

# Tight Security for Key-Alternating Ciphers with Correlated Sub-Keys\*

Stefano Tessaro and Xihu Zhang

University of Washington, Seattle, USA  
{tessaro,xihu}@cs.washington.edu

**Abstract.** Substantial effort has been devoted to proving optimal bounds for the security of key-alternating ciphers with independent sub-keys in the random permutation model (e.g., Chen and Steinberger, EUROCRYPT '14; Hoang and Tessaro, CRYPTO '16). While common in the study of multi-round constructions, the assumption that sub-keys are truly independent is unrealistic since they are generally highly correlated and generated from shorter keys.

In this paper, we show the existence of non-trivial distributions of limited independence for which a  $t$ -round key-alternating cipher achieves optimal security. Our work is a natural continuation of the work of Chen et al. (CRYPTO '14), which considered the case of  $t = 2$  when all sub-keys are identical. Here, we show that key-alternating ciphers remain secure for a large class of  $(t - 1)$ -wise and  $(t - 2)$ -wise independent distributions of sub-keys.

Our proofs proceed by generalizations of the so-called sum-capture theorem, which we prove using Fourier-analytic techniques.

**Keywords:** Provable Security, Key-alternating Ciphers

## 1 Introduction

*Key-alternating ciphers* (KACs) alternate the application of fixed, invertible, and key-independent permutations  $P_1, \dots, P_t$  on the  $n$ -bit strings with xor-ing  $t + 1$   $n$ -bit sub-keys  $s_0, s_1, \dots, s_t$ , i.e., the output of the KAC on input  $x$  and sub-keys  $\vec{s} = (s_0, s_1, \dots, s_t)$  is

$$\text{KAC}_{\vec{s}}(x) = s_t + P_t(s_{t-1} + P_{t-1}(\dots P_2(s_1 + P_1(s_0 + x)) \dots)),$$

where  $+$  denotes the bit-wise xor. Several modern block cipher designs are KACs, including Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPNs) like AES [10], PRESENT [3] and LED [14].

Most theoretical analyses of KACs [13,4,22,18,6,9,16] have proven their security as a (strong) pseudorandom permutation in a model where the permutations  $P_1, \dots, P_t$  are randomly and independently chosen and can be queried by the adversary. Moreover, the sub-keys  $\vec{s} = (s_0, s_1, \dots, s_t)$  are also chosen *independently*.<sup>1</sup> These results show that the number of queries  $q$  (to the keyed construction, and the permutations) needed to break the construction is roughly  $q = N^{t/(t+1)}$  (where  $N = 2^n$ ), which has been shown to be optimal.

**THIS PAPER: SECURITY WITH CORRELATED SUB-KEYS.** Real sub-keys are *not* independent. They are generated from a shorter key using a specific *key schedule* algorithm. However, scant progress has been made in identifying when such key schedules are secure, and independence assumptions are common even in cryptanalysis. In this paper, we therefore pose the following question:

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<sup>1</sup> In fact, Chen and Steinberger [6] already noted that their result holds in the case where the underlying subkeys are  $t$ -wise independent. The tight concrete bound proven by Hoang and Tessaro [16] also extends to the  $t$ -wise independent setting.

For which distributions of sub-keys can we still obtain optimal security against  $q = N^{t/(t+1)}$  queries?

We note that this question was partially addressed by Dunkelman *et al.* [11] for  $t = 1$  and later by Chen *et al.* [5], who proved such bounds for the case where  $t = 2$  and the sub-keys satisfy the constraint  $s_0 = s_1 = s_2$ .<sup>2</sup> Here, we consider the extension of their work beyond three rounds.

We also stress that our goal is not to find practical key schedules that are comparable to those used in actual block cipher designs. Rather, we aim to broaden the understanding of correlated key schedules and to identify when they preserve optimal security. At present, even modest savings in randomness to generate the keys are not known for multi-round KACs.

REDUCING KEY DEPENDENCE FOR ARBITRARY ROUNDS. As our first contribution, we show that for *any*  $t$ -round KAC with  $t + 1$  subkeys, there are key schedules that merely depend on  $t - 1$  independent and uniform keys that achieve  $q = \Omega(N^{t/(t+1)})$  security. This generalizes the result for  $t = 2$  proved by Chen *et al.* [5] to multi-round instantiations.

We give a general sufficient condition on key distributions for  $\vec{s}$  that achieves optimal security. Specifically, our condition considers distributions where the  $t + 1$  sub-keys  $\vec{s}$  for the  $t$ -round KAC are a linear function of a vector  $\vec{k}$  of  $t - 1$  “master” keys, denoted as  $\vec{s} = A\vec{k}$ , in which we view each master key and subkey as an element of the field  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ . The conditions to be met by the key schedules are:

1. Any  $t - 2$  rows of  $A$  must form a matrix of rank  $t - 2$ .
2. For any  $t$  rows of  $A$ 
  - the  $t$  rows must form a matrix of rank  $t - 1$ .
  - there exists a linear combination of the  $t$  rows that gives a zero vector and two neighboring rows with non-zero coefficients.

For example, a suitable and natural key schedule that satisfies our condition is where  $\vec{s}$  is from the  $(t - 1)$ -wise independent distribution obtained by evaluating a random polynomial of degree  $t - 2$  at  $t + 1$  distinct points over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ . In fact, while our condition on key schedules is more restrictive than  $(t - 2)$ -wise independence, it still permits simple key schedules for small rounds (e.g,  $t = 3$  and  $t = 4$ ) that do not require field multiplication, which may be considered an expensive operation, i.e., for  $t = 3$ , we show that one can set  $\vec{s} = (k_0, k_0, k_1, k_1)$  to have  $q = \Omega(N^{3/4})$ . For  $t = 4$ , we set  $\vec{s} = (k_0, k_1, k_2, k_0 + k_1, k_1 + k_2)$  to have  $q = \Omega(N^{4/5})$ .

LESS INDEPENDENCE FOR MORE ROUNDS. Of course, we would like to save even more randomness. We make progress by saving  $n$  more bits for a sufficiently large number of rounds. Again, we give a general condition on distributions characterized by linear functions mapping  $t - 2$   $n$ -bit keys  $\vec{k}$  to  $t + 1$  keys  $\vec{s}$ , i.e.,  $\vec{s} = A\vec{k}$ . For any linear mapping  $A$  satisfying the property that each  $t - 2$  rows of  $A$  have rank  $t - 2$ , our security proof shows, for  $t > 5$ , a bound that gives security strictly better than  $q = \Omega(N^{(t-1)/t})$ ; for  $t \geq 8$ , we achieve  $q = \Omega(N^{t/(t+1)})$  security. Again, one particular instantiation is obtained by evaluating a random polynomial of degree  $t - 3$  at  $t + 1$  distinct points over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ .

HOW FAR CAN WE GO? The end question is ultimately whether we can push our results even further. Ideally, it would be possible to use a single-key schedule (as in Chen *et al.*) for an arbitrary number of rounds. However, as we explain below, the classical approach to prove security for limited

<sup>2</sup> Actually, Chen *et al.* [5] also addressed reducing the number of keys and permutations in parallel. They showed that a 2-round KAC is secure against  $q = \Omega(N^{2/3})$  queries when instantiated by a single permutation and a single key with a key schedule built over a linear orthomorphism.

independence is via so-called “sum-capture theorems” [2,23]. In this paper, we show that the sum-capture theorem necessary to study the trivial key schedule beyond two rounds is not true. Though this does *not* suggest that the resulting construction is insecure, improving beyond the results of this paper would require substantially new counting techniques (see Section 4.3).

OTHER RELATED WORK. Another important aspect of theoretical analyses over KACs is reducing the number of random permutations used in the construction. Recently, Wu *et al.* [24] showed that a three-round KAC instantiated with four uniform and independent sub-keys and a single random permutation is secure against  $q = \Omega(N^{3/4})$  adversarial queries. Dutta [12] considered minimizing the tweakable KAC by reducing the number of random permutations and proved the security of  $q = \Omega(N^{2/3})$  for the 2-round tweakable KAC by Cogliati *et al.* [7] and 4-round tweakable KAC by Cogliati and Seurin [8].

### 1.1 Technical Overview

Our paper follows the well-established paradigm of proving the security of key-alternating ciphers based on the *expectation method* by Hoang and Tessaro [16] and generalizations of sum-capture theorems proposed by Chen *et al.* [5].

CHAIN-BASED ANALYSES. The core of existing analyses proceeds by identifying a set of *bad* transcripts that contain *chains*: these are transcripts where the adversary has made direct queries to  $P_1, P_2, \dots, P_t$ , and/or to the construction, which are linked together by the chosen subkeys. In the ideal world, such bad transcript would likely become inconsistent with the real world, i.e., the probability of obtaining a bad transcript from the real world is zero. Formally, we represent a transcript as  $\tau = (\mathcal{Q}_E, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_t, \vec{k})$ , where  $\mathcal{Q}_E$  contains queries to the construction and  $\mathcal{Q}_i$ s are the queries to individual permutations. Further,  $\vec{k}$  are the keys from which the actual sub-keys  $\vec{s} = (s_0, s_1, \dots, s_t)$  are generated. (Since our statements are independent of whether such queries occurred in the forward or backward direction, and of their order, we consider the transcript to be comprised of sets of input-output pairs.) We say that such a  $\tau$  is *bad* if the sub-keys  $(s_0, s_1, \dots, s_t)$  admit some queries  $(u_{t+1}, v_0) \in \mathcal{Q}_E, (u_1, v_1) \in \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, (u_t, v_t) \in \mathcal{Q}_t$  to constitute a chain, i.e., if there exists an index  $i$  such that for all  $j \in \{0, \dots, t\}$  with  $j \neq i$ , one has  $v_j + u_{j+1} = s_j$ , then we say they form the  $i$ -th type of chain. If the sub-keys  $\vec{s}$  are independent and uniform, then the number of chains is at most  $(t + 1) \cdot q^{t+1}$  (by a simple union bound over all types of chain); thus, the probability that the transcript is bad is at most  $O((t + 1)q^{t+1}/N^t)$ . (Note that every chain definition involved only  $t$  subkeys.)

HANDLING LIMITED INDEPENDENCE. The preceding argument does not hold if  $\vec{s}$  is generated, for example, from  $(t - 1)$ -wise independent and uniform  $n$ -bit keys, since we can expect (at best) to prove  $O((t + 1)q^{t+1}/N^{t-1})$ . We resolve this by considering a generalized version of the sum-capture quantity that provides a tighter bound over the number of chains; namely, we define

$$\mu_{\vec{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) := \left| \left\{ (v_0, (u_1, v_1), \dots, (u_{t-1}, v_{t-1}), u_t) \in V_0 \times \mathcal{Q}_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal{Q}_{t-1} \times U_t : \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} c_i(v_i + u_{i+1}) = 0 \right\} \right|, \quad (1)$$

where  $V_0, U_t \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$  and the coefficients  $\vec{c} = (c_0, \dots, c_{t-1})$  are field elements of  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ . A bound on this quantity can be used to non-trivially bound the number of chains, as long as the coefficients arising are compatible with the underlying method to generate the sub-keys and satisfy certain

conditions. This in turn help us characterize of which distributions actually yield the desired optimal security.

Concretely, when the linear coefficients  $\vec{c} = (c_0, \dots, c_{t-1})$  satisfy the condition that there is an index  $0 \leq \text{idx} < t - 1$  such that  $c_{\text{idx}} \neq 0$  and  $c_{\text{idx}+1} \neq 0$ , we prove the tight bound  $\mu_{\vec{c}} = \Theta(q^{t+1}/N)$  using Fourier analysis techniques.

REDUCING KEY DEPENDENCIES FURTHER. To obtain our results for constructions with sub-keys generated from  $t-2$  independent and uniform keys, we need to upper bound an even more restrictive version of the preceding sum-capture quantity where two linear constraints are imposed, i.e.,

$$\mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) := \left| \left\{ (v_0, (u_1, v_1), \dots, (u_{t-1}, v_{t-1}), u_t) \in V_0 \times \mathcal{Q}_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal{Q}_{t-1} \times U_t : \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} c_i(v_i + u_{i+1}) = 0, \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} d_i(v_i + u_{i+1}) = 0 \right\} \right|. \quad (2)$$

For the 2-constraint case, we specifically examine the coefficients  $\vec{c} = (c_0, \dots, c_{t-1})$  and  $\vec{d} = (d_0, \dots, d_{t-1})$  that characterize the underlying sub-keys generated when the linear key schedule is  $(t-2)$ -wise independent and uniform. In this case, we show that

- For  $t > 5$ , the  $t$ -round KAC is secure against  $q = \omega(N^{\frac{t-1}{t}})$  queries.
- For  $t \geq 8$ , the  $t$ -round KAC has tight security bound (i.e.,  $q = \Omega(N^{\frac{t}{t+1}})$ ).

Given that (2) is a natural generalization of its one-constraint counterpart, it is tempting to conclude that upper-bounding (2) is no harder than upper-bounding (1). However, the two constraints make the problem of upper-bounding (2) much harder. Moreover, the tightness of upper-bounding (1) crucially relies on a particular step, referred to as the ‘‘Cauchy-Schwartz trick’’ [2,23,5], which does not seem to apply here. We bypass this limitation by introducing a novel representation for the upper bound of (2) as the 2-norm of a matrix. In particular, one can interpret the Cauchy-Schwartz trick upper bound as a special case of the matrix norm bound where each matrix row and column contains at most one non-zero entry. Then, we use the matrix Frobenius norm, which is easier to compute for bounding the matrix 2-norm. Though our current technique proves tight security bound only for  $t \geq 8$ , we believe that the matrix 2-norm is the right characterization and one can extend the tightness result to  $t \geq 4$  via a better tool to derive the 2-norm bound, since the usage of Frobenius norm is, in most cases, not tight<sup>3</sup>.

While (2) remains a promising candidate for saving two keys, we show that for  $t = 3$ , i.e., for the 3-round KAC with identical subkey and independent permutations, the quantity of (2) is lower bounded by  $q^3/N$  with good probability. Hence, we need a sum-capture quantity with highly non-trivial characterizations or an alternative proof strategy for the 3-round KAC to obtain the desired  $q = \Omega(N^{3/4})$  security bound.

<sup>3</sup> In fact, the Frobenius norm and 2-norm can have up to a  $\sqrt{N}$  multiplicative gap for  $N \times N$  matrix (e.g., the identity matrix), and we believe that a large gap exists in our Frobenius norm bound. However, improving the 2-norm bound requires a more in-depth understanding of our defined matrix for analyzing (2) than we currently have.

GOOD TRANSCRIPT ANALYSIS. Since we have bounded the probability of a transcript being bad, we move to understand the remaining transcripts that we consider to be good. We rely on the expectation method proposed by Hoang and Tessaro [16], which is a generalization of the H-coefficient method [6,21]. In the expectation method, the final security upper bound is

$$\text{Security bound} \leq \mathbb{E}_{X_1}[g(X_1)] + \Pr[X_1 \text{ is bad}] ,$$

where  $X_1$  is the random variable representing the transcript generated from the adversary interacting with the ideal world and  $g : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow [0, +\infty)$  is a non-negative function such that  $g(\tau)$  upper bounds the real-world ideal-world probability ratio of any good transcript  $\tau$ . The goal is to find a function  $g : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow [0, +\infty)$  that minimizes the value of  $\mathbb{E}_{X_1}[g(X_1)]$ .

It is tempting to believe that the sub-keys must be at least  $t$ -wise independent and uniform when applying the techniques in [16] to achieve the tight security bound for good transcripts. However, surprisingly, we show (in Section 5) that as long as the underlying sub-keys  $\vec{s} = (s_0, \dots, s_t)$  are  $(t - 2)$ -wise independent and uniform, we can pick a non-negative function  $g$  so that

$$\mathbb{E}_{X_1}[g(X_1)] \leq O(q^{t+1}/N^t) .$$

Therefore, as long as the  $t$ -round KAC has a key schedule that gives  $(t - 2)$ -wise independent and uniform subkeys, the good transcript analysis gives the optimal bound.

## 1.2 Paper Organization

In Section 2 we define basic notations and indistinguishability framework. We give the main theorems and show tight security for classes of  $t$ -round KAC in Section 3, and we analyze the sum capture quantity for upper-bounding the number of bad transcripts in Section 4. We then provide the analysis of good transcripts in Section 5 and conclude our theorem proofs in Section 6. Finally we provide conclusions and open problems in Section 7.

## 2 Preliminaries

NOTATIONS. For a finite set  $S$ , we write  $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} S$  to denote that  $x$  receives a uniformly sampled value from  $S$ . For an algorithm  $A$ , we write  $y \leftarrow A(x_1, \dots; r)$  to denote that  $A$  takes  $x_1, \dots$  as inputs, runs with the randomness  $r$  and assigns the output to  $y$ . We let  $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} A(x_1, \dots, )$  be that  $A$ , given the inputs, is executed over a randomly chosen  $r$ , and the resulting value is assigned to  $y$ .

We use  $\mathbb{F}_p$  to denote a finite field of size  $p$ . For any two elements  $u, v \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , we use  $\langle u, v \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n u_i v_i$  to denote the inner product of  $u$  and  $v$ , where  $u_i, v_i$  are the  $i$ -th bit of  $u, v$ , respectively. For any number  $1 \leq b \leq a$ , we write  $a^{(b)} = a(a - 1) \cdots (a - b + 1)$  and take  $a^{(0)} = 1$  by convention. In all the following, for any two elements  $u, v \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , we take  $u + v$  and  $uv$  as the field addition and multiplication in  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ , respectively, where  $u + v$  is implemented as the bit-wise xor over  $\{0, 1\}^n$ . For a fixed  $n$ , we write  $N = 2^n$ . For any vector  $u$  and matrix  $A$ , we write  $u^\top$  and  $A^\top$  as their transpose.

PRP SECURITY OF BLOCK CIPHERS. We study the security of the KAC in the random permutation model. Let  $E : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$  be a blockcipher that is constructed over a set of independent, uniformly random permutations  $\vec{P} = (P_1, P_2, \dots, P_t)$ . Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary. the strong PRP advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  is defined as

$$\text{Adv}_E^{\pm \text{prp}}(\mathcal{A}) := \Pr[K \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K} : \mathcal{A}^{E_K, \vec{P}} = 1] - \Pr[P_0 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Perm}(n) : \mathcal{A}^{P_0, \vec{P}} = 1] ,$$

where  $P_0$  is a random permutation independent of  $\vec{P}$  and “ $\pm$ ” denotes that the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  can query the oracles in both a forward and backward direction.

**INDISTINGUISHABILITY FRAMEWORK.** We consider a computationally unbounded distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$  interacting with two systems,  $\mathbf{S}_0$  and  $\mathbf{S}_1$ . The interaction between  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathbf{S}_b$  (where  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ) defines a transcript  $\tau = ((u_1, v_1), \dots, (u_q, v_q))$  that records the  $q$  pairs of queries/replies  $\mathcal{A}$  made to/received from the system  $\mathbf{S}_b$ . Let  $X_b$  be the random variable representing the transcript. Then the goal is to upper bound the following statistical distance

$$\Delta(X_0, X_1) = \sum_{\tau} \max\{0, \Pr[X_1 = \tau] - \Pr[X_0 = \tau]\}.$$

**FORMULATING SYSTEMS.** We follow [19] to describe the system behavior of  $\mathbf{S}$  by associating every possible transcript  $\tau = ((u_1, v_1), \dots, (u_q, v_q))$  with a value  $\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}}(\tau) \in [0, 1]$ . One can interpret  $\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}}(\tau)$  as the probability that, if the queries  $u_1, \dots, u_q$  in  $\tau$  are asked sequentially,  $\mathbf{S}$  will answer with  $v_1, \dots, v_q$ , respectively. Note that  $\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}}(\cdot)$  is defined only by the underlying system  $\mathbf{S}$  and is hence independent of any distinguisher. We also note that  $\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}}(\cdot)$  is not a probability distribution over the transcripts because the sum over all  $\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}}(\tau)$  does not necessarily give one.

Since the distinguisher is computationally unbounded, it is sufficient to consider deterministic distinguishers only. Fix any deterministic distinguisher  $\mathcal{A}$ , let  $X$  denote the transcript distribution of  $\mathcal{A}$  interacting with  $\mathbf{S}$ . It then holds that  $\Pr[X = \tau] \in \{0, \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}}(\tau)\}$  for any  $\tau$  because either  $\mathcal{A}$  issues the queries  $u_1, \dots, u_q$  when given the answers  $v_1, \dots, v_q$ , leading to  $\Pr[X = \tau] = \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}}(\tau)$ , or it does not, resulting in  $\Pr[X = \tau] = 0$ .

Let  $\mathcal{T}$  be the set of transcripts  $\tau$  that has  $\Pr[X_1 = \tau] > 0$ . Further, noting that  $\Pr[X_0 = \tau] = \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_0}(\tau)$  if  $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$ , we can rewrite the statistical distance as

$$\Delta(X_0, X_1) = \sum_{\tau} \max\{0, \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_1}(\tau) - \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_0}(\tau)\} = \sum_{\tau} \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_1}(\tau) \cdot \max\left\{0, 1 - \frac{\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_0}(\tau)}{\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_1}(\tau)}\right\}.$$

**THE EXPECTATION METHOD.** We now review the expectation method proposed by [16], which was developed based on the H-coefficient method [6, 21]. In the H-coefficient method, the set of transcripts  $\mathcal{T}$  is partitioned into  $\mathcal{T}_{\text{good}}$  and  $\mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}$  so that for any  $\tau \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{good}}$ ,  $\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_0}(\tau)/\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_1}(\tau) \geq 1 - \varepsilon$  for some carefully chosen parameter  $\varepsilon$ . Then, an upper bound of the advantage directly follows, i.e.,

$$\Delta(X_0, X_1) \leq \varepsilon + \Pr[X_1 \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}].$$

However, instead of giving a uniform bound over all good transcripts, we can associate each  $\tau$  with a non-negative value  $g(\tau)$  so that  $\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_0}(\tau)/\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_1}(\tau) \geq 1 - g(\tau)$  for every  $\tau \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{good}}$ . Hence, we can instead derive the upper bound as

$$\Delta(X_0, X_1) \leq \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{good}}} \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_1}(\tau) \cdot g(\tau) + \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}} \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_1}(\tau) \leq \mathbb{E}_{X_1}[g(X_1)] + \sum_{\tau \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}} \mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_1}(\tau),$$

where we take the expectation over all  $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$  by the fact that  $g(\cdot)$  is non-negative. Therefore, we have the following lemma.

**Lemma 1 (The expectation method).** *If there exists a partition of  $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{T}_{\text{good}} \sqcup \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}$  and a function  $g : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow [0, +\infty)$  such that for any  $\tau \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{good}}$ ,  $\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_0}(\tau)/\mathbf{p}_{\mathbf{S}_1}(\tau) \geq 1 - g(\tau)$ , then*

$$\Delta(X_0, X_1) \leq \mathbb{E}_{X_1}[g(X_1)] + \Pr[X_1 \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}].$$

### 3 Main Results

We consider the PRP security of a  $t$ -round KAC that is built on  $t$  random permutations  $\vec{P} = (P_1, \dots, P_t)$  over  $\{0, 1\}^n$  and  $t + 1$  subkeys  $(s_0, \dots, s_t)$  where  $s_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$ . When given input  $M \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , the  $t$ -round KAC outputs

$$s_t + P_t(s_{t-1} + P_{t-1}(\dots P_1(s_0 + M) \dots)).$$

The sub-keys are generated from the master key denoted as  $(k_0, \dots, k_w)$ , where  $k_i$  are sampled from  $\{0, 1\}^n$  uniformly and independently. Therefore, the length of the master key is  $(w + 1)n$  bits. Here, we consider only linear key schedule algorithms, which can be represented as a matrix  $A$  over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ . We define the column vectors  $\vec{s} = (s_0, \dots, s_t)^\top$  and  $\vec{k} = (k_0, \dots, k_w)^\top$ , where we naturally take each  $n$ -bit string as an element in  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  and use  $\vec{s} \leftarrow A\vec{k}$  to denote the key-scheduling process.

The case of  $A$  being an identity matrix of size  $(t + 1) \times (t + 1)$  has been well studied, i.e., it was proved in [6,16] that, when the subkeys  $s_0, \dots, s_t$  are independent and uniform and the permutations  $P_1, \dots, P_t$  are independent, any adversary needs at least  $q = \Omega(N^{t/(t+1)})$  queries to achieve a constant distinguishing advantage. We now consider the case where the permutations are independent but the sub-keys are correlated and generated via linear key schedules from  $t - 1$  independent  $n$ -bit keys (considered Theorem 1) or  $t - 2$  independent  $n$ -bit keys (Theorem 2).

We start by providing a security bound of a  $t$ -round KAC for a class of key schedules that generate  $t + 1$  sub-keys from  $t - 1$  independent keys.

**Theorem 1.** *For the  $t$ -round KAC constructed over  $t$  random permutations  $\vec{P} = (P_1, \dots, P_t)$ , let the key of KAC be  $\vec{k} = (k_0, k_1, \dots, k_{t-2})^\top$ , where  $k_i$ s are independently uniformly sampled from  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ . Let sub-keys  $\vec{s} = (s_0, s_1, \dots, s_t)^\top$  be derived by  $\vec{s} \leftarrow A\vec{k}$ , where  $A$  is a  $(t + 1) \times (t - 1)$  matrix over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ , with the rows denoted as  $A_0, \dots, A_t$ , such that*

1. *Any  $t - 2$  rows of  $A$  forms a matrix of rank  $t - 2$ .*
2. *For any  $I \subseteq \{0, \dots, t\}$ ,  $|I| = t$ , then the row vectors  $(A_\ell)_{\ell \in I}$  satisfy that*
  - *$(A_\ell)_{\ell \in I}$  forms a matrix of rank  $t - 1$ .*
  - *there exist values  $(c_\ell)_{\ell \in I}$  such that  $\sum_{\ell \in I} c_\ell A_\ell = \vec{0}$ , and there are two indices  $\text{id}_{x_1}, \text{id}_{x_2} \in I$  satisfying  $\text{id}_{x_1} - \text{id}_{x_2} \in \{1, t\}$  and  $c_{\text{id}_{x_1}}, c_{\text{id}_{x_2}}$  that are both non-zero.*

*Then, for any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that issues at most  $q$  queries to KAC,  $P_1, \dots, P_t$ , where  $9(t + 2)n \leq q \leq N/4$ ,*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{KAC}}^{\pm \text{PRP}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq (t^2 + t + 1) \cdot \frac{4q^{t+1}}{N^t} + 3(t + 1) \sqrt{\frac{q^{2t-1}(t + 2)n}{N^{2t-2}}}.$$

First, we give a key schedule that gives  $(t - 1)$ -wise independent and uniform sub-keys for  $t$ -round KACs with any round  $t$ .

**Corollary 1.** *For  $t < 2^n$ , pick distinct elements  $\alpha_0, \dots, \alpha_t \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  and let subkey  $s_i = F(\alpha_i)$ , where  $F(X) = \sum_{j=0}^{t-2} k_j \cdot X^j$ . Then, an adversary needs  $\Omega(N^{t/(t+1)})$  queries to achieve a constant distinguishing advantage.*

Corollary 1 directly follows from the fact that  $A$  is a Vandermonde matrix, so every  $t - 1$  rows of  $A$  forms a full-rank sub-matrix. Hence, any  $t$  rows of  $A$  are linear dependent, with the coefficients  $(c_\ell)_{\ell \in I}$  satisfying  $c_\ell \neq 0$  for all  $\ell$ .

**Table 1.**  $q = \Omega(N^\lambda)$  for a constant security bound in Theorem 2.

$t$	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	...
$\lambda = \log_N q$	0.571	0.720	0.800	0.842	0.870	0.889	0.9	0.909	...
$t/(t+1)$	0.750	0.800	0.833	0.857	0.875	0.889	0.9	0.909	...

Note that by letting  $t = 2$  in Corollary 1, our result implies the optimal security bound of a 2-round KAC with identical subkeys and independent permutations proven by Chen *et al.* [5].

Though it is implied in the theorem statement that we need the subkeys to be  $(t - 2)$ -wise independent and uniform, for a small round  $t$  we can still obtain some simple key schedules that achieve the optimal bound for  $q$  but do not require any field multiplication operations, which may be considered expensive in key-scheduling.

**Corollary 2.** *Let there be a 3-round KAC with key schedule*

$$\vec{s} = (k_0, k_0, k_1, k_1)$$

where  $k_0, k_1$  are two independently uniform  $n$ -bit keys; an adversary then needs  $\Omega(N^{3/4})$  queries to achieve a constant distinguishing advantage.

**Corollary 3.** *Let there be a 4-round KAC with key schedule*

$$\vec{s} = (k_0, k_1, k_2, k_0 + k_1, k_1 + k_2)$$

where  $k_0, k_1, k_2$  are three independently uniform  $n$ -bit keys; An adversary then needs  $\Omega(N^{4/5})$  queries to achieve a constant distinguishing advantage.

One can check that the sub-keys in Corollary 2 (or Corollary 3) are 1-wise (or pairwise) independent and uniform and any  $t$  rows form a sub-matrix of rank  $t - 1$  with the coefficients  $(c_\ell)_{\ell \in I}$  satisfying the given conditions via Gaussian elimination.

As Theorem 1 gives a tight bound for all  $t$ , one may optimistically expect that similar results can be proven with ease when saving one more key. However, for the  $t$ -round KAC with sub-keys generated from  $t - 2$  keys, we can make only partial progress by proving the following theorem, which implies tight security only for  $t \geq 8$ .

**Theorem 2.** *For the  $t$ -round KAC constructed over  $t$  random permutations  $\vec{P} = (P_1, \dots, P_t)$ , let the key of KAC be  $\vec{k} = (k_0, k_1, \dots, k_{t-3})^\top$ , where  $k_i$ s are independently and uniformly sampled from  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ . Let sub-keys  $\vec{s} = (s_0, s_1, \dots, s_t)^\top$  be derived by  $\vec{s} \leftarrow A\vec{k}$ , where  $A$  is a  $(t + 1) \times (t - 2)$  matrix over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  such that any  $t - 2$  rows of  $A$  form a matrix of rank  $t - 2$ . Then, for any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that issues at most  $(t + 2)nN^{2/3} \leq q \leq N/4$  queries to KAC,  $P_1, \dots, P_t$ ,*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{KAC}}^{\pm \text{prp}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq (t^2 + 2t) \cdot \frac{(5q)^{t+1}}{N^t} + (t + 1)^2 \cdot \frac{(3q)^{2t-2.5}}{N^{2t-4}}.$$

Table 1 summarizes the order of  $q$  that causes the security bound to be  $\Omega(1)$ . We observe that Theorem 2 does not initially give good bound for  $t \leq 7$ . From  $t \geq 5$ , the bound starts improving relative to  $q = \Omega(N^{(t-1)/t})$ , which is obtained by instantiating a  $(t - 1)$ -round KAC from the provided  $t - 2$  keys and applying Theorem 1. When  $t \geq 8$ , the bound achieves the optimal  $q = \Omega(N^{t/(t+1)})$ . The tightness results for  $t \leq 7$  are left open.

A feasible instantiation of Theorem 2 is to let the sub-keys be the evaluations at  $t + 1$  distinct points of a degree  $t - 3$  polynomial. Then, the following corollary holds.

**Corollary 4.** For  $8 \leq t < 2^n$ , pick distinct elements  $\alpha_0, \dots, \alpha_t \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  and let subkey  $s_i = F(\alpha_i)$ , where  $F(X) = \sum_{j=0}^{t-3} k_j \cdot X^j$ . Then, an adversary needs  $\Omega(N^{t/(t+1)})$  queries to achieve a constant distinguishing advantage.

PROOF FRAMEWORK. We use the expectation method (i.e., Lemma 1) to prove both theorems. Given the query record  $\vec{Q} = (Q_E, Q_1, \dots, Q_t)$ , we generously allow the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  to see the key  $\vec{k}$  after making all queries. Therefore, we let the transcript  $\tau = (\vec{Q}, \vec{k})$  by attaching  $\vec{k}$  to the end of  $\vec{Q}$ . In the ideal world, we sample and attach a dummy key  $\vec{k}$  to  $\vec{Q}$ . Here, we define the set of bad transcripts for a  $t$ -round KAC.

**Definition 1 (Bad transcripts).** For a  $t$ -round KAC, we say a transcript  $\tau = (\vec{Q}, \vec{k})$  is bad if

$$\vec{k} \in \text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q}} = \bigcup_{i=0}^t \text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q}, i},$$

where for every  $i$ ,

$$\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q}, i} := \{\vec{k} : \vec{s} \leftarrow \text{KeySchedule}(\vec{k}), \text{ there exists } (u_{t+1}, v_0) \in Q_E, (u_1, v_1) \in Q_1, \dots, (u_t, v_t) \in Q_t \\ \text{ s.t. for all } 0 \leq j \leq t, j \neq i, v_j + s_j = u_{j+1}\}.$$

Otherwise, we say that  $\tau$  is good. We use  $\mathcal{T}_{\text{good}}$  to denote the set of all good transcripts and  $\mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}$  to denote the set of all bad transcripts. Hence,  $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{T}_{\text{good}} \sqcup \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}$ .

Then, we break the analysis into the bad and the good transcript cases. We use the generalized sum-capture quantity in Section 4 as an upper bound for the bad transcripts. We analyze the good transcripts in Section 5. Section 6 presents the final proof of theorems.

MORE FINE-GRAINED SECURITY. In the preceding theorems, we use  $q$  to be the uniform upper bound over all query types. However, we note that our proof technique also provides bounds when the number of cipher queries  $q_e$  and the number of permutation queries  $q_p$  are separated. We provide the bounds in Appendix A for both theorems but omit the proofs, which are essentially the same as proving the case for  $q_e = q_p$  but involve more case discussions.

## 4 Generalized Sum Capture Quantity for KAC

In [5] Chen *et al.* considered minimizing the 2-round KAC, where they proved a variant of “sum-capture” results [2,15,17,23]. The results are often stated that, for a randomly chosen set  $A$  of size  $q$ , the quantity

$$\mu(A) := \max_{\substack{X, Y \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_2^n \\ |X|=|Y|=q}} |\{(a, x, y) \in A \times X \times Y : a = x + y\}| \quad (3)$$

is close to its expected value  $q^3/N$  (when  $A, X, Y$  are all chosen at random) with high probability. In the 2-round KAC with an identical key schedule, the sum-capture quantity is defined as

$$\mu(Q) := \max_{\substack{X, Y \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_2^n \\ |X|=|Y|=q}} |\{(x, (u, v), y) \in X \times Q \times Y : x + u = v + y\}|, \quad (4)$$

where one can view the query transcript  $\mathcal{Q}$  derived from the interaction of an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  with the permutation to be equivalent to the set  $A$  in (3) defined by  $A = \{u + v \mid (u, v) \in \mathcal{Q}\}$ .

However, both (3) and (4) consider only a single random permutation with a single linear constraint. To generalize the sum-capture quantity so that we can handle the KAC that saves more keys, we consider the sum-capture quantity that involves  $(t-1)$  independently random permutations and  $r \in \{1, 2\}$  linear constraints over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  for the  $t$ -round KAC with a linear key schedule.

For the  $r = 1$  case, we prove the tight bounds of a sum-capture quantity for any choice of linear constraint, leading to a feasible set of key schedules that saves two keys for an arbitrary  $t$ -round KAC with tight security. However, as we increase the number of constraints to  $r = 2$ , the problem becomes more complicated, and we lack a sufficiently sophisticated technique to yield a tight bound or handle arbitrary linear constraints. We can prove only a loose upper bound for the linear-constraints that characterize the underlying sub-keys as being  $(t-2)$ -wise independent, leading to a partial result for saving three keys of  $t$ -round KAC.

**FOURIER ANALYSIS.** To prove the bounds, we rely on the tool of Fourier analysis. In this part we define some notations for the Fourier analysis over  $\{0, 1\}^m$ . Given a function  $f : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ , the Fourier coefficient of  $f$  with  $\alpha \in \{0, 1\}^m$  is defined as

$$\hat{f}(\alpha) := \frac{1}{2^m} \sum_{x \in \{0, 1\}^m} f(x) (-1)^{\langle \alpha, x \rangle}.$$

Then, we have

$$f(x) = \sum_{\alpha \in \{0, 1\}^m} \hat{f}(\alpha) (-1)^{\langle \alpha, x \rangle}. \quad (5)$$

For any set  $S \subseteq \{0, 1\}^m$ , we let  $\mathbf{1}_S : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  be the 0/1 indicator function of  $S$ . Then, the following properties hold for  $\mathbf{1}_S$ :

$$\widehat{\mathbf{1}_S}(0) = \frac{|S|}{2^m} = \sum_{\alpha \in \{0, 1\}^m} \widehat{\mathbf{1}_S}(\alpha)^2, \quad (6)$$

$$\forall \alpha \in \{0, 1\}^m : |\widehat{\mathbf{1}_S}(\alpha)| \leq \widehat{\mathbf{1}_S}(0) = \frac{|S|}{2^m}. \quad (7)$$

#### 4.1 1-constraint Sum Capture Quantity

We associate a 1-constraint sum-capture quantity with a vector of coefficients  $\vec{c} = (c_0, c_1, \dots, c_{t-1})$  as follows:

$$\mu_{\vec{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) := \left| \left\{ (v_0, (u_1, v_1), \dots, (u_{t-1}, v_{t-1}), u_t) \in V_0 \times \mathcal{Q}_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal{Q}_{t-1} \times U_t : \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} c_j (v_j + u_{j+1}) = 0 \right\} \right|.$$

**Lemma 2.** *Let  $t \geq 2$ . Let  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$  be  $t-1$  independent uniformly random permutations of  $\{0, 1\}^n$ , and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a probabilistic algorithm that makes adaptive queries to  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$ . Let  $\mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}$  be the query transcripts of  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$  interacting with  $\mathcal{A}$ . Let  $\vec{c} = (c_0, \dots, c_{t-1})$  be*

any coefficients so that there exists an index  $0 \leq \text{idx} < t - 1$  satisfying  $c_{\text{idx}} \neq 0$  and  $c_{\text{idx}+1} \neq 0$ . Then, for any  $\mathcal{A}$  that makes at most  $q$  queries to each permutations,

$$\Pr_{P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}} \left[ \exists V_0, U_t \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{2^n}, |V_0| = |U_t| = q, \right. \\ \left. \mu_{\vec{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \geq \frac{3q^{t+1}}{N} + 3q^{t-1/2} \sqrt{(t+2)n} \right] \leq \frac{2t}{N^t} .$$

We let  $\Phi(\mathcal{Q}_i) := \max_{\alpha \neq 0, \beta \neq 0} N^2 |\widehat{\mathbb{1}_{\mathcal{Q}_i}}(\alpha, \beta)|$  for the query records  $\mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}$ . To show Lemma 2, we first rely on the following Lemma 3, which states the upper bound in terms of the  $\Phi(\mathcal{Q}_i)$  we previously defined. Then, we apply Lemma 4 by Chen *et al.* [5], which provides an upper bound for the  $\Phi(\mathcal{Q}_i)$  term to conclude the proof.

**Lemma 3.** Fix any  $\vec{c} = (c_0, \dots, c_{t-1})$  such that  $c_{\text{idx}} \neq 0$  and  $c_{\text{idx}+1} \neq 0$  for some index  $0 \leq \text{idx} < t - 1$ , then for any subsets  $V_0, U_t$  with  $|V_0| = |U_t| = q$ ,

$$\mu_{\vec{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \leq \frac{q^{t+1}}{N} + q^{t-1} \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{idx}+1}) .$$

*Proof.* The first step is to write  $\mu_{\vec{c}}$  as a sum over indicator functions; we then will perform a Fourier transform over each indicator function. Although the summation will be over many terms and Fourier coefficients, the key point is that we can eliminate most summation terms and simplify the equality to sum over only a single Fourier coefficient term.

Here, we sum over the indicator functions.

$$\mu_{\vec{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \\ = \sum_{v_0} \sum_{u_1, v_1} \cdots \sum_{u_{t-1}, v_{t-1}} \sum_{u_t} \mathbb{1}_{V_0}(v_0) \mathbb{1}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(u_1, v_1) \cdots \mathbb{1}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(u_{t-1}, v_{t-1}) \cdot \mathbb{1}_{U_t}(u_t) \cdot \mathbb{1}_{\text{Eq}} \left( 0, \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} c_j (v_j + u_{j+1}) \right) ,$$

where  $\mathbb{1}_{\text{Eq}}(x, y)$  is the equality indicator function so that  $\mathbb{1}_{\text{Eq}}(x, y) = 1$  if and only if  $x = y$ . Note that for the equality indicator function, we can perform a Fourier transformation to get

$$\mathbb{1}_{\text{Eq}}(x, y) = \sum_{\alpha, \beta} \widehat{\mathbb{1}_{\text{Eq}}}(\alpha, \beta) \cdot (-1)^{\langle \alpha, x \rangle + \langle \beta, y \rangle} = \frac{1}{N} \cdot \sum_{\alpha} (-1)^{\langle \alpha, x+y \rangle},$$

where we use the fact that

$$\widehat{\mathbb{1}_{\text{Eq}}}(\alpha, \beta) = \begin{cases} 1/N & \text{if } \alpha = \beta \\ 0 & \text{o.w.} \end{cases} .$$

We expand each indicator function using a Fourier transform and continue the calculation.

$$\mu_{\vec{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \\ = \sum_{\substack{v_0, u_1, v_1, \dots \\ u_{t-1}, v_{t-1}, u_t}} \left( \sum_{\beta_0} \widehat{\mathbb{1}_{V_0}}(\beta_0) (-1)^{\langle \beta_0, v_0 \rangle} \right) \cdot \left( \sum_{\alpha_1, \beta_1} \widehat{\mathbb{1}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}}(\alpha_1, \beta_1) (-1)^{\langle \alpha_1, u_1 \rangle + \langle \beta_1, v_1 \rangle} \right) \cdots$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \cdot \left( \sum_{\alpha_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\alpha_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}) (-1)^{\langle \alpha_{t-1}, u_{t-1} \rangle + \langle \beta_{t-1}, v_{t-1} \rangle} \right) \\ & \cdot \left( \sum_{\alpha_t} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\alpha_t) (-1)^{\langle \alpha_t, u_t \rangle} \right) \cdot \frac{1}{N} \left( \sum_{\gamma} (-1)^{\langle \gamma, \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} c_j (v_j + u_{j+1}) \rangle} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Here, notice that all Fourier coefficients depend only on the variables  $\alpha$ s,  $\beta$ s and  $\gamma$ , so we can expand the multiplication and change the order of summation to obtain

$$\begin{aligned} & \mu_{\bar{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \\ &= \frac{1}{N} \cdot \sum_{\beta_0} \sum_{\alpha_1, \beta_1} \cdots \sum_{\alpha_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}} \sum_{\alpha_t} \sum_{\gamma} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\beta_0) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\alpha_1, \beta_1) \cdots \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\alpha_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\alpha_t) \\ & \cdot \sum_{v_0} \sum_{u_1, v_1} \cdots \sum_{u_{t-1}, v_{t-1}} \sum_{u_t} (-1)^{\langle \beta_0, v_0 \rangle} (-1)^{\langle \alpha_1, u_1 \rangle + \langle \beta_1, v_1 \rangle} \cdots (-1)^{\langle \alpha_{t-1}, u_{t-1} \rangle + \langle \beta_{t-1}, v_{t-1} \rangle} \\ & \cdot (-1)^{\langle \alpha_t, u_t \rangle} \cdot (-1)^{\langle \gamma, \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} c_j (v_j + u_{j+1}) \rangle} \\ &= \frac{1}{N} \cdot \sum_{\beta_0} \sum_{\alpha_1, \beta_1} \cdots \sum_{\alpha_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}} \sum_{\alpha_t} \sum_{\gamma} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\beta_0) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\alpha_1, \beta_1) \cdots \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\alpha_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}) \\ & \cdot \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\alpha_t) \cdot \left( \sum_{v_0} (-1)^{\langle \beta_0, v_0 \rangle + \langle \gamma, c_0 v_0 \rangle} \right) \cdot \left( \sum_{u_1} (-1)^{\langle \alpha_1, u_1 \rangle + \langle \gamma, c_0 u_1 \rangle} \right) \\ & \left( \sum_{v_1} (-1)^{\langle \beta_1, v_1 \rangle + \langle \gamma, c_1 v_1 \rangle} \right) \cdots \left( \sum_{u_t} (-1)^{\langle \alpha_t, u_t \rangle + \langle \gamma, c_{t-1} u_t \rangle} \right). \end{aligned}$$

The last equality is simply grouping the inner products that share the same  $u, v$  terms. Note that the field multiplication of  $c \cdot x$  can be represented as a matrix  $A_c$ <sup>4</sup> that applies to an  $n$ -dimensional vector  $x$  over  $\mathbb{F}_2$ . If  $c = 0$ , then  $A_c = O$ , where we use  $O$  to denote an all zero matrix; otherwise,  $A_c$  is a full-rank matrix. Taking the summation over the  $v_0$  term as an example, we rewrite the  $\langle \gamma, c_0 v_0 \rangle$  term as  $\langle \gamma, c_0 v_0 \rangle = \gamma^\top A_{c_0} v_0 = (A_{c_0}^\top)^\top v_0 = \langle A_{c_0}^\top \gamma, v_0 \rangle$ , where  $A_{c_0}^\top$  is the transpose of  $A_{c_0}$ . So we get

$$\begin{aligned} & \mu_{\bar{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \\ &= \frac{1}{N} \cdot \sum_{\beta_0} \sum_{\alpha_1, \beta_1} \cdots \sum_{\alpha_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}} \sum_{\alpha_t} \sum_{\gamma} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\beta_0) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\alpha_1, \beta_1) \cdots \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\alpha_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}) \cdot \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\alpha_t) \\ & \cdot \left( \sum_{v_0} (-1)^{\langle \beta_0 + A_{c_0}^\top \gamma, v_0 \rangle} \right) \cdot \left( \sum_{u_1} (-1)^{\langle \alpha_1 + A_{c_0}^\top \gamma, u_1 \rangle} \right) \left( \sum_{v_1} (-1)^{\langle \beta_1 + A_{c_1}^\top \gamma, v_1 \rangle} \right) \\ & \cdots \left( \sum_{u_{t-1}} (-1)^{\langle \alpha_{t-1} + A_{c_{t-2}}^\top \gamma, u_{t-1} \rangle} \right) \left( \sum_{v_{t-1}} (-1)^{\langle \beta_{t-1} + A_{c_{t-1}}^\top \gamma, v_{t-1} \rangle} \right) \left( \sum_{u_t} (-1)^{\langle \alpha_t + A_{c_{t-1}}^\top \gamma, u_t \rangle} \right). \end{aligned}$$

<sup>4</sup> Since we are taking the natural field interpretation over  $\{0, 1\}^n$ , where the field addition is the bit-wise xor operation, we define the  $i$ -th column of  $A_c$  as the  $n$ -dimension vector representation of field element  $c \cdot \nu_i$ , where  $\nu_i$  is the field element that has the corresponding representation to be a basis vector with the  $i$ -th position being one and the rest positions being zero.

It is known that  $\sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} (-1)^{\langle \alpha, x \rangle} = N$  if and only if  $\alpha = 0$ ; otherwise, it equals zero. We are interested only in the case where the Fourier coefficients give a non-zero summation. Interestingly, we can obtain the following equalities that are written in terms of  $\gamma$ , i.e.,

$$\forall i \in \{0, \dots, t-1\} : \alpha_{i+1} = \beta_i = A_{c_i}^\top \gamma,$$

where  $A_{c_i}$  is full-rank if  $c_i \neq 0$  or  $A_{c_i} = O$  if  $c_i = 0$ . Hence, the equality calculation can be greatly simplified as

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_{\bar{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) &= N^{2t-1} \sum_{\gamma} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(A_{c_0}^\top \gamma) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(A_{c_0}^\top \gamma, A_{c_1}^\top \gamma) \cdots \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(A_{c_{t-2}}^\top \gamma, A_{c_{t-1}}^\top \gamma) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(A_{c_{t-1}}^\top \gamma) \\ &= \frac{q^{t+1}}{N} + N^{2t-1} \sum_{\gamma \neq 0} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(A_{c_0}^\top \gamma) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(A_{c_0}^\top \gamma, A_{c_1}^\top \gamma) \cdots \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(A_{c_{t-1}}^\top \gamma) \\ &\leq \frac{q^{t+1}}{N} + N^{2t-1} \sum_{\gamma \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(A_{c_0}^\top \gamma)| \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(A_{c_0}^\top \gamma, A_{c_1}^\top \gamma)| \cdots |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(A_{c_{t-1}}^\top \gamma)|. \end{aligned}$$

We let

$$\begin{aligned} \text{left} &:= \min \text{ of } i \text{ such that } c_i \neq 0 \\ \text{right} &:= \max \text{ of } i \text{ such that } c_i \neq 0. \end{aligned}$$

To proceed, we need a case discussion of (left, right). Here, we consider the case of left = 0 and right =  $t-1$  (i.e.,  $c_0 \neq 0$  and  $c_{t-1} \neq 0$ ). The other cases yield the same upper bound, and we describe them in appendix B.1 for completeness.

Therefore, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_{\bar{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) &\leq \frac{q^{t+1}}{N} + N^{2t-1} \sum_{\gamma \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(A_{c_0}^\top \gamma)| \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(A_{c_0}^\top \gamma, A_{c_1}^\top \gamma)| \cdots |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(A_{c_{t-2}}^\top \gamma, A_{c_{t-1}}^\top \gamma)| \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(A_{c_{t-1}}^\top \gamma)| \\ &\leq \frac{q^{t+1}}{N} + N^{2t-3} \sum_{\gamma \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(A_{c_0}^\top \gamma)| \cdot \left(\frac{q}{N^2}\right)^{t-2} \cdot \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}}) \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(A_{c_{t-1}}^\top \gamma)| \\ &= \frac{q^{t+1}}{N} + q^{t-2} N \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}}) \cdot \sum_{\gamma \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(A_{c_0}^\top \gamma)| \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(A_{c_{t-1}}^\top \gamma)| \leq \frac{q^{t+1}}{N} + q^{t-1} \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}}). \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

Given the condition that  $c_{\text{id}_x} \neq 0$  and  $c_{\text{id}_{x+1}} \neq 0$ , we have  $N^2 |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}}}(A_{c_{\text{id}_x}} \gamma, A_{c_{\text{id}_{x+1}}} \gamma)| \leq \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}})$  for any  $\gamma \neq 0$ . We also used (7) that, for any  $\alpha, \beta$ ,  $|\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_i}(\alpha, \beta)| \leq q/N^2$ . We note that the last step of inequality holds because by (6) we have  $\sum_{\gamma} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(A_{c_0}^\top \gamma)^2 = \sum_{\gamma} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(A_{c_{t-1}}^\top \gamma)^2 = q/N$ , so we can apply the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality to obtain the result. This exact inequality step ensures the tight bound and was referred to as the *Cauchy-Schwartz trick* in [2,23,5].

Therefore, we proved Lemma 3.  $\square$

The remaining step is to upper bound  $\Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}})$ . Here, we apply the following lemma, which has essentially the same proof of Lemma 6 proved by Chen *et al.* in [5], with the only adjustment of changing their parameter  $\delta$  to  $\delta = \sqrt{(12 \ln N)/q}$ .

**Lemma 4.** *Assume that  $9(t+2)n \leq q \leq N/2$ . Fix an adversary making  $q$  queries to a random permutation  $P$ . Let  $Q$  denote the transcript of interaction of  $\mathcal{A}$  with  $P$ . Then,*

$$\Pr_{P,\omega} \left[ \Phi(Q) \geq \frac{2q^2}{N} + 3\sqrt{(t+2)nq} \right] \leq \frac{2}{N^t},$$

where the probability is taken over the random permutation  $P$  and the random coins  $\omega$  used by  $\mathcal{A}$ .

Plugging in the inequality, we get

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_{\vec{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) &\leq \frac{q^{t+1}}{N} + q^{t-1} \Phi(Q_{\text{idx}+1}) \leq \frac{q^{t+1}}{N} + q^{t-1} \left( \frac{2q^2}{N} + 3\sqrt{(t+2)nq} \right) \\ &= \frac{3q^{t+1}}{N} + 3q^{t-1/2} \sqrt{(t+2)n} \end{aligned}$$

with probability at least  $1 - \frac{2t}{N^t}$ . Hence, we proved Lemma 2.

**TIGHTNESS OF LEMMA 2.** We examine the tightness of 1-constraint sum-capture quantities in two aspects. The first is, given that  $\vec{c} = (c_0, \dots, c_{t-1})$  where there are two neighboring  $c_i, c_{i+1}$  so that  $c_i \neq 0, c_{i+1} \neq 0$  whether or not the upper bound is tight.

We now give the following proposition, showing that if there exist neighboring coefficients  $c_i \neq 0$  and  $c_{i+1} \neq 0$ , then for moderately large  $q$  (e.g.  $q > N^{2/3}$ ),  $\mu_{\vec{c}} \geq q^{t+1}/2N$  with high probability. We defer the detailed proof to Appendix B.2.

**Proposition 1.** *Let  $q$  be any positive integer of power of two. Fix any  $\vec{c} = (c_0, \dots, c_{t-1})$  such that there exists an index  $0 \leq i < t-1$  satisfying  $c_i \neq 0$  and  $c_{i+1} \neq 0$ . Then, there is an explicit algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  that makes at most  $q$  queries to each of  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$ , and  $V_0, U_t \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  that have  $|V_0| = |U_t| = q$  so that*

$$\Pr \left[ \mu_{\vec{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \geq \frac{q^{t+1}}{2N} \right] \geq 1 - \frac{N}{q} \cdot e^{-q^2/8N}.$$

The second proposition, complementary to Proposition 1, states that if  $\vec{c} = (c_0, \dots, c_{t-1})$  satisfies that if for any  $0 \leq i < t-1$ , either  $c_i = 0$  or  $c_{i+1} = 0$ , then  $\mu_{\vec{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t)$  can achieve up to  $q^t$ , which is larger than  $q^{t+1}/N$ . We leave the proof to Appendix B.3.

**Proposition 2.** *Let  $q$  be any positive integer of power of two. Fix any  $\vec{c} = (c_0, \dots, c_{t-1})$  such that for any  $0 \leq i < t-1$ , either  $c_i = 0$  or  $c_{i+1} = 0$ . Then, there is an explicit algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  that makes at most  $q$  queries to each of  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$ , and  $V_0, U_t \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  that have  $|V_0| = |U_t| = q$ , so that*

$$\mu_{\vec{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \geq q^t.$$

## 4.2 2-constraint Sum-Capture Quantity

We now consider the sum-capture quantity for which the number of constraints  $r = 2$ . We associate the 2-constraint sum-capture quantity with two vectors of coefficients,  $\vec{c} = (c_0, c_1, \dots, c_{t-1})$  and  $\vec{d} = (d_0, d_1, \dots, d_{t-1})$ , as

$$\mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) := \left| \left\{ (v_0, (u_1, v_1), \dots, (u_{t-1}, v_{t-1}), u_t) \in V_0 \times \mathcal{Q}_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal{Q}_{t-1} \times U_t : \right. \right. \\ \left. \left. \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} c_j(v_j + u_{j+1}) = 0, \sum_{j=0}^{t-1} d_j(v_j + u_{j+1}) = 0 \right\} \right|. \quad (9)$$

Though the 2-constraint sum-capture quantity is a natural generalization of the 1-constraint case, we note that adding only one more constraint makes proving the tightest upper bound of (9) much harder. Here, we give bounds only over the sum-capture quantity with a specific class of coefficients  $\vec{c}, \vec{d}$  that can be derived from the  $(t-2)$ -wise independently uniform sub-keys. We obtain a bound that gives the tightest KAC security for  $t \geq 8$ . However, for  $t < 5$ , our 2-constraint upper bound is even worse than a reduction-based bound (see Appendix B.4). While it is interesting to investigate whether our bound can be improved, for  $t = 3$ , in particular, we show that the preceding sum-capture quantity is lower-bounded by  $\Omega(q^3/N)$  and hence cannot be used to prove  $q = \Omega(N^{3/4})$  for the 3-round KAC with identical sub-keys.

We prove upper bounds for the class of linear constraint coefficients  $\vec{c} = (c_0, \dots, c_{t-1}), \vec{d} = (d_0, \dots, d_{t-1})$  with the property that  $c_0 = d_{t-1} = 1, c_{t-1} = d_0 = 0$ , and for all  $i \in \{1, \dots, t-2\}, c_i \neq 0, d_i \neq 0$ , and for all  $i, j \in \{1, \dots, t-2\}$  such that  $i \neq j, c_i d_i^{-1} \neq c_j d_j^{-1}$ . We justify that  $\vec{c}, \vec{d}$  corresponds to the linear key schedule from  $t-2$  independent keys that gives  $(t-2)$ -wise independently uniform sub-keys.

JUSTIFICATION. We use  $s_0, \dots, s_{t-1}$  to denote the sub-keys. Given that the sub-keys are generated linearly from  $t-2$  independent keys and are  $(t-2)$ -wise independently uniform, the middle  $t-2$  sub-keys  $s_1, \dots, s_{t-2}$  uniquely fix the original master keys; hence, the first subkey  $s_0$  and the last sub-keys  $s_{t-1}$  can be uniquely determined as a linear combination of  $s_1, \dots, s_{t-2}$ , i.e.,

$$s_0 = \sum_{i=1}^{t-2} c_i s_i, \quad s_{t-1} = \sum_{i=1}^{t-2} d_i s_i.$$

Note that all  $c_i, d_i$  should be non-zero because otherwise we could obtain a linear combination  $t-2$  sub-keys that sum to zero, breaking the  $(t-2)$ -wise independence. Further, we show by contradiction that if there exists  $i, j$  such that  $i \neq j$  and  $c_i d_i^{-1} = c_j d_j^{-1}$ , then we pick the set of sub-keys  $\{s_0, s_{t-1}\} \cup \{s_k \mid 1 \leq k \leq t-2 \wedge k \notin \{i, j\}\}$  and have

$$s_0 + c_i d_i^{-1} s_{t-1} = \sum_{k \notin \{0, i, j, t\}} (c_i d_i^{-1} d_k + c_k) s_k,$$

which is a linear dependence among  $t-2$  sub-keys. Thus, all  $c_i d_i^{-1}$  must be distinct.

Then, we have the following lemma for the 2-constraint sum-capture quantity.

**Lemma 5.** *Let  $t \geq 3$ . Let  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$  be  $t-1$  independent uniformly random permutations of  $\{0, 1\}^n$ , and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a probabilistic algorithm that makes adaptive queries to  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$ . Let  $\mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}$  be the query transcripts of  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$  interacting with  $\mathcal{A}$ . Let coefficients  $\vec{c}, \vec{d}$  be defined as above. Then, for any  $\mathcal{A}$  that makes at most  $q \geq (t+2)nN^{2/3}$  queries to each permutation,*

$$\Pr_{P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}} \left[ \exists V_0, U_t \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{2^n}, |V_0| = |U_t| = q, \right. \\ \left. \mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \geq \frac{q^{t+1}}{N^2} + t \cdot \frac{(3q)^{2t-3}}{N^{t-2}} + \frac{(3q)^{2t-2.5}}{N^{t-2}} \right] \leq \frac{2t}{N^t}.$$

DISCUSSION. Note that when  $t \geq 5$ , the security bound starts to improve over the  $t-1$  round KAC bound  $q = \Omega(N^{\frac{t-1}{t}})$ . For  $t \geq 8$ , the security bound achieves optimal security of  $q = \Omega(N^{\frac{t}{t+1}})$ .

As in the 1-constraint case, we prove an upper bound of  $\mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}$  conditioning on  $\Phi(\mathcal{Q}_i)$  being small for all  $i$ .

**Lemma 6.** Fix  $\vec{c}, \vec{d}$  defined as in Lemma 5. Then, conditioning on  $\Phi(\mathcal{Q}_i) \leq 9q^2/N$  for all  $1 \leq i \leq t-1$ , it holds that for any subsets  $V_0, U_t \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  with  $|V_0| = |U_t| = q$ ,

$$\mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \leq \frac{q^{t+1}}{N^2} + t \cdot \frac{(3q)^{2t-3}}{N^{t-2}} + \frac{(3q)^{2t-2.5}}{N^{t-2}}.$$

*Proof.* We first expand the quantity as sums over indicator function, and perform Fourier expansion, grouping inner products as we did for the 1-constraint case. The following shows the calculation result, and we left the details in Appendix B.5.

$$\mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) = N^{2t-2} \sum_{\alpha, \beta} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\theta_0) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\theta_0, \theta_1) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_2}(\theta_1, \theta_2) \cdots \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\theta_{t-2}, \theta_{t-1}) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\theta_{t-1})$$

where

$$\theta_0 = \alpha, \quad \theta_{t-1} = \beta, \\ \forall i \in \{1, \dots, t-2\} : \theta_i = A_{c_i}^\top \alpha + A_{d_i}^\top \beta.$$

We write  $\text{Coeff} = \{\theta_0, \theta_1, \dots, \theta_{t-1}\}$ . Here, we partition the summation into three cases and discuss the set of  $(\alpha, \beta)$  assignments that falls into each case.

1. At least two  $\theta$ s in  $\text{Coeff}$  are zero.
2. Exactly one  $\theta$  in  $\text{Coeff}$  is zero.
3. No  $\theta$ s in  $\text{Coeff}$  is zero.

The following claim shows that if case one happens, then all coefficients  $\theta$  are zero.

**Claim 1** If two  $\theta$ s in  $\text{Coeff}$  are zero, then  $\alpha = \beta = 0$ .

*Proof.* If  $\theta_0 = \alpha = \beta = \theta_{t-1} = 0$ , then the claim is trivial. If  $\alpha = \theta_0 = \theta_i = 0$  for some  $i$  with  $1 \leq i \leq t-2$ , then given that  $\theta_i = A_{c_i}^\top \alpha + A_{d_i}^\top \beta = A_{d_i}^\top \beta$  and  $A_{d_i}^\top$  is full-rank (because  $d_i \neq 0$ ), we can infer that  $\beta = 0$ . Similarly, we can infer  $\alpha = 0$  if  $\beta = \theta_{t-1} = \theta_i = 0$  for some  $i$  with  $1 \leq i \leq t-2$ . Now, if  $\theta_i = \theta_j = 0$  for some  $i, j$  such that  $1 \leq i, j \leq t-2$  and  $i \neq j$ , the choice of  $(\alpha, \beta)$  must satisfy

$$\begin{cases} A_{c_i}^\top \alpha + A_{d_i}^\top \beta = 0 \\ A_{c_j}^\top \alpha + A_{d_j}^\top \beta = 0 \end{cases}$$

implying that  $A_{d_{i+1}^{-1}c_{i+1}}^\top \alpha = (A_{d_{i+1}}^\top)^{-1} A_{c_{i+1}}^\top \alpha = \beta = (A_{d_{j+1}}^\top)^{-1} A_{c_{j+1}}^\top \alpha = A_{d_{j+1}^{-1}c_{j+1}}^\top \alpha$ . Hence,

$$\left( A_{d_{i+1}^{-1}c_{i+1}}^\top + A_{d_{j+1}^{-1}c_{j+1}}^\top \right) \alpha = \left( A_{d_{i+1}^{-1}c_{i+1} + d_{j+1}^{-1}c_{j+1}}^\top \right) \alpha = 0 .$$

Here,  $\alpha$  can be non-zero only if  $d_{i+1}^{-1}c_{i+1} = d_{j+1}^{-1}c_{j+1}$ . However, as we explained in the  $(t-2)$ -wise independently uniform property of sub-keys, this is not possible.  $\square$

Let  $\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3$  correspond to summation over  $(\alpha, \beta)$  for case one, two, three, respectively.

**Proposition 3.**

$$\mu_1 = \frac{q^{t+1}}{N^2}$$

*Proof.* Since case one happens only when  $\alpha = \beta = 0$ , we have  $\theta_i = 0$  for all  $i$ . Therefore, a direct calculation using the fact that  $\widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{V_0}(0) = \widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{U_t}(0) = q/N$  and  $\widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{Q_i}(0, 0) = q/N^2$  proves the bound.  $\square$

**Proposition 4.**

$$\mu_2 \leq \frac{t \cdot (3q)^{2t-3}}{N^{t-2}}$$

Since the proof of Proposition 4 can be derived via a moderate change to the proof of the 1-constraint sum-capture quantity upper bound (i.e., Lemma 2), we left the complete proof to Appendix B.6.

**Proposition 5.**

$$\mu_3 \leq \frac{(3q)^{2t-2.5}}{N^{t-2}}$$

*Proof (of Proposition 5).* We define an  $N \times N$  matrix  $M$  with each entry labeled by  $(\alpha, \beta) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \times \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  so that

$$M_{\alpha, \beta} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if some } \theta \in \text{Coeff is 0} \\ \widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{Q_1}(\alpha, A_{c_1}^\top \alpha + A_{d_1}^\top \beta) \cdots \widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{Q_{t-1}}(A_{c_{t-2}}^\top \alpha + A_{d_{t-2}}^\top \beta, \beta) & \text{o.w.} \end{cases}$$

Note that  $M$  is a  $2^n \times 2^n$  matrix. We also define the column vectors  $\vec{v}, \vec{u}$  with each entry labeled by  $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  so that  $\vec{v}_\alpha = \widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{V_0}(\alpha)$  and  $\vec{u}_\alpha = \widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{U_t}(\alpha)$ . Therefore, we can write  $\mu_3$  as

$$\mu_3 = N^{2t-2} \sum_{\alpha, \beta \mid M_{\alpha, \beta} \neq 0} \widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{V_0}(\alpha) \cdot M_{\alpha, \beta} \cdot \widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{U_t}(\beta) = N^{2t-2} \vec{v}^\top M \vec{u} .$$

Noting that the equivalent definition of the matrix 2-norm is

$$\|M\|_2 := \sup_{\|x\|_2=1} \|Mx\|_2 = \sup_{\|x\|_2=1, \|y\|_2=1} y^\top Mx ,$$

we can use the matrix norm as the upper bound of  $\mu_3$ , that is,

$$\mu_3 = N^{2t-2} \cdot \vec{v}^\top M \vec{u} \leq N^{2t-2} \|\vec{v}\|_2 \|M\|_2 \|\vec{u}\|_2 .$$

By (6), we can infer that  $\|\vec{v}\|_2 = \sqrt{\sum_{\alpha} v_{\alpha}^2} = \sqrt{\sum_{\alpha} \widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{V_0}(\alpha)^2} = \sqrt{q/N}$  and  $\|\vec{u}\|_2 = \sqrt{q/N}$ . We also use the fact that  $\|M\|_2 \leq \|M\|_F$ , where  $\|M\|_F = \sqrt{\sum_{i,j} M_{i,j}^2}$  is the Frobenius norm. Then, we have

$$\mu_3 \leq N^{2t-2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{q}{N}} \|M\|_2 \sqrt{\frac{q}{N}} \leq qN^{2t-3} \|M\|_F = qN^{2t-3} \sqrt{\sum_{\alpha,\beta} M_{\alpha,\beta}^2},$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{\alpha,\beta} M_{\alpha,\beta}^2 &= \sum_{\alpha,\beta \mid M_{\alpha,\beta} \neq 0} \widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\alpha, A_{c_1}^{\top} \alpha + A_{d_1}^{\top} \beta)^2 \cdots \widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(A_{c_{t-2}}^{\top} \alpha + A_{d_{t-2}}^{\top} \beta, \beta)^2 \\ &\leq \sum_{\alpha,\beta \mid M_{\alpha,\beta} \neq 0} \widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\alpha, A_{c_1}^{\top} \alpha + A_{d_1}^{\top} \beta)^2 \cdot \frac{(3q)^{4(t-2)}}{N^{6(t-2)}} \\ &\leq \frac{(3q)^{4(t-2)}}{N^{6(t-2)}} \sum_{\alpha,\beta} \widehat{\mathbf{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\alpha, A_{c_1}^{\top} \alpha + A_{d_1}^{\top} \beta)^2 = \frac{(3q)^{4(t-2)}}{N^{6(t-2)}} \cdot \frac{q}{N^2} \leq \frac{(3q)^{4t-7}}{N^{6t-10}}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, we get

$$\mu_3 \leq qN^{2t-3} \cdot \frac{(3q)^{2t-3.5}}{N^{3t-5}} \leq \frac{(3q)^{2t-2.5}}{N^{t-2}}.$$

□

Putting all propositions together, we have

$$\mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}} = \mu_1 + \mu_2 + \mu_3 \leq \frac{q^{t+1}}{N^2} + t \cdot \frac{(3q)^{2t-3}}{N^{t-2}} + \frac{(3q)^{2t-2.5}}{N^{t-2}}.$$

□

### 4.3 Tightness of 2-constraint Sum-Capture Quantity for 3-round KAC

A natural question is whether the upper bound of the 2-constraint sum-capture quantity can be improved to give a tight security bound for a  $t$ -round KAC when  $t < 7$ . In particular, the most interesting case is to prove a tight security bound  $q = \Omega(N^{3/4})$  for a 3-round KAC with identical sub-keys that corresponds to the instantiation in Corollary 4 when  $t = 3$ . However, for the 3-round KAC with an identical key schedule, we prove that it is impossible to show the conjectured optimal security bound via upper-bounding the sum-capture quantity, because the sum-capture quantity is lower-bounded by  $\Omega(q^3/N)$  with high probability, giving  $\mu_{\vec{c}}/N = \Omega(q^3/N^2)$  instead of the desired  $q^4/N^3$ . The sum-capture quantity lower bound for a 3-round identical sub-key KAC directly follows from Proposition 6 with  $c_1 = d_1 = 1$ . We left the proof of proposition to Appendix B.7.

**Proposition 6.** *Let  $q$  be any positive integer of power of two. Let  $t = 2$  and fix  $\vec{c} = (1, c_1, 0)$ ,  $\vec{d} = (0, d_1, 1)$ , where  $c_1, d_1$  are non-zero. Then, there exists an explicit algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  that makes at most  $q$  queries to each of  $P_1, P_2$  and  $V_0, U_3 \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  that have  $|V_0| = |U_3| = q$ , so that*

$$\Pr[\mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \mathcal{Q}_2, U_3) \geq q^3/2N] \geq 1 - \frac{N}{q} \cdot e^{-q^2/8N}.$$

Though Proposition 6 gives a lower bound of  $\Omega(q^3/N)$  for the sum-capture quantity  $\mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}$ , it does not immediately imply a distinguishing attack against the 3-round KAC. This is because the number of bad keys generated by our constructed  $\mathcal{A}$  is at most  $q$ , so we have  $\Pr[\vec{k} \in \text{Badkey}] \leq q/N$ ; The reason of  $\mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}$  being too large is that a bad key may be counted multiple times in the sum capture quantity. Therefore, we cannot prove the optimal  $q = \Omega(N^{3/4})$  bound for a 3-round KAC with identical sub-keys if overcounting cannot be eliminated.

## 5 Good Transcript Analysis

We next obtain upper bounds of  $1 - \mathbf{ps}_0(\tau)/\mathbf{ps}_1(\tau)$  for each  $\tau \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{good}}$  in the following lemma.

**Lemma 7.** *If the  $t$ -round KAC is instantiated with a key schedule that gives  $(t - 2)$ -wise independently uniform sub-keys, then there exists a function  $g : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow [0, +\infty)$  so that for any  $\tau = (\vec{Q}, \vec{k}) \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{good}}$ ,*

$$1 - \frac{\mathbf{ps}_0(\tau)}{\mathbf{ps}_1(\tau)} \leq g(\tau) ,$$

and for any query records  $\vec{Q}$ ,

$$\mathbb{E}_{\vec{k}} \left[ g(\vec{Q}, \vec{k}) \right] \leq \frac{t^2(4q)^{t+1}}{N^t} .$$

To obtain the desired function  $g(\cdot)$ , we must first understand the ratio  $\mathbf{ps}_0(\tau)/\mathbf{ps}_1(\tau)$ . Given the transcript  $\tau = (\vec{Q}, \vec{k})$  where  $\vec{Q} = (Q_E, Q_1, \dots, Q_t)$ , we write  $E \downarrow Q_E$  to denote that the real-world cipher construction  $E$  is consistent with the recorded query  $Q_E$ ; that is, for each  $(x, y) \in Q_E$ , it holds that  $E(x) = y$ . Similarly, we write  $P_i \downarrow Q_i$  to denote that the permutation  $P_i$  is consistent with the recorded query  $Q_i$ . Then, following [5,16], one can derive that

$$\frac{\mathbf{ps}_0(\vec{Q}, \vec{k})}{\mathbf{ps}_1(\vec{Q}, \vec{k})} = N^{(|Q_E|)} \cdot \Pr[E_{\vec{k}} \downarrow Q_E \mid P_1 \downarrow Q_1, \dots, P_t \downarrow Q_t] , \quad (10)$$

where  $N^{(|Q_E|)} = N(N - 1) \cdots (N - |Q_E| + 1)$ . We provide a proof of (10) in Appendix C.1.

To analyze the probability term on the RHS, we take the following graph view for KAC, which was originally introduced by Chen and Steinberger in [6].

### 5.1 Graph Definition and a Useful Lemma

Let  $G$  be a graph that consists of vertices divisible into  $m + 1$  layers  $L_0, \dots, L_m$  such that each layer contains exactly  $N$  vertices and edges that can be partitioned into  $m$  sets  $\vec{E} = (E_{(0,1)}, E_{(1,2)}, \dots, E_{(m-1,m)})$  such that  $E_{(i,i+1)}$  forms a partial (but possibly perfect) matching from  $L_i$  to  $L_{i+1}$ .

We say a vertex  $u \in L_i$ , where  $i < m$ , is right-free if no edge connects  $u$  to any vertex in  $L_{i+1}$ . Analogously, we say a vertex  $v \in L_j$ , where  $j > 0$ , is left-free if no edge connects  $v$  to any vertex in  $L_{j-1}$ .

For any vertex  $u \in L_0$ , we define the following probabilistic procedure that generates a path  $(w_0, w_1, \dots, w_m)$  from  $u$  to a vertex in  $L_m$ .

- Let  $w_0 = u$ .

- For  $i$  from 1 to  $m$ , if  $w_{i-1}$  is not right-free and connects to some vertex  $w' \in L_i$ , then let  $w_i = w'$ ; otherwise, let  $w_i$  be uniformly sampled from all left-free vertices in  $L_i$ .

We write  $\Pr[u \rightarrow v]$  to denote the probability that the path  $(u, w_1, \dots, w_m)$  satisfies  $w_m = v$ . In particular, we are interested in the pair of  $(u, v)$  where  $u$  is right-free and  $v$  is left-free.

For the layered graph  $G$ , we let  $\mathcal{U}_G(a, b)$ , where  $a \leq b$ , be the set of paths that starts at a left-free vertex in  $L_a$  and reaches a vertex in  $L_b$ . We note that the path in  $\mathcal{U}_G(a, b)$  does not necessarily end in  $L_b$ . We write  $U_G(a, b) = |\mathcal{U}_G(a, b)|$ . Note that  $U_G(a, a)$  denotes the total number of left-free vertices in  $L_a$ .

Given any  $\sigma = ((i_0, i_1), (i_1, i_2), \dots, (i_{|\sigma|-1}, i_{|\sigma|}))$  in which  $i_0 < i_1 < \dots < i_{|\sigma|}$ , we say  $\sigma$  is an interesting  $(a, b)$ -segment partitions with regard to the index set  $\mathcal{I} \subseteq \{0, \dots, m\}$  if  $i_0 = a, i_{|\sigma|} = b$  and for all  $1 < j < |\sigma|$  we have  $i_j \in \mathcal{I}$ . We use  $\mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(a, b)$  to denote the set that contains all interesting  $(a, b)$ -segment partition of the set  $\mathcal{I}$ . Given a layered graph  $G$ , we define the interesting indices of  $G$  as

$$\mathcal{I}(G) := \{i \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, m\} \mid U_G(i, i) > 0\}.$$

We are then ready to state the following lemma, a slightly different variant of the lemma proved by Chen and Steinberger in [6] but with essentially the same proof. We include a version of the proof in Appendix C.2 for completeness.

**Lemma 8.** *For any graph  $G$  defined as above, and any  $u \in L_0, v \in L_m$  such that  $u$  is right-free and  $v$  is left-free, it holds that*

$$\Pr[u \rightarrow v] = \frac{1}{N} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}(G)}(0, m)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_G(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{U_G(i_h, i_h)}.$$

## 5.2 Graph View of KAC

The KAC can also be interpreted in the graph view. Given a transcript  $\tau = (\vec{Q}, \vec{k})$ , where  $\vec{Q} = (\mathcal{Q}_E, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_t)$  and sub-keys  $\vec{s} = (s_0, \dots, s_t)$  are generated from the key  $\vec{k}$ , we define  $E_{(2i, 2i+1)} := \{(v, v + s_i) \mid v \in L_{2i}\}$  for  $i \in \{0, \dots, t\}$ . That is,  $L_{2i}$  and  $L_{2i+1}$  are connected by the “sub-key edges;” this corresponds to the step of xoring the sub-key  $s_i$  in the KAC execution. For  $i \in \{1, \dots, t\}$ , we let  $E_{(2i-1, 2i)} := \{(u, v) \mid (u, v) \in \mathcal{Q}_i\}$ . This corresponds to the queries made to the permutation  $P_i$ . Now, we note that the interesting indices for KAC can only be a subset of  $\{0, 2, 4, \dots, 2t\}$ .

For fixed query records  $\vec{Q}$ , let  $Z_{\vec{s}}(a, b)$ , where  $a \leq b$ , be the total number of paths that connects a vertex in  $L_a$  and a vertex in  $L_b$  when  $\vec{s}$  being the sub-keys. Note that the paths do not necessarily start at  $L_a$  or end at  $L_b$ . For the  $\ell$ -th cipher query  $(x_\ell, y_\ell)$ , let  $\alpha_\ell[\vec{s}]$  denote the largest possible index of the layer that is reachable from  $x_\ell$  when  $\vec{s}$  being the sub-keys. Let  $\beta_\ell[\vec{s}]$  denote the smallest index of the layer than is reachable from  $y_\ell$ . In the good key case, we always have  $\alpha_\ell[\vec{s}] < \beta_\ell[\vec{s}]$ .

Now, to bound the probability  $\Pr[E \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_E \mid P_1 \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, P_t \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_t]$ , we analyze the following experiment, which can be divided into  $|\mathcal{Q}_E|$  stages.

1. Initially,  $G_0$  is defined according to the given transcript  $\tau = (\vec{Q}, \vec{k})$ .
2. For  $\ell$  from 1 to  $|\mathcal{Q}_E|$ , given that  $G_{\ell-1}$  is defined, the probabilistic path-generating process is run for the  $\ell$ -th query  $(x_\ell, y_\ell) \in \mathcal{Q}_E$  over the graph  $G_{\ell-1}$ , from vertex  $x_\ell \in L_0$ .
  - If the generated path from  $x_\ell$  does not arrive at  $y_\ell$ , the experiment outputs 0 and aborts.
  - Otherwise, we first set  $G_\ell = G_{\ell-1}$  and then remove all vertices on the path of  $(x_\ell, y_\ell)$  from  $G_\ell$ . The new graph  $G_\ell$  will have  $N - \ell$  vertices in each layer.

3. If  $G_{|\mathcal{Q}_E|}$  is successfully defined, the experiment outputs 1.

So, we have

$$\frac{\text{ps}_0(\vec{\mathcal{Q}}, \vec{k})}{\text{ps}_1(\vec{\mathcal{Q}}, \vec{k})} = N^{(|\mathcal{Q}_E|)} \Pr[\text{Exp}(\tau) = 1] = N^{(|\mathcal{Q}_E|)} \prod_{\ell=1}^{|\mathcal{Q}_E|} \Pr[x_\ell \rightarrow y_\ell \mid G_{\ell-1}].$$

We are now ready to state the core lemma that defines the function  $g(\vec{\mathcal{Q}}, \vec{k})$  and prove it using Lemma 8.

**Lemma 9.** *For any query records  $\vec{\mathcal{Q}}$  with  $q \leq N/4$  and subkeys  $\vec{k}$  such that the transcript  $\tau = (\vec{\mathcal{Q}}, \vec{k}) \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{good}}$ ,*

$$\frac{\text{ps}_0(\vec{\mathcal{Q}}, \vec{k})}{\text{ps}_1(\vec{\mathcal{Q}}, \vec{k})} \geq 1 - \sum_{\ell=1}^q \sum_{1 \leq a \leq b \leq t} \mathbf{R}_{2a-1, 2b, \ell}[\vec{s}] \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(2a-1, 2b), |\sigma| \geq 2} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{Z_{\vec{s}}(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{N - 2q},$$

where the set of interesting indices  $\mathcal{I}$  of the segment partition set  $\mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}$  is defined as  $\mathcal{I} = \{0, 2, \dots, 2t\}$ , and  $\mathbf{R}_{a,b,\ell}[\vec{s}] := \mathbb{1}(\alpha_\ell[\vec{s}] \geq a, \beta_\ell[\vec{s}] \leq b)$ .

*Proof.* For the  $\ell$ -th cipher query  $(x_\ell, y_\ell)$  given the graph support  $G_{\ell-1}$ , we define a graph  $G$  from  $G_{\ell-1}$  that removes all layers  $L_i$  for  $i < \alpha_\ell[\vec{s}]$  and  $L_j$  for  $j > \beta_\ell[\vec{s}]$ . Thus, in the graph  $G$ , we start at a right-free vertex  $u \in L_0$  and target a left-free vertex  $v \in L_m$ , letting us apply Lemma 8.

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_G[(x_\ell \rightarrow y_\ell) \mid G_{\ell-1}] \\ &= \frac{1}{N - \ell + 1} \left( 1 - \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}(G)}(0, m)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_G(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{U_G(i_h, i_h)} \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{N - \ell + 1} \left( 1 + \frac{U_G(0, m)}{U_G(m, m)} - \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}(G)}(0, m), |\sigma| \geq 2} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_G(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{U_G(i_h, i_h)} \right) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{N - \ell + 1} \left( 1 - \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}(G)}(0, m), |\sigma| \geq 2} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_G(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{U_G(i_h, i_h)} \right) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{N - \ell + 1} \left( 1 - \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_\ell[\vec{s}], \beta_\ell[\vec{s}]), |\sigma| \geq 2} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{Z_{\vec{s}}(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{N - 2q} \right). \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

Now we consider only the case where the lower bound (11)  $\geq 0$  for all  $\ell$ . Otherwise, Lemma 9 becomes trivially true. Hence, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{ps}_0(\vec{\mathcal{Q}}, \vec{k})}{\text{ps}_1(\vec{\mathcal{Q}}, \vec{k})} &\geq \prod_{\ell=1}^q \left( 1 - \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_\ell[\vec{s}], \beta_\ell[\vec{s}]), |\sigma| \geq 2} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{Z_{\vec{s}}(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{N - 2q} \right) \\ &\geq 1 - \sum_{\ell=1}^q \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(\alpha_\ell[\vec{s}], \beta_\ell[\vec{s}]), |\sigma| \geq 2} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{Z_{\vec{s}}(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{N - 2q} \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

$$\geq 1 - \sum_{\ell=1}^q \sum_{1 \leq a \leq b \leq t} R_{2a-1, 2b, \ell}[\vec{s}] \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(2a-1, 2b), |\sigma| \geq 2} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{Z_{\vec{s}}(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{N - 2q}, \quad (13)$$

where (12) holds since  $(1-a)(1-b) \geq 1-a-b$  for any  $a, b \geq 0$  and (13) holds because the indicator function  $R$  is non-negative and satisfies  $R_{\alpha[\vec{s}], \beta[\vec{s}], \ell}[\vec{s}] = 1$ . We note that (13) is the exact quantity we pick for  $1 - g(\vec{Q}, \vec{k})$ .  $\square$

**Lemma 10.** *If  $q \leq N/4$ , then*

$$\mathbb{E}_{\vec{k}} \left( \sum_{\ell=1}^q \sum_{1 \leq a \leq b \leq t} R_{2a-1, 2b, \ell}[\vec{s}] \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(2a-1, 2b), |\sigma| \geq 2} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{Z_{\vec{s}}(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{N - 2q} \right) \leq t^2 \cdot \frac{(4q)^{t+1}}{N^t}.$$

*Proof.* By the sum of expectation and noting that none of  $\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(2a-1, 2b)$  would have  $|\sigma| \geq 2$  if  $a = b$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}_{\vec{k}} \left( \sum_{\ell=1}^q \sum_{1 \leq a \leq b \leq t} R_{2a-1, 2b, \ell}[\vec{s}] \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(2a-1, 2b), |\sigma| \geq 2} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{Z_{\vec{s}}(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{N - 2q} \right) \\ &= \sum_{\ell=1}^q \sum_{1 \leq a < b \leq t} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(2a-1, 2b), |\sigma| \geq 2} \mathbb{E}_{\vec{s}} \left( R_{2a-1, 2b, \ell}[\vec{s}] \cdot \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{Z_{\vec{s}}(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{N - 2q} \right). \end{aligned}$$


Hence, it is sufficient to derive bounds for each  $(a, b, \sigma)$ . Note that for each  $a, b$ , the random variable  $R_{2a-1, 2b, j}[\vec{s}]$  depends only on the sub-keys  $s_0, \dots, s_{a-2}, s_{b+1}, \dots, s_t$ , which are  $(a-2+1) + (t-(b+1)+1) = t-b+a-1$  sub-keys in total.

Next, given a fixed  $\sigma = ((i_0, i_1), (i_1, i_2), \dots, (i_{|\sigma|-1}, i_{|\sigma|}))$ , we analyze the key dependency for each  $Z_{\vec{s}}(i_{h-1}, i_h)$ .

1. For  $(i_0, i_1)$ , given that  $i_0 = 2a-1$  is odd and  $i_1$  is even,  $Z_{\vec{s}}(i_0, i_1)$  depends on  $(i_1 - i_0 - 1)/2$  subkeys between  $L_{i_0}$  and  $L_{i_1}$ .
2. For any  $(i_{h-1}, i_h)$  where  $h > 1$ , given  $i_{h-1}$  is an even number, implying that  $L_{i_{h-1}}$  and  $L_{i_{h-1}+1}$  are connected by “key-edges”, which always form a perfect matching regardless of the sub-key choice, then, the equality  $Z_s(i_{h-1}, i_h) = Z_s(i_{h-1} + 1, i_h)$  always holds. And we can see that  $Z_s(i_{h-1} + 1, i_h)$  depends only on  $(i_h - i_{h-1} - 2)/2$  sub-keys.

Also note that the sets of dependent sub-keys for  $Z_s(i_{h-1}, i_h)$  and  $R_{2a-1, 2b, j}[\vec{s}]$  are disjoint. After fixing  $(a, b, \sigma)$ , putting the results together shows that the total number of sub-keys that each expectation term depends on is at most

$$\begin{aligned} \#\text{dependent subkeys} &= (t - b + a - 1) + \frac{i_1 - i_0 - 1}{2} + \sum_{h=2}^{|\sigma|} \left( \frac{i_h - i_{h-1} - 1}{2} - 1 \right) \\ &= (t - b + a - 1) + \frac{\sum_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} (i_h - i_{h-1}) - 1}{2} - (|\sigma| - 1) \\ &= t - b + a - 1 + \frac{2b - 2a}{2} - |\sigma| + 1 \\ &= t - |\sigma| \leq t - 2, \end{aligned}$$



**Fig. 1.** A 3-round KAC with fixed query records  $\mathcal{Q}_1, \mathcal{Q}_2, \mathcal{Q}_3$ . The sub-keys  $\vec{s} = (s_0, \dots, s_3)$  are random and to be sampled. The solid red line indicates that the  $Z_{\vec{s}}(\text{left}, \text{right})$ , which counts the number of paths from  $L_{\text{left}}$  to  $L_{\text{right}}$ , depends on the corresponding sub-keys. Consider  $2a - 1 = 1, 2b = 6$ ; then,  $\mathbf{R}_{1,6,\ell}[\vec{s}] = 1$  and depends on  $(a - 1) + (3 - b) = 0$  sub-keys because any  $s_0$  allows  $x_\ell$  from  $L_0$  to reach  $L_1$  and  $y_\ell$  from  $L_7$  to  $L_6$ . For  $\sigma = ((1, 6))$ , the value of  $Z_{\vec{s}}(1, 6)$  depends on two sub-keys  $s_1, s_2$ . However, if the  $\sigma$  is further partitioned into  $((1, 4), (4, 6))$ , then  $Z_{\vec{s}}(1, 4)$  depends on  $s_1$  but  $Z_{\vec{s}}(4, 6)$  does not depend on any sub-keys, because  $Z_{\vec{s}}(4, 6) = Z_{\vec{s}}(5, 6) = |\mathcal{Q}_3|$ .

where we observe that a summation term of  $(a, b, \sigma)$  depends on fewer sub-keys if the size of  $\sigma$  is larger (see Figure 1 for a specific case illustration). Because our construction ensures that any  $t - 2$  sub-keys are independently and uniformly distributed, the random variables in each expectation terms are mutually independent; hence, we can break the terms into

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mathbb{E}_{\vec{k}} \left( \sum_{\ell=1}^q \sum_{1 \leq a < b \leq t} \mathbf{R}_{2a-1, 2b, \ell}[\vec{s}] \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(2a-1, 2b), |\sigma| \geq 2} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{Z_{\vec{s}}(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{N - 2q} \right) \\
& \leq \sum_{\ell=1}^q \sum_{1 \leq a < b \leq t} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(2a-1, 2b), |\sigma| \geq 2} \mathbb{E}_{\vec{s}} \left( \mathbf{R}_{2a-1, 2b, \ell}[\vec{s}] \cdot \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{2Z_{\vec{s}}(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{N} \right) \\
& = \sum_{\ell=1}^q \sum_{1 \leq a < b \leq t} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(2a-1, 2b), |\sigma| \geq 2} \mathbb{E}_{\vec{s}}(\mathbf{R}_{2a-1, 2b, \ell}[\vec{s}]) \cdot \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \mathbb{E}_{\vec{s}} \left( \frac{2Z_{\vec{s}}(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{N} \right) \tag{14}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \leq \sum_{\ell=1}^q \sum_{1 \leq a < b \leq t} \left( \frac{q}{N} \right)^{t-b+a-1} \sum_{\substack{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(2a-1, 2b), \\ |\sigma| \geq 2}} \left( \frac{2q}{N} \right)^{(|\sigma| - i_0 + 1)/2} \prod_{h=2}^{|\sigma|} \left( \frac{2q}{N} \right)^{(i_h - i_{h-1})/2} \tag{15} \\
& = \sum_{\ell=1}^q \sum_{1 \leq a < b \leq t} \left( \frac{q}{N} \right)^{t-b+a-1} \cdot \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{I}}(2a-1, 2b), |\sigma| \geq 2} \left( \frac{2q}{N} \right)^{(2b - (2a-1) + 1)/2}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\leq \sum_{\ell=1}^q \sum_{1 \leq a < b \leq t} \left(\frac{q}{N}\right)^{t-b+a-1} \cdot \left(\frac{4q}{N}\right)^{b-a+1} \leq t^2 \cdot \frac{(4q)^{t+1}}{N^t}. \quad (16)$$

In the preceding calculation, (14) holds since the sub-keys are  $(t-2)$ -wise independent. The first “ $q/N$ ” term of (15) comes from moving the  $\mathbb{E}_{\vec{s}}(\mathbf{R}_{2a-1,2b,\ell}[\vec{s}])$ , and inside the summation the “ $2q/N$ ” terms are the direct calculation upper bound of  $\mathbb{E}_s(2Z_{\vec{s}}(i_{h-1}, i_h)/N)$  for each  $(i_{h-1}, i_h)$ . Finally, the first inequality of (16) holds because the size of  $\mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{T}}(2a-1, 2b)$  is upper-bounded by  $2^{b-a}$ , which is absorbed into the “ $2q/N$ ” term, yielding a “ $4q/N$ ” term.  $\square$

## 6 Concluding the Proof

### 6.1 Proof of Theorem 1

*Proof.* We partition the set of transcripts  $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{T}_{\text{good}} \sqcup \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}$  according to Definition 1. By applying Lemma 1, we have  $\Delta(X_0, X_1) \leq \mathbb{E}_{X_1}[g(X_1)] + \Pr[X_1 \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}]$ . We start with bounding the  $\Pr[X_1 \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}]$ .

*Claim.*

$$\Pr[X_1 \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}] \leq (t+1) \cdot \frac{3q^{t+1}}{N^t} + 3(t+1) \sqrt{\frac{q^{2t-1}(t+2)n}{N^{2t-2}}} + \frac{t(t+1)}{N^t}.$$

*Proof (of claim).* We note that in the system  $\mathbf{S}_1$ , the set of bad keys  $\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q}}$  is defined only by the query records  $\vec{Q} = (Q_E, Q_1, \dots, Q_t)$ . Therefore, we have

$$\Pr[X_1 \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}] \leq \Pr_{\vec{Q}}[|\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q}}| > C] + \frac{C}{N^{t-1}}.$$

To get the size bound for  $\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q}}$ , we compute the size of  $\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},i}$  for  $0 \leq i \leq t$ . Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned} |\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},0}| &\leq \mu_{\vec{c}_0}(V_1, Q_2, Q_3, \dots, Q_{t-1}, Q_t, U_{t+1}) \\ |\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},1}| &\leq \mu_{\vec{c}_1}(V_2, Q_3, Q_4, \dots, Q_t, Q_E, U_1) \\ &\vdots \\ |\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},i}| &\leq \mu_{\vec{c}_i}(V_{i+1}, Q_{i+2}, Q_{i+3}, \dots, Q_t, Q_E, Q_1, \dots, Q_{i-1}, U_i) \\ &\vdots \\ |\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},t-1}| &\leq \mu_{\vec{c}_{t-1}}(V_t, Q_E, Q_1, \dots, Q_{t-2}, U_{t-1}) \\ |\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},t}| &\leq \mu_{\vec{c}_t}(V_0, Q_1, \dots, Q_{t-1}, U_t). \end{aligned}$$

where the linear coefficient tuples  $\vec{c}_i$  are given by condition 2 of Theorem 1 so that two neighboring coefficients are non-zero and

$$\begin{aligned} \forall i \in \{1, \dots, t\} : U_i &= \{u \mid \exists v : (u, v) \in Q_i\}, & V_i &= \{v \mid \exists u : (u, v) \in Q_i\} \\ U_{t+1} &= \{u \mid \exists v : (u, v) \in Q_E\}, & V_0 &= \{v \mid \exists u : (u, v) \in Q_E\}. \end{aligned}$$

The size of  $\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},i}$  is bounded by  $\mu_{\vec{c}_i}$  because any key  $\vec{k} \in \text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},i}$  is uniquely mapped to the sub-keys  $(s_0, \dots, s_{i-1}, s_{i+1}, s_t)$  since the linear mapping has rank  $t-1$  (stated in condition 2 of Theorem 1).

We now can apply Lemma 2 to upper bound  $\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},i}$  with high probability. For every  $i$ , by letting  $C_i = \frac{3q^{t+1}}{N} + 3q^{t-1/2}\sqrt{(t+2)n}$ , we obtain that  $\Pr_{\mathcal{Q}}[|\text{Badkey}_{\mathcal{Q},i}| > C_i] \leq \frac{2}{N^t}$ . Therefore, setting  $C = \sum_{i=0}^t C_i$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[X_1 \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}] &\leq \Pr_{\vec{Q}} [|\text{Badkey}_{\mathcal{Q}}| > C] + \frac{C}{N^{t-1}} \\ &\leq \sum_{i=0}^t \Pr_{\vec{Q}} [|\text{Badkey}_{\mathcal{Q},i}| > C_i] + \frac{C}{N^{t-1}} \\ &\leq \frac{2t(t+1)}{N^t} + (t+1) \cdot \frac{3q^{t+1}}{N^t} + 3(t+1) \cdot \frac{q^{t-1/2}\sqrt{(t+2)n}}{N^{t-1}}. \end{aligned}$$

Hence, we proved the claim.  $\square$

The next step is to pick a function  $g$  and upper bound  $\mathbb{E}_{X_1}[g(X_1)]$ . Note that by condition 1 of Theorem 1, any  $t-2$  rows of key schedule matrix  $A$  have rank  $t-2$ , implying that any  $t-2$  sub-keys are independent and uniform. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 7 and obtain a function  $g$ . Noting that because  $X_1$  is sampled from the ideal world,  $\vec{k}$  is sampled independently of  $\vec{Q}$ . So we have

$$\mathbb{E}_{X_1}[g(X_1)] = \mathbb{E}_{\vec{Q}} \mathbb{E}_{\vec{k}}[g(\vec{Q}, \vec{k})] \leq \mathbb{E}_{\vec{Q}} \left[ \frac{t^2(4q)^{t+1}}{N^t} \right] = \frac{t^2(4q)^{t+1}}{N^t}.$$

Then, by summing the two quantities and numerical simplifications, the theorem follows.  $\square$

## 6.2 Proof of Theorem 2

*Proof.* We again use Definition 1 for the bad transcripts. By applying Lemma 1, we obtain that  $\Delta(X_0, X_1) \leq \mathbb{E}_{X_1}[g(X_1)] + \Pr[X_1 \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}]$ , where we start with bounding the term  $\Pr[X_1 \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}]$ . Again, we have  $\Pr[X_1 \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}] \leq \Pr_{\vec{Q}} [|\text{Badkey}_{\mathcal{Q}}| > C] + \frac{C}{N^{t-2}}$ . To get the size bound for  $\text{Badkey}_{\mathcal{Q}}$ , we compute the size of  $\text{Badkey}_{\mathcal{Q},i}$  for  $0 \leq i \leq t$ . Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned} |\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},0}| &\leq \mu_{\vec{c}_0, \vec{d}_0}(V_1, \mathcal{Q}_2, \mathcal{Q}_3, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, \mathcal{Q}_t, U_{t+1}) \\ |\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},1}| &\leq \mu_{\vec{c}_1, \vec{d}_1}(V_2, \mathcal{Q}_3, \mathcal{Q}_4, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_t, \mathcal{Q}_E, U_1) \\ &\vdots \\ |\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},i}| &\leq \mu_{\vec{c}_i, \vec{d}_i}(V_{i+1}, \mathcal{Q}_{i+2}, \mathcal{Q}_{i+3}, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_t, \mathcal{Q}_E, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{i-1}, U_i) \\ &\vdots \\ |\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},t-1}| &\leq \mu_{\vec{c}_{t-1}, \vec{d}_{t-1}}(V_t, \mathcal{Q}_E, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-2}, U_{t-1}) \\ |\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},t}| &\leq \mu_{\vec{c}_t, \vec{d}_t}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t), \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \forall i \in \{1, \dots, t\} : U_i &= \{u \mid \exists v : (u, v) \in \mathcal{Q}_i\}, & V_i &= \{v \mid \exists u : (u, v) \in \mathcal{Q}_i\} \\ U_{t+1} &= \{u \mid \exists v : (u, v) \in \mathcal{Q}_E\}, & V_0 &= \{v \mid \exists u : (u, v) \in \mathcal{Q}_E\}. \end{aligned}$$

Since any  $t - 2$  rows of the key schedule matrix  $A$  have rank  $t - 2$ , the size of  $\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},i}$  is bounded by  $\mu_{\vec{c}_i, \vec{d}_i}$ , and we can always choose the sets of linear coefficients  $\vec{c}_i = (c_{i,0}, \dots, c_{i,t-1})$  and  $\vec{d}_i = (d_{i,0}, \dots, d_{i,t-1})$  that satisfy the requirements of Lemma 5.

we can now apply Lemma 5 to upper bound  $\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},i}$  with high probability. For every  $i$ , by letting  $C_i = \frac{q^{t+1}}{N^2} + t \cdot \frac{(3q)^{2t-3}}{N^{t-2}} + \frac{(3q)^{2t-2.5}}{N^{t-2}}$ , we obtain that  $\Pr_{\mathcal{Q}}[|\text{Badkey}_{\vec{Q},i}| > C_i] \leq \frac{2t}{N^t}$ . Therefore, setting  $C = \sum_{i=0}^t C_i$ , we directly obtain the result

$$\Pr[X_1 \in \mathcal{T}_{\text{bad}}] \leq (t + 1) \cdot \frac{q^{t+1} + 2t}{N^t} + t(t + 1) \cdot \frac{(3q)^{2t-3}}{N^{2t-4}} + (t + 1) \frac{(3q)^{2t-2.5}}{N^{2t-4}}.$$

For the good transcripts, noting that any  $t - 2$  rows of key schedule matrix  $A$  have rank  $t - 2$ , implying that any subset of  $t - 2$  sub-keys is independent and uniform. Therefore, we apply Lemma 7 and obtain  $\mathbb{E}_{X_1}[g(X_1)] \leq \frac{t^2(4q)^{t+1}}{N^t}$ . By summing the two quantities and some numerical simplification, the theorem follows.  $\square$

## 7 Conclusion and Open Problems

In this paper, we provided key schedules of limited independence for  $t$ -round key-alternating ciphers achieving tight security. We proved that the  $t$ -round key-alternating cipher remains tightly secure for a class of  $(t - 1)$ -wise independent sub-key distributions and, when  $t \geq 8$ , for  $(t - 2)$ -wise sub-key distributions.

Though our result does not extend to  $(t - 2)$ -wise independent sub-key distributions for  $3 \leq t \leq 7$ , we expect that a tighter analysis of the matrix 2-norm for the sum-capture quantity should prove the tightness result for  $4 \leq t \leq 7$ . Also, given that we resolved the good key analysis for  $(t - 2)$ -wise independent sub-keys, it would be interesting to investigate new methods for bounding the bad keys and proving tight security of 3-round KACs with identical key schedules. Another rich research vein involves the study of whether the tightness result holds for  $(t - 3)$ -wise distributions or beyond.

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## Appendix

### A More Fine-grained Security of Theorems

#### A.1 Theorem 1

Here we provide a version of Theorem 1 with the number of construction queries  $q_e$  and the number of permutation queries  $q_p$  being separated. We only provide a proof sketch for the theorem and lemmas, since the techniques are essentially the same as we were proving for the case of  $q_e = q_p$ .

**Theorem 3.** *For the  $t$ -round KAC constructed over  $t$  random permutations  $\vec{P} = (P_1, \dots, P_t)$ , let the key of KAC be  $\vec{k} = (k_0, k_1, \dots, k_{t-2})^\top$  in which  $k_i$ 's are independently uniformly sampled from  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ . Let subkeys  $\vec{s} = (s_0, s_1, \dots, s_t)^\top$  be derived by  $\vec{s} \leftarrow A\vec{k}$  in which  $A$  is a  $(t+1) \times (t-1)$  matrix over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ , with the rows denoted as  $A_0, \dots, A_t$ , such that*

1. Any  $t-2$  rows of  $A$  forms a matrix of rank  $t-2$ .
2. For any  $I \subseteq \{0, \dots, t\}$ ,  $|I| = t$ , then the row vectors  $(A_\ell)_{\ell \in I}$  satisfy that
  - $(A_\ell)_{\ell \in I}$  forms a matrix of rank  $t-1$ .
  - there exists values  $(c_\ell)_{\ell \in I}$  such that  $\sum_{\ell \in I} c_\ell A_\ell = \vec{0}$  and there are two indices  $\text{id}_{x_1}, \text{id}_{x_2} \in I$  satisfying  $\text{id}_{x_1} - \text{id}_{x_2} \in \{1, t\}$  and  $c_{\text{id}_{x_1}}, c_{\text{id}_{x_2}}$  are both non-zero.

Then for any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that issues at most  $q_e$  queries to KAC, and at most  $q_p$  queries to  $P_1, \dots, P_t$ , in which  $9(t+2)n \leq q_e, q_p \leq N/4$

a. if  $q_e \leq q_p$ , then

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{KAC}[\vec{P}]}^{\pm \text{PRP}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq (t+1) \cdot \frac{4q_e^{1/2} q_p^{t+1/2}}{N^t} + 3(t+1) \sqrt{\frac{q_e q_p^{2t-2}}{N^{2t-2}} \cdot (nt^2 + 2nt)} + t^2 \cdot \frac{4q_e \cdot (4q_p)^t}{N^t}.$$

b. if  $q_e \geq q_p$ , then

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{KAC}[\vec{P}]}^{\pm \text{PRP}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq (t+1) \cdot \frac{4q_e^2 q_p^{t-1}}{N^t} + 3(t+1) \sqrt{\frac{q_e^2 q_p^{2t-3}}{N^{2t-2}} \cdot (nt^2 + 2nt)} + t^2 \cdot \frac{4q_e \cdot (4q_p)^t}{N^t}.$$

We note that both cases come from the same proof but are manipulated in favor of a unified representation for the class of defined KACs. When  $q_e = q_p$ , both cases provide tight bound. However, we stress that when  $q_e \neq q_p$ , both bounds are not necessarily the best possible bound. To prove a better bound, one may want to further focus on a specific key schedule instead of a class of key schedule algorithms.

*Proof (sketch).* We still follow the definition of bad transcripts as we were proving Theorem 1. The good transcript analysis follows the proof of Lemma 7 identically and contributes the term  $t^2 \cdot \frac{(4q_e) \cdot (4q_p)^t}{N^t}$ .

Here we state a more fine-grained version of sum capture theorem, with all queries are separated. We note that the proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 2.

**Lemma 11.** *Let  $t \geq 2$ . Let  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$  be  $t-1$  independent random permutations of  $\{0, 1\}^n$ , and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a probabilistic algorithm that makes adaptive queries to  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$ . Let  $\mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}$  be the query transcripts of  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$  interacting with  $\mathcal{A}$ . Let  $\vec{c} = (c_0, \dots, c_{t-1})$  be the coefficients so that there is an index  $\text{id}_x \in \{0, \dots, t-2\}$  satisfying  $c_{\text{id}_x} \neq 0$  and  $c_{\text{id}_x+1} \neq 0$ . Let  $\text{left}$  be the smallest index so that  $c_{\text{left}} \neq 0$  and let  $\text{right}$  be the largest index such that  $c_{\text{right}} \neq 0$ . Let  $q_0, \dots, q_t$  be positive integers such that  $9(t+2)n \leq q_i \leq N/2$  for every  $0 \leq i \leq t$ , then for any  $\mathcal{A}$  that makes at most  $q_i$  queries to  $P_i$ ,*

$$\Pr_{P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}} \left[ \exists V_0, U_t \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{2^n}, |V_0| = q_0, |U_t| = q_t, \mu_{\vec{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \geq \frac{q_0 q_1 \cdots q_{t-1} q_t}{N} + \left( \sqrt{q_{\text{left}} q_{\text{right}+1}} \cdot \prod_{i \in \{0, \dots, t\} \setminus \{\text{left}, \text{right}+1, \text{id}_x+1\}} q_i \right) \cdot \left( \frac{2q_{\text{id}_x+1}^2}{N} + 3\sqrt{(t+2)nq_{\text{id}_x+1}} \right) \right] \leq \frac{2t}{N^t}.$$

We again upper bound the size of bad key sets by upper bounding their corresponding sum capture quantity. Note that when applying Lemma 11, we have exactly one quantity in  $\{q_0, \dots, q_t\}$  being  $q_e$  and the rest quantities being  $q_p$ .

When  $q_e \leq q_p$ , the above sum capture quantity is maximized if we have  $q_{\text{left}} = q_e$ . When  $q_e \geq q_p$ , we break the second additive terms of above quantity into two terms, i.e., the term that multiplied by  $2q_{\text{id}_x+1}^2/N$  and the term multiplied by  $3\sqrt{(t+2)nq_{\text{id}_x+1}}$ . Note that the first term obtains maximum value if  $q_{\text{id}_x+1} = q_e$  and the second term obtains maximum value if  $q_i = q_e$  for some  $i \in \{0, \dots, t\} \setminus \{\text{left}, \text{right}+1, \text{id}_x+1\}$ .  $\square$

## A.2 Theorem 2

Here we only provide a bound for the case of  $q_e \leq q_p$ , which is a reasonable assumption.

**Theorem 4.** *For the  $t$ -round KAC constructed over  $t$  random permutations  $\vec{P} = (P_1, \dots, P_t)$ , let the key of KAC be  $\vec{k} = (k_0, k_1, \dots, k_{t-3})^\top$  in which  $k_i$ 's are independently and uniformly sampled from  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ . Let subkeys  $\vec{s} = (s_0, s_1, \dots, s_t)^\top$  be derived by  $\vec{s} = A\vec{k}$  in which  $A$  is a  $(t+1) \times (t-2)$  matrix over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  such that any  $t-2$  rows of  $A$  forms a matrix of rank  $t-2$ . Then for any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that issues at most  $q_e$  queries to KAC and  $q_p$  queries to  $P_1, \dots, P_t$ ,*

a. *if  $(t+2)nN^{2/3} \leq q_p \leq N/4$ , then*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{KAC}[\vec{P}]}^{\pm \text{prp}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq (t+1)^2 \cdot \frac{4q_e \cdot (4q_p)^t}{N^t} + (t+1)^2 \cdot \frac{\sqrt{q_e} \cdot (3q_p)^{2t-3}}{N^{2t-4}}.$$

b. *if  $9(t+2)n \leq q_p \leq (t+2)nN^{2/3}$ ,*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{KAC}[\vec{P}]}^{\pm \text{prp}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq & (t+1)^2 \cdot \frac{4q_e \cdot (4q_p)^t}{N^t} + t(t+1) \sqrt{\frac{q_e q_p^5}{N^{t+1}}} \cdot \left( 5(t+2)^2 n^2 \cdot \sqrt{\frac{q_p}{N}} \right)^{t-3} \\ & + (t+1) \sqrt{\frac{q_e q_p^2}{N^{t-2}}} \cdot \left( 5(t+2)^2 n^2 \cdot \sqrt{\frac{q_p}{N}} \right)^{t-2}. \end{aligned}$$

We state the following sum capture lemma for proving the above theorem.

**Lemma 12.** Let  $t \geq 2$ . Let  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$  be  $t-1$  independent random permutations of  $\{0, 1\}^n$ , and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a probabilistic algorithm that makes adaptive queries to  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$ . Let  $\mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}$  be the query transcripts of  $P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}$  interacting with  $\mathcal{A}$ . Let  $\vec{c}, \vec{d}$  be the coefficients as in Lemma 5. Let  $q_0, \dots, q_t$  be positive integers exactly one of  $\{q_0, \dots, q_t\}$  equals  $q_e$  and the rest equal  $q_p$ , where  $9(t+2)n \leq q_p \leq N/2$  and  $q_e \leq q_p$ , then for any  $\mathcal{A}$  that makes at most  $q_i$  queries to  $P_i$ ,

$$\Pr_{P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}} \left[ \exists V_0, U_t \subseteq \mathbb{F}_{2^n}, |V_0| = q_0, |U_t| = q_t, \mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \geq \frac{q_e q_p^t}{N^2} + t \cdot \frac{q_e^{1/2} q_p^{5/2}}{N} \cdot \left( \frac{2q_p^2}{N} + 3\sqrt{(t+2)nq_p} \right)^{t-3} + q_e^{1/2} q_p \left( \frac{2q_p^2}{N} + 3\sqrt{(t+2)nq_p} \right)^{t-2} \right] \leq \frac{2t}{N^t}.$$

*Proof (sketch).* The general proof paradigm follows the proof of Lemma 6. We let the  $i$ -th case to be that  $q_i = q_e$  and  $q_j = q_p$  for all  $j \neq i$  and proceed with the proof as in Lemma 6. However, we note that the worst bound comes from the case when  $q_0 = q_e$  or  $q_t = q_e$ .

We again perform Fourier transform and simplification. After obtaining the summation over Fourier terms, we break the term  $\mu$  into three cases and show the following propositions. We omit the proofs of propositions since most of them are case discussions and they are essentially following their counterpart in Lemma 6 but with some minor numerical manipulations.

**Proposition 7.**

$$\mu_1 = \frac{q_e q_p^t}{N^2}.$$

**Proposition 8.** Conditioning on  $q_e \leq q_p$  and all  $P_i$  satisfying  $\Phi(P_i) \leq 2q_i^2/N + 3\sqrt{(t+2)nq_i}$ ,

$$\mu_2 \leq t \cdot \frac{q_e^{1/2} q_p^{5/2}}{N} \cdot \left( \frac{2q_p^2}{N} + 3\sqrt{(t+2)nq_p} \right)^{t-3}.$$

**Proposition 9.** Conditioning on  $q_e \leq q_p$  and all  $P_i$  satisfying  $\Phi(P_i) \leq 2q_i^2/N + 3\sqrt{(t+2)nq_i}$ ,

$$\mu_3 \leq q_e^{1/2} q_p \left( \frac{2q_p^2}{N} + 3\sqrt{(t+2)nq_p} \right)^{t-2}.$$

## B Omitted Proofs for Sum Capture Quantities

### B.1 Missing Cases Proof of Lemma 3

In this part we provide the complete case discussions for the proof of Lemma 3. Recall that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{left} &:= \min \text{ of } i \text{ such that } c_i \neq 0 \\ \text{right} &:= \max \text{ of } i \text{ such that } c_i \neq 0, \end{aligned}$$

then we have  $\text{left} \leq \text{idx}$  and  $\text{right} \geq \text{idx} + 1$  given  $c_{\text{idx}} \neq 0$  and  $c_{\text{idx}+1} \neq 0$ .

- **Case 2.**  $\text{left} > 0, \text{right} < t - 1$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mu(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) - \frac{q^{t+1}}{N} \\
& \leq N^{2t-1} \sum_{\gamma \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(A_{c_0}^\top \gamma)| \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(A_{c_0}^\top \gamma, A_{c_1}^\top \gamma)| \cdots |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(A_{c_{t-2}}^\top \gamma, A_{c_{t-1}}^\top \gamma)| \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(A_{c_{t-1}}^\top \gamma)| \\
& \leq N^{2t-3} \sum_{\gamma \neq 0} \frac{q}{N} \cdot \left(\frac{q}{N^2}\right)^{\text{left}-1} \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{left}}}(0, A_{c_{\text{left}}}^\top \gamma)| \cdot \left(\frac{q}{N^2}\right)^{\text{right}-\text{left}-1} \cdot \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}}) \\
& \quad \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{right}+1}}(A_{c_{\text{right}}}^\top \gamma, 0)| \cdot \left(\frac{q}{N^2}\right)^{t-2-\text{right}} \cdot \frac{q}{N} \\
& = q^{t-2} N^3 \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}}) \cdot \sum_{\gamma \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{left}}}(0, A_{c_{\text{left}}}^\top \gamma)| \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{right}+1}}(A_{c_{\text{right}}}^\top \gamma, 0)|
\end{aligned}$$

To this point, it is unclear how to directly apply the Cauchy-Schwartz trick, however, a few additional steps can help us get to similar calculations in Case 1.

We let  $V' = \{v \mid \exists u : (u, v) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{left}}\}$ ,  $U' = \{u \mid \exists v : (u, v) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{right}+1}\}$ .

*Claim.* For any  $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ ,

$$\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V'}(\alpha) = \frac{1}{N} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{left}}}(0, \alpha), \quad \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U'}(\alpha) = \frac{1}{N} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{right}+1}}(\alpha, 0).$$

*Proof (of the claim).* Because the proof for both equalities are similar, we only prove the first equality.

By the definition of Fourier transform, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{left}}}(0, \alpha) &= \frac{1}{N^2} \sum_{u, v \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} \mathbb{1}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{left}}}(u, v) (-1)^{\langle 0, u \rangle + \langle \alpha, v \rangle} \\
&= \frac{1}{N^2} \sum_{u, v \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} \mathbb{1}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{left}}}(u, v) (-1)^{\langle \alpha, v \rangle} \\
&= \frac{1}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{N} \sum_{v \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}} \mathbb{1}_{V'}(v) (-1)^{\langle \alpha, v \rangle} = \frac{1}{N} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V'}(\alpha)
\end{aligned}$$

□

Therefore, by applying the claim, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mu(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) - \frac{q^{t+1}}{N} \\
& \leq q^{t-2} N \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}}) \cdot \sum_{\gamma} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U'}(A_{c_{\text{left}}}^\top \gamma)| \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{right}+1}}(A_{c_{\text{right}}}^\top \gamma, 0)| \\
& \leq q^{t-1} \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}})
\end{aligned}$$

- **Case 3.** left = 0, right < t - 1.

In this case we have

$$\mu(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) - \frac{q^{t+1}}{N}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&\leq N^{2t-3} \sum_{\gamma} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(A_{c_0}^{\top} \gamma)| \cdot \left(\frac{q}{N^2}\right)^{\text{right}-1} \cdot \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}}) \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{right}+1}}(A_{c_{\text{right}}}^{\top} \gamma, 0)| \cdot \left(\frac{q}{N^2}\right)^{t-2-\text{right}} \cdot \frac{q}{N} \\
&= q^{t-2} N^2 \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}}) \cdot \sum_{\gamma} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(A_{c_0}^{\top} \gamma)| \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{right}+1}}(A_{c_{\text{right}}}^{\top} \gamma, 0)|
\end{aligned}$$

Let  $U' = \{u \mid \exists v : (u, v) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{right}+1}\}$ , then we have  $\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U'}(\alpha) = \frac{1}{N} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{\text{right}+1}}(\alpha, 0)$  for any  $\alpha$ . Hence we get

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mu(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) - \frac{q^{t+1}}{N} \\
&\leq q^{t-2} N \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}}) \cdot \sum_{\gamma} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(A_{c_0}^{\top} \gamma)| \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U'}(A_{c_{\text{right}}}^{\top} \gamma)| \\
&\leq q^{t-1} \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{\text{id}_{x+1}})
\end{aligned}$$

- **Case 4.** left  $> 0$ , right  $= t - 1$ .

The proof for **Case 4** is a symmetric case of **Case 3**.

## B.2 Proof of Proposition 1

*Proof.* Let

$$\ell := \min \text{ of } j \text{ such that } c_j \neq 0.$$

Therefore we have  $\ell \leq i$ . We define  $\mathcal{A}$  to be the following algorithm.

1.  $\mathcal{A}$  queries  $P_{\ell}$  in the backward direction at points  $c_{\ell}^{-1} \cdot X$  for all  $0 \leq X < q$  (or sets  $V_0$  be the corresponding queried points if  $\ell = 0$ )
2.  $\mathcal{A}$  queries  $P_{i+1}$  in the forward direction at points  $c_i^{-1} \cdot X$  for all  $0 \leq X < q$ .
3.  $\mathcal{A}$  make  $q$  arbitrary queries to each  $P_j$  for  $j \notin \{\ell, i+1\}$ .

then we are left to count the number of tuples  $(v_0, (u_1, v_1), \dots, (u_{t-1}, v_{t-1}), u_t)$  that satisfies  $\sum_{j=0}^{t-1} c_j(v_j + u_{j+1}) = 0$ . Here we consider the case that  $\ell > 0$  as similar analysis applies to  $\ell = 0$ . The equality constraint can be rearranged as

$$c_{t-1}u_t + \sum_{j \in \{\ell+1, \dots, t-1\}, j \neq i+1} (c_{j-1}u_j + c_jv_j) = c_{\ell}v_{\ell} + c_iu_{i+1} + c_{i+1}v_{i+1} \quad (17)$$

in which we drop all terms  $c_i = 0$  for  $i < \ell$  per definition of  $\ell$ .

Now we leave  $(u_{\ell}, v_{\ell}) \in \mathcal{Q}_{\ell}$  and  $(u_{i+1}, v_{i+1}) \in \mathcal{Q}_{i+1}$  undecided and pick other tuples arbitrarily, giving us  $q^{t-1}$  choices. This corresponds to exactly the LHS of (17) being fixed and the RHS of (17) being undecided. Then note that by the specification of  $\mathcal{A}$ , we have  $0 \leq c_iu_{i+1} < q$  and  $0 \leq c_{\ell}v_{\ell} < q$ , so to let (17) hold, we need to pick  $(u_{i+1}, v_{i+1})$  so that the higher  $n - \log q$  bits of  $c_{i+1}v_{i+1}$  equals the LHS.

To analyze the number of feasible  $v_{i+1}$ 's, note that if we group  $v_{i+1}$ 's by their higher  $n - \log q$  bits of  $c_{i+1}v_{i+1}$  into  $N/q$  groups, then one can show that in expectation each group receives  $q^2/N$  of  $v_{i+1}$ 's. For moderately large  $q$ , if  $v_{i+1}$ 's are sampled with replacement, then a direct Chernoff bound can show that every group has the number of  $v_{i+1}$ 's that are close to  $q^2/N$  with overwhelming probability. However, given  $v_{i+1}$ 's are sampled without replacement, we use the following lemma by Panconesi and Srinivasan in [20], where they observed that Chernoff bound also holds for negatively correlated variables.

**Lemma 13** ([20]). *Let  $X_1, \dots, X_m$  be random variables taking values in  $\{0, 1\}$  such that for any set  $S \subseteq \{1, \dots, m\}$ ,  $\Pr[\bigwedge_{i \in S} X_i = 1] \leq \prod_{i \in S} \Pr[X_i = 1]$ , let  $X = \sum_{i=1}^m X_i$  and let  $\eta = \mathbb{E}[X]$ , then for any  $0 < \delta < 1$*

$$\Pr[X < (1 - \delta)\eta] \leq e^{-\delta^2 \eta/2}.$$

Note that in our case, we fix an  $r \in \{0, 1\}^{n - \log q}$  and let  $X_j = 1$  if the higher  $n - \log q$  bits of the  $j$ -th sampled  $v_{i+1}$  has its  $c_{i+1}v_{i+1}$  equalled  $r$ , otherwise  $X_j = 0$ . Then we have

$$\Pr[\bigwedge_{i \in S} X_i = 1] = q^{|S|}/N^{|S|} \leq (q/N)^{|S|} = \prod_{i \in S} \Pr[X_i = 1].$$

Applying Lemma 13 with  $\delta = 1/2$ , we have  $\Pr[X < q^2/2N] \leq e^{-q^2/8N}$ . Finally taking a union bound over all  $r$ 's, we proved that every group of  $v_{i+1}$ 's has at least  $q^2/2N$  elements with probability at least  $1 - (N/q) \cdot e^{-q^2/8N}$ .

Hence, for the  $q^{t-1}$  choices of tuples, we can pick at least  $q^2/2N$  of  $(u_{i+1}, v_{i+1})$  that cancels the higher  $n - \log q$  bits of the LHS value of (17). The remaining value is in  $\{0, \dots, q - 1\}$  and hence can be cancelled to zero by a unique choice of  $v_\ell$ .  $\square$

### B.3 Proof of Proposition 2

*Proof.* For any  $i$  that has  $c_i \neq 0$ , we let  $\mathcal{A}$  query  $P_i$  in the backward direction at points  $c_i^{-1} \cdot X$  for all  $0 \leq X < q$  (or we set  $V_0$  be the corresponding queried points if  $i = 0$ ) and we let  $\mathcal{A}$  query  $P_{i+1}$  in the forward direction at points  $c_i^{-1} \cdot X$  for all  $0 \leq X < q$  (or we set  $U_t$  be the corresponding queried points if  $i = t - 1$ ). Finally  $\mathcal{A}$  makes arbitrary  $q$  queries to any permutations that were never queried (or pick arbitrary  $q$  points for  $V_0, U_t$  if the points were not set). We note that each permutation receives exactly  $q$  queries because for every  $1 \leq i \leq t - 1$ , either  $c_{i-1} = 0$  or  $c_i = 0$ , so the permutation  $P_i$  can only receive either  $q$  forward queries or  $q$  backward queries.

If all  $c_i = 0$ , then obviously  $\mu_{\vec{c}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) = q^{t+1}$ . Otherwise, we can rewrite the linear constraint as

$$\sum_i c_i(v_i + u_{i+1}) = \sum_{i: c_i \neq 0} (c_i v_i + c_i u_{i+1}) = 0$$

in which for every  $i$  satisfying  $c_i \neq 0$ , we have  $0 \leq c_i v_i < q$  and  $0 \leq c_i u_{i+1} < q$ . So, we can fix an index  $j$  such that  $c_j \neq 0$  and leave the tuple  $(u_j, v_j)$  undecided (or  $v_0$  undecided if  $j = 0$ ). Then we have  $q^t$  choices over the other  $t$  tuples, and the equality constraint  $\sum_{i: c_i \neq 0} (c_i v_i + c_i u_{i+1}) = 0$  uniquely fix a feasible  $v_j$  so that  $0 \leq c_j v_j = \sum_{i \neq j: c_i \neq 0} (c_i v_i + c_i u_{i+1}) + c_j u_{j+1} < q$ . Hence we have  $q^t$  feasible choice of tuples in total, giving a lower bound for the sum capture quantity.

### B.4 A Reduction-based Bound for 2-constraint Sum Capture Quantity

**Proposition 10.** *With the same setting as in Lemma 5, for any  $\mathcal{A}$  that makes at most  $q \geq (t + 2)nN^{2/3}$  queries to each permutations,*

$$\Pr_{P_1, \dots, P_{t-1}} \left[ \exists V_0, U_t \subseteq \mathbb{F}_2^n, |V_0| = |U_t| = q, \mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \geq \frac{6q^t}{N} \right] \leq \frac{2(t-1)}{N^{t-1}}.$$

*Proof (of Proposition 10).* Given the 2-constraint sum capture quantity with the specific coefficient  $\vec{c}, \vec{d}$ , We show that one can use 1-constraint sum capture quantity to derive an upper bound for  $\mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}$ . Let  $U_{t-1} := \{u \mid \exists v : (u, v) \in \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}\}$  and  $c' = (c_0, \dots, c_{t-2})$ , then we show that

$$\mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \leq \mu_{\vec{c}'}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-2}, U_{t-1}).$$

Given a fix tuple  $(v_0, (u_1, v_1), \dots, (u_{t-2}, v_{t-2}), (u_{t-1}, v_{t-1}), u_t) \in V_0 \times \mathcal{Q}_1 \times \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1} \times U_t$  satisfying  $\sum_{j=0}^{t-1} c_j(v_j + u_{j+1}) = 0$  and  $\sum_{j=0}^{t-1} d_j(v_j + u_{j+1}) = 0$ , one can map the tuple to  $(v_0, (u_1, v_1), \dots, (u_{t-2}, v_{t-2}), u_{t-1}) \in V_0 \times \mathcal{Q}_1 \times \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-2} \times U_{t-1}$  satisfying  $\sum_{j=0}^{t-2} c_j(v_j + u_{j+1}) = 0$  by dropping the term  $v_{t-1}$  and  $u_t$  (note that  $c_{t-1} = 0$ ). This mapping is injective because  $v_{t-1}$  can be deterministically derived given  $u_{t-1} \in U_{t-1}$  and  $\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}$ , and  $u_t$  can be calculated deterministically via  $d_{t-1}(u_t + v_{t-1}) = \sum_{j=0}^{t-2} d_j(v_j + u_{j+1})$  given  $d_1, d_2, \dots, d_{t-1}$  are all non-zero. Hence the inequality holds.

Then the proposition follows by applying Lemma 2 to upper bound  $\mu_{\vec{c}'}^{\vec{d}}$  and noting that  $q \geq (t+2)nN^{2/3}$ .  $\square$

### B.5 Omitted Calculation of $\mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}$ in Lemma 6

Note that  $c_0 = d_{t-1} = 1$  and  $c_{t-1} = d_0 = 0$ , we can write  $\mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}$  as

$$\begin{aligned} & \mu_{\vec{c}, \vec{d}}(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) \\ &= \sum_{v_0, u_1, v_1, \dots, u_{t-1}, v_{t-1}, u_t} \mathbb{1}_{V_0}(v_0) \mathbb{1}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(u_1, v_1) \cdots \mathbb{1}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(u_{t-1}, v_{t-1}) \mathbb{1}_{U_t}(u_t) \\ & \quad \cdot \mathbb{1}_{\text{eq}} \left( v_0 + u_1, \sum_{i=1}^{t-2} c_i(v_i + u_{i+1}) \right) \mathbb{1}_{\text{eq}} \left( u_t + v_{t-1}, \sum_{i=1}^{t-2} d_i(v_i + u_{i+1}) \right) \\ &= \sum_{v_0, u_1, v_1, \dots, u_{t-1}, v_{t-1}, u_t} \left( \sum_{\beta_0} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\beta_0) (-1)^{\langle \beta_0, v_0 \rangle} \right) \left( \sum_{\alpha_1, \beta_1} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\alpha_1, \beta_1) (-1)^{\langle \alpha_1, u_1 \rangle + \langle \beta_1, v_1 \rangle} \right) \\ & \quad \cdots \left( \sum_{\alpha_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\alpha_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}) (-1)^{\langle \alpha_{t-1}, u_{t-1} \rangle + \langle \beta_{t-1}, v_{t-1} \rangle} \right) \left( \sum_{\alpha_t} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\alpha_t) (-1)^{\langle \alpha_t, u_t \rangle} \right) \\ & \quad \cdot \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum_{\gamma} (-1)^{\langle \gamma, v_0 + u_1 + \sum_{i=1}^{t-2} c_i(v_i + u_{i+1}) \rangle} \right) \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum_{\delta} (-1)^{\langle \delta, u_t + v_{t-1} + \sum_{i=1}^{t-2} d_i(v_i + u_{i+1}) \rangle} \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{N^2} \sum_{\beta_0, \alpha_1, \beta_1, \dots, \alpha_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}, \alpha_t} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\beta_0) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\alpha_1, \beta_1) \cdots \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\alpha_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\alpha_t) \\ & \quad \cdot \left( \sum_{v_0} (-1)^{\langle \beta_0, v_0 \rangle + \langle \gamma, v_0 \rangle} \right) \left( \sum_{u_1} (-1)^{\langle \alpha_1, u_1 \rangle + \langle \gamma, v_1 \rangle} \right) \left( \sum_{v_1} (-1)^{\langle \beta_1, v_1 \rangle + \langle \gamma, c_1 v_1 \rangle + \langle \delta, d_1 v_1 \rangle} \right) \\ & \quad \cdots \left( \sum_{u_{t-1}} (-1)^{\langle \alpha_{t-1}, u_{t-1} \rangle + \langle \gamma, c_{t-2} u_{t-1} \rangle + \langle \delta, d_{t-2} u_{t-1} \rangle} \right) \left( \sum_{v_{t-1}} (-1)^{\langle \beta_{t-1}, v_{t-1} \rangle + \langle \delta, v_{t-1} \rangle} \right) \\ & \quad \cdot \left( \sum_{u_t} (-1)^{\langle \alpha_t, u_t \rangle + \langle \delta, u_t \rangle} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Here the set of Fourier coefficients that give non-zero sum can be represented in terms of  $(\gamma, \delta)$  as

$$\begin{cases} \alpha_1 = \beta_0 = \gamma \\ \alpha_2 = \beta_1 = A_{c_1}^\top \gamma + A_{d_1}^\top \delta \\ \vdots \\ \alpha_{i+1} = \beta_i = A_{c_i}^\top \gamma + A_{d_i}^\top \delta \\ \vdots \\ \alpha_{t-1} = \beta_{t-2} = A_{c_{t-2}}^\top \gamma + A_{d_{t-2}}^\top \delta \\ \alpha_t = \beta_{t-1} = \delta \end{cases} .$$

So we obtain

$$\mu(V_0, \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}, U_t) = N^{2t-2} \sum_{\gamma, \delta} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\gamma) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\gamma, A_{c_1}^\top \gamma + A_{d_1}^\top \delta) \cdots \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(A_{c_{t-2}}^\top \gamma + A_{d_{t-2}}^\top \delta, \delta) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\delta) .$$

## B.6 Proof of Proposition 4

*Proof.* We let  $\mu_{2,i}$  be the sum over all  $(\alpha, \beta)$  that leads to only  $\theta_i = 0$ , so we have  $\mu_2 = \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} \mu_{2,i}$ . Since exactly one  $\theta_i$  is zero for some  $0 \leq i \leq t-1$ , we break the indices  $i$  into two cases.

**Case 1.**  $\theta_i = 0$  for  $1 \leq i \leq t-2$ . In this case, it holds that  $A_{c_i}^\top \alpha + A_{d_i}^\top \beta = 0$ . Hence fixing a non-zero  $\alpha$  gives us a unique non-zero  $\beta$ . Therefore, we have

$$\mu_{2,i} = N^{2t-2} \sum_{\alpha \neq 0} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\theta_0) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\theta_0, \theta_1) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_2}(\theta_1, \theta_2) \cdots \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\theta_{t-2}, \theta_{t-1}) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\theta_{t-1})$$

in which for  $j \neq i$ ,  $\theta_j \neq 0$  are uniquely fixed by  $\alpha$ , and  $\theta_i = 0$ . Hence we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_{2,i} &\leq N^{2t-2} \sum_{\alpha \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\theta_0)| |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\theta_0, \theta_1)| \cdots |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{i-1}}(\theta_{i-2}, \theta_{i-1})| |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_i}(\theta_{i-1}, 0)| \\ &\quad \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{i+1}}(0, \theta_{i+1})| |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{i+2}}(\theta_{i+1}, \theta_{i+2})| \cdots |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\theta_{t-2}, \theta_{t-1})| |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\theta_{t-1})| \\ &\leq N^4 \sum_{\alpha \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\theta_0)| \cdot \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_1) \cdots \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{i-1}) \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_i}(\theta_{i-1}, 0)| \\ &\quad \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{i+1}}(0, \theta_{i+1})| \cdot \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{i+2}) \cdots \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}) \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\theta_{t-1})| \\ &\leq N^4 \cdot \left(\frac{9q^2}{N}\right)^{t-3} \sum_{\alpha \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\theta_0)| |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_i}(\theta_{i-1}, 0)| |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{i+1}}(0, \theta_{i+1})| |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\theta_{t-1})| \\ &\leq \frac{(3q)^{2t-6}}{N^{t-7}} \sum_{\alpha \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\theta_0)| \frac{q}{N^2} \cdot \frac{q}{N^2} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\theta_{t-1})| \\ &= \frac{(3q)^{2t-4}}{9N^{t-3}} \sum_{\alpha \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\theta_0)| \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(\theta_{t-1})| \leq \frac{(3q)^{2t-3}}{N^{t-2}} . \end{aligned}$$

**Case 2.**  $\alpha = \theta_0 = 0$  or  $\beta = \theta_{t-1} = 0$ . As the two cases are very similar, we only give a proof for the case of  $\beta = \theta_{t-1} = 0$ .

$$\mu_{2,0} = N^{2t-2} \sum_{\alpha \neq 0} \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\theta_0) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\theta_0, \theta_1) \cdots \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\theta_{t-2}, 0) \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(0)$$

in which for  $j \neq t-1$ ,  $\theta_j \neq 0$  are uniquely fixed by  $\alpha$ , and  $\theta_{t-1} = \beta = 0$ . Hence we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu_{2,i} &\leq N^{2t-2} \sum_{\alpha \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\theta_0)| |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_1}(\theta_0, \theta_1)| \cdots |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\theta_{t-2}, 0)| |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(0)| \\
&= N^2 \sum_{\alpha \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\theta_0)| \cdot \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_1) \cdots \Phi(\mathcal{Q}_{t-2}) \cdot |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\theta_{t-2}, 0)| |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U_t}(0)| \\
&\leq N^2 \cdot \left(\frac{9q^2}{N}\right)^{t-2} \cdot \sum_{\alpha \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\theta_0)| |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\theta_{t-2}, 0)| \cdot \frac{q}{N} \\
&= \frac{(3q)^{2t-3}}{3N^{t-3}} \cdot \sum_{\alpha \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\theta_0)| |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\theta_{t-2}, 0)|
\end{aligned}$$

Now we let  $U' = \{u \mid (u, v) \in \mathcal{Q}_{t-1}\}$ , then we have  $\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U'}(\delta) = \widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{\mathcal{Q}_{t-1}}(\delta, 0)/N$  for any  $\delta \in \{0, 1\}^n$ . Therefore we have

$$\mu_{2,i} \leq \frac{(3q)^{2t-3}}{3N^{t-3}} \sum_{\alpha \neq 0} |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{V_0}(\theta_0)| |\widehat{\mathbb{1}}_{U'}(\theta_{t-2})| \cdot \frac{1}{N} \leq \frac{(3q)^{2t-3}}{N^{t-2}} \cdot \frac{q}{N} \leq \frac{(3q)^{2t-3}}{N^{t-2}}.$$

Finally by summing up all terms we obtain  $\mu_2 \leq \sum_{i=0}^{t-1} \mu_{2,i} \leq \frac{t(3q)^{2t-3}}{N^{t-2}}$ .  $\square$

## B.7 Proof of Proposition 6

*Proof.* We design the algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  as the following:

1.  $\mathcal{A}$  queries both  $V_0$  at  $c_1 \cdot X$  for all  $0 \leq X < q$ .
2.  $\mathcal{A}$  queries both  $U_t$  at  $d_1 \cdot X$  for all  $0 \leq X < q$ .
3.  $\mathcal{A}$  queries  $P_1$  at  $c_1 \cdot X$  for all  $0 \leq X < q$  in the forward direction.
4.  $\mathcal{A}$  queries  $P_2$  at  $d_1 \cdot X$  for all  $0 \leq X < q$  in the backward direction.

We note that the analysis is very similar to Proposition 1. Since  $\mathcal{A}$  queries  $P_2$  in the backward direction, we have the  $u_2$ 's are sampled from  $\{0, 1\}^n$  without replacement. We group the  $u_2$ 's by their higher  $n - \log q$  bits into  $N/q$  groups, and show that for moderately large  $q$ , with overwhelming probability, each group has at least  $q^2/2N$  elements.

We pick an arbitrary  $r \in \{0, 1\}^{n - \log q}$  and let  $X_j = 1$  if the  $j$ -th sampled  $u_2$  has the higher  $n - \log q$  bits equal  $r$ , otherwise  $X_j = 0$ . Then one can show that for any  $S \subseteq \{1, \dots, q\}$ ,

$$\Pr\left[\bigwedge_{j \in S} x_j = 1\right] = q^{|S|}/N^{|S|} \leq (q/N)^{|S|} = \prod_{j \in S} \Pr[X_j = 1].$$

Therefore, we can apply the Chernoff bound for negatively correlated variables (i.e., Lemma 13) and obtain that  $\Pr\left[\sum_{j=1}^q X_j < \frac{q^2}{2N}\right] \leq e^{-q^2/8N}$ . By a union bound over all  $N/q$  groups, we have every group maintaining at least  $q^2/2N$  elements with probability at least  $1 - (N/q) \cdot e^{-q^2/8N}$ .

Now, we fix an arbitrary  $(u_1, v_1) \in \mathcal{Q}_1$  out of  $q$  choices, then we have at least  $q^2/2N$  choices of  $(u_2, v_2) \in \mathcal{Q}_2$  such that  $0 \leq v_1 + u_2 < q$ . Therefore we can find a unique  $v_0 \in \mathcal{V}_0$  and  $u_3 \in U_3$  so that  $v_0 + u_1 = v_1 + u_2 = v_2 + u_3$ , concluding that the sum capture quantity is lower-bounded by  $q^3/2N$ .  $\square$

## C Omitted Proofs for Good Transcript Analysis

### C.1 Proof of inequality (10)

*Proof.* We note that  $\tau = (\vec{Q}, \vec{k}) \in \mathcal{T}$  is an attainable transcript. By definition, we can write the ratio as

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\text{ps}_0(\vec{Q}, \vec{k})}{\text{ps}_1(\vec{Q}, \vec{k})} &= \frac{\Pr_{P_1, \dots, P_t}[E \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_E, P_1 \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, P_t \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_t]}{\Pr_{P_0, P_1, \dots, P_t}[P_0 \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_E, P_1 \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, P_t \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_t]} \\ &= \frac{\Pr_{P_1, \dots, P_t}[E \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_E \mid P_1 \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, P_t \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_t]}{\Pr_{P_0, P_1, \dots, P_t}[P_0 \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_E \mid P_1 \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, P_t \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_t]} \end{aligned}$$

in which  $E$  is the real-world cipher construction that depends on  $P_1, \dots, P_t$  and key  $\vec{k}$ . We note that the second equality directly follows from dividing both nominator and denominator by the probability  $\Pr[P_1 \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, P_t \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_t]$ .

Next we compute the conditional probability term in the denominator, given  $P_0$  is independent from the rest of permutations  $P_1, \dots, P_t$ , we have

$$\Pr_{P_0, P_1, \dots, P_t}[P_0 \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_E \mid P_1 \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_1, \dots, P_t \downarrow \mathcal{Q}_t] = \prod_{i=0}^{|\mathcal{Q}_E|-1} \frac{1}{N-i} = \frac{1}{N^{(|\mathcal{Q}_E|)}}.$$

Hence we proved the equality. □

### C.2 Proof of Lemma 8

We first restate the lemma.

**Lemma 14.** *For any graph  $G$  that consists of  $m+1$  layers  $L_0, \dots, L_m$ , with each adjacent layer forming a (partial) matching, we have that for any  $u \in L_0, v \in L_m$  such that  $u$  is right-free and  $v$  is left-free,*

$$\Pr[u \rightarrow v] = \frac{1}{N} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_G(0, m)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_G(i_{h-1}, i_h)}{U_G(i_h, i_h)},$$

where  $\mathcal{B}_G(0, m)$  contains all interesting  $(0, m)$ -segment partition of  $G$ .

*Proof.* Because all analyses will be performed over graph  $G$ , we simplify the notation by letting  $\mathcal{U}_{i,j} := \mathcal{U}_G(i, j)$  and  $U_{i,j} := U_G(i, j)$ . We also define the set of indices between  $a$  and  $b$  as  $\mathcal{I}(a, b) := \{i \in \mathcal{I}(G) \mid a \leq i \leq b\}$ . To prove the lemma, we first need the following intermediate result.

*Claim.* For any  $1 \leq i \leq j \leq m$  such that  $i \in \mathcal{I}(G)$ ,

$$\Pr[w_i \in \mathcal{U}_G(i, j)] = \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \cdot \left( 1 + \sum_{y \in \mathcal{I}(1, i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_G(y, i)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1}, i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1}, i_{h-1}}} \right)$$

*Proof.* We prove the claim by induction over  $i$ . We note that the base case  $i = 1 \in \mathcal{I}(G)$  because  $u \in L_0$  is right-free, implying that there exists a left-free vertex in  $L_1$ . It is trivial that  $\Pr[w_1 \in \mathcal{U}_{1,j}] = U_{1,j}/U_{1,1}$ .

For the inductive case, suppose that for all  $k \in \mathcal{I}(G), k < i$  the claim holds. We note that for  $w_i$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[w_i \in \mathcal{U}_{i,j}] &= \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \cdot \left( 1 - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}(1,i-1)} \Pr[w_i \in \mathcal{U}_{k,i}] \right) \\ &= \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \cdot \left( 1 - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}(1,i-1)} \Pr[w_k \in \mathcal{U}_{k,i}] \right). \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

The first equality holds because, first, given  $w_i$  hits at the head of a path in  $L_i$ , it is impossible to have  $w_i$  belonging to any path starts earlier than  $L_i$ , while also noting that all events  $w_i \in \mathcal{U}_{k,i}$  are disjoint. Then given  $w_i$  does not belong to any  $\mathcal{U}_{k,i}$  for  $k < i$ , the random process samples a vertex from  $U_{i,i}$  left-free vertices in  $L_i$ , with  $U_{i,j}$  of them are the head of path that ends no earlier than layer  $L_j$ . The second equality is applying the fact that  $\Pr[w_i \in \mathcal{U}_{k,i}] = \Pr[w_k \in \mathcal{U}_{k,i}]$ .

Now we plug the equality of  $\Pr[w_k \in \mathcal{U}_{k,i}]$  into (18) and proceed with the calculation.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[w_i \in \mathcal{U}_{i,j}] &= \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \cdot \left( 1 - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}(1,i-1)} \frac{U_{k,j}}{U_{k,k}} \left( 1 + \sum_{y \in \mathcal{I}(1,k-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(y,k)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1},i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1},i_{h-1}}} \right) \right) \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

$$= \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \cdot \left( 1 - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}(1,i-1)} \frac{U_{k,j}}{U_{k,k}} - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}(1,i-1)} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{I}(1,k-1)} \frac{U_{k,j}}{U_{k,k}} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(y,k)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1},i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1},i_{h-1}}} \right) \quad (20)$$

$$= \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \cdot \left( 1 - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}(1,i-1)} \frac{U_{k,j}}{U_{k,k}} - \sum_{y \in \mathcal{I}(1,i-2)} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}(y+1,i-1)} \frac{U_{k,j}}{U_{k,k}} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(y,k)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1},i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1},i_{h-1}}} \right) \quad (21)$$

$$= \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \cdot \left( 1 + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}(1,i-1)} (-1) \cdot \frac{U_{k,j}}{U_{k,k}} + \sum_{y \in \mathcal{I}(1,i-2)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(y,i): |\sigma| \geq 2} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1},i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1},i_{h-1}}} \right) \quad (22)$$

$$= \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \cdot \left( 1 + \sum_{k \in \mathcal{I}(1,i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(k,i)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1},i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1},i_{h-1}}} \right). \quad (23)$$

In the above calculation, (19) comes from directly expanding the  $\Pr[w_k \in \mathcal{U}_{k,i}]$  terms. We switch the summation of  $k$  and  $y$  in (21). Note that we get (22) because the second  $k$  term is essentially enumerating a partition point for the interval  $\{y, y+1, \dots, i-1, i\}$ , so we can merge the summation over  $k$  into  $\sigma$ , obtaining  $\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(y,i)$  with  $|\sigma| \geq 2$ . Finally combining the remaining terms give us summation over  $\sigma$  without size requirement, as in (23).

Hence we completed the inductive step and proved the claim.  $\square$

To further proceed with the remaining proof, we need the following proposition and we will applying the following equality multiple times in later calculations.

**Proposition 11.** For any  $i \in \mathcal{I}(G)$ ,

$$\frac{1}{U_{ii}} = \frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{I}(0, i-1)} \frac{U_{x,i}}{U_{i,i}}.$$

*Proof (of Proposition 11).* We have  $N = U_{i,i} + \sum_{x \in \mathcal{I}(0, i-1)} U_{x,i}$  because the total  $N$  paths that pass vertices in  $L_i$  start no later than  $L_i$ , and no paths start at  $L_x$  where  $x \notin \mathcal{I}(G)$ . Then we are done by dividing both sides by  $N \cdot U_{i,i}$ , which is non-zero when  $i \in \mathcal{I}(G)$ .  $\square$

We continue the calculation.

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[w_i \in U_{i,j}] \\ &= \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} + \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{I}(1, i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(y,i)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1}, i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1}, i_{h-1}}} \end{aligned} \quad (24)$$

$$= \left( \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} + \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{I}(0, i-1)} \frac{U_{x,i}}{U_{i,i}} \right) \quad (25)$$

$$+ \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{I}(1, i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(y,i)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \left( \frac{U_{i_0, i_1}}{N} + \sum_{x \in \mathcal{I}(0, i_0-1)} \frac{U_{x, i_0}}{N} \cdot \frac{U_{x, i_0}}{U_{i_0, i_0}} \right) \prod_{h=2}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1}, i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1}, i_{h-1}}} \quad (26)$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \left( \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} + \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{I}(0, i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_G(x,i), |\sigma|=1} \frac{U_{i_0, i_1}}{U_{i_1, i_1}} \right) \\ &+ \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{I}(1, i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(y,i)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \cdot \frac{U_{i_0, i_1}}{N} \cdot \prod_{h=2}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1}, i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1}, i_{h-1}}} \end{aligned} \quad (27)$$

$$+ \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{I}(1, i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(y,i)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{I}(0, i_0-1)} \frac{U_{x, i_0}}{U_{i_0, i_0}} \cdot \frac{U_{x, i_0}}{N} \prod_{h=2}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1}, i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1}, i_{h-1}}} \quad (28)$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \left( \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} - \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{I}(0, i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_G(x,i), |\sigma|=1} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_0, i_1}}{U_{i_1, i_1}} \right) \\ &+ \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{I}(1, i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(y,i)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \cdot \frac{U_{i_0, i_1}}{N} \cdot \prod_{h=2}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1}, i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1}, i_{h-1}}} \\ &+ \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{I}(0, i-2)} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{I}(x+1, i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(y,i)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_0, i_1}}{U_{i_0, i_0}} \cdot \frac{U_{x, i_0}}{N} \prod_{h=2}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1}, i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1}, i_{h-1}}} \end{aligned} \quad (29)$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= \left( \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} - \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{I}(0, i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_G(x,i), |\sigma|=1} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_0, i_1}}{U_{i_1, i_1}} \right) \\ &+ \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{I}(1, i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(y,i)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \cdot \frac{U_{i_0, i_1}}{N} \cdot \prod_{h=2}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1}, i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1}, i_{h-1}}} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& - \frac{U_{i,j}}{U_{i,i}} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{I}(0,i-2)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(x,i): |\sigma| \geq 2} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{x,i_0}}{N} \prod_{h=2}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1},i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1},i_{h-1}}} \tag{30} \\
& = \left( \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} - \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{I}(0,i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}_G(x,i), |\sigma|=1} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_0,i_1}}{U_{i_1,i_1}} \right) \\
& \quad + \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{I}(1,i-1)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(y,i)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \cdot \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1},i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1},i_{h-1}}} \\
& \quad - \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{I}(0,i-2)} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(x,i): |\sigma| \geq 2} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1},i_h}}{U_{i_{h-1},i_{h-1}}} \tag{31} \\
& = \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} - \frac{U_{i,j}}{N} \sum_{\sigma \in \mathcal{B}(0,i)} (-1)^{|\sigma|} \prod_{h=1}^{|\sigma|} \frac{U_{i_{h-1},i_h}}{U_{i_h,i_h}}
\end{aligned}$$

In the above calculation, we get the term (25) by applying Proposition 11 to the first term in (24), and we get (26) by separating the  $(i_0, i_1)$  term in the multiplication out and applying Proposition 11. By splitting the term (26) we get terms (27) and (28). To get the term (29) from (28), we take out the summation over  $x$  and switch it with summation over  $y$ . Merging the terms giving us . In (31) we switch the denominator term  $U_{i,i}$  outside the summation with the denominator term  $N$  inside the summation. And the terms for  $x, y \geq 1$  are all canceled, finally giving us the desired equality.

If we slightly tweak the graph  $G$  by adding another layer  $m + 1$  with a single edge connecting  $v$  to  $L_{m+1}$ . Then we proved the lemma by computing  $\Pr[u \rightarrow v] = \Pr[w_m \in \mathcal{U}_{m,m+1}]$  into which we plugging  $U_{m,m+1} = 1$ .  $\square$