Post-Quantum Security of Key Encapsulation Mechanism against CCA Attacks with a Single Decapsulation Query

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Abstract. Recently, in post-quantum cryptography migration, it has been shown that an IND-1-CCA-secure key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM) is required for replacing an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DH) in widely-used protocols, e.g., TLS, Signal, and Noise. IND-1-CCA security is a notion similar to the traditional IND-CCA security except that the adversary is restricted to one single decapsulation query. At EUROCRYPT 2022, based on CPA-secure public-key encryption (PKE), Huguenin-Dumittan and Vaudenay presented two IND-1-CCA KEM constructions called T_{CH} and T_H, which are much more efficient than the widely-used IND-CCA-secure Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) KEMs. The security of T_{CH} was proved in both random oracle model (ROM) and quantum random oracle model (QROM). However, the QROM proof of T_{CH} requires that the ciphertext size of the resulting KEM is twice as large as the one of the underlying PKE. While, the security of T_H was only proved in the ROM, and the QROM proof is left open.
In this paper, we present an IND-1-CCA KEM construction T_{RH}, which can be seen as an implicit variant T_H, and is as efficient as T_H. We prove the security of T_{RH} in both ROM and QROM with much tighter reductions than Huguenin-Dumittan and Vaudenay's work. In particular, our proof will not lead to ciphertext expansion. Moreover, for T_{RH}, T_H and T_{CH}, we also show that a $O(1/q)$ ($O(1/q^2)$, resp.) reduction loss is unavoidable in the ROM (QROM, resp.), and thus claim that our ROM proof is optimal in tightness. Finally, we make a comprehensive comparison among the relative strengths of IND-1-CCA and IND-CCA in the ROM and QROM.

Keywords: quantum random oracle model · key encapsulation mechanism · 1CCA security · tightness · KEM-TLS

1 Introduction

With the gradual advancement of NIST post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standardization, research on migration from the existing protocols to post-quantum protocols with new standardized algorithms has been a hot topic. For ephemeral key establishment, one has to move the current Diffie-Hellman (DH) key-exchange to post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs).

The security goal required for such a substitutive KEM has been thoroughly analyzed for TLS 1.3 [15, 20], KEM-TLS [36, 37], Signal [9] and Noise [2]. In general, the security of these DH-based protocols is proved based on the PRF-ODH assumption [10]. But, when one uses KEM to replace DH, IND-1-CCA security is required instead, see post-quantum TLS [15, 20, 36, 37], post-quantum Signal [9] and post-quantum Noise [2]. In addition, Huguenin-Dumittan and Vaudenay [20] pointed out that IND-1-CCA KEMs are also used in Ratcheting [4, 24, 31]. Roughly speaking, IND-1-CCA security says that the adversary is required to distinguish an honestly generated key from a randomly generated key by making at most a *single* decapsulation query.

IND-1-CCA security is obviously implied by IND-CCA security that has been widely studied in [16, 17, 34, 21–23, 6, 25, 19, 14]. In general, IND-CCA-secure KEMs are obtained by applying Fujisaki-Okamoto-like (FO-like) transform to a OW/IND-CPA-secure public-key encryption (PKE). In particular, all the KEM candidates to be standardized and Round-4 KEM submissions [29] adopted FO-like construction. The current implementations of KEM-TLS [36, 37], post-quantum TLS 1.3 [30] and post-quantum Noise framework [2] directly take IND-CCA-secure KEMs as IND-1-CCA-secure KEMs. However, FO-like IND-CCA-secure KEMs require re-encryption of the decrypted plaintext in decapsulation, making it an expensive operation. For instance, as shown in [20], when re-encryption is removed, there will be a 2.17X and 6.11X speedup over decapsulation in CRYSTALS-Kyber [8] and FrodoKEM [27] respectively. Moreover, the re-encryption makes the KEM more vulnerable to side-channel attacks and almost all the NIST-PQC Round-3 KEMs are affected, see [39, 3]. Meanwhile, the side-channel leakage of re-encryption will significantly increase deployment costs and thus complicate the integration of NIST-PQC KEMs [26]. Therefore, designing a dedicated IND-1-CCA-secure KEM without re-encryption was taken as an open problem raised by Schwabe, Stebila and Wiggers [36].

This problem was recently studied by Huguenin-Dumittan and Vaudenay [20]. They found that simple modification of the current FO-like KEMs can achieve an IND-1-CCA-secure KEM without re-encryption. In detail, they presented two constructions. One construction (called T_{CH}) is that an additional confirmation hash value of message and ciphertext is appended to the original ciphertext. The security of T_{CH} was proved in the random oracle model (ROM) with tightness $\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$, and in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) with tightness $\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q^3)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}^2$, where ϵ_R ($\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$, resp.) is the advantage of the reduction R (adversary $\mathcal{A}$, resp.) breaking the security of the underlying PKE (the resulting KEM, resp.), and q is the number of $\mathcal{A}$'s queries to the random oracle (RO). Different from ROM, QROM allows the adversary to make quantum queries to the RO. As argued by Boneh, Dagdelen, Fischlin, Lehmann, Schaffner and Zhandry in [7], to prove the post-quantum security of cryptosystem, one has to prove in the QROM. Unfortunately, the QROM proof of T_{CH} in [20] requires the additional confirmation hash to be length-preserving[3]. That is, compared with

[3] This is implicitly required by the QROM proof in [20], although it is not explicitly pointed out. In the QROM proof of T_{CH}, the technique in [17, 38] is used to simu-

FO-KEMs, the T_{CH} KEM will increase the size of the ciphertext by $|ct| + |m|$, where $|ct|$ is the original ciphertext size and $|m|$ is the message size. Thus, for PKEs with large ciphertext size, e.g., CRYSTALS–Kyber [8] to be standardized by NIST PQC project, the T_{CH} KEM will lead to a significant ciphertext expansion, although the re-encryption is removed.

The second construction of IND-1-CCA-sucre KEM given in [20] is T_H, where ciphertext c is obtained by encrypting a randomly message m, the key is derived by $H(m, c)$. For decapsulation, if $m' = Dec(sk, c) = \perp$, $\perp$ is returned, otherwise $H(m', c)$ is returned, where Dec is the decryption algorithm of PKE, and sk is the secret key. In fact, T_H is the same as $U^{\perp}$ in [17]. Note that both T_{CH} and T_H do not require re-encryption. But, compared with T_{CH}, T_H will not lead to ciphertext expansion. However, Huguenin-Dumittan and Vaudenay [20] only gave the ROM proof of T_H with tightness $\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q^3)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$. The QROM proof is left open due to the challenge that a lot of RO programming property is used[4].

Thus, a natural question is that can we give an IND-1-CCA-secure KEM construction with a tighter QROM/ROM proof, and meanwhile without re-encryption and ciphertext expansion.

1.1 Our Contributions

In this paper, we give an affirmative answer for the aforementioned question. Our detailed contributions are as follows.

1. First, we present a ROM/QROM provably IND-1-CCA-secure KEM construction called T_{RH} without re-encryption and ciphertext expansion. T_{RH} is the same as the T_H except that in decapsulation a pseudorandom value $H(0, c)$ is returned instead of an explicit $\perp$ for an invalid ciphertext c such that $Dec(sk, c) = \perp$. In the ROM, our reduction has tightness $\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$, which is much tighter than $\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q^3)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$ given by [20] for T_H. In the QROM, our reduction achieves tightness $\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q^2)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}^2$, is tighter than $\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q^3)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}^2$ given by Huguenin-Dumittan and Vaudenay in [20] for T_{CH} (with ciphertext expansion).
2. Then, we show that if the underlying PKE has malleability property, a $O(1/q)$ ($O(1/q^2)$, resp.) loss is unavoidable in the ROM (QROM, resp.). That is, our ROM reduction is optimal in general. Roughly speaking, the malleability property says that an adversary can efficiently transform a ciphertext into another ciphertext which decrypts to a related plaintext. In particular, such a malleability property is met by real-world public-key encryption schemes, e.g., ElGamal, CRYSTALS–Kyber.PKE [8], etc.

late the additional confirmation hash with a k-wise independent function, which is required to be length-preserving such that the simulator can implement decryption by inverting this function.

[4] At EUROCRYPT 2022, Huguenin-Dumittan and Vaudenay [20] conjectured that the popular compressed oracle technique proposed by Zhandry [42] might be of use in the QROM proof. Surprisingly, in our QROM proof, only the other well-known techniques called one-way to hiding (O2H) [1, 6] and measure-and-reprogram [12] are used.

3. Finally, we compare the relative strengths of IND-1-CCA and IND-CCA in the ROM and QROM, see Fig 1. For each pair of notions A, B ∈{IND-1-CCA ROM, IND-CCA ROM, IND-1-CCA QROM, IND-CCA QROM}, we show either an implication or a separation, so that no relation remains open.

Table 1: Reduction tightness in the ROM/QROM.

Transformation	Reduction tightness	Ciphertext expansion	Re-encryption	ROM or QROM
FO [17]	$\epsilon_R \approx \epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$	N	Y	ROM
T_{CH} [20]	$\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$	Y	N	ROM
T_H [20]	$\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q^3)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$	N	N	ROM
Our T_{RH}	$\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$	N	N	ROM
FO [23, 6]	$\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}^2$	N	Y	QROM
T_{CH} [20]	$\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q^3)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}^2$	Y	N	QROM
Our T_{RH}	$\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q^2)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}^2$	N	N	QROM



Fig. 1: The relations among notions of security for KEM. An arrow is an implication, and there is a path from A to B if and and only A ⇒ B. The hatched arrows represent separations actually we prove. The number on an hatched arrow refers to the theorem in this paper which establishes this relationship.

Remark 1. Our construction T_{RH} is essentially the construction $U^{\not\perp}$ in [17], except that the secret seed s in decapsulation is replaced by a public value 0 (0 can be any fixed message). In fact, our proof can work for both secret seed and public value thanks to the newly introduced decapsulation simulation technique, while the current IND-CCA proofs for implicit FO-KEMs (e.g., see [17, 21]) can only work for secret seed. We choose to replace secret seed by public value since it reduces the secret key size and makes the construction more concise. Morerover, from a high-assurance implementation (i.e., side-channel protected) point of view, public value 0 is also preferable to secure seed s. As commented by Schneider at NIST pqc-forum [35], if s is taken as one part of secret key, the protection of s against physical attacks will result in significant costs in storage, and the consequent DPA-protected calculation of $H(s, c)$ is also expensive.

1.2 Technique Overview

Construction and reduction. Re-encryption is the core feature of FO-like IND-CCA-secure KEMs, which guarantees that only specific valid ciphertext can be correctly decapsulated, and thus makes the decapsulation simulation in the ROM/QROM proof easy (see [16, 17, 34, 21–23, 6, 19, 14, 18]). However, on the other hand, as mentioned earlier, removing the re-encryption will bring a significant speed boost in decapsulation [36, 20] and reduce the risk of side-channel attacks [39, 3].

Removing re-encryption leads to that the current decapsulation simulation used for FO-like IND-CCA-secure KEMs cannot work for the KEM constructions in this paper and [20]. So the key in the proof is the decapsulation simulation. We note that for a valid ciphertext $\bar{c}$ such that $(Dec(sk, \bar{c}) = \bar{m} \neq \perp)$, the decapsulation returns $H(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$. Thus, if we reprogram $H(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$ to a random $\bar{k}$, we can simulate the decapsulation of $\bar{c}$ using $\bar{k}$ without knowledge of sk. To guarantee the consistency between the outputs of H and the simulated decapsulation, one needs to correctly guess when the adversary makes a query $(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$ to H, and perform a reprogram at that time. In the ROM, a randomly guess is correct with probability $1/q$.

In the QROM, due to adversary's superposition RO-query, it is hard to define when the adversary makes a query $(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$. Therefore, in the QROM, we argue in a different way. We find that the consistency between H and the simulated decapsulation can be guaranteed if the predicate $Decap(sk, \bar{c}) = H(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$ is satisfied. Don, Fehr, Majenz, and Schaffner [13, 12] showed that a random measure-and-reprogram can keep the predicate satisfied with a high probability. However, the measure-and-reprogram in [13, 12] cannot be directly applied to our case. This is due to the fact that the random measure in [13, 12] is performed for all the H-queries while in our case there is an implicit (classical) H-query used in the real decapsulation that will be removed in the simulated decapsulation and thus can not be measured. In this paper, extending the proof of measure-and-reprogram technique in [13, 12], we derive an adapted variant of measure-and-reprogram (see Lemma 2.4), which is suitable for our case. With this adapted measure-and-reprogram, the QROM adversary can accept the simulation of both H and the decapsulation oracle with probability at least $O(1/q^2)$. In T_{RH}, $H(0, c)$ is returned for an invalid ciphertext c $(Dec(sk, c) = \perp)$. Thus, we can integrate the invalid case into the valid argument, which in total introduces only $O(1/q)$ loss in the ROM and $O(1/q^2)$ loss in the QROM. On the contrary, when $\perp$ is returned for invalid ciphertxts as in T_H, one needs to distinguish invalid case and invalid case additionally. In [20], reprogramming is performed twice so that their decapsulation simulation introduces a $O(1/q^2)$ loss in the ROM.

When embedding the instance of the underlying security experiment into the IND-1-CCA instance, we successfully embed an IND-CPA instance without reduction loss in the ROM. While in [20] a OW-CPA instance is embedded with a $O(1/q)$ loss in the ROM. In the QROM, the instance embedding is very tricky. We extend the double-sided O2H technique (see Lemma 2.3) to argue the QROM instance embedding, more details please refer to the proof of Theorem 3.2.

We also remark that one can easily extend the results in this paper to the IND-q-CCA KEM case for any arbitrary constant q. But, as aforementioned, in practical protocols, e.g., TLS 1.3, KEM-TLS, IND-1-CCA KEM is sufficient.

Attack and tightness. Re-encryption in the FO-like KEMs will guarantee that only the ciphertexts generated by derandomization are identified as valid. That is, any ciphertext obtained by transforming one valid ciphertext are identified as invalid by re-encryption check. However, for the IND-1-CCA KEMs in this paper and [20], the re-encryption check is removed. Thus, given a challenge ciphertext $c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*)$ to distinguish $K_0 = H(m^*, c^*)$ from a random K_1, an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ can efficiently transform c^* into another ciphertext c' such that $Dec(sk, c') = f(m^*)$ for some specific function f (this property is defined as malleability), then $\mathcal{B}$ can derive a hash value $tag = H(f(m^*), c^*)$ such that $H(f(m^*), c^*) = Decap(sk, c')$. Thus, $\mathcal{B}$ can search for m^* such that $tag = H(f(m^*), c^*)$ from the message $\mathcal{M}$ by querying the random oracle H, and finally use $H(m^*, c^*)$ to distinguish K_0 from K_1. By detailed analysis, we can show $\mathcal{B}$ can achieve advantage at least $O(q/2^\lambda)$ in the ROM ($O(q^2/2^\lambda)$ in the QROM). For a λ-bit secure PKE, any PPT adversary breaks the security of PKE with advantage at most $O(1/2^\lambda)$. Thus, we can claim that a $O(1/q)$ ($O(1/q^2)$, resp.) loss is unavoidable in the ROM (QROM, resp.) for the IND-1-CCA KEMs in this paper and [20].

Implication and separation. By introducing a proof of quantum access to random oracle given in [40], we construct a KEM that is provably IND-CCA-secure (hence also IND-1-CCA secrue) in the ROM, but cannot achieve IND-1-CCA security (hence also IND-CCA seucrity) in the QROM. In addition, we show that applying our H_{RU} to lattice-based PKE, e.g., FrodoPKE [27], can derive an IND-1-CCA ROM (and also QROM) secure KEM. However, such a KEM cannot achieve IND-CCA security in the ROM (hence QROM). The other implication relations can be trivially obtained.

1.3 Related Work

The tranformations in [20] and our paper are similar to U-transformation which is originally proposed in [11] and converts a OW-PCA-secure/deterministic PKE into an IND-CCA-secure KEM. The U-transformation has various variants, including $U^{\perp}_{m}$, $U^{\not\perp}_{m}$, $HU^{\perp}_{m}$, $HU^{\perp}$,$QU^{\perp}_{m}$, $QU^{\not\perp}_{m}$, $U^{\perp}$, $U^{\not\perp}$[5]. For $QU^{\perp}_{m}$ and $QU^{\not\perp}_{m}$, Hofheinz, Hövelmanns and Kiltz [17] showed that the IND-CCA security of KEM can be reduced to the OW-PCA security[6] of PKE with tightness $\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q^2)\epsilon^2_{\mathcal{A}}$. For implicit transformations $U^{\not\perp}_{m}$ and $U^{\not\perp}$, Jiang, Zhang, Chen,

[5] The symbol $\perp$ ($\not\perp$) means explicit (implicit) rejection, m (without m) means $K = H(m)$ ($K = H(m, c)$), H (Q) means an additional (length-preserving) hash value is appended into the ciphertext. In this paper, $U^{\perp}_{m}$ and $U^{\not\perp}_{m}$ are referred to transformations with re-encryption in decapsulation.

[6] OW-PCA security is the same as the OW-CPA security except that the adversary can additionally access a plaintext-checking oracle that judges whether decryption of a given ciphertext is equal to a given plaintext.

Wang and Ma [21] showed that the IND-CCA security of KEM can be reduced to the quantum variant of OW-PCA security of PKE or OW-CPA security of deterministic PKE (DPKE) with tightness $\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q^2)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}^2$, which is further improved to $\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}^2$ by Jiang, Zhang and Ma [23], improved to $\epsilon_R \approx \epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}^2$ by Bindel, Hamburg, Hövelmanns, Hülsing and Persichetti [6], and improved to $\epsilon_R \approx O(1/q)\epsilon_{\mathcal{A}}$ by Kuchta, Sakzad, Stehlé, Steinfeld and Sun [25]. In particular, Saito, Xagawa, and Yamakawa [34] gave a tight reduction for $U_m^{\not\perp}$ from a newly introduced security (called disjoint simulatability) of DPKE to the IND-CCA security of KEM. This tight result was subsequently extended for the explicit $HU_m^{\perp}$ by Jiang, Zhang and Ma [22]. For $HU_m^{\perp}$ and $HU^{\perp}$, Bindel, Hamburg, Hövelmanns, Hülsing and Persichetti [6] showed that the same QROM results can be achieved as the implicit variants. Recently, Don, Fehr, Majenz and Schaffner [14] first proved the QROM security of $U_m^{\perp}$ and $U^{\perp}$[7]. Note that all the U-transformations require re-encryption in decapsulation except $U^{\perp}$ and $U^{\not\perp}$ (see [17, 21]). However, the proofs for $U^{\perp}$ and $U^{\not\perp}$ in [17, 21] require the underlying PKE satisfies OW-PCA security, which is usually obtained by using de-randomization and re-encryption.

1.4 Open Problem

In this paper, we prove a $O(1/q)$ ($O(1/q^2)$, resp.) loss is unavoidable in the ROM (QROM, resp.) for the IND-1-CCA KEMs in this paper and [20]. Meanwhile, our ROM proof essentially matches this loss. However, our QROM tightness does not match $O(1/q^2)$. Thus, a natural question is that can our QROM reduction tightness be further improved, or can one find a new attack that matches the QROM proof in this paper.

2 Preliminaries

Symbol description. A security parameter is denoted by λ. The set $\{0, \cdots, q\}$ is denoted by $[q]$. The abbreviation PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial time. $\mathcal{K}$, $\mathcal{M}$, $\mathcal{C}$ and $\mathcal{R}$ are denoted as key space, message space, ciphertext space and randomness space, respectively. Given a finite set X, we denote the sampling of a uniformly random element x by $x \leftarrow_{\$} X$. Denote the sampling from some distribution D by $x \leftarrow D$. $x =? y$ is denoted as an integer that is 1 if $x = y$, and otherwise 0. $\Pr[P : G]$ is the probability that the predicate P holds true where free variables in P are assigned according to the program in G. Denote deterministic (probabilistic, resp.) computation of an algorithm A on input x by $y = A(x)$ ($y \leftarrow A(x)$, resp.). Let $|X|$ be the cardinality of set X. A^H ($A^{|H\rangle}, resp.$) means that the algorithm A gets classical (quantum, resp.) access to the oracle H.

[7] Strictly speaking, they proved the security of $FO_m^{\perp}$ in the QROM. But, their proof can be translated into a proof for $U_m^{\perp}$ and $U^{\perp}$.

2.1 Quantum Random Oracle Model

We refer the reader to [28] for basic of quantum computation. Random oracle model (ROM) [5] is an idealized model, where a hash function is modeled as a publicly accessible random oracle. In quantum setting, an adversary with quantum computer can off-line evaluate the hash function on an arbitrary superposition of inputs. As a result, quantum adversary should be allowed to query the random orale with quantum state. We call this quantum random oracle model (QROM) [7].

Lemma 2.1 (One-way to hiding (O2H)[1, Theorem 3]). *Let $S \subseteq \mathcal{X}$ be random. Let G, H be oracles such that $\forall x \notin S.\ G(x) = H(x)$. Let z be a random bitstring. (S, G, H, z may have arbitrary joint distribution.) Let A be quantum oracle algorithm that makes at most q queries (not necessarily unitary). Let $B^{|H\rangle}$ be an oracle algorithm that on input z does the following: pick $i \in [q-1]$, run $A^{|H\rangle}(z)$ until (just before) the $(i+1)$-th query, measure all query input registers in the computational basis, output the set T of measurement outcomes. Then*

$$\left|\Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|H\rangle}(Z)] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|G\rangle}(Z)]\right| \leq 2q\sqrt{\Pr[S \cap T \neq \emptyset : T \leftarrow B^{|H\rangle}(z)]}.$$

Lemma 2.2 ((Adapted) Double-sided O2H [6, Lemma 5]). *Let G, $H : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ be oracles such that $\forall x \neq x^*.\ G(x) = H(x)$. Let z be a random bitstring. (x^*, G, H, z may have arbitrary joint distribution.) Let A be quantum oracle algorithm that makes at most q queries (not necessarily unitary). Then, there is an another double-sided oracle algorithm $B^{|G\rangle,|H\rangle}(z)$ such that B runs in about the same amount of time as A, and*

$$\left|\Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|H\rangle}(z)] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|G\rangle}(z)]\right| \leq 2\sqrt{\Pr[x^* = x' : x' \leftarrow B^{|G\rangle,|H\rangle}(z)]}.$$

In particular, the double-sided oracle algorithm $B^{|G\rangle,|H\rangle}(z)$ runs $A^{|H\rangle}(z)$ and $A^{|G\rangle}(z)$ in superposition, and the probability $\Pr[x^* = x' : x' \leftarrow B^{|G\rangle,|H\rangle}(z)]$ is exactly $\left\||\psi_H^q\rangle - |\psi_G^q\rangle\right\|^2/4$, where $|\psi_H^q\rangle$ ($|\psi_G^q\rangle$, resp.) be the final state of $A^{|H\rangle}(z)$ ($A^{|G\rangle}(z), resp.$).

Next, we give the following two lemmas that will be used in the proof of our main theorem. Lemma 2.3 shows how to bound the advantage of searching a reprogramming point in double-sided oracle. Lemma 2.4 gives a variant of the measure-and-reprogram in [12], which is suitable for our case.

Lemma 2.3 (Search in Double-sided Oracle). *Let G, $H : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ be oracles such that $\forall x \neq x^*\ G(x) = H(x)$. Let z be a random bitstring. Let A be quantum oracle algorithm that makes at most q queries (not necessarily unitary). Let $B^{|G\rangle,|H\rangle}(z)$ be a double-sided oracle algorithm such that $\Pr[x^* = x' : x' \leftarrow B^{|G\rangle,|H\rangle}(z)] = \left\||\psi_H^q\rangle - |\psi_G^q\rangle\right\|^2/4$, where $|\psi_H^q\rangle$ ($|\psi_G^q\rangle$, resp.) be the final state of $A^{|H\rangle}(z)$ ($A^{|G\rangle}(z), resp.$). Let $C^{|H\rangle}(z)$ be an oracle algorithm that picks $i \leftarrow_{\$} \{1, 2, \ldots, q\}$, runs $A^{|H\rangle}(z)$ until (just before) the i-th query, measures the*

query input registers in the computational basis, and outputs the measurement outcome. Thus, we have

$$\Pr[x^* = x' : x' \leftarrow B^{|G\rangle,|H\rangle}(z)] \leq q^2 \Pr[x^* = x' : x' \leftarrow C^{|H\rangle}(z)].$$

In particular, if $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{X}_1 \times \mathcal{X}_2$, $x^* = (x_1^*, x_2^*)$, x_1^* *is uniform and independent of* x_2^* *and* z*, then we further have* $\Pr[x^* = x' : x' \leftarrow B^{|G\rangle,|H\rangle}(z)] \leq q^2/|\mathcal{X}_1|$.

Proof. Let $|\psi_0\rangle$ be an initial state that depends on z (but not on G, H or x^*), $O_H : |x, y\rangle \to |x, y \oplus H(x)\rangle$, and U_i is A's state transition operation after the i-th query. (And analogously for $A^{|G\rangle}$.) We define $|\psi_H^i\rangle$ as $U_i O_H \cdots U_1 O_H |\psi_0\rangle$, and similarly $|\psi_G^i\rangle$. Thus, $|\psi_H^q\rangle$ ($|\psi_G^q\rangle$, resp.) be the final states of $A^{|H\rangle}(z)$ ($A^{|G\rangle}(z)$, resp.). Let $P_{x^*} = |x^*\rangle\langle x^*|$, $D_i = \left\||\psi_H^i\rangle - |\psi_G^i\rangle\right\|$. Then, for $i \geq 1$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
D_i &= \left\|U_i O_H |\psi_H^{i-1}\rangle - U_i O_G |\psi_G^{i-1}\rangle\right\| \\
&= \left\|O_H |\psi_H^{i-1}\rangle - O_G |\psi_H^{i-1}\rangle + O_G |\psi_H^{i-1}\rangle - O_G |\psi_G^{i-1}\rangle\right\| \\
&\overset{*}{\leq} \left\|(O_H - O_G)|\psi_H^{i-1}\rangle\right\| + \left\|O_G(|\psi_H^{i-1}\rangle - \psi_G^{i-1}\rangle)\right\| \\
&\overset{**}{=} D_{i-1} + \left\|(O_H - O_G) P_{x^*} |\psi_H^{i-1}\rangle\right\| \\
&\overset{***}{=} D_{i-1} + 2\left\|P_{x^*} |\psi_H^{i-1}\rangle\right\| \qquad (1)
\end{aligned}$$

Here, the inequation $(*)$ uses the triangle inequality. The equation $(**)$ uses that $(O_H - O_G)P_{x^*} = O_H - O_G$ since $G(x) = H(x)$ for $\forall x \neq x^*$. The inequation $(***)$ uses the fact that $(O_H - O_G)$ has operator norm ≤ 2. Note that $D_0 = \||\psi_0\rangle - |\psi_0\rangle\| = 0$. From (1), we get $D_i \leq D_{i-1} + 2\left\|P_{x^*}|\psi_H^{i-1}\rangle\right\|$. This implies $D_q \leq 2\sum_{i=1}^q \left\|P_{x^*}|\psi_H^i\rangle\right\|$.

Using Jensen's inequality, we get $\sum_{i=1}^q \left\|P_{x^*}|\psi_H^i\rangle\right\| \leq q\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^q 1/q \left\|P_{x^*}|\psi_H^i\rangle\right\|^2}$. Note that $\Pr[x^* = x' : x' \leftarrow C^{|H\rangle}(z)]$ is $\sum_{i=1}^q 1/q \left\|P_{x^*}|\psi_H^i\rangle\right\|^2$. Thus, we have $D_q \leq 2q\sqrt{\Pr[x^* = x' : x' \leftarrow C^{|H\rangle}(z)]}$.

Since $\Pr[x^* = x' : x' \leftarrow B^{|G\rangle,|H\rangle}(z)]$ is exactly $\||\psi_H^q\rangle - |\psi_G^q\rangle\|^2/4 = D_q^2/4$, we have $\Pr[x^* = x' : x' \leftarrow B^{|G\rangle,|H\rangle}(z)] \leq q^2 \Pr[x^* = x' : x' \leftarrow C^{|H\rangle}(z)]$.

In particular, if $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{X}_1 \times \mathcal{X}_2$, $x^* = (x_1^*, x_2^*)$, x_1^* is uniform and independent of x_2^* and z, then $\Pr[x^* = x' : x' \leftarrow C^{|H\rangle}(z)] \leq 1/|\mathcal{X}_1|$. Thus, we have $\Pr[x^* = x' : x' \leftarrow B^{|G\rangle,|H\rangle}(z)] \leq q^2/|\mathcal{X}_1|$. □

Lemma 2.4 ((Adapted) Measure-and-reprogram). *Let* $A^{|H\rangle}$ *be an arbitrary oracle quantum algorithm that makes* q *queries to a uniformly random* $H : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ *and that outputs some classical* $x \in \mathcal{X}$ *and a (possibly quantum) output* z*. In particular,* A*'s* i^**-th query input state is exactly* $|x\rangle$ *(a classical state).*

Let $S^A(\Theta)$ *be an oracle algorithm that randomly picks a pair* $(i, b_0) \in ([q-1] \setminus \{i^*-1\} \times \{0,1\}) \cup \{(q,0)\}$*, runs* $A^{|H_i^{i^*}\rangle}$ *to output* z*, where* $H_i^{i^*}$ *is an oracle that returns* Θ *for* A*'s* i^**-th* H*-query, measures* A*'s* $(i+1)$*-th* H*-query input to obtain* x*, returns* A*'s* l*-th* H*-query using* H *for* $l < (i+1+b_0)$ *and* $l \neq i^*$*, and*

returns A's l-th H-query using $H_{x\Theta}$ ($H_{x\Theta}(x) = \Theta$ and $H_{x\Theta}(x') = H(x')$ for all $x' \neq x$) for $l \geq (i+1+b_0)$ and $l \neq i^*$.

Let $S_1^A(\Theta)$ be an oracle algorithm that randomly picks a pair $(j, b_1) \in (\{i^*, \cdots, q-1\} \times \{0,1\}) \cup \{(q,0)\} \cup \{(i^*-1, 1)\}$, runs $A^{|H_j\rangle}$ to output z, where H_j is an oracle that measures A's $(j+1)$-th H-query input to obtain x, returns A's l-th H-query using H for $l < (i+1+b_0)$, and returns A's l-th H-query using $H_{x\Theta}$ for $l \geq (i+1+b_0)$.

Thus, for any $x_0 \in X$, $i^* \in \{1, \cdots, q\}$ and any predicate V:

$$\Pr_H[x = x_0 \wedge V(x, H(x), z) = 1 : (x,z) \leftarrow A^{|H\rangle}] \leq 2(2q-1)^2 \Pr_{H,\Theta}[x = x_0 \wedge V(x, \Theta, z) = 1 : (x,z) \leftarrow S^A] + 8q^2 \Pr_{H,\Theta}[x = x_0 \wedge V(x, \Theta, z) = 1 : (x,z) \leftarrow S_1^A],$$

where the subscript $\{H, \Theta\}$ in $\Pr_H$ and $\Pr_{H,\Theta}$ denotes that the probability is averaged over a random choice of H and Θ. Moreover, if $V = V_1 \wedge V_2$ such that $V_1(x,y,z) = 1$ iff y is returned for A's i^*-th query, then $\Pr_{H,\Theta}[x = x_0 \wedge V(x, \Theta, z) = 1 : (x,z) \leftarrow S_1^A] \leq \frac{1}{|\mathcal{Y}|}$.

Proof. Let $|\phi_0\rangle$ be an initial state that is independent of H and Θ[8]. $O_H : |x, y\rangle \to |x, y \oplus H(x)\rangle$. Let A_i be A's state transition operation after the i-th H-query ($i \in \{1, \cdots, q\}$). We set $A^H_{i\to j} = A_j O_H \cdots A_{i+1} O_H$ for $0 \leq i < j \leq q$ and $A^H_{i\to j} = \mathbb{I}$ for $i \geq j$. Let $|\phi_i^H\rangle = A^H_{0\to i}|\phi_0\rangle$ be the state of A right before the $(i+1)$-th query. The final state $|\phi_q^H\rangle$ is considered to be a state over registers X, Z and E. Let quantum predicate V be a family of projections $\{\Pi_{x,\Theta}\}_{x,\Theta}$ with $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and $\Theta \in \mathcal{Y}$. Set $G_x^\Theta = |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes \Pi_{x,\Theta}$, where $X = |x\rangle\langle x|$ acts on register X, and $\Pi_{x,\Theta}$ acts on register Z. Then, we have $\Pr[x = x_0 \wedge V(x, H(x), z) = 1 : (x,z) \leftarrow A^{|H\rangle}] = \left\| G_{x_0}^{H(x_0)} |\phi_q^H\rangle \right\|^2$.

Since $H_{x\Theta}(x') = H(x')$ for all $x' \neq x$, we have $(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+1\to q})(A^H_{i\to i+1})(\mathbb{I} - X)|\phi_i^H\rangle = (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i\to q})(\mathbb{I} - X)|\phi_i^H\rangle$. Thus, $(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+1\to q})|\phi_{i+1}^H\rangle$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+1\to q})(A^H_{i\to i+1})(\mathbb{I} - X)|\phi_i^H\rangle + (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+1\to q})(A^H_{i\to i+1})X|\phi_i^H\rangle \\
&= (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i\to q})(\mathbb{I} - X)|\phi_i^H\rangle + (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+1\to q})(A^H_{i\to i+1})X|\phi_i^H\rangle \\
&= (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i\to q})|\phi_i^H\rangle - (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i\to q})X|\phi_i^H\rangle + (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+1\to q})(A^H_{i\to i+1})X|\phi_i^H\rangle.
\end{aligned}$$

Applying G_x^Θ and using the triangle equality, we have $\left\| G_x^\Theta (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i\to q})|\phi_i^H\rangle \right\| \leq$

$$\left\| G_x^\Theta (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+1\to q})|\phi_{i+1}^H\rangle \right\| + \left\| G_x^\Theta (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i\to q})X|\phi_i^H\rangle \right\| + \left\| G_x^\Theta (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+1\to q})(A^H_{i\to i+1})X|\phi_i^H\rangle \right\|.$$

Summing up the above inequality over $i = 0, \cdots, q-1$, we get

$$\left\| G_x^\Theta |\phi_q^{H_{x\Theta}}\rangle \right\| \leq \left\| G_x^\Theta |\phi_q^H\rangle \right\| + \sum_{0 \leq i < q, b \in \{0,1\}} \left\| G_x^\Theta (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+b\to q})(A^H_{i\to i+b})X|\phi_i^H\rangle \right\| \quad (2)$$

[8] This initial state can be seen as an additional input to A. In [12, Theorem 2], it is also implicitly required that the initial state is independent of H and Θ.

Note that A's i^*-th query is classical and the query input is $|x\rangle$. Then, $X|\phi^H_{(i^*-1)}\rangle = |\phi^H_{(i^*-1)}\rangle$. Thus, there is a specific term

$$\left\|G^{\Theta}_x(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i^*-1)\to q})X|\phi^H_{(i^*-1)}\rangle\right\| = \left\|G^{\Theta}_x(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i^*-1)\to q})|\phi^H_{(i^*-1)}\rangle\right\| \tag{3}$$

on the right hand side of inequality (2).

Set $B^H_{j\to k} = A_{i^*+k}O_H\cdots A_{i^*+j+1}O_H$ for $k \geq (j+1)$ ($B^H_{j\to k} = \mathbb{I}$ for $k \leq j$.), $|\psi_0\rangle = (A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i^*-1)\to i^*})\,|\phi^H_{(i^*-1)}\rangle$, and $|\psi^H_j\rangle = B^H_{0\to j}|\psi_0\rangle$. Then, $\left\|G^{\Theta}_x(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i^*-1)\to q})|\phi^H_{(i^*-1)}\rangle\right\| = \left\|G^{\Theta}_x|\psi^{H_{x\Theta}}_{q-i^*}\rangle\right\| = \left\|G^{\Theta}_x B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{0\to(q-i^*)}|\psi_0\rangle\right\|$.

Since $H_{x\Theta}(x') = H(x')$ for all $x' \neq x$, we have $(B^H_{j\to(j+1)})(\mathbb{I}-X)|\psi^H_j\rangle = (B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j\to(j+1)})(\mathbb{I}-X)|\psi^H_j\rangle$. Thus, we can write $(B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j+1\to(q-i^*)})|\psi^H_{j+1}\rangle$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= (B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j+1\to(q-i^*)})(B^H_{j\to j+1})(\mathbb{I}-X)|\psi^H_j\rangle + (B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j+1\to(q-i^*)})(B^H_{j\to j+1})X|\psi^H_j\rangle\\
&= (B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j\to(q-i^*)})(\mathbb{I}-X)|\psi^H_j\rangle + (B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j+1\to(q-i^*)})(B^H_{j\to j+1})X|\psi^H_j\rangle\\
&= (B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j\to(q-i^*)})|\psi^H_j\rangle - (B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j\to(q-i^*)})X|\psi^H_j\rangle + (B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j+1\to(q-i^*)})(B^H_{j\to j+1})X|\psi^H_j\rangle.
\end{aligned}$$

Rearranging terms, applying G^{Θ}_x and using the triangle equality, we have $\left\|G^{\Theta}_x(B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j\to(q-i^*)})|\psi^H_j\rangle\right\| \leq \left\|G^{\Theta}_x(B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j+1\to(q-i^*)})|\psi^H_{j+1}\rangle\right\| +$

$$\left\|G^{\Theta}_x(B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j\to(q-i^*)})X|\psi^H_j\rangle\right\| + \left\|G^{\Theta}_x(B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j+1\to(q-i^*)})(B^H_{j\to j+1})X|\psi^H_j\rangle\right\|.$$

Summing up the inequality over $j = 0,\cdots,q-i^*-1$, we get

$$\begin{aligned}
\left\|G^{\Theta}_x(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i^*-1)\to q})|\phi^H_{(i^*-1)}\rangle\right\| = \ &\left\|G^{\Theta}_x B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{0\to(q-i^*)}|\psi_0\rangle\right\| \leq \left\|G^{\Theta}_x|\psi^H_{q-i^*}\right\| +\\
&\sum_{0\leq j<(q-i^*),b\in\{0,1\}} \left\|G^{\Theta}_x(B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j+b\to(q-i^*)})(B^H_{j\to j+b})X|\psi^H_j\rangle\right\|
\end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

According to equalities (2), (3) and (4), we get

$$\left\|G^{\Theta}_x|\phi^{H_{x\Theta}}_q\rangle\right\| \leq Term1 + Term2, \tag{5}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
Term0 \ &= \sum_{\substack{0\leq i<(i^*-1)\\ b_0\in\{0,1\}}} \left\|G^{\Theta}_x(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+b_0\to q})(A^H_{i\to i+b_0})X|\phi^H_i\rangle\right\| + \left\|G^{\Theta}_x(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i^*-1)\to q})X|\phi^H_{(i^*-1)}\rangle\right\|\\
&= \sum_{0\leq i<(i^*-1),b_0\in\{0,1\}} \left\|G^{\Theta}_x(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+b_0\to q})(A^H_{i\to i+b_0})X|\phi^H_i\rangle\right\|\\
&+ \left\|G^{\Theta}_x|\psi^H_{q-i^*}\right\| + \sum_{0\leq j<(q-i^*),b_0\in\{0,1\}} \left\|G^{\Theta}_x(B^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j+b_0\to(q-i^*)})(B^H_{j\to j+b_0})X|\psi^H_j\rangle\right\|\\
&= \sum_{0\leq i<(i^*-1),b_0\in\{0,1\}} \left\|G^{\Theta}_x(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+b_0\to q})(A^H_{i\to i+b_0})X|\phi^H_i\rangle\right\|\\
&+ \left\|G^{\Theta}_x(A^H_{i^*\to q})(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i^*-1)\to i^*})|\phi^H_{(i^*-1)}\rangle\right\|
\end{aligned}$$

$$+\sum_{\substack{i^*\le i<q\\ b_0\in\{0,1\}}}\left\|G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i+b_0)\to q})(A^{H}_{i\to(i+b_0)})X(A^{H}_{i^*\to i})(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i^*-1)\to i^*})|\phi^{H}_{(i^*-1)}\rangle\right\|$$

$$Term1 = \left\|G_x^{\Theta}|\phi_q^H\rangle\right\| + \sum_{\substack{i^*\le i<q\\ b_1\in\{0,1\}}}\left\|G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+b_1\to q})(A^{H}_{i\to i+b_1})X|\phi_i^H\rangle\right\|$$
$$+\left\|G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i^*\to q})(A^{H}_{(i^*-1)\to i^*})X|\phi^{H}_{(i^*-1)}\rangle\right\|.$$

According to inequality (5), we have $\left\|G_x^{\Theta}|\phi_q^{H_{x\Theta}}\rangle\right\|^2 \le 2Term0^2 + 2Term1^2$. Since $G_x^{\Theta} = G_x^{\Theta}X$, we get $G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H}_{i^*\to q})(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i^*-1)\to i^*})|\phi^{H}_{(i^*-1)}\rangle = G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i+b_0)\to q})(A^{H}_{i\to(i+b_0)})X(A^{H}_{i^*\to i})(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i^*-1)\to i^*})|\phi^{H}_{(i^*-1)}\rangle$ with $i=q$ and $b_0=0$ and $G_x^{\Theta}|\phi_q^H\rangle = G_x^{\Theta}X|\phi_q^H\rangle = G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+b_1\to q})(A^{H}_{i\to i+b_1})X|\phi_i^H\rangle$ with $i=q$ and $b_1=0$. Then, using Jensen's inequality, we have

$$\begin{aligned}Term0^2 &\le (2q-1)\Big(\sum_{0\le i<(i^*-1),b_0\in\{0,1\}}\left\|G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+b_0\to q})(A^{H}_{i\to i+b_0})X|\phi_i^H\rangle\right\|^2\\ &+\left\|G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H}_{i^*\to q})(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i^*-1)\to i^*})|\phi^{H}_{(i^*-1)}\rangle\right\|^2\\ &+\sum_{\substack{i^*\le i<q\\ b_0\in\{0,1\}}}\left\|G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i+b_0)\to q})(A^{H}_{i\to(i+b_0)})X(A^{H}_{i^*\to i})(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i^*-1)\to i^*})|\phi^{H}_{(i^*-1)}\rangle\right\|^2\Big)\\ &= (2q-1)^2\,\mathbb{E}_{i,b_0}\left[\left\|\delta_{i<(i^*-1)}T_0\right\|^2+\left\|\delta_{i\ge i^*}T_1\right\|^2\right],\end{aligned}$$

where $T_0 = (G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+b_0\to q})(A^{H}_{i\to i+b_0})X|\phi_i^H\rangle)$, $T_1 = G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i+b_0)\to q})(A^{H}_{i\to(i+b_0)})X(A^{H}_{i^*\to i})(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{(i^*-1)\to i^*})|\phi^{H}_{(i^*-1)}\rangle$, $\delta_{i<(i^*-1)}=1$ if $i<(i^*-1)$ otherwise 0, $\delta_{i\ge i^*}=1$ if $i\ge i^*$ otherwise 0, the expectation in $Term0^2$ is over uniform $(i,b_0)\in([q-1]\setminus\{i^*-1\}\times\{0,1\})\cup\{(q,0)\}$. Then, the probability of S outputting (x,z) such that $V(x,\Theta,z)=1$ is exactly $\mathbb{E}_{i,b_0}\left[\left\|\delta_{i<(i^*-1)}T_0\right\|^2+\left\|\delta_{i\ge i^*}T_1\right\|^2\right]$.

$$\begin{aligned}Term1^2 &\le (2q-2i^*+2)\Big(\left\|G_x^{\Theta}|\phi_q^H\rangle\right\|^2+\sum_{\substack{i^*\le i<q\\ b_1\in\{0,1\}}}\left\|G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i+b_1\to q})(A^{H}_{i\to i+b_1})X|\phi_i^H\rangle\right\|^2\\ &+\left\|G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{i^*\to q})(A^{H}_{(i^*-1)\to i^*})X|\phi^{H}_{(i^*-1)}\rangle\right\|^2\Big)\\ &= (2q-2i^*+2)^2\,\mathbb{E}_{j,b_1}\left[\left\|G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j+b_1\to q})(A^{H}_{j\to j+b_1})X|\phi_j^H\rangle\right\|^2\right]\end{aligned}$$

where the expectation in $Term1^2$ is over uniform $(j,b_1)\in(\{i^*,\cdots,q-1\}\times\{0,1\})\cup\{(q,0)\}\cup\{(i^*-1,1)\}$. Then, the probability of S_1 outputting (x,z) such that $V(x,\Theta,z)=1$ is exactly $\mathbb{E}_{j,b_1}\left[\left\|G_x^{\Theta}(A^{H_{x\Theta}}_{j+b_1\to q})(A^{H}_{j\to j+b_1})X|\phi_j^H\rangle\right\|^2\right]$.

Since the initial state is independent of H and Θ, we have $\Pr_{H,\Theta}[\left\|G_x^{\Theta}|\phi_q^{H_{x\Theta}}\rangle\right\|^2]$ $= \Pr_{H,\Theta}[\left\|G_x^{H(x)}|\phi_q^{H}\rangle\right\|^2]$. Thus, for any $x_0 \in X$ and predicate V, we have $\Pr_H[x = x_0 \wedge V(x,\Theta,z) = 1 : (x,z) \leftarrow A^{|H\rangle}] \leq 2(2q-1)^2 \Pr_{H,\Theta}[x = x_0 \wedge V(x,\Theta,z) = 1 : (x,z) \leftarrow S^A] + 8q^2 \Pr_{H,\Theta}[x = x_0 \wedge V(x,\Theta,z) = 1 : (x,z) \leftarrow S_1^A]$, as desired. Set $V_1(x,y,z) = 1$ iff y is returned for A's i^*-th query. When $V = V_1 \wedge V_2$, we get $\Pr_{H,\Theta}[x = x_0 \wedge V(x,\Theta,z) = 1 : (x,z) \leftarrow S_1^A] \leq \Pr[H(x) = \Theta] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{Y}|}$.

2.2 Cryptographic Primitives

Definition 2.1 (Public-key encryption). *A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme* PKE *consists of a triple of polynomial time (in the security parameter λ) algorithms and a finite message space $\mathcal{M}$. (1) $Gen(1^\lambda) \to (pk, sk)$: the key generation algorithm, is a probabilistic algorithm which on input 1^λ outputs a public/secret key-pair (pk, sk). Usually, for brevity, we will omit the input of Gen. (2) $Enc(pk, m) \to c$: the encryption algorithm Enc, on input pk and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, outputs a ciphertext $c \leftarrow Enc(pk, m)$. (3) $Dec(sk, c) \to m$: the decryption algorithm Dec, is a deterministic algorithm which on input sk and a ciphertext c outputs a message $m := Dec(sk, c)$ or a rejection symbol $\perp \notin \mathcal{M}$.*

Definition 2.2 (Correctness [17]). *A* PKE *is* δ-correct *if* $E[\max_{m\in\mathcal{M}} \Pr[Dec(sk,c) \neq m : c \leftarrow Enc(pk,m)]] \leq \delta$, *where the expectation is taken over* $(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen$. *We say a PKE is perfectly correct if* $\delta = 0$.

Note that this definition works for a deterministic or randomized PKE, but for a deterministic PKE[9] the term $\max_{m\in\mathcal{M}} \Pr[Dec(sk,c) \neq m : c = Enc(pk,m)]$ is either 0 or 1 for each keypair (pk, sk).

Definition 2.3 (Injectivity of DPKE [6]). *A deterministic PKE (DPKE) is* ε-injective *if* $\Pr[Enc(pk,*)$ *is not injective* $: (pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen] \leq \varepsilon$.

Remark 2. we observe that if DPKE is δ-correct, then DPKE is injective with probability $\geq 1 - \delta$. That is, for DPKE, δ-correctness implies δ-injectivity.

Definition 2.4 (OW-CPA-secure PKE). *Let* PKE $= (Gen, Enc, Dec)$ *be a public-key encryption scheme with message space $\mathcal{M}$. Define* $\mathrm{OW-CPA}$ *game of PKE as in Fig. 2. Define the* $\mathrm{OW-CPA}$ *advantage function of an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against PKE as* $\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{OW-CPA}}_{\text{PKE}}(\mathcal{A}) := \Pr[\text{OW-CPA}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\text{PKE}} = 1]$.

Game OW-CPA	Game IND-CPA
1 : $(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen, m^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$	1 : $(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen, b \leftarrow_\$ \{0,1\}$
2 : $c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*), m' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk, c^*)$	2 : $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk)$
3 : **return** $m' =? m^*$	3 : $c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m_b), b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk, c^*)$
	4 : **return** $b' =? b$

Fig. 2: Game OW-CPA and game IND-CPA for PKE.

[9] A PKE is determinstic if *Enc* is deterministic

Definition 2.5 (IND-CPA-secure PKE). *Let* $\mathrm{PKE} = (Gen, Enc, Dec)$ *be a PKE scheme. Define* $\mathrm{IND}-\mathrm{CPA}$ *game of PKE as in Fig. 2, where* m_0 *and* m_1 *have the same length. Define the* $\mathrm{IND}-\mathrm{CPA}$ *advantage function of an adversary* $\mathcal{A}$ *against PKE as* $\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-CPA}}_{\mathrm{PKE}}(\mathcal{A}) := |\Pr[\text{IND-CPA}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathrm{PKE}} = 1] - 1/2|$.

Malleability. In this paper, we say a $\mathrm{PKE} = (Gen, Enc, Dec)$ has a malleability property if for any (pk, sk) generated by Gen, any $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and $c \leftarrow Enc(pk, m)$, there exists an algorithm B that on input (pk, c) outputs (f, c') such that (1) $f(m) = Dec(sk, c')$ $(Dec(sk, c') \neq \perp)$ (2) $f(\tilde{m}) \neq Dec(sk, c')$ for any $\tilde{m} \in \mathcal{M}$ and $\tilde{m} \neq m$.

Definition 2.6 (Key encapsulation). *A key encapsulation mechanism KEM consists of three algorithms. (1)* $Gen(1^\lambda) \to (pk, sk)$*: the key generation algorithm Gen outputs a key pair* (pk, sk)*. Usually, for brevity, we will omit the input of Gen. (2)* $Encaps(pk) \to (K, c)$*: the encapsulation algorithm Encaps, on input pk, outputs a tuple* (K, c)*, where* $K \in \mathcal{K}$ *and ciphertext c is said to be an encapsulation of the key K. (3)* $Decaps(sk, c) \to K$*: the deterministic decapsulation algorithm Decaps, on input sk and an encapsulation c, outputs either a key* $K := Decaps(sk, c) \in \mathcal{K}$ *or a rejection symbol* $\perp \notin \mathcal{K}$*.*

Definition 2.7 (IND-CCA-secure KEM). *We define the* $\mathrm{IND}-\mathrm{CCA}$ *game as in Fig. 3 and the advantage function of an adversary* $\mathcal{A}$ *against* KEM *as* $\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-CCA}}_{\mathrm{KEM}}(\mathcal{A}) := \left|\Pr[\text{IND-CCA}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\mathrm{KEM}} = 1] - 1/2\right|$.

Game IND-CCA	$\textsc{Decaps}(sk, c)$
1 : $(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen, b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}$	1 : **if** $c = c^*$ **return** $\perp$
2 : $(K_0^*, c^*) \leftarrow Encaps(pk), K_1^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$	2 : **else return**
3 : $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\textsc{Decaps}}(pk, c^*, K_b^*)$	3 : $K := Decaps(sk, c)$
4 : **return** $b' =? b$	

Fig. 3: IND-CCA game for KEM.

2.3 Learning with Error (LWE)

Definition 2.8. *Let* n, m, q *be positive integers, and let* χ *be a distribution over* $\mathbb{Z}$*. The (decision) LWE problem is to distinguish between the distributions* $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{As} + \mathbf{e} (\mathrm{mod} q))$ *and* $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{u})$*, where* $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$*,* $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{Z}_q^n$*,* $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \chi^m$*,* $\mathbf{u} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{Z}_q^m$*.*

In this paper, we refer the LWE assumption to that no quantum polynomial-time algorithm can solve the LWE problem with more than a negligible advantage.

2.4 Proof of Quantum access to Random Oracle (PoQRO)

Definition 2.9 ([40]). *A (non-interactive) proof of quantum access to a random oracle (PoQRO) consists of the following three algorithms. (1)* $Setup(1^\lambda)$*:*

This is a classical algorithm that takes the security parameter 1^λ as input and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk. (2) $Prove^{|H\rangle}(pk)$: This is a quantum algorithm that takes a public key pk as input and given quantum access to a random oracle H, and outputs a proof π[10]. (3) $Verify^H(sk, \pi)$: This is a classical algorithm that takes a secret key sk and a proof π as input and given classical access to a random oracle H, and outputs 1 indicating acceptance or 0 indicating rejection. PoQRO is required to satisfy the following properties.

Correctness. *We have* $\Pr[Verify^H(sk, \pi) = 0 : (pk, sk) \leftarrow Setep(1^\lambda), \pi \leftarrow Prove^{|H\rangle}(pk)] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$.

Soundness. *For any quantum polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that is given a classical oracle access to H, we have* $\Pr[Verify^H(sk, \pi) = 1 : Setep(1^\lambda), \pi \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^H(pk)] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$.

Lemma 2.5 ([40, Theorem 3.3]). *If the LWE assumption holds, then there exists a PoQRO.*

3 IND-1-CCA-secure KEM without re-encryption and ciphertext expansion

To a public-key encryption PKE′=(Gen', Enc', Dec') and a random oracle H ($H : \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{K}$), we associate KEM = $T_{RH}[\mathrm{PKE}', H]$. 0 can be any fixed message in $\mathcal{M}$. The algorithms of KEM=(Gen,$Encaps$,$Decaps$) are defined as in Fig. 4.

Theorem 3.1 (ROM security). *If PKE′ is* δ-correct*, for any adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the IND-1-CCA security of KEM in Fig. 4, issuing at most a single (classical) query to the decapsulation oracle* DECAPS *and at most q_H queries to the random oracle H, there exists a OW-CPA adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and an IND-CPA adversary $\mathcal{D}$ against PKE′ which run in about the same time as $\mathcal{B}$ such that*

$$\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\text{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq q_H(q_H+1)\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{OW-CPA}}_{\text{PKE}'}(\mathcal{A}) \tag{6}$$
$$\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\text{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq 2(q_H+1)\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-CPA}}_{\text{PKE}'}(\mathcal{D}) + 2q_H(q_H+1)/\left|\mathcal{M}\right|.$$

If the PKE is deterministic, the bound (6) can be improved as

$$\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\text{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq (q_H+1)\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{OW-CPA}}_{\text{PKE}'}(\mathcal{A}) + (q_H+1)\delta.$$

Gen	*Encaps*(*pk*)	*Decaps*(*sk*, *c*)
1 : $(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen'$	1 : $m \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{M}$	1 : $m' := Dec'(sk, c)$
2 : **return** (pk, sk)	2 : $c \leftarrow Enc'(pk, m)$	2 : **if** $m' = \perp$ **return** $K := H(0, c)$
	3 : $K := H(m, c)$	3 : **else return** $K := H(m', c)$
	4 : **return** (K, c)	

Fig. 4: IND-1-CCA-secure KEM = $T_{RH}[\mathrm{PKE}', H]$

[10] Here, π is a classical value, and note a quantum state

GAMES $G_0 - G_2$

$(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen', j = 0, i \leftarrow\!\!\$\, [q_H]$
QUERY $=$ **false** , $H_1 \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \Omega_H$
$\bar{k}, k_1^* \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{K}, b \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \{0,1\}$
$m^* \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{M}, c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*)$
$k_0^* = H(m^*, c^*)$ $//G_0$
$k_0^* \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{K}$ $//G_1 - G_2$
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^{H, \text{DECAPS}}(pk, c^*, k_b^*)$
return $b' =? b$

$H_1^i(m, c)$

if $(m, c) = (m_{i+1}, c_{i+1})$
  return $\bar{k}$
else return $H_1(m, c)$

$H(m, c)$

if $(m, c) = (m^*, c^*)$ $//G_1 - G_2$
  QUERY $=$ **true** $//G_1 - G_2$
if $j \geq i$ **return** $H_1^i(m, c)$ $//G_2$
$j = j + 1$ $//G_2$
return $H_1(m, c)$

DECAPS $(sk, \bar{c} \neq c^*)$ $//G_0 - G_2$

if more than 1 query **return** $\perp$
return $K := \bar{k}$ $//G_2$
$m' := Dec'(sk, \bar{c})$
if $m' = \perp$ **do** $\bar{m} = 0$
else do $\bar{m} = m'$
return $K := H(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$ $//G_0 - G_1$

Fig. 5: Games G_0-G_2 for the proof of Theorem 3.1

Proof. Let $\mathcal{B}$ be an adversary against the IND-CCA security of KEM, issuing (exactly) one classical query to DECAPS (by introducing a dummy query if necessary), and at most q_H queries (excluding the queries implicitly made in DECAPS) to H. Let Ω_H be the sets of all functions $H : \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{K}$. Consider the games in Fig. 5.

GAME G_0. Since game G_0 is exactly the IND-1-CCA game, $\left|\Pr[G_0^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] - 1/2\right| = \mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\text{KEM}}(\mathcal{B})$.

GAME G_1. In game G_1, $k_0^* := H(m^*, c^*)$ is replaced by $k_0^* \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{K}$. Thus, in G_1, the bit b is independent of $\mathcal{B}$'s view, thus $\Pr[G_1^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] = 1/2$. Define QUERY as the event that (m^*, c^*) is queried to H. Then, G_1 is identical with G_0 in $\mathcal{B}$'s view unless the event QUERY happens. Thus, we have

$$\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\text{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) = \left|\Pr[G_0^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_1^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1]\right| \leq \Pr[\text{QUERY} : G_1].$$

GAME G_2. In game G_2, we make two changes. First, we modify the DECAPS oracle, and replace $K := H(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$ by $K := \bar{k}$. Second, we reprogram the random oracle H conditional a uniform i over $[q_H]$. In particular, reprogram H to H_1^i (given by Fig. 5) when $\mathcal{B}$ makes the $(i+1)$-th H-query $(0 \leq i \leq (q_H - 1))$, and then answer $\mathcal{B}$ with H_1^i for $\mathcal{B}$'s j-th query $(j \geq (i+1))$. $H_1^i(m, c)$ returns $\bar{k}$ when $(m, c) = (m_{i+1}, c_{i+1})$ and $H_1(m, c)$ otherwise. Let $(i^* + 1)$ be the number of $\mathcal{B}$'s first query to H with $(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$, where $i^* \in [q_H - 1]$. We also denote $i^* = q_H$ as the event that $\mathcal{B}$ makes no query to H with $(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$. Note that G_3 has the same distribution as G_2 in $\mathcal{B}$'s view when $i^* = i$. Thus, we have

$$\Pr[\text{QUERY} : G_1] \leq (q_H + 1) \Pr[\text{QUERY} : G_2].$$

Let $(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen'$, $m^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{M}$, $c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*)$. Then, we construct an adversary $\mathcal{A}'(pk, c^*)$ that simulates $\mathcal{B}$'s view as in game G_2 and returns $\mathcal{B}$'s H-query list H-List, see Fig. 6. Note that a q_H-wise independent function is statistically indistinguishable from a true random function for any distinguisher that makes at most q_H queries [41]. Thus, the probability of the H-List returned by $\mathcal{A}'$ contains (m^*, c^*) is exactly $\Pr[\textsc{Query} : G_2]$.

Now, we construct an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against the OW-CPA security of underlying PKE. If the underlying PKE is probabilistic, $\mathcal{A}$ runs $\mathcal{A}'$, and randomly selects one message in the H-List as a return. Then, we have $\mathtt{Adv}^{\mathrm{OW-CPA}}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}(\mathcal{A}) = 1/q_H \Pr[\textsc{Query} : G_2]$. If the underlying PKE is deterministic, $\mathcal{A}$ runs $\mathcal{A}'$, selects a (m', c') from H-List such that $c' = c^*$ and $Enc(pk, m') = c^*$, and returns m'. If the challenge ciphertext c^* will not yield a decryption failure (this happens with probability $1 - \delta$), the probability of that $\mathcal{A}$ returns m^* is $\Pr[\textsc{Query} : G_2]$. Thus, we have $\mathtt{Adv}^{\mathrm{OW-CPA}}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}(\mathcal{A}) \geq \Pr[\textsc{Query} : G_2] - \delta$. Therefore, putting the inequalities together will yield the following result. For probabilistic PKE, we have

$$\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\mathrm{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq q_H(q_H + 1)\mathtt{Adv}^{\mathrm{OW-CPA}}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}(\mathcal{A}).$$

For deterministic PKE, we have

$$\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\mathrm{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq (q_H + 1)\mathtt{Adv}^{\mathrm{OW-CPA}}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}(\mathcal{A}) + (q_H + 1)\delta.$$



Fig. 6: Adversary $\mathcal{A}'$ for the proof of Theorem 3.1

When the underlying PKE satisfies IND-CPA security, we can construct an IND-CPA adversary $\mathcal{D}$, and derive a tighter bound. In particular, $\mathcal{D}(pk)$ samples two uniform messages m_0^* and m_1^* from $\mathcal{M}$, i.e., $m_0^*, m_1^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{M}$. The IND-CPA challenger chooses a bit b, generates the challenge ciphertext $c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m_b^*)$ and sends c^* to $\mathcal{D}$. Then, $\mathcal{D}$ runs $\mathcal{A}'(pk, c^*)$, get $\mathcal{B}$'s H-List. If $(m_{b'}^*, *)$ is in H-List and $(m_{1-b'}^*, *)$ is not in H-List, $\mathcal{D}$ returns b'. For other cases, $\mathcal{D}$ return a uniform b', i.e., $b' \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}$.

Let BAD be the event that $\mathcal{B}$ queries $(m_{1-b}^*, *)$ (that is, $(m_{1-b}^*, *)$ is in H-List). Note that m_{1-b}^* is uniformly distributed and independent from $\mathcal{B}$'s view.

Thus, the events BAD and QUERY are independent, and $\Pr[\mathrm{BAD}] \leq q_H / |\mathcal{M}|$. Note that if BAD does not happen, then $\mathcal{D}$ makes a correct guess of b with probability 1 when QUERY happens, and with probability 1/2 when QUERY does not happen. Thus, we have $\mathtt{Adv}^{\mathrm{IND-CPA}}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}(\mathcal{D}) = |\Pr[b' = b] - 1/2|$

$$
\begin{aligned}
&= |\Pr[b' = b \wedge \mathrm{BAD}] + \Pr[b' = b \wedge \neg\mathrm{BAD}] - 1/2(\Pr[\mathrm{BAD}] + \Pr[\neg\mathrm{BAD}])| \\
&\geq |\Pr[b' = b \wedge \neg\mathrm{BAD}] - 1/2\Pr[\neg\mathrm{BAD}]| - \Pr[\mathrm{BAD}]\,|\Pr[b' = b|\mathrm{BAD}] - 1/2| \\
&\geq |\Pr[b' = b \wedge \neg\mathrm{BAD}] - 1/2\Pr[\neg\mathrm{BAD}]| - 1/2\Pr[\mathrm{BAD}] \\
&= |\Pr[b' = b \wedge \neg\mathrm{BAD} \wedge \mathrm{QUERY}] - 1/2\Pr[\neg\mathrm{BAD} \wedge \mathrm{QUERY}]| - 1/2\Pr[\mathrm{BAD}] \\
&= 1/2\Pr[\neg\mathrm{BAD} \wedge \mathrm{QUERY}] - 1/2\Pr[\mathrm{BAD}] \\
&\geq 1/2\Pr[\mathrm{QUERY}] - \Pr[\mathrm{BAD}] \\
&\geq 1/2\Pr[\mathrm{QUERY}] - q_H/|\mathcal{M}| = 1/2\Pr[\mathrm{QUERY} : G_2] - q_H/|\mathcal{M}|\,.
\end{aligned}
$$

Putting the bounds together, we have

$$\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\mathrm{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq 2(q_H+1)\mathtt{Adv}^{\mathrm{IND-CPA}}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}(\mathcal{D}) + 2q_H(q_H+1)/|\mathcal{M}|\,.$$

□

Theorem 3.2 (QROM security). *If PKE′ is* δ-correct*, for any adversary* $\mathcal{B}$ *against the IND-1-CCA security of KEM in Fig. 4, issuing at most single (classical) query to the decapsulation oracle* DECAPS *and at most* q_H *queries to the quantum random oracle* H*, there exists a OW-CPA adversary* $\mathcal{A}$ *and an IND-CPA adversary* $\mathcal{D}$ *against PKE′ such that the running time of* $\mathcal{A}$ *and* $\mathcal{D}$ *is about that of* $\mathcal{B}$*,*

$$\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\mathrm{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq 6(q_H+1)^2\sqrt{\mathtt{Adv}^{\mathrm{OW-CPA}}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}(\mathcal{A}) + 1/|\mathcal{K}|}.$$

$$\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\mathrm{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq 6(q_H+1)\sqrt{4\mathtt{Adv}^{\mathrm{IND-CPA}}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}(\mathcal{D}) + 2(q_H+1)^2/|\mathcal{M}| + 1/|\mathcal{K}|}.$$

If the PKE is deterministic, the bound can be improved as

$$\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\mathrm{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq 6(q_H+1)\sqrt{\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{OW-CPA}}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}(\mathcal{A}) + 1/|\mathcal{K}| + \delta}.$$

Proof sketch: Our proof mainly consists of two steps. One is the underlying security game embedding via replacing the real key $H(m^*, c^*)$ with a random key (i.e., reprogramming H). We argue the impact of such a reprogramming by different O2H variants. When the underlying PKE is OW-CPA-secure, we follow previous proofs for $U^{\not\perp}$ in [21, 6], and use general O2H (Lemma 2.1) for probabilistic PKE and double-sided O2H (Lemma 2.2) for deterministic PKE. When the underlying PKE is IND-CPA-secure, we also adopt double-sided O2H (Lemma 2.2) to argue the reprogramming impact. Since the embedded IND-CPA game is decisional, an additional game that searches a reprogramming point in double-sided oracle is introduced and we use Lemma 2.3 to argue this advantage. The other is simulation of the DECAPS oracle. As discussed in Sec. 1.2, we adopt a

new DECAPS simulation that directly replaces the output $H(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$ with a random key $\bar{k}$. Intuitionally, this simulation is perfect if $H(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$ is reprogrammed to be $\bar{k}$ when the adversary first makes a query $(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$. However, in the QROM, it is hard to define the first time to query $(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$. Thus, in the QROM, we argue this in a different way. We find the simulation is perfect if the predicate $\text{DECAPS}(sk, \bar{c}) = H(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$ is satisfied. Since in the simulation of DECAPS, an implicit (classical) H-query $(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$ made in the real implementation is removed and thus this specific query can not be measured. Therefore, we use a refined measure-and-reprogram technique in Lemma 2.4 to argue the simulation impact.

Proof. Let Ω_H be the sets of all functions $H : \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{K}$. Let $\mathcal{B}$ be an IND-CCA adversary against KEM, issuing a single classical query to DECAPS (if none, introduce a dummy one), and at most q_H quantum queries (excluding the queries implicitly made in DECAPS) to H. Consider the games in Fig. 7.

GAME G_0. Since game G_0 is exactly the IND-1-CCA game, $\left|\Pr[G_0^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] - 1/2\right| = \mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\text{KEM}}(\mathcal{B})$.

GAME G_1. In game G_1, the random oracle H accessed by $\mathcal{B}$ is replaced by an oracle H' given by Fig. 7. It is easy to see that G_1 can be rewritten as game G_2.

GAMES $G_0 - G_2$

$(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen', H \leftarrow_{\$} \Omega_H$
$k, k_1^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{K}, b \leftarrow_{\$} \{0,1\}$
$m^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{M}, c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*)$
$k_0^* = H(m^*, c^*)$ $//G_0 - G_1$
$k_0^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{K}$ $//G_2$
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^{|H\rangle, \text{DECAPS}}(pk, c^*, k_b^*)$ $//G_0, G_2$
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^{|H'\rangle, \text{DECAPS}}(pk, c^*, k_b^*)$ $//G_1$
return $b' =? b$

DECAPS $(sk, \bar{c} \neq c^*)$ $//G_0 - G_2$

$m' := Dec'(sk, \bar{c})$
if more than 1 query **return** $\perp$
if $m' = \perp$ **do** $\bar{m} = 0$
else do $\bar{m} = m'$
return $K := H(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$

$H'(m, c)$

if $(m, c) = (m^*, c^*)$ **return** k
return $H(m, c)$

Fig. 7: Games G_0-G_2 for the proof of Theorem 3.2

GAME G_2. The game G_2 is the same as game G_0 except that $k_0^* := H(m^*, c^*)$ is replaced by $k_0^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{K}$. Thus, in G_2, the bit b is independent of $\mathcal{B}$'s view, thus $\Pr[G_2^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] = 1/2$. Note that games G_1 and G_2 have the same distribution. Thus, $\Pr[G_1^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[G_2^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] = 1/2$. Therefore, we have

$$\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\text{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) = \left|\Pr[G_0^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_1^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1]\right|. \tag{7}$$

Lemma 3.1. *There exists a OW-CPA adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against probabilistic* PKE$'$ *such that the running time of $\mathcal{A}$ is about that of $\mathcal{B}$ and* $\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\text{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq 6(q_H + 1)^2 \sqrt{\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{OW-CPA}}_{\text{PKE}'}(\mathcal{A}) + 1/|\mathcal{K}|}$.

GAMES $G_{3A} - G_{4A}$

$(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen', H \leftarrow_{\$} \Omega_H, k^*, \bar{k} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{K}, m^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{M}, c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*)$

$l = 0, j \leftarrow_{\$} [q_H - 1], (i, b) \leftarrow_{\$} ([q_H - 1] \times \{0, 1\}) \cup \{(q_H, 0)\}$

Run $\mathcal{B}^{|H\rangle, \text{DECAPS}}(pk, c^*, k^*)$ until the $(j{+}1)$-th query $|\psi\rangle$ $\quad //G_{3A}$

Run $\mathcal{B}^{|H_1^i\rangle, \text{DECAPS}}(pk, c^*, k^*)$ until the $(j{+}1)$-th query state$|\psi\rangle$ $\quad //G_{4A}$

$(m', c') \leftarrow M|\psi\rangle$

// Make a standard measure M on $\mathcal{B}$'s $(j+1)$-th query input register

return $m^* =?m'$

DECAPS $(sk, \bar{c} \neq c^*)$ $//G_{3A} - G_{4A}$

if more than 1 query **return** $\perp$

return $\bar{k}$ $\quad //G_{4A}$

$m' := Dec'(sk, \bar{c})$

if $m' = \perp$ **do** $\bar{m} = 0$

else do $\bar{m} = m'$

return $K := H(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$

$H_1^i(m, c)$

if $l \geq (i + b) \wedge (m, c) = (m_{i+1}, c_{i+1})$

// (m_{i+1}, c_{i+1}) is the measurement outcome

// on $\mathcal{B}$'s $(i+1)$-th query input register

return $\bar{k}$

else return $H(m, c)$

$l = l + 1$

Fig. 8: Games G_{3A}-G_{4A} for the proof of Lemma 3.1

The proof of Lemma 3.1. Define games G_{3A} and G_{4A} as in Fig. 8.

Let $z1 = (pk, sk, c^*, k_b^*, b)$. Let A^O $(O \in H, H')$ be an oracle algorithm that runs $\mathcal{B}^{|O\rangle, \text{DECAPS}}(pk, c^*, k_b^*)$ to obtain b', and returns $b' =?b$. Thus, we have $\Pr[G_0^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|H\rangle}(z1)]$ and $\Pr[G_1^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|H'\rangle}(z1)]$. Let $B(z1)$ be an algorithm that randomly samples $j \in [q_H - 1]$, runs $A^{|H'\rangle}$ until (just before) the $(j+1)$-th query[11], measures the query input registers in the computational basis, and outputs measurement outcomes. Thus, we have $\Pr[G_{3A}^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[(m^*, *) \leftarrow B^{|H\rangle}(z1)] \geq \Pr[(m^*, c^*) \leftarrow B^{|H\rangle}(z1)]$. Therefore, according to Lemma 2.1, we have

$$\left|\Pr[G_0^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_1^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1]\right| \leq 2(q_H + 1)\sqrt{\Pr[G_{3A}^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1]}.$$

Let $C^{|H\rangle}$ be an oracle algorithm that samples pk, sk, k^*, j, m^*, c^*, and runs $\mathcal{B}^{|H\rangle, \text{DECAPS}}$ as in game G_{3A}. Let $\bar{c}$ be $\mathcal{B}$'s query to the DECAPS oracle. Let $\bar{m} = 0$ if $m' = \perp$, and $\bar{m} = m'$ if $m' \neq \perp$, where $m' = Dec'(sk, \bar{c})$. Let $x = (\bar{m}, \bar{c})$, $y = H(x)$, and $z = (z_1, z_2, z_3) = (\text{DECAPS}(sk, \bar{c}), m^*, m')$. C outputs (x, z). Let $V_1(x, y, z) = (y =?z_1)$ and $V_2 = (z_2 =?z_3)$ Instantiating the predicate V in Lemma 2.4 by $V = V_1 \wedge V_2$. Note that in G_{3A} the return of DECAPS oracle is exactly $H(x)$. That is, $V_1 = 1$ is always satisfied. Thus, we have $\Pr[G_{3A}^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] = \sum x_0 \Pr_H[x = x_0 \wedge V(x, H(x), z) = 1 : (x, z) \leftarrow C^{|H\rangle}]$.

[11] In game G_{3A}, H' is rewritten to be H.

Note that C needs to implicitly query $H(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$ to simulate the DECAPS oracle. That is, C makes $q_H + 1$ H-queries in total. In the following, unless otherwise specified, the H-queries we mentioned does not include this implicit H-query. Let $S^C(\Theta)$ be an oracle algorithm that always returns Θ for C's implicit classical H-query $H(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$. S samples a uniform $(i, b) \leftarrow_\$ ([q_H - 1] \times \{0, 1\}) \cup \{(q_H, 0)\}$, and runs $C^{|H\rangle}$ until the C's $(i+1)$-th query (excluding the implicit H-query), measures the query input registers to obtain x, continues to run $C^{|H\rangle}$ until the $(i+b+1)$-th H-query, reprogram H to $H_{x\Theta}$ ($H_{x\Theta}(x) = \Theta$ and $H_{x\Theta}(x') = H(x')$ for all $x' \neq x$), and runs $A^{|H_{x\Theta}\rangle}$ until the end to output z. Let $x = (\bar{m}, \bar{c})$, $y = \Theta$, and $z = (z_1, z_2, z_3) = (\text{DECAPS}(sk, \bar{c}), m^*, m')$. S^C outputs (x, z). Note that $V_1(x, y, z) = (y =? z_1) = 1$ for S^C. Sample $\Theta = \bar{k} \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{K}$ and $H \leftarrow_\$ \Omega_H$. Then, $S^C(\Theta)$ perfectly simulates game G_{4A} and we have $\Pr[G^{\mathcal{B}}_{4A} \Rightarrow 1] = \sum x_0 \Pr_{H,\Theta}[x = x_0 \wedge V(x, \Theta, z) = 1 : (x, z) \leftarrow S^C]$.

According to Lemma 2.4, $\Pr_H[x = x_0 \wedge V(x, H(x), z) = 1 : (x, z) \leftarrow C^{|H\rangle}] \leq 2(2q_H + 1)^2 \Pr_{H,\Theta}[x = x_0 \wedge V(x, \Theta, z) = 1 : (x, z) \leftarrow S^C] + 8(q_H + 1)^2 |\mathcal{K}|$. Therefore, we get

$$\Pr[G^{\mathcal{B}}_{3A} \Rightarrow 1] \leq 8(q_H + 1)^2 (\Pr[G^{\mathcal{B}}_{4A} \Rightarrow 1] + 1/|\mathcal{K}|).$$

Now, we can construct a OW-CPA adversary $\mathcal{A}(pk, c^*)$ against PKE$'$, where $(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen', m^* \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{M}, c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*)$. $\mathcal{A}$ samples $k^*, \bar{k}, j, i, b$ as in game G_{4A}, picks a $2q_H$-wise independent function H (undistinguishable from a random function for a q-query adversary according to [41, Theorem 6.1]), runs $\mathcal{B}^{|H^i_1\rangle, \text{DECAPS}}(pk, c^*, k^*)$ (the simulations of H^i_1, DECAPS are the same as the ones in game G_{4A}) until the $(j+1)$-th query, measures $\mathcal{B}$'s query input register to obtain (m', c'), finally outputs m' as a return. It is obvious that the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ against the OW-CPA security of PKE$'$ is exactly $\Pr[G^{\mathcal{B}}_{4A} \Rightarrow 1]$. Putting everything together, we have

$$\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\text{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq 6(q_H + 1)^2 \sqrt{\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{OW-CPA}}_{\text{PKE}'}(\mathcal{A}) + 1/|\mathcal{K}|}.$$

Lemma 3.2. *There exists a OW-CPA adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against deterministic* PKE$'$ *such that the running time of $\mathcal{A}$ is about that of $\mathcal{B}$ and* $\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}_{\text{KEM}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq 6(q_H + 1)\sqrt{\mathtt{Adv}^{\text{OW-CPA}}_{\text{PKE}'}(\mathcal{A}) + 1/|\mathcal{K}|} + \delta$.

The proof of Lemma 3.2. Define games G_{3B}, G_{4B} and G_{5B} as in Fig. 9. Let $z1 = (pk, sk, c^*, k^*_0)$, where $(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen'$, $k^*_0 \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{K}$, $m^* \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{M}$, and $c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*)$. Sample $G \leftarrow_\$ \Omega_H$. Let G' be an oracle such that $G'(m^*, c^*) = k^*_0$, and $G'(x) = G(x)$ for $x \neq (m^*, c^*)$. Let $A^{|O\rangle}(z1)$ ($O \in G, G'$) be an oracle algorithm that first samples $k^*_1 \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{K}$, $b \leftarrow_\$ \{0, 1\}$, then runs $\mathcal{B}^{|O\rangle, \text{DECAPS}}(pk, c^*, k^*_b)$ to obtain b' (simulating DECAPS as in games G_0 and G_1), finally returns $b' =? b$. Thus, we have $\Pr[G^{\mathcal{B}}_0 \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|G'\rangle}(z1)]$ and $\Pr[G^{\mathcal{B}}_1 \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|G\rangle}(z1)]$.

Lemma 2.2 states that there exists an oracle algorithm $\bar{B}^{|G\rangle, |G'\rangle}(z1)$ such that $|\Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|G\rangle}(z1)] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|G'\rangle}(z1)| \leq 2\sqrt{\Pr[(m^*, c^*) \leftarrow \bar{B}^{|G\rangle, |G'\rangle}(z1)]}$. Define game G_{3B} as in Fig. 9, where $\hat{B}$ is the same as $\bar{B}$ except that $\hat{B}$ simulates

$\mathcal{B}$'s DECAPS query using a given DECAPS oracle (simulated as in G_0 and G_1). Thus, it is obvious that $\Pr[(m^*, c^*) \leftarrow \bar{B}^{|G\rangle,|G'\rangle}(z1)] \leq \Pr[G_{3B}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1]$. Thus, we have

$$\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathrm{KEM}}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq 2\sqrt{\Pr[G_{3B}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1]}.$$

$G_{3B} - G_{5B}$

$(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen', G \leftarrow_{\$} \Omega_H, k_0^*, \bar{k} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{K}, m^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{M}, c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*)$
$l = 0, (i, b) \leftarrow_{\$} ([q_H - 1] \times \{0, 1\}) \cup \{(q_H, 0)\}$
$(m', c') \leftarrow \hat{B}^{|G\rangle,|G'\rangle,\text{DECAPS}}(pk, c^*, k_0^*)$ $//G_{3B}, G_{4B}$
$(m', c') \leftarrow \hat{B}^{|G_1^i\rangle,|G'\rangle,\text{DECAPS}}(pk, c^*, k_0^*)$ $//G_{5B}$
return $m^* =? m'$

DECAPS $(sk, \bar{c} \neq c^*)$

if more than 1 query **return** $\perp$
return $\bar{k}$ $//G_{5B}$
$m' := Dec'(sk, \bar{c})$
if $m' = \perp$ **do** $\bar{m} = 0$
else do $\bar{m} = m'$
return $K := G(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$

$G_1^i(m, c)$

if $l \geq (i + b) \wedge (m, c) = (m_{i+1}, c_{i+1})$
// (m_{i+1}, c_{i+1}) is the measurement outcome
// on $\hat{B}$'s $(i+1)$-th query input register
  return $\bar{k}$
else return $G(m, c)$
$l = l + 1$

$G'(m, c)$

if $(m, c) = (m^*, c^*)$ $//G_{3B}$
if $c = c^* \wedge Enc'(pk, m) = c^*$ $//G_{4B} - G_{5B}$
  return $k_0^* // G_{3B} - G_{5B}$
return $G(m, c) // G_{3B} - G_{4B}$
return $G_1^i(m, c) // G_{5B}$

Fig. 9: Games G_0-G_2 for the proof of Lemma 3.2

Game G_{4B} is identical to game G_{3B} except the simulation of G'. In game G_{4B}, the judgement condition $(m, c) = (m^*, c^*)$ is replaced by $c = c^* \wedge Enc'(pk, m) = c^*$ without knowledge of m^*. Define event COLL that there is $m \neq m^*$ such that $Enc'(pk, m) = c^* = Enc'(pk, m^*)$. Note that if COLL does not happen (implied by the injectivity of DPKE), then G_{4B} and G_{3B} have the same distribution. Thus, we have

$$\left|\Pr[G_{3B}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_{4B}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1]\right| \leq \delta.$$

In game G_{5B}, DECAPS is modified to output a random $\Theta = \bar{k}$ for the single query $\bar{c}$, and the random oracle G is correspondingly reprogrammed conditioned on (i, b), where $(i, b) \leftarrow_{\$} ([q_H - 1] \times \{0, 1\}) \cup \{(q_H, 0)\}$. Using Lemma 2.4 in the same way as in Lemma 3.1, we have

$$\Pr[G_{4B}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1] \leq 8(q_H + 1)^2(\Pr[G_{5B}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1] + 1/|\mathcal{K}|).$$

Now, we can construct a OW-CPA adversary $\mathcal{A}(pk, c^*)$ against deterministic PKE$'$, where $(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen', m^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{M}, c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*)$. $\mathcal{A}$ samples $k_0^*, \bar{k}, i, b$ as in game G_{5B}, picks a $2q_H$-wise function G, runs $\hat{B}^{|G_1^i\rangle, |G'\rangle, \textsc{Decaps}}(pk, c^*, k^*)$ (the simulations of $G_1^i, G', \textsc{Decaps}$ are the same as in game G_{5B}) to obtain (m', c'), finally outputs m' as a return. It is obvious that the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ against the OW-CPA security of deterministic PKE$'$ is exactly $\Pr[G_{5B}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1]$. Thus, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathrm{KEM}}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}(\mathcal{B}) &\leq 2\sqrt{8(q_H+1)^2(\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}^{\text{OW-CPA}}(\mathcal{A}) + 1/|\mathcal{K}|) + \delta} \\ &\leq 6(q_H+1)\sqrt{\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}^{\text{OW-CPA}}(\mathcal{A}) + 1/|\mathcal{K}| + \delta}.\end{aligned}$$

Lemma 3.3. *There exists an IND-CPA adversary $\mathcal{D}$ against probabilistic* PKE$'$ *such that the running time of $\mathcal{D}$ is about that of $\mathcal{B}$ and* $\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathrm{KEM}}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq 6(q_H+1)\sqrt{4\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\mathcal{D}) + 2(q_H+1)^2/|\mathcal{M}| + 1/|\mathcal{K}|}$.

The proof of Lemma 3.3. Define games $G_{3C} - G_{6C}$ as in Fig. 10.

Let $z1 = (pk, sk, c^*, k_0^*)$, where $(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen'$, $k_0^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{K}$, $m_0^*, m_1^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{M}$, $\bar{b} \leftarrow_{\$} \{0,1\}$ and $c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m_{\bar{b}}^*)$. Sample $G \leftarrow_{\$} \Omega_H$. Let G' be an oracle such that $G'(m_{\bar{b}}^*, c^*) = k_0^*$, and $G'(x) = G(x)$ for $x \neq (m_{\bar{b}}^*, c^*)$. Let $A^{|O\rangle}(z1)$ ($O \in G, G'$) be an oracle algorithm that first samples $k_1^* \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{K}$, $\tilde{b} \leftarrow_{\$} \{0,1\}$, then runs $\mathcal{B}^{|O\rangle, \textsc{Decaps}}(pk, c^*, k_{\tilde{b}}^*)$ to obtain $\tilde{b}'$ (simulating Decaps as in games G_0 and G_1), finally returns $\tilde{b}' =? \tilde{b}$. Thus, we have $\Pr[G_0^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|G'\rangle}(z1)]$ and $\Pr[G_1^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|G\rangle}(z1)]$.

Lemma 2.1 states that there exists an oracle algorithm $\bar{B}^{|G\rangle, |G'\rangle}(z1)$ such that $|\Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|G\rangle}(z1)] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow A^{|G'\rangle}(z1)| \leq 2\sqrt{\Pr[(m_{\bar{b}}^*, c^*) \leftarrow \bar{B}^{|G\rangle, |G'\rangle}(z1)]}$. Define game G_{3C} as in Fig. 10, where $\hat{B}$ is the same as $\bar{B}$ except that $\hat{B}$ simulates $\mathcal{B}$'s Decaps query using a given Decaps oracle (simulated as in G_0 and G_1). Thus, it is obvious that $\Pr[(m_{\bar{b}}^*, c^*) \leftarrow \bar{B}^{|G\rangle, |G'\rangle}(z1)] \leq \Pr[G_{3C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1]$. Thus, we have

$$\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathrm{KEM}}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}(\mathcal{B}) \leq 2\sqrt{\Pr[G_{3C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1]}.$$

In game G_{4C}, Decaps is modified to output a random $\Theta = \bar{k}$ for the single query $\bar{c}$, and the random oracle H is correspondingly reprogrammed conditioned on (i, b), where $(i, b) \leftarrow_{\$} ([q_H - 1] \times \{0,1\}) \cup \{(q_H, 0)\}$. Then, using Lemma 2.4 in the same way as in Lemma 3.1, we have

$$\Pr[G_{3C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1] \leq 8(q_H+1)^2(\Pr[G_{4C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1] + 1/|\mathcal{K}|).$$

Game G_{5C} is identical to game G_{4C} except that $G'(m_{\bar{b}}, c^*) = k_0^*$ is replaced by $G'(m_{1-\bar{b}}, c^*) = k_0^*$, and correspondingly $(m_{1-\bar{b}}^*, c^*) =? (m', c')$ is returned instead of $(m_{\bar{b}}^*, c*) =? (m', c')$.

Note that game G_{4C} conditioned on $\bar{b} = 1$ has the same output distribution as game G_{4C} conditioned on $\bar{b} = 0$. Thus, we have $\Pr[G_{4C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1 : \bar{b} = 0] =$

$\Pr[G_{4C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1 : \bar{b} = 1] = \Pr[G_{4C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1]/2$. Analogously, we have $\Pr[G_{5C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1 : \bar{b} = 1] = \Pr[G_{5C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1]/2$. Note that $m^*_{1-\bar{b}}$ is independent of pk, c^* and k^*. Thus, according to Lemma 2.3, we have

$$\Pr[G_{5C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1 : \bar{b} = 1] \leq (q_H + 1)^2 / |\mathcal{M}| .$$

GAMES $G_{3C} - G_{6C}$

$(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen', G \leftarrow_\$ \Omega_H, l = 0, (i, b) \leftarrow_\$ ([q_H - 1] \times \{0, 1\}) \cup \{(q_H, 0)\}$
$k_0^*, \bar{k} \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{K}, \bar{b} \leftarrow_\$ \{0, 1\}, m_0^*, m_1^* \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{M}, c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*_{\bar{b}})$
$(m', c') \leftarrow \hat{B}^{|G\rangle, |G'\rangle, \textsc{Decaps}}(pk, c^*, k_0^*)$ $//G_{3C}$
$(m', c') \leftarrow \hat{B}^{|G_1^i\rangle, |G'\rangle, \textsc{Decaps}}(pk, c^*, k_0^*)$ $//G_{4C} - G_{6C}$
return $(m^*_{\bar{b}}, c^*) =?(m', c')//G_{3C} - G_{4C}$
return $(m^*_{1-\bar{b}}, c^*) =?(m', c')//G_{5C}$
if $(m_0^*, c^*) = (m', c')$ **then** $\tilde{b}' = 0$ **else then** $\tilde{b}' = 1//G_{6C}$
return $\tilde{b}' =?\bar{b}//G_{6C}$

$\textsc{Decaps}\ (sk, \bar{c} \neq c^*)$ $//G_{3C} - G_{6C}$

if more than 1 query **return** $\perp$
return $\bar{k}$ $//G_{4C} - G_{6C}$
$m' := Dec'(sk, \bar{c})$
if $m' = \perp$ **do** $\bar{m} = 0$
else do $\bar{m} = m'$
return $K := G(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$

$G_1^i(m, c)$

if $l \geq (i + b) \wedge (m, c) = (m_{i+1}, c_{i+1})$
// (m_{i+1}, c_{i+1}) is the measurement outcome
// on $\mathcal{B}$'s $(i + 1)$-th query input register
  return $\bar{k}$
else return $G(m, c)$
$l = l + 1$

$G'(m, c)$

if $(m, c) = (m^*_{\bar{b}}, c^*)$ $//G_{3C} - G_{4C}$
if $(m, c) = (m^*_{1-\bar{b}}, c^*)$ $//G_{5C}$
if $(m, c) = (m_0^*, c^*)$ $//G_{6C}$
  return $k_0^*//G_{3C} - G_{6C}$
return $G(m, c)//G_{3C}$
return $G_1^i(m, c)//G_{4C} - G_{6C}$

Fig. 10: Games G_{3C}-G_{6C} for the proof of Lemma 3.3

Define game G_{6C} as in Fig. 10. Thus, $\Pr[G_{6C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1]$

$$= 1/2 \Pr[(m_0^*, c^*) = (m', C') : \bar{b} = 0] + 1/2 \Pr[(m_0^*, c^*) \neq (m', C') : \bar{b} = 1]$$
$$= 1/2 \Pr[(m_0^*, c^*) = (m', C') : \bar{b} = 0] + 1/2 - 1/2 \Pr[(m_0^*, c^*) = (m', C') : \bar{b} = 1]$$
$$= 1/2 + 1/2 \Pr[G_{4C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1 : \bar{b} = 0] - 1/2 \Pr[G_{5C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1 : \bar{b} = 1]$$
$$= 1/2 + 1/4(\Pr[G_{4C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_{5C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1])$$

Now, we can construct an IND-CPA adversary $\mathcal{D}(pk)$ against PKE$'$, where $(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen'$. $\mathcal{D}$ samples $m_0^*, m_1^* \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{M}$, receives challenge ciphertext $c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m_{\tilde{b}}^*)$ ($\tilde{b} \leftarrow_\$ \{0,1\}$), samples $k_0^*, \bar{k}, i, b$ as in game G_{6C}, picks a $2q_H$-wise independent function H, runs $\hat{B}^{|H_1^i\rangle,|H'\rangle,\textsc{Decaps}}(pk, c^*, k_0^*)$ (the simulations of $H_1^i, H', \textsc{Decaps}$ is the same as in game G_{6C}) to obtain (m', c'), finally outputs 0 if $(m_0^*, c^*) = (m', c')$, and returns 1 otherwise. Thus, apparently,

$$\left|\Pr[G_{6C}^{\hat{B}} \Rightarrow 1] - 1/2\right| = \mathtt{Adv}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}^{\mathrm{IND-CPA}}(\mathcal{D})$$

Putting everything together, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathrm{KEM}}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}(\mathcal{B}) &\leq 2\sqrt{8(q_H+1)^2(4\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}^{\mathrm{IND-CPA}}(\mathcal{D}) + 2(q_H+1)^2/|\mathcal{M}| + 1/|\mathcal{K}|)} \\ &\leq 6(q_H+1)\sqrt{4\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathrm{PKE}'}^{\mathrm{IND-CPA}}(\mathcal{D}) + 2(q_H+1)^2/|\mathcal{M}| + 1/|\mathcal{K}|}.\end{aligned}$$

□

4 Tightness of the reductions

In this section, we will show that for $KEM = T_{RH}[\mathrm{PKE}', H]$, a $O(q)$-ROM-loss (and q^2-loss) is unavoidable in general.

Theorem 4.1. *Let* PKE$' = (Gen', Enc', Dec')$ *be a PKE with malleability property. Let* $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^n$ *be the message space of* PKE$'$*. Then, there exists a ROM (QROM, resp.) adversary* $\mathcal{B}$ *against the IND-1-CCA security of* $KEM = T_{RH}[\mathrm{PKE}', H]$ *such that the advantage* $\mathtt{Adv}_{\mathrm{KEM}}^{\text{IND-1-CCA}}(\mathcal{B})$ *is about* $(1/e)\frac{q}{|\mathcal{M}|}$ *(*$(q+1)^2/|\mathcal{M}|$*, resp.), where* q *is the number of queries to* H *such that* $1/\sqrt{|\mathcal{M}|} \leq \sin(\frac{\pi}{6q+3})$ *and* $q \leq |\mathcal{K}|$ *(*$\mathcal{K}$ *is the key space).*

Proof. Let $(pk, sk) \leftarrow Gen'$, $m^* \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{M}$, $c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*)$, $k_0^* = H(m^*, c^*)$, $k_1^* \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{K}$, and $b \leftarrow_\$ \{0,1\}$. Since PKE$'$ satisfies the malleability property, there exists an algorithm $\bar{B}$ that on input (pk, c^*) outputs (f, c') such that (1) $f(m^*) = Dec(sk, c') \neq \perp$; (2)$f(\tilde{m}) \neq Dec(sk, c')$ for any $\tilde{m} \in \mathcal{M}$ and $\tilde{m} \neq m$.

Define the function $g_{c,k}^H : \mathcal{M} \to \{0,1\}$ as

$$g_{c,k}^H(m) = \begin{cases} 1 & H(f(m), c) = k \\ 0 & \text{Otherwise} \end{cases}$$

First, we consider the ROM case. Let $\mathcal{B}^{H,\textsc{Decaps}}(pk, c^*, k_b^*)$ be a ROM adversary as follows.

1. Run $\bar{B}$ to obtain (f, c');
2. Query the $\textsc{Decaps}$ oracle with c' and obtain k';
3. Randomly pick $m_1, \ldots, m_q$ from $\mathcal{M}$, and compute $g_{c',k'}^H(m_i)$ for each $i \in \{1, \ldots, q\}$ by querying H;

4. If there exists an m_i such that $g^H_{c',k'}(m_i) = 1$, return $1 - (H(m_i, c^*) =? k^*_b)$, else return $\perp$.

Note that $g^H_{c',k'}(m^*) = 1$ with probability 1, and $g^H_{c',k'}(\tilde{m}) = 1$ with negligible probability $1/|\mathcal{K}|$ for $\tilde{m} \neq m^*$. We also note that $\Pr[m^* \in \{m_1, \ldots, m_q\}] = \frac{q}{\mathcal{M}}$. Thus, the ROM advantage of $\mathcal{B}$ is at least $\frac{q}{\mathcal{M}}(1 - 1/|\mathcal{K}|)^{q-1} \gtrapprox (1/e)\frac{q}{\mathcal{M}}$ since $q \leq |\mathcal{K}|$.

Next, we consider the QROM case. Let $\mathcal{B}^{|H\rangle,\textsc{Decaps}}(pk, c^*, k^*_b)$ be a QROM adversary as follows.

1. Run $\bar{B}$ to obtain (f, c');
2. Query the DECAPS oracle with c' and obtain k';
3. Use Grover's algorithm for q steps to try to find m^*. In details, apply Grover iteration q time on initial state $HGate^{\otimes n}|0^n\rangle$ and make a standard measurement to derive $\bar{m}$, where Grover iteration is composed of oracle query O_g that turns $|m\rangle$ into $(-1)^{g^H_{c',k'}(m)}|m\rangle$, and diffusion operator $U = HGate^{\otimes n}(2|0^n\rangle\langle 0^n| - I_n)HGate^{\otimes n}$;
4. Return $1-(H(\bar{m}, c^*) =? k^*_b)$, where $\bar{m}$ is the outcome obtained using Grover's algorithm in step 3.

Note that $g^H_{c',k'}(m^*) = 1$ with probability 1, and $g^H_{c',k'}(\tilde{m}) = 1$ with negligible probability $1/|\mathcal{K}|$ for $\tilde{m} \neq m^*$. Let $p_0 = \Pr[g^H_{c',k'}(m) = 1 : m \in \mathcal{M}] \geq 1/|\mathcal{M}|$. By q Grover iterations (requiring q quantum queries to H), the probability p_1 of finding m^* is $\sin^2((2q+1)\theta)$, where $\sin^2(\theta) = p_0$.

When $1/\sqrt{|\mathcal{M}|} \leq \sin(\frac{\pi}{6q+3})$, we have $(2q+1)\theta \leq \pi/3$. Thus, we have

$$\sin((2q+1)\theta) \geq \sin(\theta) + \frac{2q \cdot \theta}{2} \geq (q+1)\sin(\theta).$$

Therefore, we have $p_1 = \sin^2((2q+1)\theta) \geq \frac{(q+1)^2}{|\mathcal{M}|}$. Note that when m^* is obtained, one can derive b^* with probability 1 by querying $H(\bar{m}, c^*)$. Thus, the QROM advantage of $\mathcal{B}$ is at least $\frac{(q+1)^2}{|\mathcal{M}|}$. □

Remark 3. Most IND-CPA-secure PKEs has malleability property, e.g., ElGamal, Kyber.PKE [8], etc. Moreover, malleability property is inherent for a homomorphic PKE. Let PKE $= (Gen, Enc, Dec)$ be homomorphic in addition. That is, $Enc(pk, m_1 + m_2) = Enc(pk, m_1) + Enc(pk, m_2)$. Then, we can construct algorithm $\bar{B}(pk, c^*)$ ($c^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*)$) that randomly picks $m \in \mathcal{M}$, computes $c' = c^* + Enc(pk, m)$, and defines $f(x) = x + m$. Note that $f(m^*) = Dec(sk, c')$ and $f(\tilde{m}) \neq Dec(sk, c')$ for $\tilde{m} \neq m$[12]. Thus, the homomorphic property of a PKE implies the malleability property in this paper.

Remark 4. For a λ-bit IND-CPA-secure malleable public-key encryption PKE$'$ with message space $\mathcal{M} = 2^\lambda$ we require that any PPT adversary breaks the security of PKE$'$ with advantage at most $\frac{1}{2^\lambda}$. For example, such a PKE$'$ can be

[12] Here, we assume the PKE has perfect correctness for simplicity.

constructed based on the LWE assumption by a suitable parameter selection [33]. Theorem 4.1 shows that a ROM (QROM, resp.) adversary against the IND-1-CCA security of KEM $= T_{RH}[\mathrm{PKE}', H]$ can achieve advantage at least $(1/e)\frac{q}{2^\lambda}$ ($\frac{(q+1)^2}{2^\lambda}$, resp.), where q is the number of adversary's queries to H. That is, a $O(1/q)$ ($O(1/q^2)$, resp.) loss is unavoidable in the ROM (QROM, resp.) for T_{RH}.

Remark 5. We remark that the output of decapsulation for an invalid ciphertext c is irrelevant to the attack given in Theorem 4.1. Thus, the aforementioned tightness results can also be applied to T_H. We also remark that such a tightness result can also be extended to the IND-1-CCA KEM construction T_{CH} given in [20], where there is tag $tag = H'(m^*, c_0^*)$ in the ciphertext $(c_0^* \leftarrow Enc(pk, m^*))$, and the key is computed by $K = H(m^*)$. The idea is that the adversary against KEM can first search m^* such that $tag = H'(m^*, c_0^*)$ by querying H', and then query H with m^*, thus break the key indistinguishability. Following the same analysis in Theorem 4.1, one can easily derive the same tightness result for T_{CH}.

5 Relations among notions of CCA security for KEM

In this section, we will compare the relative strengths of notions of IND-1-CCA security and IND-CCA security in ROM and QROM. In detail, we works out the relations among four notions. For each pair of notions $\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B} \in \{$ IND-1-CCA ROM, IND-1-CCA QROM, IND-CCA ROM, IND-CCA QROM $\}$, we show one of the following:

- A $\Rightarrow$ B: A proof that if a KEM meets the notion of security A then it also meets the notion of security B.
- A $\not\Rightarrow$ B: There is a KEM construction that provably meets the notion of security A but does not meet the notion of security B.

First, according to the security definitions, one can trivially derive the relations IND-CCA QROM $\Rightarrow$ IND-1-CCA QROM $\Rightarrow$ IND-1-CCA ROM, and IND-CCA QROM $\Rightarrow$ IND-CCA ROM $\Rightarrow$ IND-1-CCA ROM. Next, we show the other nontrivial relations.

Theorem 5.1. *If the LWE assumption holds, then we have IND-1-CCA ROM$\not\Rightarrow$ IND-1-CCA QROM, IND-CCA ROM$\not\Rightarrow$IND-1-CCA QROM and IND-CCA ROM $\not\Rightarrow$IND-CCA QROM.*

Proof. First, if the LWE assumption holds, we can have a KEM=(Gen, $Encaps$, $Decaps$) that satisfies the IND-CCA ROM security. For example, FrodoKEM [27] is such a KEM whose IND-CCA ROM security can be reduced to the LWE assumption.

Let PoQRO=($Setup, Prove, Verify$) be a proof of quantum access to random oracle H, whose existence is based on the LWE assumption, see Lemma 2.5. Here, H is independent of the KEM.

Gen'	$Encaps'(pk)$	$Decaps'(sk, c)$
1 : $(pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow Gen$	1 : **parse** $pk = (pk_1, pk_2)$	1 : **parse** $sk = (sk_1, sk_2)$
2 : $(pk_2, sk_2) \leftarrow Setup$	2 : $(K, c_1) \leftarrow\$ Encaps(pk_1)$	2 : **parse** $c = (c_1, c_2)$
3 : $pk = (pk_1, pk_2)$	3 : $c = (c_1, \perp)$	3 : **if** $Verify^H(sk_2, c_2) = 1$
4 : $sk = (sk_1, sk_2)$	4 : **return** (K, c)	4 : **return** sk_1
5 : **return** (pk, sk)		5 : **return** $Decaps(sk_1, c_1)$

Fig. 11: Separation instance KEM′ for Theorem 5.1.

Construct a new KEM′=(Gen', $Encaps'$, $Decaps'$) as in Fig. 11. Note that any efficient ROM adversary cannot find a c_2 such that $Verify^H(sk_2, c_2) = 1$ (otherwise the soundness of the PoQRO is broken). Thus, for an efficient ROM adversary, querying oracle $Decaps'$ is equivalent to querying oracle $Decaps$. Thus, KEM′ also meets the IND-CCA ROM security.

Meanwhile, a QROM adversary can find a c_2 such that $Verify^H(sk_2, c_2) = 1$. Thus, by querying oracle $Decaps'$ (only one time), a QROM adversary can obtain sk_1, hence break the IND-CCA security of KEM′. Therefore, KEM′ does not meet the IND-1-CCA QROM security (and also IND-CCA QROM security). Since KEM meets the IND-CCA ROM security, KEM is also IND-1-CCA-secure in the ROM. Hence, we have IND-1-CCA ROM$\not\Rightarrow$IND-1-CCA QROM, IND-CCA ROM$\not\Rightarrow$IND-1-CCA QROM and IND-CCA ROM$\not\Rightarrow$IND-CCA QROM. □

Theorem 5.2. *If the LWE assumption holds, then we have IND-1-CCA ROM $\not\Rightarrow$ IND-CCA ROM, IND-1-CCA QROM$\not\Rightarrow$ IND-CCA QROM, and IND-1-CCA QROM$\not\Rightarrow$ IND-CCA ROM.*

Proof. Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be the key-generation, encryption and decryption algorithms of FrodoPKE [27], whose IND-CPA security can be reduced to the LWE assumption. Then, according to Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, KEM=T_{RH}[FrodoPKE, H] is IND-1-CCA secure in both ROM and QROM.

Note that such a KEM is essentially a FO-KEM without re-encryption. Qin et al. [32] had shown such a KEM is vulnerable to key-mismatch attacks that can recover the secret key with only polynomial queries to the decapsulation oracle. That is, KEM=T_{RH}[FrodoPKE, H] is not IND-CCA-secure in ROM (and QROM).

Hence, we have IND-1-CCA ROM$\not\Rightarrow$IND-CCA ROM, IND-1-CCA QROM$\not\Rightarrow$ IND-CCA QROM, and IND-1-CCA QROM $\not\Rightarrow$IND-CCA ROM. □

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