the multiset corresponding to these samples.

Then D defines

$$\tilde{p}_w \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{\text{number of times } w \text{ occurred in } X_{\text{sampled}}}{tm}$$

$$\tilde{q}_w \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{\text{number of times } w \text{ occurred in } Y_{\text{sampled}}}{tm}$$

Finally, given a sample z from a distribution $Z \in \{X_n, Y_n\}$, the adversary will guess

$$A(z) = \begin{cases} X & \text{if } \tilde{p}_z \geq \tilde{q}_z \\ Y & \text{if } \tilde{p}_z < \tilde{q}_z. \end{cases}$$

A Hoeffding bound shows that

$$\Pr [|\tilde{p}_z - p_z| > \delta] < 2e^{-2mt\delta^2}$$

and similarly

$$\Pr [|\tilde{q}_z - q_z| > \delta] < 2e^{-2mt\delta^2}$$

Fix $\delta > 0$, and define

$$\begin{aligned} G &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{z \in W \mid |p_z - q_z| > 2\delta\} \\ B &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{z \in W \mid |p_z - q_z| \leq 2\delta\} \end{aligned}$$

Now, notice that

$$\max(p_z, q_z) - 2\delta < \min(p_z, q_z) \quad \text{for all } z \in B. \quad (1)$$

The Hoeffding bounds give

$$\Pr [\max(p_z, q_z) = \max(\tilde{p}_z, \tilde{q}_z)] > 1 - 2e^{-2mt\delta^2} \quad \text{for } z \in G \quad (2)$$

Let $\epsilon = \max_z (|\Pr(X_n = z) - \Pr(Y_n = z)|)$. Thus $\epsilon \geq \frac{\Delta(X_n, Y_n)}{m}$, which is non-negligible.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr [A \text{ is correct}] &= \frac{1}{2} \left[\sum_{z \in Z} \Pr [\max(\tilde{p}_z, \tilde{q}_z) = \max(p_z, q_z)] \max(p_z, q_z) + \sum_{z \in Z} \Pr [\max(\tilde{p}_z, \tilde{q}_z) \neq \max(p_z, q_z)] \min(p_z, q_z) \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \left[\sum_{z \in Z} \Pr [\max(\tilde{p}_z, \tilde{q}_z) = \max(p_z, q_z)] \max(p_z, q_z) + \sum_{z \in B} \Pr [\max(\tilde{p}_z, \tilde{q}_z) \neq \max(p_z, q_z)] \min(p_z, q_z) \right] \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} \left[\sum_{z \in Z} \Pr [\max(\tilde{p}_z, \tilde{q}_z) = \max(p_z, q_z)] \max(p_z, q_z) + \sum_{z \in B} \Pr [\max(\tilde{p}_z, \tilde{q}_z) \neq \max(p_z, q_z)] [\max(p_z, q_z) - 2\delta] \right] \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} \left[\sum_{z \in G} \Pr [\max(\tilde{p}_z, \tilde{q}_z) = \max(p_z, q_z)] \max(p_z, q_z) + \sum_{z \in B} [\max(p_z, q_z) - 2\delta] \right] \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} \left[\left(1 - 2e^{-2mt\delta^2}\right) \sum_{z \in Z} \max(p_z, q_z) - 2m\delta \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \left[\left(1 - 2e^{-2mt\delta^2}\right) [1 + \Delta(X_n, Y_n)] - 2m\delta \right] \\ &= \left(1 - 2e^{-2mt\delta^2}\right) \left[\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\Delta(X_n, Y_n) \right] - m\delta \end{aligned}$$

Which is a non-negligible advantage for sufficiently large t and sufficiently small δ . □