

Quantum cryptography based on an algorithm for determining simultaneously all the mappings of a Boolean function

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Abstract

We study a quantum cryptography based on an algorithm for determining simultaneously all the mappings of a Boolean function using an entangled state. The security of our cryptography is based on the Ekert 1991 protocol, which uses an entangled state. Eavesdropping destroys the entanglement. Alice selects a secret function from the number of possible function types. Bob's aim is then to determine the selected function (a key) without an eavesdropper learning it. In order for both Alice and Bob to be able to select the same function classically, in the worst case Bob requires multiple queries to Alice. In the quantum case however, Bob requires just a single query. By measuring the single entangled state, which is sent to him by Alice, Bob can obtain the function that Alice selected. This quantum key distribution method is faster compared to the multiple queries that would be required in the classical case.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Some of the developments in quantum algorithms relevant for the present work are as follows: The Bernstein–Vazirani algorithm [1, 2], published in 1993, can be considered an extension of the Deutsch–Jozsa algorithm [3–5]. In 1994, algorithms were proposed by Simon [6] and by Shor [7]. In 1996, Grover [8] presented strong arguments for exploring the computational possibilities offered by quantum mechanics. In 2020, a parallel computation for all of the combinations of values in variables of a logical function was proposed [9]. In 2021, concrete quantum circuits for addition of two numbers of arbitrary length were proposed [10]. Quantum cryptography based on an algorithm for determining a function using qudit systems was studied by Nagata *et al.* [11]. Continuous-variable quantum computing and its applications to cryptography were proposed by Diep *et al.* [12].

Here, we study a quantum cryptography based on an algorithm for determining simultaneously all the mappings of a Boolean function using an entangled state. The security of our cryptography is based on the Ekert 1991 protocol [13], which uses an entangled state. Under this protocol, eavesdropping will destroy the entanglement. Our proposed cryptographic scheme is as follows: Alice selects a secret function from the possible function types. Bob’s aim is then to determine the selected function (a key) without an eavesdropper learning it. In order for both Alice and Bob to be able to select the same function classically, in the worst case Bob would require multiple queries to Alice. In the quantum case however, Bob requires just a single query. By measuring the single entangled state that is sent to him by Alice, Bob can obtain the function that Alice selected. This quantum key distribution method is faster than the classical case, which would require multiple classical queries.

II. QUANTUM ALGORITHM FOR DETERMINING ALL THE 2 MAPPINGS OF A BOOLEAN FUNCTION

In this section, we propose a quantum cryptography based on an algorithm for determining a function using qubit systems. We consider the Boolean function $f : \{0, 1\} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. Alice knows all the 2 mappings $f(0)$ and $f(1)$ of the function, that is, $f(x)$ itself. Bob knows none of them. His aim is to obtain all of the mappings without an eavesdropper learning them. In the classical case, Bob needs two queries. In the quantum case, Bob needs just a single query. Hence, the quantum cryptography is faster than a classical cryptography by a factor of 2.

Quantum superposition is a fundamental feature of many quantum algorithms. It allows quantum computers to evaluate simultaneously the mappings of a function $f(x)$ for many different values of x . Suppose that

$$f : \{0, 1\} \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \quad (1)$$

is a Boolean function with a one-bit domain and range. A convenient way of computing the function on a quantum computer is to consider a two-qubit quantum computer that starts with the state $|x, y\rangle$, where x and y are variables used in mapping f . The abbreviation $|x, y\rangle$ stands for $|x\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$.

Like in the Deutsch–Jozsa problem, we are given a black box quantum computer known as an oracle that implements some function $f : \{0, 1\}^2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. For the quantum algorithms to work, the oracle computing $f(x)$ from x has to be a quantum oracle that doesn’t decohere x . It also mustn’t leave any copy of x lying around at the end of an oracle call. We have the function f implemented as a quantum oracle. The oracle maps the state $|x\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$ to $|x\rangle \otimes |y \oplus f(x)\rangle$, where \oplus stands for addition modulo 2.

It is possible to transform the state $|x, y\rangle$ into

$$|x, y \oplus f(x)\rangle, \quad (2)$$

by applying the quantum oracle. Let U_f denote the transformation defined by the mapping

$$U_f|x, y\rangle = |x, y \oplus f(x)\rangle. \quad (3)$$

Here, (2) and (3) meet the category of Boolean algebras because their outcomes meet this category. Therefore, quantum computing meets the category of Boolean algebras.

We want to develop quantum algorithms that would allow for the ultimate parallel processing. The way to do it is to find the actual ultimate parallelism while keeping in mind the physical quantum phenomena. To that end, we insert an imaginary number i into the usual phase kickback formation and the mapping U_f , and define the following

formulas:

$$\begin{aligned}
U_f|0\rangle(|0\rangle - i|1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} &= +|0\rangle(|f(0)\rangle - i|\overline{f(0)}\rangle)/\sqrt{2} \\
&= \begin{cases} (-i)^{f(0)}|0\rangle(|0\rangle - i|1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} & \text{if } f(0) = 0, \\ (-i)^{f(0)}|0\rangle(|0\rangle + i|1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} & \text{if } f(0) = 1. \end{cases} \quad (4)
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
U_f|1\rangle(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} &= +|1\rangle(|f(1)\rangle - |\overline{f(1)}\rangle)/\sqrt{2} \\
&= \begin{cases} (-1)^{f(1)}|1\rangle(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} & \text{if } f(1) = 0, \\ (-1)^{f(1)}|1\rangle(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} & \text{if } f(1) = 1, \end{cases} \quad (5)
\end{aligned}$$

where $|\overline{1}\rangle = |0\rangle$ and $|\overline{0}\rangle = |1\rangle$.

The phase of the outcome of (4) is different from the phase of the outcome of (5). Adding (4) and (5) gives (7). A mathematical problem can be solved if the input state is defined as (7) because the mapping U_f is defined. Here we use a phase effect, which is a quantum phenomenon.

We define the following notations:

$$|-\rangle_y = \frac{|0\rangle - i|1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}, |+\rangle_y = \frac{|0\rangle + i|1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}, |-\rangle_x = \frac{|0\rangle - |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}}. \quad (6)$$

We further define the input state as follows, using an imaginary number i :

$$|\psi_0\rangle = \alpha|0\rangle|-\rangle_y + \beta|1\rangle|-\rangle_x, \langle\psi_0|\psi_0\rangle = 1 \Leftrightarrow |\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1, \alpha \neq 0, \beta \neq 0. \quad (7)$$

Applying U_{f_i} , ($i = 0, 1, 2, 2^{2^1} - 1$), to $|\psi_0\rangle$, results in $U_{f_i}|\psi_0\rangle = |\psi_1\rangle_i$, therefore leaving us with one of 2^{2^1} cases, where the power 1 of 2^{2^1} indicates the case of one qubit:

$$\begin{aligned}
|\psi_1\rangle_0 &= \alpha|0\rangle|-\rangle_y + \beta|1\rangle|-\rangle_x & \text{iff } f_0(0) = 0, f_0(1) = 0, \\
|\psi_1\rangle_1 &= -i\alpha|0\rangle|+\rangle_y - \beta|1\rangle|-\rangle_x & \text{iff } f_1(0) = 1, f_1(1) = 1, \\
|\psi_1\rangle_2 &= \alpha|0\rangle|-\rangle_y - \beta|1\rangle|-\rangle_x & \text{iff } f_2(0) = 0, f_2(1) = 1, \\
|\psi_1\rangle_3 &= -i\alpha|0\rangle|+\rangle_y + \beta|1\rangle|-\rangle_x & \text{iff } f_3(0) = 1, f_3(1) = 0. \quad (8)
\end{aligned}$$

Once we have (8), we know simultaneously both $f(0)$ and $f(1)$ by measuring the single output state. How can we obtain (8)? Note that we cannot obtain it solely by using the usual phase kickback formation as this formation changes only the global phase and global phases are indistinguishable. For this reason, such a situation must be avoided.

Let us consider for distinguishing between the four states. Unfortunately, they are not orthogonal each other. Thus we might consider we cannot distinguish between the four states. In (8) the operations on the mapping look fine to us because the process here is based upon the phase that was obtained from the kickback formation. Therefore, the issue of orthogonality is not so essential here as we consider the phase of each state to be guaranteed.

So, by measuring $|\psi_1\rangle_i$, we can determine simultaneously all the 2 mappings of $f_i(x)$ for all x . Interestingly, the quantum algorithm enables us to determine a perfect property of $f_i(x)$, namely, $f_i(x)$ itself, and does it faster than a classical apparatus would. Classically namely, at least 2 evaluations would be necessary to that end.

Based on the above, our cryptography is as follows:

- Alice randomly selects a function f_i .
- She applies U_{f_i} to $|\psi_0\rangle$ and obtains an entangled state $|\psi_1\rangle_i$.
- She sends the entangled state $|\psi_1\rangle_i$ to Bob.
- Bob compares (by measurement) the outcome state $|\psi_1\rangle_i$ with the input state and obtains all the 2 mappings with the respective values for the function f_i .
- Bob learns what function Alice selected.
- Alice and Bob compare their functions (a subset of the results).
- If Eve eavesdropped, Alice and Bob will each have a different function.
- If Eve did not eavesdrop, Alice and Bob will each have the same function.

Alice and Bob perform the protocol described above many times in order to obtain enough secret keys (functions) for a secure communication.

A. Concrete Example

We present a concrete example for a full and natural understanding of our quantum communication method. Let us consider the case where Alice selects a function f_1 . Bob wants to know all the following mappings:

$$f(0) = ?, f(1) = ?. \quad (9)$$

In the classical case, Bob requires 2 evaluations. In the quantum case, Bob requires just one query.

Alice prepares the following input state:

$$|\psi_1\rangle_0 = \alpha|0\rangle|-\rangle_y + \beta|1\rangle|-\rangle_x \quad (10)$$

Next, Alice applies U_{f_1} to $|\psi_0\rangle$ to obtain $U_{f_1}|\psi_0\rangle = |\psi_1\rangle_1$. After that, she has the following output state:

$$|\psi_1\rangle_1 = -i\alpha|0\rangle|+\rangle_y - \beta|1\rangle|-\rangle_x \quad (11)$$

Bob enquires with Alice as to what phase factors of the quantum output state Alice has. In this example, the quantum phase factors of the output state are as follows:

$$-i, -1. \quad (12)$$

With this information, he then obtains simultaneously all the mappings of f_1 :

$$f(0) = 1, f(1) = 1. \quad (13)$$

Finally, Bob learns that Alice selected a particular f_1 . Again, this takes less than a classical apparatus would take, i.e. at least 2 evaluations. Likewise, Alice can select either of the 4 combinations of the mappings. That is, our argumentation is true for each fixed parameter i .

III. QUANTUM ALGORITHM FOR DETERMINING ALL THE 3 MAPPINGS OF A BOOLEAN FUNCTION

In this section, we propose a quantum cryptography based on an algorithm for determining a function using qutrit systems. Consider the Boolean function $f : \{0, 1, 2\} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. In our protocol, Alice will know all the 3 mappings $f(0)$, $f(1)$, and $f(2)$, that is, $f(x)$ itself. Bob will know none of them. His aim will therefore be to obtain all of them without an eavesdropper learning them. In the classical case, Bob needs three queries to learn all the mappings. In the quantum case, Bob needs just one single query. Hence, the quantum cryptography is faster than a classical cryptography by a factor of 3.

Quantum superposition is a fundamental feature of many quantum algorithms. It allows quantum computers to evaluate simultaneously the mappings of a function $f(x)$ for many different x . Suppose that

$$f : \{0, 1, 2\} \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \quad (14)$$

is a Boolean function known to Alice but not known to Bob. Bob's aim is therefore to determine all the mappings

$$f(0) = ?, f(1) = ?, f(2) = ?, \quad (15)$$

that is, $f(x)$ itself. In the classical case, Bob requires 3 queries to establish all the mappings. In the quantum case, Bob requires just a single query. Therefore, the quantum communication is faster than a classical communication, which would require at least 3 queries.

In a qutrit system, Alice can select one of the 8 possible functions. Later we introduce a parameter $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots, 7$ to distinguish between these functions.

Let us discuss our quantum cryptography using qutrit systems. We introduce the transformation U_f defined by the map

$$U_f|x\rangle|j\rangle = |x\rangle|(f(x) + j) \bmod 3\rangle. \quad (16)$$

From the map U_f , we insert an imaginary number i and define the following formulas:

$$\begin{aligned} U_f|0\rangle(|0\rangle - i|1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} &= +|0\rangle(|f(0)\rangle - i|f(0) + 1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} \\ &= \begin{cases} |0\rangle(|0\rangle - i|1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} & \text{if } f(0) = 0, \\ |0\rangle(|1\rangle - i|2\rangle)/\sqrt{2} & \text{if } f(0) = 1. \end{cases} \end{aligned} \quad (17)$$

$$\begin{aligned} U_f|1\rangle(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} &= +|1\rangle(|f(1)\rangle - |f(1) + 1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} \\ &= \begin{cases} |1\rangle(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)/\sqrt{2} & \text{if } f(1) = 0, \\ |1\rangle(|1\rangle - |2\rangle)/\sqrt{2} & \text{if } f(1) = 1. \end{cases} \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

We define a quantum state in a three-dimensional space $|\phi\rangle$ as follows:

$$|\phi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}(\omega^3|0\rangle + \omega^2|1\rangle + \omega|2\rangle), \quad (19)$$

where $\omega = e^{2\pi i/3}$. We have the following formula by the phase kickback formation:

$$U_f|2\rangle|\phi\rangle = \omega^{f(2)}|2\rangle|\phi\rangle. \quad (20)$$

In fact, from the map U_f , we can define the following formulas:

$$\begin{aligned} & U_f|2\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}(\omega^3|0\rangle + \omega^2|1\rangle + \omega|2\rangle) \\ &= |2\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}(\omega^3|f(2)\rangle + \omega^2|f(2)+1\rangle + \omega|f(2)+2\rangle) \\ &= \begin{cases} |2\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}(\omega^3|0\rangle + \omega^2|1\rangle + \omega|2\rangle) & \text{if } f(2) = 0, \\ \omega|2\rangle \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}(\omega^3|0\rangle + \omega^2|1\rangle + \omega|2\rangle) & \text{if } f(2) = 1. \end{cases} \end{aligned} \quad (21)$$

Observe that

$$(U_f)^3|x\rangle|j\rangle = |x\rangle|(3f(x)+j) \bmod 3\rangle = |x\rangle|j\rangle. \quad (22)$$

Therefore, the map U_f is a cyclic transformation. Here, we define the normalized input state ($\langle\psi_0|\psi_0\rangle = 1$) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_0\rangle &= \alpha|0\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - i|1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \beta|1\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \gamma|2\rangle|\phi\rangle, \\ |\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 + |\gamma|^2 &= 1, \alpha \neq 0, \beta \neq 0, \gamma \neq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

Let us introduce a parameter i . Later, we will see that all the information for f_i is embedded into a single output state. This means that all the information for f_i can be learned from the single output state. This is the key of our quantum communication.

At the beginning of our communication protocol, Alice applies U_{f_i} , ($i = 0, 1, \dots, 7$) to $|\psi_0\rangle$, $U_{f_i}|\psi_0\rangle = |\psi_1\rangle_i$, the output state is one of 8 cases:

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_0 &= \alpha|0\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - i|1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \beta|1\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \gamma|2\rangle|\phi\rangle \\ &\text{iff } f_0(0) = 0, f_0(1) = 0, f_0(2) = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (24)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_1 &= \alpha|0\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - i|1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \beta|1\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \omega\gamma|2\rangle|\phi\rangle \\ &\text{iff } f_1(0) = 0, f_1(1) = 0, f_1(2) = 1, \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_2 &= \alpha|0\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - i|1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \beta|1\rangle \left[\frac{|1\rangle - |2\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \gamma|2\rangle|\phi\rangle \\ &\text{iff } f_2(0) = 0, f_2(1) = 1, f_2(2) = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_3 &= \alpha|0\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - i|1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \beta|1\rangle \left[\frac{|1\rangle - |2\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \omega\gamma|2\rangle|\phi\rangle \\ &\text{iff } f_3(0) = 0, f_3(1) = 1, f_3(2) = 1, \end{aligned} \quad (27)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_4 &= \alpha|0\rangle \left[\frac{|1\rangle - i|2\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \beta|1\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \gamma|2\rangle|\phi\rangle \\ &\text{iff } f_4(0) = 1, f_4(1) = 0, f_4(2) = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (28)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_5 &= \alpha|0\rangle \left[\frac{|1\rangle - i|2\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \beta|1\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \omega\gamma|2\rangle|\phi\rangle \\ &\text{iff } f_5(0) = 1, f_5(1) = 0, f_5(2) = 1, \end{aligned} \quad (29)$$

$$|\psi_1\rangle_6 = \alpha|0\rangle \left[\frac{|1\rangle - i|2\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \beta|1\rangle \left[\frac{|1\rangle - |2\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \gamma|2\rangle|\phi\rangle$$

iff $f_6(0) = 1, f_6(1) = 1, f_6(2) = 0,$

(30)

$$|\psi_1\rangle_7 = \alpha|0\rangle \left[\frac{|1\rangle - i|2\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \beta|1\rangle \left[\frac{|1\rangle - |2\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \omega\gamma|2\rangle|\phi\rangle$$

iff $f_7(0) = 1, f_7(1) = 1, f_7(2) = 1.$

(31)

Let us consider for distinguishing between the eight states. Unfortunately, they are not orthogonal each other. Thus we might consider we cannot distinguish between the eight states. In (24)-(31) the operations on the mapping look fine to us because the process here is based upon the phase that was obtained from the kickback formation. Therefore, the issue of orthogonality is not so essential here as we consider the phase of each state to be guaranteed.

By measuring the state $|\psi_1\rangle_i$ sent by Alice, Bob can determine simultaneously all the 3 mappings of $f_i(x)$ for all $x(= 0, 1, 2)$. Interestingly, the quantum communication gives us the ability to transmit a perfect property of $f_i(x)$, namely, $f_i(x)$ itself. Moreover, the quantum transmission is faster than a classical communication, which would require at least 3 queries.

With the above, our cryptography is as follows:

- Alice selects a function f_i at random.
- She applies U_{f_i} to $|\psi_0\rangle$ and obtains an entangled state $|\psi_1\rangle_i$.
- She sends the entangled state $|\psi_1\rangle_i$ to Bob.
- Bob compares (by measurement) the result state $|\psi_1\rangle_i$ with the input state and obtains all the 3 mappings with regards to the function f_i .
- Bob learns what function Alice selected.
- Alice and Bob compare their functions (a subset of the results).
- If Eve eavesdropped, Alice and Bob will each have a different function.
- If Eve did not eavesdrop, Alice and Bob will each have the same function.

Alice and Bob perform the protocol described above many times in order to obtain enough secret keys (functions).

A. Concrete Example

For a full and natural understanding of our quantum communication method, we present below a concrete example for a qutrit system. Let us consider the case where Alice selects a function f_1 . Bob wants to know all the mappings

$$f(0) = ?, f(1) = ?, f(2) = ?. \tag{32}$$

In the classical case, Bob requires 3 evaluations. In the quantum case, Bob requires just one query.

At the beginning, Alice prepares the following input state:

$$|\psi_0\rangle = \alpha|0\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - i|1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \beta|1\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \gamma|2\rangle|\phi\rangle. \tag{33}$$

Next, Alice applies U_{f_1} to $|\psi_0\rangle$ obtaining $U_{f_1}|\psi_0\rangle = |\psi_1\rangle_1$. Her output state is

$$|\psi_1\rangle_1 = \alpha|0\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - i|1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \beta|1\rangle \left[\frac{|0\rangle - |1\rangle}{\sqrt{2}} \right] + \omega\gamma|2\rangle|\phi\rangle. \tag{34}$$

Bob enquires with Alice as to what phase factors of the quantum output state Alice has. In this example, the quantum phase factors of the output state are as follows:

$$1, 1, \omega. \tag{35}$$

Then Bob obtains simultaneously all the mappings of f_1 :

$$f(0) = 0, f(1) = 0, f(2) = 1. \tag{36}$$

Finally, Bob learns that Alice selected the mapping f_1 . Again, the quantum method is faster than a classical apparatus, which would require at least 3 evaluations. Likewise, Alice can select any of the 8 combinations of the mappings. That is, our argumentation holds for each fixed parameter i .

IV. QUANTUM ALGORITHM FOR DETERMINING ALL THE 4 MAPPINGS OF A BOOLEAN FUNCTION

In this section, we propose a quantum cryptography based on an algorithm for determining a function using qubit systems. Consider the Boolean function $f : \{0, 1\}^2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. Assume that Alice knows all the 4 mappings $f(0, 0)$, $f(0, 1)$, $f(1, 0)$, and $f(1, 1)$, that is, $f(x, y)$ itself. Assume further that Bob knows none of them. His aim is then to obtain all of these mapping values without an eavesdropper learning them. In the classical case, Bob needs four queries. In the quantum case, Bob needs just a single query. Thus, the quantum cryptography is faster than a classical cryptography by a factor of 4.

We propose a quantum algorithm for determining the 2^2 mappings of a function. Suppose that

$$f : \{0, 1\}^2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \quad (37)$$

is a Boolean function. We want to know simultaneously the 2^2 mappings $f(0, 0)$, $f(0, 1)$, $f(1, 0)$, and $f(1, 1)$. Later we will see a complete match between our results and a Boolean algebra F_2 [14]. In the Boolean algebra F_2 , the functions are of two variables. For example, $f(x, y)$ is the function where x and y are variables used in mapping f . In what follows, the abbreviation $f(xy)$ will stand for $f(x, y)$.

We define the input state as follows using an application of (7):

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_0\rangle &= a_1|00\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_2|01\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x + a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x, \\ \langle\psi_0|\psi_0\rangle &= 1 \Leftrightarrow |a_1|^2 + |a_2|^2 + |a_3|^2 + |a_4|^2 = 1, a_1 \neq 0, a_2 \neq 0, a_3 \neq 0, a_4 \neq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (38)$$

From the mapping U_f , we can define the following formulas:

$$U_f|00\rangle|-\rangle_y = \begin{cases} (-i)^{f(00)}|00\rangle|-\rangle_y & \text{if } f(00) = 0, \\ (-i)^{f(00)}|00\rangle|+\rangle_y & \text{if } f(00) = 1. \end{cases} \quad (39)$$

$$U_f|01\rangle|-\rangle_y = \begin{cases} (-i)^{f(01)}|01\rangle|-\rangle_y & \text{if } f(01) = 0, \\ (-i)^{f(01)}|01\rangle|+\rangle_y & \text{if } f(01) = 1. \end{cases} \quad (40)$$

$$U_f|10\rangle|-\rangle_x = \begin{cases} (-1)^{f(10)}|10\rangle|-\rangle_x & \text{if } f(10) = 0, \\ (-1)^{f(10)}|10\rangle|-\rangle_x & \text{if } f(10) = 1. \end{cases} \quad (41)$$

$$U_f|11\rangle|-\rangle_x = \begin{cases} (-1)^{f(11)}|11\rangle|-\rangle_x & \text{if } f(11) = 0, \\ (-1)^{f(11)}|11\rangle|-\rangle_x & \text{if } f(11) = 1. \end{cases} \quad (42)$$

Applying U_{f_i} , ($i = 0, 1, 2, \dots, 2^2 - 1$), to $|\psi_0\rangle$ gives $U_{f_i}|\psi_0\rangle = |\psi_1\rangle_i$ and leaves us with one of the 2^{2^2} cases:

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_0 &= a_1|00\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_2|01\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x + a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_0(00) &= 0, f_0(01) = 0, f_0(10) = 0, f_0(11) = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (43)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_1 &= a_1|00\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_2|01\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x - a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_1(00) &= 0, f_1(01) = 0, f_1(10) = 0, f_1(11) = 1, \end{aligned} \quad (44)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_2 &= a_1|00\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_2|01\rangle|-\rangle_y - a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x + a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_2(00) &= 0, f_2(01) = 0, f_2(10) = 1, f_2(11) = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (45)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_3 &= a_1|00\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_2|01\rangle|-\rangle_y - a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x - a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_3(00) &= 0, f_3(01) = 0, f_3(10) = 1, f_3(11) = 1, \end{aligned} \quad (46)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_4 &= a_1|00\rangle|-\rangle_y - ia_2|01\rangle|+\rangle_y + a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x + a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_4(00) &= 0, f_4(01) = 1, f_4(10) = 0, f_4(11) = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (47)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_5 &= a_1|00\rangle|-\rangle_y - ia_2|01\rangle|+\rangle_y + a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x - a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_5(00) &= 0, f_5(01) = 1, f_5(10) = 0, f_5(11) = 1, \end{aligned} \quad (48)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_6 &= a_1|00\rangle|-\rangle_y - ia_2|01\rangle|+\rangle_y - a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x + a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_6(00) &= 0, f_6(01) = 1, f_6(10) = 1, f_6(11) = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (49)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_7 &= a_1|00\rangle|-\rangle_y - ia_2|01\rangle|+\rangle_y - a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x - a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_7(00) &= 0, f_7(01) = 1, f_7(10) = 1, f_7(11) = 1, \end{aligned} \quad (50)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_8 &= -ia_1|00\rangle|+\rangle_y + a_2|01\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x + a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_8(00) &= 1, f_8(01) = 0, f_8(10) = 0, f_8(11) = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (51)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_9 &= -ia_1|00\rangle|+\rangle_y + a_2|01\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x - a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_9(00) &= 1, f_9(01) = 0, f_9(10) = 0, f_9(11) = 1, \end{aligned} \quad (52)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_{10} &= -ia_1|00\rangle|+\rangle_y + a_2|01\rangle|-\rangle_y - a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x + a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_{10}(00) &= 1, f_{10}(01) = 0, f_{10}(10) = 1, f_{10}(11) = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (53)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_{11} &= -ia_1|00\rangle|+\rangle_y + a_2|01\rangle|-\rangle_y - a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x - a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_{11}(00) &= 1, f_{11}(01) = 0, f_{11}(10) = 1, f_{11}(11) = 1, \end{aligned} \quad (54)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_{12} &= -ia_1|00\rangle|+\rangle_y - ia_2|01\rangle|+\rangle_y + a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x + a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_{12}(00) &= 1, f_{12}(01) = 1, f_{12}(10) = 0, f_{12}(11) = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (55)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_{13} &= -ia_1|00\rangle|+\rangle_y - ia_2|01\rangle|+\rangle_y + a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x - a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_{13}(00) &= 1, f_{13}(01) = 1, f_{13}(10) = 0, f_{13}(11) = 1, \end{aligned} \quad (56)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_{14} &= -ia_1|00\rangle|+\rangle_y - ia_2|01\rangle|+\rangle_y - a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x + a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_{14}(00) &= 1, f_{14}(01) = 1, f_{14}(10) = 1, f_{14}(11) = 0, \end{aligned} \quad (57)$$

$$\begin{aligned} |\psi_1\rangle_{15} &= -ia_1|00\rangle|+\rangle_y - ia_2|01\rangle|+\rangle_y - a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x - a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x \\ \text{iff } f_{15}(00) &= 1, f_{15}(01) = 1, f_{15}(10) = 1, f_{15}(11) = 1. \end{aligned} \quad (58)$$

Let us consider for distinguishing between the sixteen states. Unfortunately, they are not orthogonal each other. Thus we might consider we cannot distinguish between the sixteen states. In (43)-(58) the operations on the mapping look fine to us because the process here is based upon the phase obtained from the kickback formation. So, the issue of orthogonality is not so essential because we consider the phase of each state to be guaranteed here.

By measuring $|\psi_1\rangle_i$ we can determine simultaneously all the 2^2 mappings of $f_i(x, y)$ for all x and y . Interestingly, the quantum algorithm gives us the ability to determine a perfect property of $f_i(x, y)$, namely, $f_i(x, y)$ itself. This determination is faster than with a classical apparatus, which would require at least 2^2 evaluations.

Our cryptography is as follows:

- Alice randomly selects a function f_i .
- She applies U_{f_i} to $|\psi_0\rangle$ and obtains an entangled state $|\psi_1\rangle_i$.
- She sends the entangled state $|\psi_1\rangle_i$ to Bob.
- Bob compares (by measurement) the result state $|\psi_1\rangle_i$ with the input state and obtains all the 4 mappings with the values concerning the function f_i .
- Bob learns what function Alice selected.
- Alice and Bob compare their functions (a subset of the results).
- If Eve eavesdropped, Alice and Bob will each have a different function.
- If Eve did not eavesdrop, Alice and Bob will each have the same function.

Alice and Bob perform the protocol described above many times in order to obtain enough secret keys (functions).

A. Concrete Example

Let us consider the case where Alice selects a function f_1 . Bob wants to know all the following mappings:

$$f(0,0) = ?, f(0,1) = ?, f(1,0) = ?, f(1,1) = ?. \quad (59)$$

In the classical case, Bob requires 4 evaluations. In the quantum case, Bob requires just one query.

Alice prepares the following input state:

$$|\psi_0\rangle = a_1|00\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_2|01\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x + a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x. \quad (60)$$

Next, Alice applies U_{f_1} to $|\psi_0\rangle$ to obtain $U_{f_1}|\psi_0\rangle = |\psi_1\rangle_1$. She has the following output state:

$$|\psi_1\rangle_1 = a_1|00\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_2|01\rangle|-\rangle_y + a_3|10\rangle|-\rangle_x - a_4|11\rangle|-\rangle_x. \quad (61)$$

Bob enquires with Alice as to what phase factors of the quantum output state Alice has. In this example, the quantum phase factors of the output state are as follows:

$$1, 1, 1, -1. \quad (62)$$

Then, Bob obtains simultaneously all the mappings of f_1 :

$$f(0,0) = 0, f(0,1) = 0, f(1,0) = 0, f(1,1) = 1. \quad (63)$$

Finally, Bob realizes that Alice selected f_1 . Again, this quantum communication is faster than using a classical apparatus, which would require at least 4 evaluations. Likewise, Alice can select any of the 16 combinations of the mappings. That is, our argumentation holds for each fixed parameter i .

V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we have studied a quantum cryptography based on an algorithm for determining all the mappings of a Boolean function simultaneously using an entangled state. The security of our cryptography is based on the Ekert 1991 protocol, which uses an entangled state. Consequently, eavesdropping destroyed the entanglement. In the cryptography, Alice selected a secret function among the possible function types. Bob's aim was then to determine the selected function (a key) without an eavesdropper learning it. In order for both Alice and Bob to be able to select the same function classically, in the worst case Bob would require multiple queries to Alice. In the quantum case however, Bob required just a single query. By measuring the single entangled state, which was sent to him by Alice, Bob obtained the function that Alice had selected. This quantum key distribution method is faster than the multiple classical queries that would be required in the classical case.

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NOTE

On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.

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