

LATTICE ATTACKS ON NTRU AND LWE: A HISTORY OF REFINEMENTS

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1. INTRODUCTION

Since its invention in 1982, the LLL lattice reduction algorithm [LLL82] has found countless applications. In cryptanalysis, the two most prominent applications of LLL and its generalisations, e.g. Slide [GN08a], BKZ [Sch87, SE94] and SD-BKZ [MW16], are factoring RSA keys with extra information on the secret key via Coppersmith's method [Cop96, NSS⁺17], and the cryptanalysis of lattice-based schemes.

After almost 40 years of cryptanalytic applications, predicting and optimising lattice reduction algorithms remains an active area of research. While we do have theorems bounding the worst-case performance of these algorithms, those bounds are asymptotic and not necessarily tight when applied to practical or even cryptographic instances. Reasoning about the behaviour of those algorithms relies on heuristics and approximations, some of which are known to fail for relevant corner cases.

Decades after Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lovász gave birth to this fascinating and lively research area, this state of affairs became a more pressing issue recently. Motivated by post-quantum security, standardisation bodies, governments and industry started to move towards deploying lattice-based cryptographic algorithms. This spurred the refinement of those heuristics and approximations, leading to a better understanding of the behaviour of these algorithms over the last few years.

Lattice reduction algorithms, such as LLL and BKZ, proceed with repeated local improvements to the lattice basis, and each such local improvement means solving the short(est) vector problem in a lattice of a smaller dimension. Therefore, two questions arise: how costly is it to find those local improvements and what is the global behaviour as those improvements are applied.

While those two questions may not be perfectly independent, we will, in this survey, focus on the second one, namely, the global behaviour of such algorithms, given oracle access for finding local improvements. Our focus on the global behaviour is motivated by our intent to draw more of the community's attention to this aspect. We will take a particular interest in the behaviour of such algorithms on a specific class of lattices, underlying the most popular lattice problems to build

cryptographic primitives, namely the LWE problem and the NTRU problem. We will emphasise on the approximations that have been made, their progressive refinements and highlight open problems to be addressed.

1.1. LWE and NTRU. The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem and the NTRU problem have proven to be versatile building blocks for cryptographic applications [HPS96, Reg05, GPV08, BV11]. For both of these problems, there exist ring and matrix variants. More precisely, the original definition of NTRU is the ring variant [HPS96] and the matrix variant is rarely considered whereas for LWE the original definition is the matrix variant [Reg09] with a ring variant being defined later [SSTX09, LPR10]. In this survey, we generally treat the matrix variants since our focus is on lattice reduction for general lattices.

Definition 1 (LWE [Reg09]). Let n, q be positive integers, χ be a probability distribution on \mathbb{Z} and \mathbf{s} be a uniformly random vector in \mathbb{Z}_q^n . We denote by $L_{\mathbf{s}, \chi}$ the probability distribution on $\mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ obtained by choosing $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ uniformly at random, choosing $e \in \mathbb{Z}$ according to χ and considering it in \mathbb{Z}_q , and returning $(\mathbf{a}, c) = (\mathbf{a}, \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + e) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$.

Decision-LWE is the problem of deciding whether pairs $(\mathbf{a}, c) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ are sampled according to $L_{\mathbf{s}, \chi}$ or the uniform distribution on $\mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$.

Search-LWE is the problem of recovering \mathbf{s} from pairs $(\mathbf{a}, c) = (\mathbf{a}, \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s} \rangle + e) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ sampled according to $L_{\mathbf{s}, \chi}$.

We note that the above definition puts no restriction on the number of samples, i.e. LWE is assumed to be secure for any polynomial number of samples. Further, since for many choices of n, q, χ solving Decision-LWE allows solving Search-LWE [Reg09, BLP⁺13] and vice versa, it is meaningful to just speak of the LWE problem (for those choices of parameters). By rewriting the system in systematic form [ACPS09], it can be shown that the LWE problem where each component of the secret \mathbf{s} is sampled from the error distribution χ is as secure as the problem for uniformly random secrets. LWE with such a secret, following the error distribution, is known as normal form LWE. We will consider normal form LWE in this survey. Furthermore, in this note, the exact specification of the distribution χ will not matter, and we may simply specify an LWE instance by giving the standard deviation σ of χ . We will, furthermore, implicitly assume that χ is centred, i.e. has expectation 0. We may also write LWE in matrix form as $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \equiv \mathbf{c} \pmod{q}$. The NTRU problem [HPS96] is defined as follows:

Definition 2 (NTRU [HPS96]). Let n, q be positive integers, let $f, g \in \mathbb{Z}_q[x]$ be polynomials of degree n sampled from some distribution χ , subject to f being invertible modulo a polynomial ϕ of degree n , and let $h = g/f \pmod{(\phi, q)}$. The *NTRU problem* is the problem of finding f, g given h (or any equivalent solution $(x^i \cdot f, x^i \cdot g)$ for some $i \in \mathbb{Z}$).

Concretely, the reader may think of $\phi = x^n + 1$ when n is a power of two and χ to be some distribution producing polynomials with small coefficients. The matrix variant considers $\mathbf{F}, \mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$ such that $\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{G} \cdot \mathbf{F}^{-1} \pmod{q}$.

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2. NOTATION & PRELIMINARIES

All vectors are denoted by bold lower case letters and are to be read as column-vectors. Matrices are denoted by bold capital letters. We write a matrix \mathbf{B} as $\mathbf{B} = (\mathbf{b}_0, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{d-1})$ where \mathbf{b}_i is the i -th column vector of \mathbf{B} . If $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times d}$ has full-column rank d , the lattice Λ generated by the basis \mathbf{B} is denoted by $\Lambda(\mathbf{B}) = \{\mathbf{B} \cdot \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^d\}$. A lattice is q -ary if it contains $q\mathbb{Z}^d$ as a sublattice, e.g. $\{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^d \mid \mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{A} \equiv \mathbf{0}\}$ for some $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}^{d \times d'}$. We denote by $(\mathbf{b}_0^*, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{d-1}^*)$ the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation (GS) of the matrix $(\mathbf{b}_0, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{d-1})$. For $i \in \{0, \dots, d-1\}$, we denote the orthogonal projection to the span of $(\mathbf{b}_0, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{i-1})$ by π_i ; π_0 denotes “no projection”, i.e. the identity. We write π_v for the projection orthogonal to the space spanned by $\text{vec}v$. For $0 \leq i < j \leq d$, we denote by $\mathbf{B}_{[i:j]}$ the local projected block $(\pi_i(\mathbf{b}_i), \dots, \pi_i(\mathbf{b}_{j-1}))$, and when the basis is clear from context, by $\Lambda_{[i:j]}$ the lattice generated by $\mathbf{B}_{[i:j]}$. We write $\log(\cdot)$ for the logarithm to base two.

The Euclidean norm of a vector \mathbf{v} is denoted by $\|\mathbf{v}\|$. The volume (or determinant) of a lattice $\Lambda(\mathbf{B})$ is $\text{vol}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B})) = \prod_i \|\mathbf{b}_i^*\|$. It is an invariant of the lattice. The first minimum of a lattice Λ is the norm of a shortest non-zero vector, denoted by $\lambda_1(\Lambda)$. We use the abbreviations $\text{vol}(\mathbf{B}) = \text{vol}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))$ and $\lambda_1(\mathbf{B}) = \lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))$.

The Hermite constant γ_β is the square of the maximum norm of any shortest vector in all lattices of unit volume in dimension β :

$$\gamma_\beta = \sup \left\{ \lambda_1^2(\Lambda) \mid \Lambda \in \mathbb{R}^\beta, \text{vol}(\Lambda) = 1 \right\}.$$

Minkowski’s theorem allows to derive an upper bound $\gamma_\beta = O(\beta)$, and this bound is reached up to a constant factor: $\gamma_\beta = \Theta(\beta)$.

3. LATTICE REDUCTION: THEORY

All lattices of dimension $d \geq 2$ admit infinitely many bases and two bases \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{B}' generate (or represent) the same lattice if and only if $\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{B}' \cdot \mathbf{U}$ for some unimodular matrix $\mathbf{U} \in \text{GL}_d(\mathbb{Z})$. In other words, the set of (full-rank) lattices can be viewed as the quotient $\text{GL}_d(\mathbb{R}) / \text{GL}_d(\mathbb{Z})$. Lattice reduction is the task of finding a good representative of a lattice, i.e. a basis $\mathbf{B} \in \text{GL}_d(\mathbb{R})$ representing $\Lambda \in \text{GL}_d(\mathbb{R}) / \text{GL}_d(\mathbb{Z})$.

While there exists a variety of formal definitions for what is a good representative, the general goal is to make the Gram-Schmidt basis \mathbf{B}^* as small as possible. Using the simple *size-reduction* algorithm (see [Ngu10, Alg. 3]), it is possible to also enforce the shortness of the basis \mathbf{B} itself.

It should be noted that since we have an invariant $\prod_i \|\mathbf{b}_i^*\| = \text{vol}(\Lambda)$, we cannot make all GS vectors small at the same time, but the goal becomes to balance their

lengths. More pictorially, we consider the log-profile of a basis as the graph of $(\ell_i = \log \|\mathbf{b}_i^*\|)_{i=0\dots d-1}$ as a function of i . By the volume invariant, the area under this graph is fixed, and the goal of reduction is to make this graph *flatter*.

A very strong¹ notion of reduction is the Hermite-Korkine-Zolotarev reduction, which requires each basis vector \mathbf{b}_i to be a shortest non-zero vector of the remaining projected lattice $\Lambda_{[i:d]}$. The Block-Korkine-Zolotarev reduction relaxes HKZ, only requiring \mathbf{b}_i to be close-to-shortest in a local “block”. More formally:

Definition 3 (Hermite-Korkine-Zolotarev and Block-Korkine-Zolotarev [Ngu10]). The basis $\mathbf{B} = (\mathbf{b}_0, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{d-1})$ of a lattice Λ is said to be HKZ reduced if $\|\mathbf{b}_i^*\| = \lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}_{[i:d]}))$ for all $i < d$. It is said BKZ reduced with block-size β and $\epsilon \geq 0$ if $\|\mathbf{b}_i^*\| \leq (1 + \epsilon) \cdot \lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}_{[i:\min(i+\beta, d)]}))$ for all $i < d$.

In practice, the BKZ algorithm [Sch87, SE94] and its terminated variant [HPS11a] are commonly employed to perform lattice reduction. BKZ is also the algorithm we will focus on in this survey.

The BKZ algorithm will proceed by enforcing the condition $\|\mathbf{b}_i^*\| \leq (1 + \epsilon) \cdot \lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}_{[i:\min(i+\beta, d)]}))$ cyclically for $i = 0, \dots, d - 2, 0, \dots, d - 2, 0, \dots$, see Algorithm 1. However, each modification of \mathbf{b}_i^* may invalidate the same condition for $j \neq i$. The value of ϵ , which allows to account for numerical instability, is typically chosen very close to 0 (say 0.01); we may sometimes omit it and just speak of a BKZ- β reduced basis. Overall, we obtain the following guarantees for the BKZ algorithm.

Theorem 4 (BKZ). *If a basis \mathbf{B} is BKZ- β reduced with parameter $\epsilon > 0$ it satisfies*

- $\|\mathbf{b}_0\| \leq \sqrt{(1 + \epsilon) \cdot \gamma_\beta^{\frac{d-1}{\beta-1}+1}} \cdot \text{vol}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))^{1/d}$ (Hermite factor), and
- $\|\mathbf{b}_0\| \leq \left((1 + \epsilon) \cdot \gamma_\beta \right)^{\frac{d-1}{\beta-1}} \cdot \lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))$ (approximation factor).

Remark. The approximation factor is established in [Sch94], the Hermite factor bound is claimed in [GN08b]. In [HPS11a] a bound of $2 \cdot \sqrt{\gamma_\beta^{\frac{d-1}{\beta-1}+3}}$ is established for the terminating variant. In [HPS11b] this bound is improved to $K \cdot \sqrt{\beta^{\frac{d-1}{\beta-1}+0.307}}$ for some universal constant K .

Asymptotically, the lattice reduction algorithm with best, known worst-case guarantees is Slide reduction [GN08a]. We refer to [GN08a] for its formal definition which requires the notion of duality and only state some of its guarantees concerning Gram–Schmidt length.

Theorem 5 (Slide reduction [GN08a]). *If a basis \mathbf{B} is Slide reduced for parameters $\beta \mid d$ and $\epsilon > 0$ it satisfies*

- $\|\mathbf{b}_0\| \leq \sqrt{(1 + \epsilon) \cdot \gamma_\beta^{\frac{d-1}{\beta-1}}} \cdot \text{vol}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))^{1/d}$ (Hermite factor), and
- $\|\mathbf{b}_0\| \leq \left((1 + \epsilon) \cdot \gamma_\beta \right)^{\frac{d-\beta}{\beta-1}} \cdot \lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))$ (approximation factor).

¹HKZ should nevertheless not be considered to be the strongest notion of reduction. Indeed HKZ is a greedy definition, speaking of the shortness of each vector individually. One could go further and require, for example, $\Lambda_{[0:d/2]}$ to be a densest sublattice of Λ [Ran53].

Data: LLL-reduced lattice basis \mathbf{B}

Data: block size β

repeat until no more change

for $i \leftarrow 0$ to $d - 2$ **do**

 LLL on $\mathbf{B}_{[i:\min(i+\beta,d)]}$;

$\mathbf{v} \leftarrow$ find a short vector in $\Lambda(\mathbf{B}_{[i:\min(i+\beta,d)]})$;

 insert \mathbf{v} into \mathbf{B} at index i and handle linear dependencies with LLL;

end

Algorithm 1: High-level description of the BKZ Algorithm.

In practice, BKZ is not implemented as in Algorithm 1. Most notably, stronger preprocessing than LLL is applied. A collection of improvements to the algorithm (when enumeration is used to instantiate the SVP oracle) are collectively known as BKZ 2.0 [CN11] and implemented e.g. in FPLLL [The19a] and thus Sage [S⁺19]. Slide reduction is also implemented in FPLLL.

4. PRACTICAL BEHAVIOUR ON RANDOM LATTICES

4.1. Shape Approximation. The Gaussian Heuristic predicts that the number $|\Lambda \cap \mathcal{B}|$ of lattice points inside a measurable body $\mathcal{B} \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ is approximately equal to $\text{vol}(\mathcal{B})/\text{vol}(\Lambda)$. Applied to Euclidean d -balls, it leads to the following prediction of the length of a shortest non-zero vector in a lattice.

Definition 6 (Gaussian Heuristic). We denote by $\text{gh}(\Lambda)$ the expected first minimum of a lattice Λ according to the Gaussian Heuristic. For a full rank lattice $\Lambda \subset \mathbb{R}^d$, it is given by:

$$\text{gh}(\Lambda) = \left(\frac{\text{vol}(\Lambda)}{\text{vol}(\mathcal{B})} \right)^{1/d} = \frac{\Gamma\left(1 + \frac{d}{2}\right)^{1/d}}{\sqrt{\pi}} \cdot \text{vol}(\Lambda)^{1/d} \approx \sqrt{\frac{d}{2\pi e}} \cdot \text{vol}(\Lambda)^{1/d}.$$

where \mathcal{B} denotes the d -dimensional Euclidean ball. We also denote by $\text{gh}(d)$ the quantity $\text{gh}(\Lambda)$ of any d -dimensional lattice Λ of volume 1: $\text{gh}(d) \approx \sqrt{d/2\pi e}$. For convenience we also denote $\text{lgh}(x)$ for $\log(\text{gh}(x))$.

Combining the Gaussian Heuristic with the definition of a BKZ reduced basis, after BKZ- β reduction we expect

$$\begin{aligned} \ell_i &= \log\left(\lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}_{[i:\min(i+\beta,d)]})\right) \approx \text{lgh}(\min(\beta, d - i)) + \frac{\log\left(\text{vol}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}_{[i:\min(i+\beta,d)]})\right)}{\min(\beta, d - i)} \\ &= \text{lgh}(\min(\beta, d - i)) + \frac{\sum_{j=i}^{\min(i+\beta,d)-1} \ell_j}{\min(\beta, d - i)}. \end{aligned}$$

If $d \gg \beta$ this linear recurrence implies a geometric series for the $\|\mathbf{b}_i^*\|$. Considering one block of dimension β and unit volume, we expect $\ell_i = (\beta - i - 1) \cdot \log(\alpha_\beta)$ for

$i = 0, \dots, \beta - 1$ and some α_β . We obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \ell_0 &= (\beta - 1) \cdot \log(\alpha_\beta) \approx \text{lgh}(\beta) + \frac{1}{\beta} \sum_{i=0}^{\beta-1} i \cdot \log(\alpha_\beta) \\ &= \text{lgh}(\beta) + (\beta - 1)/2 \cdot \log(\alpha_\beta). \end{aligned}$$

Solving for α_β assuming equality we obtain $\alpha_\beta = \text{gh}(\beta)^{2/(\beta-1)}$.

Applying the same argument to a basis in dimension $d \gg \beta$ with $\ell_i = (d - i - 1) \cdot \log(\alpha_\beta)$ for $i = 0, \dots, d - 1$ we get $\|\mathbf{b}_0\|/\text{vol}(\Lambda)^{1/d} = \alpha_\beta^{d-1}/\alpha_\beta^{(d-1)/2} = \alpha_\beta^{(d-1)/2} = \text{gh}(\beta)^{(d-1)/(\beta-1)}$. This known as Geometric Series Assumption:

Definition 7 (Geometric Series Assumption (GSA) [Sch03]). Let \mathbf{B} be a BKZ- β reduced basis of a lattice of volume V . The Geometric Series Assumption states that:

$$\log \|\mathbf{b}_i^*\| = \ell_i = \frac{d - 1 - 2i}{2} \cdot \log(\alpha_\beta) + \frac{1}{d} \log V$$

where $\alpha_\beta = \text{gh}(\beta)^{2/(\beta-1)}$.

The above assumption is reasonably accurate in the case $\beta \ll d$ (and $\beta \gg 50$), but it ignores what happens in the last $d - \beta$ coordinates. Indeed, the last block is HKZ-reduced, and should therefore follow the typical profile of an HKZ reduced basis.

Under the Gaussian Heuristic, we can predict the shape $\ell_0 \dots \ell_{d-1}$ of an HKZ reduced basis, i.e. the sequence of expected norms for the vectors \mathbf{b}_i^* . This, as before, implicitly assumes that all the projected lattices Λ_i also behave as random lattices. The sequence is inductively defined as follows:

Definition 8. The (unscaled) HKZ-shape of dimension d is defined by the following sequence for $i = 0, \dots, d - 1$:

$$h_i = \text{lgh}(d - i) - \frac{1}{d - i} \sum_{j < i} h_j.$$


This leads to the following refinement of the GSA:

Definition 9 (Tail-adapted Geometric Series Assumption (TGSA)). Let \mathbf{B} be a BKZ- β reduced basis of a lattice of volume V . The Tail-adapted Geometric Series Assumption states that:

$$\begin{aligned} \ell_i &= \frac{d - 1 - 2i}{2} \cdot \log \alpha_\beta + s && \text{if } 0 \leq i \leq d - \beta, \\ \ell_i &= h_{i-(d-\beta)} + \ell_{d-\beta} - h_0 && \text{if } d - \beta \leq i < d. \end{aligned}$$

where $s \in \mathbb{R}$ is the scaling term such that $\sum \ell_i = \log V$.

We plot an example for a basis after BKZ reduction under the GSA and the TGSA in Figure 1 to illustrate their respective shapes. In Figure 1 we chose $d = 2\beta$ to highlight the difference between the two models. As can be seen from that figure, the first few indices of the HKZ shape drop slower than predicted by the GSA and the last indices drop faster.

FIGURE 1. GSA and TGSA for $d = 1,000$ and $\beta = 500$.

Appealing to the Gaussian Heuristic, we may also replace $\sqrt{\gamma_\beta}$, i.e. worst-case bounds, with $\text{gh}(\beta)$, i.e. average-case expectations, in Theorems 4 and 5. This suggests the following heuristics.

Definition 10 (Estimates for block reductions). If a basis \mathbf{B} is BKZ- β reduced for $50 \ll \beta \ll d$ we expect

$$\|\mathbf{b}_0\| \lesssim \min \begin{cases} \sqrt{\alpha_\beta}^{d-1} \cdot \text{vol}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))^{1/d} & \text{(Hermite factor)} \\ \alpha_\beta^{d-1} \cdot \lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B})) & \text{(approximation factor)} \end{cases}$$


If a basis \mathbf{B} is Slide reduced with parameter β we expect

$$\|\mathbf{b}_0\| \lesssim \min \begin{cases} \sqrt{\alpha_\beta}^{d-1} \cdot \text{vol}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))^{1/d} & \text{(Hermite factor)} \\ \alpha_\beta^{d-\beta} \cdot \lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B})) & \text{(approximation factor)} \end{cases}$$

The cases over which the minimum is taken define two regimes: the ‘‘Hermite regime’’ and the ‘‘approximation regime’’.

If the lattice is random, then $\lambda_1 \approx \text{gh}(\Lambda)$ and we expect to be in the Hermite regime; the approximation regime is only triggered by the presence of an unusually short vector. In the Hermite regime we can replace \lesssim by \approx and we will discuss what happens in the approximation regime further in Section 5.4.

We note that the literature usually writes the above approximate equations in terms of the so-called root-Hermite factor $\delta_\beta := (\|\mathbf{b}_0\|/\text{vol}(\Lambda)^{1/d})^{1/d}$. We can therefore establish that $\delta_\beta = \sqrt{\alpha_\beta}^{1-1/d} \approx \sqrt{\alpha_\beta}$. We note that making this approximation or not leads to the ‘‘-1 discrepancy’’ blamed on [ADPS16] in a footnote of [AGVW17]: the analysis of [ADPS16] simply did not apply this approximation

FIGURE 2. $\log(\alpha_\beta)$.

Experimentally observed slopes of sixteen lattices compared with δ_β as predicted in (1). The input lattices are q -ary lattices in dimension $d = 170$ with $q = 2^{20} - 3$; the experimental $\log(\alpha_\beta)$ are established using a least-square fit of the log Gram–Schmidt vectors.


step. In [Che13] an expression for δ_β is given as

$$(1) \quad \lim_{\beta \rightarrow \infty} \delta_\beta = \left(\frac{\beta}{2\pi e} \cdot (\pi\beta)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{2(\beta-1)}}$$

assuming $d \gg \beta$. Experimentally, (1) also holds with good accuracy for $\beta > 50$ and typical d used in cryptography (say, $d \geq c \cdot \beta$ for some $c > 1$). We compare experimentally observed $\log(\alpha_\beta)$ with the right hand side of (1) in Figure 2.

4.2. Simulators. While the (T)GSA provides a first rough approximation of the shape of a basis, it is known to be violated in small dimensions [CN11]. Indeed, it also does not hold exactly for larger block sizes when d is a small multiple of β , the case most relevant to cryptography. Furthermore, it only models the shape after the algorithm has terminated, leaving open the question of how the quality of the basis improves throughout the algorithm. To address these points [CN11] introduced a simulator for the BKZ algorithm which is often referred to as the “CN11 simulator”. It takes as input a list of ℓ_i representing the shape of the input basis and a block size β . It then considers blocks $\ell_i, \dots, \ell_{i+\beta-1}$ of dimension β , establishes the expected norm of the shortest vector in this block using the Gaussian Heuristic and updates ℓ_i . To address that the Gaussian Heuristic does not hold for $\beta < 50$, the simulator makes use of a precomputed list of the average norms of a shortest vector of random lattices in small dimensions. The simulator keeps

FIGURE 3. CN11 simulator output for $\beta = 500$ on random q -ary lattice in dimension $d = 1,500$.




on going until no more changes are made or a provided limit on the number of iterations or “tours” is reached.

The simulator is implemented e.g. in FPyLLL [The19b] and thus in Sage. In Figure 3 we plot the output of the simulator for a basis in dimension 1,500 with block size 500 (solid line). We also plot the derivative (dotted line) to illustrate that the GSA also does not hold for $i < d - \beta$. In fact, we observe a ripple effect, with the tail-shape exhibiting a damped echo toward the left of the basis. The TGSA is in some sense only a first-order approximation, only predicting the first ripple.

A further simulation refinement was proposed in [BSW18]. Building upon [YD17], the authors confirmed that the CN11 simulator can be pessimistic about the norm of the first vector output by BKZ. This is because it assumes the shortest vector in a lattice always has the norm that is predicted by the Gaussian Heuristic. By, instead, modelling the norm of the shortest vector as a random variable, the authors were able to model the “head concavity” behaviour of BKZ after many tours and in small block sizes as illustrated in Figure 4. They also proposed a variant of the BKZ algorithm (pressed-BKZ) that is tailored to exploit this phenomenon. For example, they manage to reach a basis reduction equivalent to BKZ-90 while only using block size 60. The authors note, though, that the head concavity phenomenon does not significantly affect cryptographic block sizes. Indeed, exploiting luck on this random variable seems to only be interesting for small block sizes.

4.3. q -ary Lattices and the Z-shape. Recall that both NTRU and LWE give rise to q -ary lattices. These lattices always contain the vector $(q, 0, \dots, 0)$ and all its permutations. These so-called “ q -vectors” can be considered short, depending on the parameters of the instance being considered, and might be shorter than what we

FIGURE 4. Head concavity.



Dimension $d = 2,000$ and block size $\beta = 45$ after 2,000 tours, reproduced from [BSW18].


would expect to obtain following predictions such as the GSA or the TGSA. Furthermore, some of those q -vectors naturally appear in the typical basis construction of q -ary lattices. Even when this is not the case, they can be made explicit by computing the Hermite Normal Form.

To predict lattice reduction on such bases, we may observe that one of the guarantees of the LLL algorithm is that the first vector \mathbf{b}_0 never gets longer. For certain parameters this can contradict the GSA. In fact, if \mathbf{b}_i^* does not change for all $i < j$, then \mathbf{b}_j^* cannot become longer either, which means that after the reduction algorithm has completed we may still have many such q -vectors at the beginning of our basis, unaffected by the reduction. It is therefore tempting to predict a piecewise linear profile, with two pieces. It should start with a flat line at $\log q$, followed by a sloped portion following the predicted GSA slope.

In fact, the shape has three pieces, and this is easy to argue for LLL, since LLL is a self-dual algorithm.² This means in particular that the last Gram-Schmidt vector cannot get shorter, and following the same argument, we can conclude that the basis must end with a flat piece of 1-vectors. All in all, the basis should follow a Z-shape, and this is indeed experimentally the case [How07, Wun19], as depicted in Figure 5, where we picked a small q to highlight the effect. We shall call such a prediction [DKL⁺18, Wun19] the ZGSA.

It is tempting to extend such a ZGSA model to other algorithms beyond LLL and this has been used for example in [DKL⁺18]. We might also attempt to refine it to

²This is not entirely true, as the size-reduction condition is not self-dual, but the constraints on the Gram-Schmidt vectors themselves are, which is enough for our purpose.


FIGURE 5. GSA and q -ary lattice contradiction.

Norms of Gram-Schmidt vectors of 180 dimensional random q -ary lattices with $q = 17$ and volume q^{80} . The grey, blurry lines plot ℓ_i for LLL reduced bases of 16 independent lattices.

a ZTGSA model, where we put an HKZ tail just before the flat section of Gram-Schmidt vectors of norm 1. However this is a questionable way of reasoning, because BKZ, unlike LLL, is not self-dual. However, it is worth noting that it seems possible to force BKZ to behave in such a way, simply by restricting BKZ to work on the indices up $i < j$, where j is carefully calibrated so that $\|\mathbf{b}_j^*\| \approx 1$. This is not self-dual, but up to the tail of BKZ, it would produce a Z-shape as well.

Yet, we could also let BKZ work freely on the whole basis, and wonder what would happen. In other words, we may ask whether it is preferable to apply such a restriction to BKZ or not. A natural approach to answering this question would be to simply use the CN11 simulator, however, it appears that the Z-shape is very poorly simulated. Indeed, while the simulator can easily maintain q -vectors when they are shorter than the one locally predicted by the Gaussian Heuristic, the phenomenon on the right end of the Z seems more complicated: some 1-vectors are replaced by Gram-Schmidt vectors of norm strictly less than 1, but not all, see Figure 6. Thus, we see the “z-shape” known from the literature but with the addition of a kink in the tail block.

Simulating or predicting the behaviour of BKZ on q -ary lattices is still open, but it would allow addressing the question if it can be exploited. A partial answer seems obtainable by defining a specialised variant of the Gaussian heuristic that takes orthogonal sublattices into account. While we are not certain that a deeper study of this phenomenon would lead to cryptanalytic advances, it is nevertheless quite frustrating to have to resort to Z(T)GSA without a perfect understanding of the behaviour of lattice reduction on this class of lattices.



Norms of Gram-Schmidt vectors (grey, blurry lines) after BKZ-65 reduction of sixteen 180 dimensional q -ary lattices with $q = 17$ and volume q^{80} compared with models from the literature.

4.4. **Random Blocks?** The heuristic analysis of BKZ is based on the assumption that each sublattice considered by the algorithm “behaves like a random lattice” (*strong version*), or at least that the expectation or distribution of its shortest vector is the same as for a random lattice (*weak version*).

More formally, we would have to define the notion of a random lattice, invoking the Haar measure. However, we can nevertheless interrogate this heuristic without going into those details here. Indeed, as we can see in Figure 2, the predicted slopes below dimension 30 are far from the actual behaviour. In fact, the predictions for small block sizes are nonsensical as they predict a flatter slope as β decreases below 30 and even an inversion of the slope below block size ≈ 10 .

While we can observe the prediction and the observation converging for block sizes above 50 what level of precision do we attribute to those predictions? Given the phenomena perturbing the GSA surveyed in this article (heads, tails, ripples), how pertinent is the data from Figure 2? Pushing experimental evidence a bit further would be reassuring here: while we do not expect surprises, it would be good to replace this expectation with experimental evidence.

But more conceptually, we note that making the *strong version* of the heuristic assumption (each block behaves like a random lattice) is self contradictory. Indeed, the model leads to conclude that the shape is essentially a line, at least when $\beta \ll d$ and the considered block $\mathbf{B}_{[\kappa, \kappa + \beta]}$ is far from the head and the tail, i.e. $\kappa \gg \beta$, $d - \kappa \gg \beta$. But this block, like all other blocks, is fully HKZ-reduced: since $\mathbf{b}_{\kappa+i}^*$ is a shortest vector of $\Lambda(\mathbf{B}_{[\kappa+i, \kappa+i+\beta]})$, it is also a shortest vector of $\Lambda(\mathbf{B}_{[\kappa+i, \kappa+i+\beta]})$. Yet, HKZ-reduced bases of random lattices have a concave shape not a straight slope.

We do not mean to discredit the current methodology to predict attacks on lattice-based schemes; current evidence does suggest predictions such as (5) are reasonably precise. In particular, the above argument does not rule out the *weak version* of the hypothesis: the shortest vector of those non-random blocks may still have an expected length following the Gaussian Heuristic. In fact, for random lattices, it is known that the length of the shortest vector is increasingly concentrated around the Gaussian Heuristic; there may be increasingly fewer lattices that fall far from it, which may explain why bias in the distribution of the lattices themselves does not translate to a bias on the length of its shortest vector.

However, we wish to emphasise that the question of the distribution of those local blocks is at the centre of our understanding of lattice reduction algorithms but remains open. While even formulating specific yet relevant questions seems hard, this phenomenon suggests itself as a challenging but pressing area to study.

5. BEHAVIOUR ON LWE INSTANCES

We can reformulate the matrix form of the LWE equation $\mathbf{c} - \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{s} \equiv \mathbf{e} \pmod{q}$ as a linear system over the Integers as:

$$\begin{pmatrix} q\mathbf{I} & -\mathbf{A} \\ 0 & \mathbf{I} \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} * \\ \mathbf{s} \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{c} \\ \mathbf{0} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{e} \\ \mathbf{s} \end{pmatrix}$$

or homogeneously as

$$(2) \quad \mathbf{B} = \begin{pmatrix} q\mathbf{I} & -\mathbf{A} & \mathbf{c} \\ 0 & \mathbf{I} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & t \end{pmatrix}, \quad \mathbf{B} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} * \\ \mathbf{s} \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{e} \\ \mathbf{s} \\ t \end{pmatrix}$$

where t is some chosen constant and $*$ stands in for an arbitrary vector. In other words, there exists an element in the lattice spanned by \mathbf{B} with expected norm $\sqrt{(n+m) \cdot \sigma^2 + t^2}$. Let $d = n + m + 1$. If we have $\sqrt{(n+m) \cdot \sigma^2 + t^2} < \text{gh}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B})) \approx \sqrt{\frac{d}{2\pi e}} \cdot q^{n/d}$ then \mathbf{B} admits an unusually short vector.

Remark. We note that when $t \nmid q$ then $\Lambda(\mathbf{B})$ is not a q -ary lattice as in this case $(0, \dots, 0, q)^T \notin \Lambda$. The reader may think $t = 1$ which is commonly used in practice albeit being slightly worse compared to $t = \sigma$ which maximises $\lambda_2(\Lambda)/\lambda_1(\Lambda)$ and which makes the problem easier (see below).

5.1. Kannan Embedding. More generally, we can consider this approach to solving LWE as solving an instance of the bounded distance decoding problem (BDD) using a solver for the unique shortest vector problem.

Definition 11 (α -Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD $_\alpha$)). Given a lattice basis \mathbf{B} , a vector \mathbf{t} , and a parameter $0 < \alpha < 1/2$ such that the Euclidean distance $\text{dist}(\mathbf{t}, \mathbf{B}) < \alpha \cdot \lambda_1(\mathbf{B})$, find the lattice vector $\mathbf{v} \in \Lambda(\mathbf{B})$ which is closest to \mathbf{t} .

Remark. In our definition above we picked $\alpha < 1/2$ which guarantees a unique solution. The problem can be generalised to $1/2 < \alpha \leq 1$ where we expect a unique solution with high probability.

LWE with a fixed number of samples can be viewed as an instance of BDD (with overwhelming probability over the choice of the samples). Asymptotically, for any polynomially-bounded $\gamma \geq 1$ there is a reduction from $\text{BDD}_{1/(\sqrt{2}\gamma)}$ to uSVP_γ [BSW16]. The unique shortest vector problem (uSVP) is defined as follows:

Definition 12 (γ -unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVP_γ)). Given a lattice Λ such that $\lambda_2(\Lambda) > \gamma \cdot \lambda_1(\Lambda)$ find a nonzero vector $\mathbf{v} \in \Lambda$ of length $\lambda_1(\Lambda)$.

This reduction is essentially the embedding technique, due to Kannan [Kan87], presented at the beginning of this section, combined with some tricks to improve the parameters of the reduction. For the remaining of this section, we will discuss how strong we require lattice reduction to be to find a unique shortest vector which can then be used to recover the secret values of an LWE instance.

5.2. Asymptotic Handwaving. Recall that in Definition 10 two regimes are defined, the Hermite regime and the approximation regime. Now, consider decision LWE. On the one hand, when \mathbf{c} is just a random vector then the lattice spanned by \mathbf{B} is a random q -ary lattice and we are in the Hermite regime, i.e. $\lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B})) \approx \text{gh}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))$. On the other hand, when \mathbf{c} is formed as in LWE then $\Lambda(\mathbf{B})$ contains $(\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t)$ and we expect $\lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B})) = \|(\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t)\|$. Now, if this is sufficiently smaller than $\text{gh}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))$ then we are in the approximation regime. Thus, one way to distinguish LWE from uniform is to detect the “phase transition” between the two regimes, the point when the approximation regime “kicks in”, i.e. when

$$\begin{aligned} \sqrt{\alpha_\beta}^{2d-2} \cdot \lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B})) &< \sqrt{\alpha_\beta}^{d-1} \cdot \text{vol}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))^{1/d} \text{ for BKZ and} \\ \sqrt{\alpha_\beta}^{2d-2\beta} \cdot \lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B})) &< \sqrt{\alpha_\beta}^{d-1} \cdot \text{vol}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))^{1/d} \text{ for Slide reduction.} \end{aligned}$$

Rearranging we obtain the following success conditions

$$\begin{aligned} (3) \quad &\lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B})) < \sqrt{\alpha_\beta}^{1-d} \cdot \text{vol}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))^{1/d} \text{ with BKZ and} \\ (4) \quad &\lambda_1(\Lambda(\mathbf{B})) < \sqrt{\alpha_\beta}^{2\beta-d-1} \cdot \text{vol}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))^{1/d} \text{ with Slide reduction} \end{aligned}$$

for solving decision LWE in block size β .

5.3. The 2008 Estimates. In [GN08b] the authors performed experiments in small block sizes to establish when lattice reduction finds a unique shortest vector. The authors considered two classes of semi-orthogonal lattices and Lagarias-Odlyzko lattices [LO83] which permit to estimate the gap $\lambda_2(\Lambda)/\lambda_1(\Lambda)$ between the first and second minimum of the lattice. For all three families, [GN08b] observed that LLL and BKZ seem to recover a unique shortest vector with high probability whenever $\lambda_2(\Lambda)/\lambda_1(\Lambda) \geq \tau_\beta \cdot \delta_\beta^d$, where $\tau_\beta < 1$ is an empirically determined constant that depends on the lattice family, algorithm and block size used.

In [AFG14] an experimental analysis of solving LWE based on the same estimate was carried out for lattices of the form (2). As mentioned above, this lattice contains an unusually short vector $\mathbf{v} = (\mathbf{e}^T, \mathbf{s}^T, t)^T$ of squared norm $\|\mathbf{v}\|^2 = \|\mathbf{s}\|^2 + \|\mathbf{e}\|^2 + t^2$ and we expect $\lambda_1(\Lambda)^2 = \|\mathbf{v}\|^2$. Thus, when $t^2 \approx \|\mathbf{e}\|^2 + \|\mathbf{s}\|^2$ resp. $t = 1$

this implies $\lambda_1(\Lambda) \approx \sqrt{2(n+m)} \cdot \sigma$ resp. $\lambda_1(\Lambda) \approx \sqrt{n+m} \cdot \sigma$. The second minimum $\lambda_2(\Lambda)$ is assumed to correspond to the Gaussian Heuristic for the lattice (a more refined argument would consider the Gaussian Heuristic of $\Lambda' = \pi_{\mathbf{v}}(\Lambda)$, but these quantities are very close for relevant parameters). Experiments in [AFG14] using LLL and BKZ with small block sizes (5 and 10) were interpreted to match the 2008 estimate, providing constant values for τ_β for lattices of the form (2), depending on the chosen algorithm, for a 10% success rate. Overall, τ_β was found to lie between 0.3 and 0.4 when using BKZ.

We note that we may interpret this observation as being consistent with Inequality (3).

5.4. The 2016 Estimate. The 2008 estimates offer no insight into why the algorithm behaves the way it does but only provide numerically established constants that seem to somewhat vary with the algorithm or the blocksize. In [ADPS16] an alternative estimate was outlined. The estimate predicts that $(\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t)$ can be found if

$$(5) \quad \sqrt{\beta/d} \cdot \|(\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t)\| \approx \sqrt{\beta \cdot \sigma^2} < \delta_\beta^{2\beta-d-1} \cdot \text{vol}(\Lambda(\mathbf{B}))^{1/d},$$


under the Geometric Series Assumption (until a projection of the unusually short vector is found). The right hand side of the inequality is the expected norm of the Gram–Schmidt vector at index $d - \beta$ (see Definition 7). The left-hand side is an estimate for $\|\pi_{d-\beta}((\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t))\|$. If the inequality holds then $\pi_{d-\beta}((\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t))$ is a shortest vector in $\mathbf{B}_{[d-\beta:d]}$ and will thus be found by BKZ and inserted at index $d - \beta$. This is visualised in the top figure of Figure 7. Subsequent calls to an SVP oracle on $\mathbf{B}_{[d-2\beta+1:d-\beta+1]}$ would insert $\pi_{d-2\beta+1}((\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t))$ at index $d - 2\beta + 1$ etc.

The 2016 estimate was empirically investigated and confirmed in [AGVW17]. The authors ran experiments in block sizes up to 78 and observed that a BKZ managed to recover the target vector with good probability as predicted in [ADPS16]. An example is given in the bottom figure of Figure 7. Furthermore, they showed (under the assumption that vectors are randomly distributed in space) that once BKZ has set $\mathbf{b}_i^* = \pi_{d-\beta}((\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t))$, calls to LLL are expected to suffice to recover $(\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t)$ itself.

Comparing Inequality (5) with Inequalities (3) and (4) we note that it more closely resembles the prediction for Slide reduction rather than for BKZ, despite the rationale and experimental evidence being obtained for BKZ. This suggests that the average behaviour of BKZ and Slide reductions in the approximation factor regime is roughly the same, despite different worst-case bounds being proven. Furthermore, we note that Inequality (5) gains an additional factor of $\sqrt{\beta/d}$ compared with Inequality (4).


5.5. Further Refinements. On the other hand, the authors of [AGVW17] also observed that the algorithm behaves somewhat better than predicted. That is, they managed to solve the underlying instances using block sizes somewhat smaller than required to make Inequality (5) hold.

This is attributed to a “double intersection” in [AGVW17]. As illustrated in Figure 7, the projection of the target vector and the norms of the Gram-Schmidt



Expected and observed norms for lattices of dimension $d = 183$ and volume q^{m-n} after BKZ- β reduction for LWE parameters $n = 65$, $m = 182$, $q = 521$, standard deviation $\sigma = 8/\sqrt{2\pi}$ and $\beta = 56$ (minimal (β, m) such that (5) holds). Average of Gram-Schmidt lengths is taken over 16 BKZ- β reduced bases of random q -ary lattices, i.e. without an unusually short vector. Reproduced from [AGVW17].

vectors may intersect twice: once at index $d - \beta$ and once close to index d , say at index $d - o$ for some small o . Applying the same reasoning as above, we expect $\pi_{d-o}((\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t))$ to be inserted as \mathbf{b}_{d-o}^* . Thus, we expect a subsequent SVP call at index $d - \beta - o$ to recover and insert $\pi_{d-\beta-o}((\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t))$. Alternatively, an SVP call in dimension $\beta - o$ at index $d - \beta$ could now recover $\pi_{d-\beta}((\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t))$ since this vector is $\in \Lambda_{[d-\beta:d-o]}$. However, it is noted in [AGVW17] that this “double intersection” phenomenon does not occur for typical cryptographic parameters.



The difference $\Delta\beta = \text{real} - \text{predicted}$, as a function of the average experimental β . The experiment consists in running a single tour of BKZ- β for $\beta = 2, 3, 4, \dots$ until the secret short vector is found. This was averaged over 256 many LWE instances per data-point, for parameters $q = 3301$, $\sigma = 20$ and $n = m \in \{30, 32, 34, \dots, 88\}$.
Reproduced from [DSDGR20].

Another source of imprecision when applying Inequality (5) is that it assumes the GSA (before an unusually short vector is found), replacing this assumption with a BKZ simulator produces refined estimates.

But there seems to be another subtle phenomenon at play. In [DSDGR20] it is noted that, for very small block sizes β , the prediction of [AGVW17] is on the contrary too optimistic. The reason is that, while the projected vector $\pi_{d-\beta}((\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t))$ may be detected with good probability at position $d - \beta$, we require a bit more luck to lift correctly, i.e. to recover the full vectors $(\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{s}, t)$ from its projection. Instead, a probabilistic model is proposed, to account for both initial detection and lifting, and this prediction seems to fit very well with experiments, see Figure 8.

Balancing costs. It should be mentioned that just running BKZ is not the optimal strategy to solve uSVP instances. Indeed, having spent $O(d)$ many SVP- β calls pre-processing the whole basis, this strategy hopes for the last such SVP call to essentially produce the solution. An improved strategy instead balances the cost of the pre-processing step and the final search step. Therefore, it could, for example, be natural to do a last call to SVP- β' for β' slightly larger than β ; this has for example been implemented with sieving in [ADH⁺19] to break Darmstadt LWE challenges [FY15] and was already standard in the enumeration literature [LN13].

The optimal strategy is, therefore, more difficult to predict and hardness estimates often rely on scripts that numerically optimise the various parameters of the algorithm based on assumptions such as the relative costs of running SVP in

slightly larger or smaller dimension, the number of calls to an SVP oracle required to achieve a given root-Hermite factor, etc. To avoid this complication, some designers instead opt for accounting only for the cost of a single call to SVP- β when even considering several tours of BKZ- β (a simplification introduced as the ‘core SVP hardness’ in [ADPS16]). In this model, the issue of balancing costs between β' and β does not arise, i.e. $\beta' = \beta$ is optimal and the attack cost is bounded from below by the cost of one call to SVP- β on a BKZ- β reduced basis.

6. BEHAVIOUR ON NTRU INSTANCES

To solve NTRU we may consider the lattice

$$(6) \quad \Lambda_{\mathbf{H}}^q = \left\{ (\mathbf{x}^T, \mathbf{y}^T)^T \in \mathbb{Z}^{2n} \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q} \right\}.$$

where \mathbf{H} is the matrix associated with multiplication by h modulo ϕ , i.e. the columns of \mathbf{H} are spanned by the coefficients of $x^i \cdot h \pmod{\phi}$ for $i = 0, \dots, n-1$. The lattice $\Lambda_{\mathbf{H}}^q$ is spanned by

$$\mathbf{B} = \begin{pmatrix} q\mathbf{I} & \mathbf{H} \\ 0 & \mathbf{I} \end{pmatrix}$$

and contains a short vector (\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{g}) . This can be observed by multiplying the basis by $(\mathbf{f}, *)$ from the right, where $*$ represents the vector performing modular reduction modulo q and where \mathbf{f} resp. \mathbf{g} is the coefficient vector of f resp. g . If $\|(\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{g})\|$ is much smaller than $\text{gh}(\Lambda_{\mathbf{H}}^q) \approx \sqrt{n/(\pi e)} \cdot \sqrt{q}$ then this lattice contains an unusually short vector. Indeed, it also contains all vectors corresponding to ‘rotations’ of (f, g) , i.e. $(x^i \cdot f \pmod{\phi}, x^i \cdot g \pmod{\phi})$ for $i = 0, \dots, n-1$ and their integral linear combinations. In other words, the NTRU lattice contains a dense sublattice.

6.1. NTRU as uSVP. Considering NTRU as the problem of recovering an unusually short vector in the NTRU lattice was already done in the initial NTRU paper [HPS98]. Also, the original NTRU paper [HPS98] also discussed an observation from [CS97] (analysing [HPS96]) that an attacker does not need to recover f, g exactly but that any sufficiently small multiple of f suffices to break the scheme. For the uSVP case the hardness of the problem was related to $\text{gh}(\Lambda)/\lambda_1(\Lambda)$ where $\lambda_1(\Lambda) = \|(\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{g})\|$. When considering message recovery instead of key recovery a related quantity is considered. We may a posteriori reinterpret this as framing attacks on NTRU in the framework of the ‘2008 estimate’ (see Section 5.3) but replacing $\lambda_2(\Lambda)$ by $\text{gh}(\Lambda)$. This approach became a common way of reasoning about NTRU lattices, see e.g. [DDLL13]. Yet, the validity of this approach is doubtful as in NTRU lattices we have $\lambda_2(\Lambda) = \lambda_1(\Lambda)$ in contrast to the lattices arising for LWE. In this context, we note that the early study of May and Silverman [MS01] massaged the lattice to decrease the NTRU lattice dimension while also eliminating all but one of the NTRU short vectors.

The 2016 estimate (see Section 5.4) sidesteps this discussion on whether $\lambda_2(\Lambda)$ matters, as the heuristic reasoning here does not involve this quantity. This estimate also ended up being used for estimating the hardness of breaking NTRU [NTR, Section 6.4.2]. More recently the framework proposed in [DSDGR20] allowed to

revisit the tricks of May and Silverman [MS01], and it was concluded that this trick was slightly counterproductive. Indeed, the probabilistic model permits to account for the cumulated probabilities of detecting *any* of those short vectors in the full lattice, and this is slightly easier than finding *the* (up to signs) unique short vector of the massaged lattice.

Indeed, another line of works showed that the presence of many short vectors can make the problem exponentially easier, at least in some “overstretched” regimes. These works [GS02, ABD16, CJL16, KF17] seem to suggest that simple encryption schemes should not be affected at all but we will argue that the exact crossover point remains to be determined.

6.2. Attacks on Overstretched NTRU. In this last section, we cover an attack that exploits the fact that NTRU lattices hide not one but many unexpectedly short vectors, yielding an unexpectedly dense sublattice. If the right conditions are met then it turns out that this dense sublattice is easier to uncover than the individual vectors spanning it.

This, however, is a fairly a-posteriori view of this discovery. At first, this weakness was associated not primarily with a density property, but more with an algebraic structure property: namely, the presence of subfields in NTRU. The idea of exploiting this structure had been considered as soon as 2002, by Gentry, Szydly, Jonsson, Nguyen and Stern [GS02, Sec. 6]; but it was quickly abandoned: yes, NTRU keys can be normed-down to a subfield and still yield valid NTRU keys, but this trade-off of dimension versus approximation factor did not seem advantageous for the actual NTRUEncrypt parameters.

When Bai and ourselves explored this idea again [ABD16] (independently [CJL16] also explored a closely related idea), the situation was rather different: NTRU was not just a single scheme with a few parameter sets, it was a parameterised assumption with increasing popularity for building homomorphic encryption schemes. In these newly considered regimes the trade-off mentioned above seemed on the contrary quite advantageous. We, therefore, claimed asymptotic improvements over the natural lattice reduction attack, which – depending on the parameters – could decrease the costs of the attacks from exponential to sub-exponential or even polynomial.

This claimed improvement was soon challenged by Kirchner and Fouque [KF17]. Our mistake was not the complexity of our new algorithm but rather the fact that the complexity of straight-up lattice reduction attacks was much better than expected on such overstretched NTRU instances. They claimed that the old attack should behave as well as the new one, and – with minor performance-enhancing tricks – were able to demonstrate this in practice. In conclusion, the new algorithm we invented was completely useless, and old algorithms performed just as well, if not better, and were more generally applicable. We found solace in the belief that the results of Kirchner and Fouque may not have been discovered without our algebraic detour.

6.2.1. The Subfield Attack. The key idea of this attack is as follows: the relation $h = f/g \bmod q$ between the public key h and the private key (f, g) can be normed

down to a smaller field; furthermore, if f and g are short enough, their norms in a smaller field will also be somewhat short. Therefore, one may hope to attack the problem in a subfield and lift back the solution. We note that in the case of cyclotomic number fields, there is always at least one non-trivial sub-field, namely the maximal totally real subfield \mathbb{K}^+ , of relative rank $r = [\mathbb{K} : \mathbb{K}^+] = 2$. In the case of power of two cyclotomic number fields ($n = 2^k$), one chooses the subfield to tune r to any power of 2 less than n . On the contrary, this approach is not directly applicable to fields as chosen in [BCLv19].

In more detail, let \mathbb{K} be a number field ($\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{Q}(x)/(\phi(x))$ where ϕ comes from Definition 2), and for simplicity let us assume that \mathbb{K} is a cyclotomic number field. Let \mathbb{L} be a subfield with relative rank $r = [\mathbb{K} : \mathbb{L}]$, and let N denote the relative norm $N : \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{L}$, defined by $N(x) = \prod_a a(x)$ where a ranges over all the automorphisms of \mathbb{K} that are identity over \mathbb{L} . Defining $f' = N(f)$, $g' = N(g)$ and $h' = N(h)$, we note that $h' = f'/g' \bmod q$ still holds over \mathbb{L} . Furthermore, if f, g have lengths roughly $\sqrt{n} \cdot \sigma$, we expect f', g' to have lengths roughly $(\sqrt{n} \cdot \sigma)^r$.

On the other hand, the dimension of the normed-down NTRU lattice is $2n/r$ and its volume $q^{n/r}$. The original article [ABD16] reasons more formally using the approximate factor bound of lattice reduction, however here we will give a simplified and more heuristic exposition. Roughly, using either the 2008 or the 2016 estimate, we expect to solve this instance using a block size β such that:

$$(\sqrt{n} \cdot \sigma)^r \cdot \delta_\beta^{2n/r} \leq \sqrt{q}.$$

For $\sigma = \text{poly}(n)$, the subfield attack [ABD16] obtains the asymptotic success condition

$$\frac{\beta}{\log \beta} = \Theta\left(\frac{n}{r \log q - r^2 \log n}\right)$$

assuming $r \log q - r^2 \log n > 0$.

Parameterising the attack to not use a subfield ($r = 1$) should therefore require $\beta = \tilde{\Theta}(n/\log q)$ while choosing a relative rank $r = \Theta(\log q/\log n)$ leads to $\beta = \tilde{\Theta}(n/\log^2 q)$. For schemes that use large moduli such as fully homomorphic schemes [LTV12, BLLN13] or candidate cryptographic multi-linear maps [GGH13], this therefore makes a significant difference; both in practice and in theory.

Full secret reconstruction. It should be noted that finding f', g' does not lead to a full recovery of the original secret. However, we can still reconstruct a small multiple $\alpha(f, g)$ of the original secret key (f, g) , by constructing $(f', g' \cdot h/h')$. This is typically enough to break encryption schemes. If we insist on recovering the original key (f, g) , this intermediate information is still helpful. For example, repeating the attack with a rerandomized initial basis, we may recover the exact lattice generated by the secret key $(f, g)^T \cdot \mathcal{O}_{\mathbb{K}}$. Recovering (f, g) is now much easier; it can be done with an algorithm for the Principal Ideal Problem, and this is classically sub-exponential time [BEF⁺17], and quantumly polynomial time [BS16].

6.2.2. The Dense Sublattice Attack. We will now explain why the above subfield attack was a detour to the discovery of a much more general result by Kirchner and Fouque [KF17]. In a sense, LLL and BKZ are rather clever algorithms and what

we can try to make more visible to them via algebraic massaging of the lattice at hand was already geometrically obvious to them: there is a particularly dense sublattice to be found inside NTRU instances. This version of the attack is therefore not prevented by choosing a number field as in [BCLv19], or even by going for a matrix version of NTRU without any underlying number field.

To prove that LLL can indeed uncover this hidden dense sublattice, let us first go back to the (worst-case) argument to prove that LLL can solve a unique-SVP instance when $\lambda_2(\Lambda)/\lambda_1(\Lambda) > (4/3 + \epsilon)^{d/2}$.

It follows from the inequality $\lambda_1(\Lambda) \geq \min_i \|\mathbf{b}_i^*\|$, which is obtained by writing a shortest vector \mathbf{v} as $\mathbf{v} = \sum v_i \mathbf{b}_i^*$ and noting that \mathbf{v} must be longer than \mathbf{b}_j^* where j is the largest index such that $v_j \neq 0$. From there, we argue that

$$\|\mathbf{b}_1\| \leq (4/3 + \epsilon)^{d/2} \min_i \|\mathbf{b}_i^*\| \leq (4/3 + \epsilon)^{d/2} \lambda_1(\Lambda) < \lambda_2(\Lambda).$$

Recall that we can make an even simpler case that LLL or BKZ must distinguish this lattice from random without having to go through the full argument. Indeed, let us simply note that for a random lattice we expect a particular shape for the basis, say following ZGSA or ZTGSA. But for a large enough β , the prediction for the shape becomes incompatible with the constraint that $\lambda_1(\Lambda) \geq \min_i \|\mathbf{b}_i^*\|$. In such cases, LLL and BKZ must, therefore, behave differently, and this is easily seen by just looking at the shape: the NTRU lattice has been distinguished from random.

The analysis of Kirchner and Fouque follows essentially from the same kind of argument, generalising the invariant $\lambda_1(\Lambda) \geq \min_i \|\mathbf{b}_i^*\|$. Here, we can read “ $\lambda_1(\Lambda)$ ” as the determinant of the densest 1-dimensional sublattice; a k -dimensional variant of the inequality was given by Pataki and Tural.

Lemma 13 (Lemma 1 from [PT08]). *Let Λ be a d -dimensional lattice, and $\mathbf{b}_0, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{d-1}$ be any basis of Λ , and let $k \leq d$ be a positive integer. Then, for any k -dimensional sublattice $\Lambda' \subset \Lambda$, it holds that:*

$$\text{vol}(\Lambda') \geq \min_J \prod_{j \in J} \|\mathbf{b}_j^*\|$$

where J ranges over all subsets of $\{0, \dots, d-1\}$ of size k .

We will now apply this to the dense sublattice Λ' generated by the n short vectors out of the $d = 2n$ dimensions of the NTRU lattice. This gives a (log) left-hand-side of $\log \text{vol}(\Lambda') \leq n \log R$ where $R = \|(\mathbf{f}, \mathbf{g})\| \approx \sqrt{d}\sigma$ (and in fact we can argue that $\log \text{vol}(\Lambda') \approx n \log R$). For the right-hand side, the minimum is reached by the n last indices $J = \{n, n+1, \dots, 2n-1\}$.

Pictorially, the usual 1-dimensional argument forbids the last Gram-Schmidt vector to go above R ; if the heuristically predicted shape contradicts this rule, then the shortest vector must have been detected somehow. The multi-dimensional version of Pataki and Tural instead forbids the black-hashed region to have a surface larger than the grey-filled region in Figure 9.

We make our prediction under the Z-shape model, denoting $s = \log \alpha_\beta$ the slope of the middle section, between indices $n-z$ and $n+z$. The inaccuracies of this model discussed in Section 4.3 should be asymptotically negligible,




FIGURE 9. The Pataki-Tural constraint on reduced NTRU bases

as we will be interested in regimes for which $\beta = o(z)$. The picture makes it also easy to compute the right-hand side of the inequality. It is given by the surface of a right-angled triangle of height $h = \frac{1}{2} \log q$. Its surface is given by $S = \frac{1}{2}hz = \frac{1}{2}h^2/s = (\log q)^2/(8 \log \alpha_\beta)$. We therefore predict that the Pataki-Tural inequality would be violated when $nR = S$, that is: $\log \alpha_\beta = \log^2 q/(8nR)$. Noting that $\log \alpha_\beta = \Theta(\frac{\log \beta}{\beta})$, we conclude that the lattice reduction is going to detect the dense sublattice when

$$\frac{\beta}{\log \beta} = \Theta\left(\frac{nR}{\log^2 q}\right).$$

The required blocksize is therefore $\beta = \tilde{\Theta}(n/\log^2 q)$ as it was for the subfield attack, however a more careful analysis of the hidden constants [KF17] reveals that going to the subfield is slightly unfavorable.

6.2.3. Concrete Behaviour. While we kept the above development asymptotic for simplicity, it is not hard to keep track of the hidden constants – or even to run simulations – and to predict precisely when the Pataki-Tural lemma would be violated. However, even such a methodology would only lead to an upper bound on the cost of this attack and not an estimate. Indeed, this methodology would essentially correspond to the one of Section 5.2 for LWE-uSVP ; it is based on an impossibility argument, but it does not explain or predict the phenomenon, unlike the 2016 estimate.

We, therefore, emphasise this gap as our last and foremost open problem: give a more detailed explanation of how BKZ detects the hidden sub-lattice, leading to a heuristic estimate on when the phenomenon happens, confirmed by extensive experiments. A possible answer may be found by extending the probabilistic analysis of [DSDGR20], this time accounting for more than the n shortest vectors

$(x^i \cdot f, x^i \cdot g)$ for $0 \leq i < n$. Indeed, one could instead consider all the vectors $(p \cdot f, p \cdot g)$ for elements p up to a certain length. These vectors are longer and therefore the probability of finding a given one of them is smaller. Yet, it might be that, in some regimes of parameters, their number outgrows this decrease in probability. When considering multiple vectors from the same dense sublattice the events of finding each of them may not be independent which might require some care when modelling.

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